

**A Report on the Politics of Boston**

**Edited by**

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**and**

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Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts  
Institute of Technology and Harvard University  
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## Foreword

This report is one of a series bringing together data useful to researchers, teachers, and students.

All reports in the series contain similar data, organized in the same way to facilitate comparative analysis.

The reports are not finished treatises. Rather they are systematic collections of raw and semi-interpreted data. Some sections are not as complete as they should be. To improve the reports, supplements may be issued from time to time. The reports are produced in looseleaf form so that they may be easily added to.

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This report was written by graduate and undergraduate students at Harvard, with the exception of Part V, Section C (on labor), the author of which, David Greenstone, is a graduate student at the University of Chicago. Peter Braestrup, the author of Part V, Section A (on the Boston press) was a Nieman Fellow at Harvard in 1959-60. Most of the papers were written for a graduate seminar on city politics.

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
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
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
**- BOSTON -**  
**UNITED STATES CENSUS TRACTS**




Wards and Communities of Boston



## Ethnic Voting Blocs in Boston



Explanatory Note: The map shows those precincts in which the five ethnic groups listed have shown voting strength in the last ten years.



THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS  
 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
 DIVISION OF PLANNING  
 OUTLINE MAP OF THE VARIOUS  
**BOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS**




**LEGEND**





- P METROPOLITAN PARKS DISTRICT, 36 CITIES & TOWNS
  - W METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, 25 CITIES & TOWNS
  - S METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE DISTRICT, 35 CITIES & TOWNS
  - T BOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICT (TRANSIT) 14 CITIES & TOWNS
  - ◆ METROPOLITAN PARKS DISTRICT (NANTASKET ONLY)
- 48 CITIES AND TOWNS ARE INCLUDED  
 IN THE ABOVE DISTRICTS
- BOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICT AS DEFINED BY  
 1950 UNITED STATES CENSUS (65 CITIES AND TOWNS)  
 (1950)

# BOSTON METROPOLITAN AREA



NEW HAMPSHIRE



-  CORE  
12 cities & towns
-  INNER BAND  
41 cities & towns
-  OUTER BAND  
96 cities & towns
-  U.S. Census  
Definition of  
BOSTON  
METROPOLITAN  
AREA  
43 cities & towns

RODE ISLAND

SCALE: 1/8 Inch = 1 Mile

Note: The MTA District is the same as the CORE, excluding Winthrop, and also including Belmont, Newton, and Milton.

## PART I - THE ELECTORATE

A. Characteristics of the Population1. Number of Persons

The population of Boston declined by 15.4 per cent in the decade 1950-1960, according to preliminary figures from the 1960 census. In 1950 its population was 801,444; in 1960 it was 677,626. Among cities with a population of at least 100,000, only Providence, with a drop of 16.9 per cent, had a higher rate of decrease. Boston dropped from 10th place to 13th in rank of U. S. cities by population, having been passed by Houston, Milwaukee, and San Francisco during the decade.

While the central city declined by 123,818 in the decade 1950-1960, the Standard Metropolitan Area increased by 156,300, from 2,410,572 to 2,566,872, according to preliminary census figures. This is a growth of 6.5 per cent. The area outside the central city grew from 1,608,128 to 1,889,246, an increase of 17.4 per cent.

A report by the Greater Boston Economic Study Committee in December 1959 predicted a population growth of 606,700 from 1950 to 1970 in its "study area" (149 cities and towns). According to this report, which is attached as Document #1, the population of the core cities (Boston and 11 other cities together comprise geographically a single central city) will decline slightly; a band of 40 cities and towns ringing the core but within 15 miles of the State House in



downtown Boston will absorb almost 60 per cent of the increase; growth will continue mainly along the radial transportation routes that fan out from the core area. For details see Table 1 and Document #1.

Boston can lose a good many inhabitants and still be a densely populated city. In 1950 it had 16,767 persons per square mile. Among the ten largest cities in the country it ranked third in density of population, behind only New York and Chicago.

Table 2 summarizes population changes, 1940-58, within the city by planning districts (units designated by the City Planning Board that correspond roughly with the communities shown in Map 2).

TABLE 1

POPULATION FOR BOSTON, GREATER BOSTON, AND STATE,  
1950, 1955, AND 1970  
(In Thousands)

	1950	1955	Est. 1970	Change	
				1950 to 1955	1950 to 1970
<u>By Metropolitan Bands</u>					
Boston	801	725	729	- 76	- 72
Core, Except Boston 11 Cities & Towns	629	604	655	- 25	/ 26
Inner Band 40 Cities & Towns	817	920	1,152	/103	/335
Outer Band 97 Cities & Towns	883	964	1,204	/ 81	/321
Greater Boston 149 Cities & Towns	3,130	3,213	3,740	/ 83	/610
Rest of Massachusetts 202 Cities & Towns	1,561	1,625	1,774	/ 64	/213
Total for State 351 Cities & Towns	4,691	4,838	5,514	/147	/823
<u>Percent Distribution</u>					
Boston	17.1	15.0	13.2		
Core, Except Boston	13.4	12.5	11.9		
Inner Band	17.4	19.0	20.9		
Outer Band	18.8	19.9	21.8		
Greater Boston	66.7	66.4	67.8		
Rest of Massachusetts	33.3	33.6	32.2		
Total for State	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Source: Greater Boston Economic Study Committee, The Population of the Cities and Towns of Greater Boston Projected to 1970. Dec. 1959.

TABLE 2

1940-58 POPULATION CHANGES  
BOSTON PLANNING DISTRICTS

	1940	1950	1955*	1958*	Births	Deaths	1950-58 Natural Increase	1950-58 Migration	Annual N.I. Rate	Annual Migration Rate
Boston Proper	107,963	112,079	100,235	93,251	14,304	15,393	-1,089	-17,739	-121	-1,971
Brighton	63,367	67,188	63,121	61,222	12,593	6,808	5,785	-11,751	643	-1,306
Charlestown	25,587	31,332	24,927	23,470	4,770	2,550	2,220	-10,082	247	-1,120
Dorchester	162,598	162,304	160,262	152,993	28,950	16,125	12,825	-22,136	1,425	-2,459
East Boston	59,663	53,296	46,617	45,128	8,808	4,119	4,689	-12,857	521	-1,428
Hyde Park	25,857	29,711	31,056	32,960	6,509	2,468	4,041	-792	449	-88
Jamaica-Fens	87,767	99,216	90,669	88,323	16,115	10,976	5,139	-16,032	571	-1,782
Roslindale	36,824	38,329	37,189	36,256	6,631	3,573	3,058	-5,131	339	-570
Roxbury	121,756	124,367	107,930	99,110	24,592	13,134	11,458	-36,715	1,273	-4,079
South Boston	59,558	60,135	55,661	52,698	12,792	5,836	6,956	-14,393	178	-1,599
West Roxbury	19,876	23,487	24,715	26,390	3,929	2,411	1,518	1,385	169	153
CITY TOTALS	770,816	801,444	742,382	711,801	139,993	83,437	56,556	-146,199	6,284	-16,244

\*Estimates

Source: Compiled from the following: City of Boston Building Department Records, City of Boston  
Health Department Records (Division of Vital Statistics)  
U. S. Census of Population, 1940 and 1950  
U. S. Census of Housing, 1956

2. Ethnicity and National Origins

According to the 1950 census, 144,092 of 801,444 persons in Boston--18 per cent of the population--were foreign-born whites. Among the ten largest cities in the country only New York, with 22.6 per cent, had a higher proportion of foreign-born. Detroit was third with 14.9 per cent, and Cleveland and Chicago each had 14.5 per cent. The foreign-born population by areas within the city is shown in Table 3.

The census also showed that 277,950 persons in Boston were of foreign-born parentage. The two groups--foreign-born and children of at least one foreign-born parent--comprised 51.9 per cent of the population. The major groups, by country of origin, were as follows:

	<u>Foreign-born</u>	<u>Foreign Parentage</u>	<u>Total</u>
Ireland	27,737	78,955	106,692
Italy	25,315	53,335	78,650
Canada (other than French)	24,654	41,025	65,679
USSR	21,686	34,150	55,836
England and Wales	5,396	11,395	16,791
Poland	5,918	9,505	15,423
Germany	7,120	3,289	10,409
Lithuania	4,530	5,495	10,025

The census data are the only data available on the ethnic composition of the Boston population. From them it is clear that the Irish, despite the twentieth-century influx of Italians, remain the predominant ethnic group in the city.

How heavily predominant they are is difficult to deduce, since the census does not include third and fourth generation Irish and probably counts as Canadians some persons of Irish descent.

### 3. The Non-White Population

No one is prepared to place an exact figure on the size of the non-white population. Ten years ago the census placed it at 42,744. At least 96 or 97 per cent of this figure were assumed to be Negro.

The Negroes constituted only a little more than 5 per cent of the city's total population in 1950, but this was their highest proportion in nearly 200 years.

From 1940 to 1950 the Negro community grew by 70 per cent. Meanwhile, the population of whites was easing upward at only 2 per cent.

Since 1950, the Negro rate of increase has been placed by the Urban League at something in the neighborhood of 35 per cent. This rough yardstick applied to the intervening 10 years provides a current estimate of a Negro population of 60,000. But since the white population of Boston has declined by 90,000, civic leaders expect the 1960 census to show that Negroes now comprise about 7 per cent of the city total.

Though the rate of Negro in-migration is slackening, the proportion of Negroes continues to grow because of white abandonment of the city. Meanwhile, a newly enacted "open-covenant" housing law at least nominally improves the Negro's chances of escaping to suburbia. These factors all tend to

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cloud the future and make projections more risky than ordinarily. Most observers will not even hazard a guess at the future population components.

In 1950, the census figures showed that Negroes lived in all but 23 of the city's 156 statistical tracts. In only seven tracts did they account for as much as 50 per cent of the population. But these figures offhand suggest a far wider dispersal than actually exists, since the bulk of Boston's Negroes live in four wards, and an overwhelming concentration exists in a single portion of only one ward of the 22 (ward 9).

Ten years ago, according to the census figures, the vast majority of the non-whites were in Roxbury. A more recent study by the Urban League showed that 55 per cent of the Negro population was in Roxbury and 28 per cent in the South End. Forced relocation and voluntary withdrawals have possibly reduced the concentration, but not overwhelmingly. The extent of the Roxbury-South End concentration is shown in Table 3, which also includes the breakdowns for other communities.

The fact that the so-called "Negro area" of Boston is only one-quarter colored offers a strong contrast with the ghettos and black belts of other major cities. An ethnic-religious analysis of the Roxbury area shows these divisions:

Negro. . . . .	27%
Jewish . . . . .	8%
Non-Jewish White . . . . .	62%
{ Catholic. . . . .	42%
{ Protestant. . . . .	20%
Other. . . . .	3%

But to truly appreciate the difference between the

I-8

gray of Boston and the black of Chicago's South Side, one merely has to walk the streets of Roxbury. There he will find white and Negro children playing arm-in-arm and colored women gossiping over backyard fences with their white neighbors.



TABLE 3

NON-WHITE AND FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION  
OF BOSTON AREAS, 1950

<u>AREA</u>	<u>TOTAL POPULATION 1950</u>	<u>NON-WHITE 1950</u>	<u>FOREIGN- BORN WHITES 1950</u>
Back Bay	51,221	1,270	7,530
South End	54,563	13,230	10,362
Brighton	67,188	386	12,490
Charlestown	31,332	410	3,157
North End	18,248	93	5,146
West End	27,202	263	5,931
North Dorchester	122,530	897	24,945
South Dorchester	77,242	201	16,310
East Boston	51,152	75	10,289
Hyde Park	28,928	53	4,718
Jamaica Plain	38,303	81	6,749
Roslindale	39,781	150	7,082
Roxbury	112,936	25,445	17,223
South Boston	55,670	64	8,580
West Roxbury	23,004	11	2,992

4. Religion

There are no reliable data on the religious composition of the Boston population. In a letter to the authors of The Alienated Voter (Document #3, p. 7), Dr. David Cox, director of the Department of Research and Strategy of the Massachusetts Council of Churches, has estimated the Catholic proportion of the population at 55 per cent, the Protestant at 25 per cent, and the Jewish at 15 per cent, with the remaining 5 per cent "undeclared." Dr. Cox's Department has some data on the religious composition of some areas near Boston but none on the city itself. This is true also of the School of Theology at Boston University, which conducts religious surveys but has not surveyed Boston.

The Boston section of the National Council of Jewish Women, in a "Council Community Research Study" (December 1958), estimated the Jewish population of the city at 77,000, about 10 per cent of the total. It broke this down by communities within the city as follows:

Boston proper	5,000
Allston and Brighton	17,000
Dorchester, Roxbury and Mattapan	53,000
West Roxbury and Roslindale	1,520
Jamaica Plain	475

According to this report, the Jewish population is shifting away from Roxbury and Dorchester to Brighton (in the city) and Brookline and Milton in the near suburbs, with young couples moving to the outlying suburbs of Framingham, Natick,

Sharon, Randolph, and Lexington. There are 33 Jewish temples in Boston, 15 of them in Dorchester and 8 in Roxbury.

These data on the Jewish population, though evidently not derived from a systematic survey, are superior to anything available on the Catholic and Protestant populations. The Catholic Directory for 1960 gives the Catholic population of the Boston Archdiocese as 1,625,024. The Archdiocese includes Essex, Middlesex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Plymouth Counties (except for the towns of Mattapoisett, Marion, and Wareham), an area that had a population of 3,035,168 in 1950. The proportion of Catholics in the city of Boston would presumably be somewhat higher than in the Archdiocese as a whole. No figure for the city is available from the chancery of the Archdiocese in Boston.

According to the Boston Catholic Directory for 1960, there are 79 parishes and chapels in the city, distributed as follows:

Boston proper	4	Dorchester	14
Back Bay	2	East Boston	8
North End	4	Hyde Park	5
South End	7	Jamaica Plain	3
West End	2	Roslindale	2
Allston	1	Roxbury	9
Brighton	3	South Boston	9
Charlestown	3	West Roxbury	3

Of these, two are identified by the Directory as Italian, two as Polish, and one each as German, Melkite Byzantine, French, Portuguese, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Byzantine Slavonic.

According to C. C. Beasley, director of the Boston

Council of Churches, there are 187 Protestant churches in the city. A list of them was not available from the Council when this report was prepared. The yellow pages of the Boston phone directory list 70 Protestant churches, 14 of which are Baptist, 13 Congregational, 11 Episcopal, nine Methodist, eight Eastern Orthodox, seven Unitarian, five Lutheran, and three Presbyterian. The large number of Baptist churches is accounted for in part by the Negro population.

### 5. Employment

According to the 1950 census, of the 633,224 persons 14 years old and over in Boston, 336,692, or 53.2 per cent, were in the civilian labor force. Of these 65.3 per cent were male and 34.7 per cent were female. The proportion of unemployed was 7.4 per cent. The figures for occupational categories were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Prof., Tech., & Kindred	32,461	10.4
Mgrs., Off., & Prop.	23,901	7.7
Clerical, etc.	60,533	19.4
Sales	26,051	8.4
Craftsmen, Foremen, etc.	42,100	13.5
Operatives	61,170	19.6
Pvt. Hshld. workers	5,065	1.6
Service wkrs.	39,939	12.8
Laborers	17,881	5.7
Not Reported	2,724	.9

The census also showed that 247,040 persons received wages or salaries from private employers, 43,231 worked for

governments, and 23,043 were self-employed.

According to the Massachusetts Department of Commerce, the largest employers in Boston in 1957 were the wholesale and retail trades (134,781 employees) and manufacturing (89,477). The leading industries were apparel (621 firms, 19,419 employees), printing (469 firms, 14,521 employees), and food products (207 firms, 13,983 employees). These employment figures include persons who did not live in Boston.

#### 6. Family Income

The median income of Boston families in 1949 was \$3429, lowest among the ten largest cities in the country except for St. Louis. The following figures are from the 1950 census:

	Family Income, 1949	
	<u>Median</u>	<u>% \$5000 or more</u>
Chicago	\$3956	33.2
Detroit	3955	33.1
Washington	3800	34.6
Los Angeles	3575	27.7
Cleveland	3531	24.1
New York	3526	21.2
Philadelphia	3322	22.9
Baltimore	3275	23.1
BOSTON	3249	21.2
St. Louis	3205	19.9

#### 7. Community Identities

Boston grew by annexing various towns. The names of the annexed places survive, and so to some extent do the identity and sense of community of the place. Weekly newspapers are published in several of these communities. As Map 2 at the beginning of this section shows, the boundaries of the communities coincide in some cases with present ward boundaries.

B. Characteristics of the Population  
by Ward and Census Tract

Characteristics of Boston's 22 wards are summarized in Table 4, which follows. For selected census tract data, see Document #2, "Information on Boston." These data may be correlated with the ward with the aid of Map 1 and the transparent ward map at the beginning of this report.

TABLE 4  
CHARACTERISTICS OF BOSTON WARDS

Ward	Location	Pred. Eth. Grp.	Party Enrollment, 1959		State Repr., 1959-60
			D	R	
1	East Boston	It	48,813	15,492	Rico Matera (D) Michael A. Porrazzo (D)
2	Charlestown	Ir-It	23,306	7,238	Gerard F. Doherty (D)
3	West End North End South End	Ir-It	40,174	8,376	Charles W. Capraro (D) Michael A. Nazzaro, Jr. (D)
4	South End Back Bay	Ir-Y	27,743	3,532	Gordon D. Boynton (R) John D. Brown (R)
5	Back Bay	Y	30,723	3,235	John W. Frenning (R) William F. Otis (R)
6	South Boston	Ir	26,293	8,237	John T. Tynan (D)
7	South Boston	Ir	30,352	10,653	James F. Condon (D) John J. Moakley (D)
8	Roxbury	Ir-N-It	25,812	4,918	Chas. Iannello (D)
9	Roxbury	N	26,447	3,800	Lincoln G. Pope, Jr. (D)
10	Roxbury	Ir	28,293	8,271	James N. Kelly (D) John J. Linehan (D)
11	Roxbury	Ir	27,582	7,246	David J. O'Connor (D)

TABLE 4 (cont.)

Ward	Location	Pred. Eth. Grp.	1959 Pop.		Party Enrollment, 1959		State Repr., 1959-60
			D	R	D	R	
12	Dorchester	J-N-Ir	32,003	5,890	2,353		George Greene (D) Oswald L. Jordan (D)
13	Dorchester	Ir	32,257	9,160	688		Robert H. Quinn (D)
14	Mattapan and Dorchester	J	50,088	15,155	1,696		Julius Ansel (D) Samuel Harmon (D) Alvin C. Tamkin (D)
15	Dorchester	Ir	24,409	8,296	499		Daniel M. O'Sullivan (D)
16	Dorchester	Ir	31,116	12,243	952		George V. Kenneally, Jr. (D) Robert J. Mulligan (D)
17	Dorchester	Ir	30,830	11,134	1,617		John T. Driscoll (D) William F. Keenan (D)
18	Roslindale Hyde Park	Ir-It	50,413	17,720	2,561		Michael H. Cantwell (D) Michael P. Feeney (D) Charles L. Patrone (D)
19	Jamaica Plain	Ir	29,601	9,953	1,571		John W. Costello (D) James J. Craven, Jr. (D)
20	West Roxbury	Ir-It Y-J	39,431	13,960	3,498		Edmond J. Donlan (D) Chas. Robt. Doyle (D) Joseph M. O'Loughlin (D)
21	Allston	Ir-J	36,752	8,379	3,066		Peter J. Cloherty (D) William F. Joyce (D) Norman S. Weinberg (D)



TABLE 4 (cont.)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Pred. Eth. Grp.</u>	<u>1959 Pop.</u>	<u>Party Enrollment, 1959</u>	<u>State Repr., 1959-60</u>
				<u>D</u> <u>R</u>	
22	Brighton	Ir-J	32,264	10,649      1,087	Robert Q. Crane (D) Vincent J. Shanley (D)

PART II - CITY GOVERNMENT, THE NONPARTISAN SYSTEM,  
WARD CHARACTERISTICS

A. The Structure of the Government\*

1. The Origins of the Present Charter

Before 1909, Boston had a weak mayor bi-cameral council government. A 13-member board of aldermen was elected at large under a system in which each voter might vote for seven of the positions. A common council was elected by wards--three members from each of 25 wards. Party designations appeared on the ballot.

The main impetus for reform appears to have come from the business community. In 1903 the Chamber of Commerce joined with the Merchants Association, Associated Board of Trade, Fruit and Produce Exchange, and the Bar Association to form the Good Government Association (now remembered as the G.G.A. or "goo-goos"). The G.G.A.'s purpose was to "inform the citizens of Boston, to awaken their civic pride, and to secure the election of honest and capable men to office, regardless of party affiliations." In its early years it furnished unbiased information about the candidates to the voters.

In 1907 another reform organization, the Committee of One Hundred, came into being. It got Mayor Fitzgerald to appoint a commission to investigate the condition of Boston's government and recommend improvements. This led to the 1909

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\*This part of the report is adapted from a paper by Sam Speck.

charter change by which nonpartisanship was introduced.

Before nonpartisanship was introduced, the voting strength of the Democrats was about twice that of the Republicans. The reformers wanted to join to the Republican minority the "better class" of Democrats who were voting Democratic on the local level because of state or national issues.

The basic changes made in the charter reform of 1909 were these:

1. The mayor was strengthened by eliminating the council's power to override his veto; his term was extended to four years.
2. A nine-member council elected at large, three members each year for three-year terms, replaced the board of aldermen and common council.
3. Party designations were removed from the ballot.
4. A permanent finance commission was created to serve as a "watchdog."
5. Provision was made for administration of departments by trained personnel appointed by the mayor, but subject to approval of the state civil service commission.

The Democratic "machine" was very much opposed to these reforms. The requirement of civil service commission approval would interfere with patronage, and at-large council elections would disrupt ward organizations.

The reform charter was approved by the voters 39,000 to 35,000.

The Democrats complained that the charter reform proposal was nothing but a Republican device for getting a share in city government. Republicans more or less frankly agreed. Appointment by the governor of a finance commission to keep

watch on Boston's affairs, approval of department heads by the state civil service commission, and elimination of party designations from the ballot all increased Republican influence

For a few years after the charter change, able councils seem to have been elected. Soon, however, the quality of the councils declined. "The bulk of the criticism of the present charter," a revision committee reported to the legislature in 1923, "has been against the city council; that the men elected in recent years are neither sufficiently representative, nor the best qualified that could be obtained."

About this same time the Boston Herald commented:

The theory of a city council elected at large is as sound as ever, but in its practical application it is a joke. When seventy-one percent of the registered voters of a city deliberately stay away from the polls, the whole system must be wrong.

In 1924 the voters revised the 1909 charter. Non-partisanship was retained, but the nine-member council elected at large was replaced by a 22-member ward council.

This change did not prove wholly satisfactory. The principal objections, as reported in testimony before the Boston Charter Commission of 1933, were these:

1. The system of nominating mayoralty candidates by nomination papers [no primary]...led to a multiplicity of candidates, occasioning considerable confusion during election campaigns, and resulting in the choice of a mayor by a relatively small minority of the voters.
2. [Council election by wards] led to the choice of councillors who have thought more about securing expenditures of public money for improvements in their own sections of the city than about the financial interest of the city as a whole.

Recently in commenting on the reforms of this period an official of the Boston Municipal Research Bureau said:

Change was demanded in an effort to eliminate Curley-type government. Under the system of nomination by petition, Curley won by splitting the opposition. Often he would put a candidate in the race against himself to do just that. He always won by a plurality rather than a majority.

In 1949 dissatisfaction culminated in a charter referendum. After considerable conflict in the Senate, the legislature allowed the Boston electorate to replace the 1924 charter with one of three plans, Plan A, D, or E.

Plan E provided for a city manager and small council elected at large by proportional representation. Plan D provided for a city manager and a small council elected at large under an arrangement whereby each voter might vote for six of the nine council positions. Plan A provided for a strong mayor and a nine-member council elected at large. All proposals retained the nonpartisan principle, and all provided for primaries. Whichever plan first received a prescribed number of petition signatures was to be placed before the voters.

Opinion polls showed that the majority probably favored Plan E. Many Democratic politicians, however, regarded Plan E as another attempt by the Republicans to get more than their share. In a supplementary statement to a 1947 Senate study of the problem, a couple of Democratic legislators observed:

Replacing Boston's mayor with a city manager...would guarantee that the mayor of Boston, the one Democrat in the commonwealth who has a position from which he can wage a strong campaign for governor, would be removed from the picture. (Senate Doc. 530, April 1, 1947, p. 22)

Curley regarded Plan A as the least dangerous to him. And he pulled out all the stops to block Plan E. (Plan D never had much support.) When the supporters of the three

plans arrived at the Election Commissioner's office on the appointed day to receive the regulation petitions, they found that only the Plan A petitions were ready. Six days later the other petitions were ready. By this time the Curley forces had an unbeatable lead. The mayor found it easy to get the city employees to sign.

Thus it was that in November 1949 the voters chose between the status quo and Plan A. They adopted Plan A by a vote of 146,162 to 73,882. The wards voting most heavily for the new charter were those in which Democrats constituted a minority of registered voters (wards 4, 5, and 21; ward 12, where the Democrats were also a minority, was not especially strong for the change).

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Votes Cast for Plan A as % of Votes Cast in Ward</u>
1	63
2	56
3	66
4	72
5	76
6	64
7	64
8	64
9	64
10	63
11	65
12	66
13	66
14	64
15	63
16	63
17	67
18	69
19	68
20	69
21	72
22	67

In 1950 the New Boston Committee was formed to find and support able candidates to serve under the new charter. One of the principal leaders of the Committee was Jerome Rappaport, an idealistic young man fresh out of Harvard Law School. The Committee made a great impression upon the public because it was public-spirited, nonpartisan, and representative of interests in every ward. In 1951 its mayoral nominee, John B. Hynes, defeated Mayor Curley by 77,000 votes, and its city council and school committee candidates won control of those bodies. In the 1953 election, most of its school committee slate lost, and thereafter the Committee collapsed.

Many factors seem to have contributed to this collapse. It had not pledged its candidates to a program, and once in office they tended to ignore it. It lacked funds for activity between campaigns. Most people think, however, that the main trouble was internal friction. The Committee could not satisfy all of the diverse elements in its membership. There had been disagreement over the selection of a school slate and when this was followed by the defeat of the slate the organization was badly hurt. Then when Rappaport, the idealistic young lawyer, began appearing in tax abatement cases, there was cynical comment and further loss of morale.

## 2. The Present Formal Structure of the City Government

The Mayor, the City Council, and the School Committee are elected.

### The Mayor

The Mayor is elected in odd-numbered years for a four-

year term. His salary is \$20,000. He appoints and removes department heads and board members, prepares the budget, and originates ordinances. As noted below, he has little to do with school and police matters. Otherwise his is a strong office. The present mayor is John F. Collins, who was elected in 1959 to succeed John B. Hynes.

#### The City Council

The Council is a nine-member body elected at large in odd-numbered years. Members are paid \$5,000, and may not hold other city offices. The Mayor may summon the Council and address it when he pleases, and the Council may require him or his department heads to furnish information in writing or to appear in person to answer questions. In practice he rarely asks to see the Council, whereas it calls upon the administration for information fairly often. Both the Mayor and the Council may initiate ordinances, loans, land sales, and other measures "for the welfare of the city." The Council can, of course, refuse to accept recommendations made by the Mayor, but it cannot appropriate out of general revenues more than he recommends. The Mayor, on the other hand, may veto acts of the Council. In matters involving money, he has an item veto which cannot be overridden. In other matters, his veto may be overridden by a vote of six. The Council has no part in the award of contracts (except for certain long-term ones), but it has sole power with respect to the issuance of certain licenses and the settlement of certain claims against the city.



The Council elects a President each year. He presides, appoints committees, and, if need be, serves as Acting Mayor. The Council appoints only the City Clerk and a small Council staff, and it confirms the mayoral appointments of only constables, weighers of goods, and members of the Housing and Redevelopment Authorities. Much of the Council's business is done in committees (appropriations and finance, claims, confirmations, hospitals, inspection of prisons, legislative matters, licenses, ordinances, public housing, public lands, public services and recreation, rules, urban redevelopment, and executive committee of the whole).

Meetings of the full Council are open to the public. They are held every Monday at 2 p.m.

The following were elected to the Council in 1959:

Edward F. McLaughlin, Jr.: 39; lawyer, graduate of Dartmouth; son of former Fire Commissioner, former assistant U. S. District Attorney; candidate for U. S. Congress in 1958; City Councillor since 1954, president in 1959; drew top listing on the ballot.

William J. Foley, Jr.: 35; lawyer; graduate of Holy Cross; son of County district attorney; former assistant County district attorney; candidate for County district attorney in 1954, for County register of deeds in 1958; City Councillor since 1952, president in 1957.

Patrick F. McDonough: 34; lawyer; born in Ireland; graduate of Boston College; former policeman; candidate for County register of deeds in 1958; City Councillor since 1956, president in 1958.

John E. Kerrigan: 51; no college; City Councillor 1934-38, 1944-45, since 1952; president in 1938 and 1944, acting mayor in 1945.

Joseph C. White: 60; director of telephone and telegraph division of State department of public utilities; graduate of Boston College; State representative four years, State senator four years, City school committee many years; candidate for County sheriff in 1956; City Councillor since 1952, president in 1954.

Peter F. Hines: 31; lawyer; graduate of Boston College; son of industrial advisor to the present mayor; appointed to City Council in 1958.

Christopher A. Iannella: 46; lawyer, graduate of Boston College (and Harvard Law School); State representative eight years; City Councillor since 1958.

James S. Coffey: 60; employee of State department of public works; business college; State representative four years; candidate for Governor's Council 1956; City Councillor 1940-51, candidate 1953-57, appointed to City Council 1958.

John Patrick Connolly: 65; president of local laborer's union; no college; former clerk County court; State representative four years; candidate for City Council 1953-57. Served a prison sentence for selling jobs.

#### School Committee

A School Committee of five is elected in odd-numbered years for a two-year term. Members are unpaid. The Committee is the policy-making body of the School Department. It prepares the school budget, approves appointment of all teaching and non-teaching personnel, establishes policies governing salary scales, approves contracts and selects a superintendent and (from among those nominated by him) six assistant superintendents. It meets weekly, usually on Monday afternoon, at its offices at 15 Beacon Street. Meetings are open to the public.

There is a statutory limitation of \$21.2 million on the annual appropriations of the School Committee. The Committee may exceed this amount only with the approval of the Mayor and City Council. In fact, the school budget is always far above the limit. The Mayor and Council are therefore in a position to bargain with the Committee.

Those elected to the School Committee in 1959 were:

John J. Tierney, Jr.: 33, Dorchester. Incumbent and lawyer. Served with Voluntary Defenders and eight years with Boston police. Member American, Mass. and Boston Bar Assns., Trial Lawyers, K. of C. and V.F.W. Education: English High, Suffolk University and Law School.

Joseph Lee: 58, West End. Political economist. Former member School Committee for three terms. As recreation supporter, he inaugurated Charles River sailing program. Member Marine Corps League and A. L. Education: Country Day School, Texas University and Harvard.

John P. Regan: 41, West Roxbury. Incumbent and chairman, Lawyer and former assistant corporation counsel for City of Boston. Member B.P.O.E., A.L., Mass. and Boston Bar Assns., Trial Lawyers and Local 1695, I.L.A. Education: Boston College and Boston University Law School.

Madeleine L. Reilly: 47. Lawyer and only woman incumbent. A brother, Charles F., is a Boston teacher. Education: Brockton High, Boston College, Emerson and Stonehill College, Boston University Law School.

William J. Hendrick, Jr.: 30, South Boston. Insurance representative. Four years pre-medical at B. C. Member South Boston Citizen's Assn., and A.L. Education: Boston College, B. C. Graduate School (E.M.) and B. C. Law School.

#### Police Commissioner

The Police Commissioner is appointed by the Governor for a seven-year term. Approval of an increase in the number of patrolmen or in their pay scales must be gotten from the Mayor and City Council, but in all other matters they have no part. The law requires them to provide funds for the police department upon requisition of the Commissioner.

#### Metropolitan Transit Authority

The Metropolitan Transit Authority operates subway, bus, trolley, and trackless trolley routes in Boston and 13 other cities of the core and inner band. It is a publicly-owned corporation headed by a board of three trustees who are appointed by the governor. For a full discussion of the MTA,

see part VI, section B.

#### Finance Commission

A Finance Commission appointed by the Governor may investigate any or all matters relating to the city of Boston or the County of Suffolk. The Commission makes annual reports to the General Court (legislature). It has the power of subpoena. Although formally it has no connection with the elected government of Boston, in practice the Mayor is consulted on appointments.

#### Metropolitan District Commission

The Commission is a state agency which provides water, sewage disposal, and park service for Greater Boston. For an account of its origins and functioning, see Charles R. Cherington, in S. B. Sweeney, ed., Metropolitan Analysis, pp. 127-142.

#### Suffolk County

Boston and three other cities--Revere, Chelsea, and Winthrop--comprise Suffolk County. Under an arrangement made many years ago, the Mayor and City Council of Boston serve as the government of the County, and the three cities which do not help elect them pay no part of the expenses of the County. The County budget, which is published in the same document with the Boston budget, totaled \$8,114,523 in fiscal 1959. The principal items were for correctional institutions and courts. As explained elsewhere in this report, Boston considers that Revere, Chelsea, and Winthrop should pay their proportional share of County expenses, but the legislature

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has so far refused to make any change. Many people think the county should be abolished altogether.

B. The Nonpartisan System\*1. The Place of the Parties

Both Democratic and Republican parties are organized on a ward and precinct basis. Frequently the ward organizations are led by elective and appointive officeholders (especially state senators and representatives). There are close connections between city and state politicians, and state officeholders are apt to participate actively in city campaigns. The Republican Party is organized around its city and state committee; the Democratic Party, by contrast, more nearly resembles a federation of factions devoted to various public officials.

Both parties have city campaign committees, but neither committee officially endorses candidates in primary or general city elections. Paul Feeney, Democratic City Committee Chairman, says:

Our committee hasn't endorsed any candidate for nonpartisan elections in the last twenty years. We haven't given candidates any money either.

In the 1959 campaign, Harry Elam was the only Republican to get a place on the November ballot. Yet even he did not get either official endorsement or financial assistance from the Republican City Committee.

As individuals, however, members of both committees may play prominent roles in nonpartisan campaigns. In the 1959 campaign, the Christian Science Monitor reported (10/28/59

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\*This section of the report is adapted from a paper by Sam Speck.

with reference to the mayoralty campaign:

Perhaps even more voting mileage may be realized by the senator [Powers, a Democrat] from the lengthening roll of Republican backers he displays.... Included among these are Ralph H. Bonnell, Republican National Committeeman from Massachusetts, Vernon Hitchins, former president of the Republican Clubs of Massachusetts,... and individual endorsements of official Republican leaders in Boston including seventeen of the twenty-two ward chairmen, seven state committeemen and women, president of the Republican City Committee of Boston, a majority of the executive committee of the Suffolk Republican Club, and president of the Ward 21 Republican Club.

The Republican City Committee Chairman, James Bayley, used the Committee letterhead to urge support of Powers, and he introduced Powers to Republican groups and meetings. A state committeewoman wrote similar letters for Powers on the Republican State Committee letterhead.

Generally it is only the Republican leaders who intervene from backstage in this way. Since Republicans are outnumbered 7-1 in Boston, they usually have no candidate of their own. The Democratic leaders, although they might like to, cannot openly support one (Democratic) candidate against the others.

As to why the Republicans took such trouble in behalf of Powers, the best explanation seems to be that they thought his victory would create rivalry between him and the Democratic Governor, Foster Furcolo, and thus weaken Furcolo if he ran against Republican Senator Saltonstall in 1960. And even if Powers lost, Republican support of him would help worsen his future relations with the Governor. When after the election some Republican workers took State Chairman McLean to task for supporting Powers, McLean said (Christian Science Monitor, 11/6/59):

If Powers wins, Furcolo goes down a little, but if Powers loses, he will go back to the Senate. If you think he is going to kiss and make up with Furcolo, you're crazy. The Republicans have a much better chance of achieving victory in 1960 than if Powers had been elected.

Republican City Chairman Bayley explained on this same occasion that he supported Powers because Powers publicly pledged that if elected mayor he would never again run for a partisan office, that he would appoint some Republicans, and that he would run a nonpartisan administration.

## 2. Campaign Strategy in a Nonpartisan, At-Large System

Only once since 1909 has a Republican been elected mayor of Boston. That was in 1925, and it happened then only because two strong Democrats split the vote in a three-cornered race. In recent years no Republican has <sup>seriously</sup> tried to get elected. As matters stand, the nonpartisan primary is really an "open Democratic" primary. Some suppose this means that nonpartisanship makes no real difference in Boston--that the nonpartisan general election merely takes the place of a Democratic primary. It is not that simple. Under the nonpartisan system, over 100,000 Republicans and independents can participate; in an "open Democratic" primary they could not. This means that a (Democratic) candidate must appeal to them also and must promise them a certain amount of patronage.

The result is that platforms are broadly drawn and appeals made as inclusive as possible. Candidates generally minimize their party connections. In 1959, for example, both candidates made a great show of their bi-partisanship.



Powers even promised that "you will never again see the name of John E. Powers on the ballot for a statewide office!" (Significantly, this declaration was made before the Young Republicans Club.)

During the 1959 campaign, Powers made gifts to certain charities from his campaign fund. Perhaps these may be taken as quantitative measures of the importance of the various sectors of the electorate. The amounts were as follows

\$35,000 to send retarded children with Cardinal  
Cushing to Lourdes, France  
5,000 to Combined Jewish Appeal  
2,500 to Combined Colored Ministers Association  
500 to Boston home for the aged  
2,500 to a Protestant church in South Boston

Because in a nonpartisan, at-large election candidates must address themselves to the whole city and must do so without the facilities of a party organization, interest groups which can offer access to large and diversified audiences are of very great importance. "Under Boston's present system," Paul Feeney, the chairman of the Democratic City Committee, has observed, "communications and city-wide interests gain power. Communication becomes more important when elections are no longer on a personal, ward basis."

The press is, of course, the most important of these interests. But organizations with city-wide membership, such as the City Employees Association, deserve mention too.

The mayoralty campaign is expensive. Powers, the unsuccessful candidate, reported expenses of \$203,540 and Collins, who won, reported \$164,546. These figures probably mean little, however, for the Massachusetts law does not require a complete accounting and, in any case, the law is

little regarded. Insiders say that the Powers campaign cost nearly \$500,000. Collins also probably had much more than he acknowledged.

According to Powers' official report, he got \$1,000 contributions from 35 persons and contributions of \$500 to \$1,000 from 153 persons. Collins said he got \$1,000 each from 33 persons and \$500 to \$1,000 from 76 others. (Names of \$1,000 donors to Powers were listed in the Herald, Jan. 8, 1960; Collins' big donors were listed in the Herald, Dec. 4, 1959).

A good share of the expense was for the preliminary election. In the course of a face-to-face TV appearance with Collins after the preliminary and before the general election, Powers said that he thought they had each spent about \$150,000. He said he had spent twice as much as Collins on radio, but that Collins had spent twice as much as he on TV. "I might have exceeded John [Collins] a little bit in the matter of newspapers," he said, "but I had less outdoor advertising."

The campaign funds did not, of course, come from party coffers. Powers raised \$240,000 at a single testimonial banquet at the end of March. The big contributors were mostly contractors doing business with the city and large property owners who wanted assurance that tax laws would not be changed to their disadvantage (tax abatements, discussed elsewhere in this report, are another matter. These are secured by paying large fees to one of several lawyers "on the inside," not by contribution to campaign funds).

Some have said that in nonpartisan campaigns little

attention is usually paid to issues. In the 1959 Boston election, there was fairly serious discussion of issues. In TV and other appearances and in statements to the press, the leading contenders came to grips with important questions and took some clear-cut stands. Collins, for example, came out for a sales tax. For examples of the 1959 campaign oratory, see the candidates' replies to questions put them by the Sunday Globe, Oct. 18 (p. 4-A) and Oct. 25 (p. A-61).

Powers was advertised as having a "brain trust" of high-powered academic advisers. Actually, as Bryant Danner explains in his Campaign Decision-Makers (accompanying this Report as Related Document #4), the academics did little research that could be used during the campaign and their advice on strategy was not taken seriously by the professionals.

Collins had no "brain trust." His campaign was managed by Henry A. Scagnoli, 33 Bexley Road, Roslindale, a 39-year-old assistant buyer for a wholesale building supply firm. Collins wrote his own press releases and speeches, so he said, and relied for research assistance on School Committeeman John P. McMorrow (one of the candidates who had opposed him in the September preliminary election); Attorney James Sullivan of Dorchester; Elmer Foster, former public relations director for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and William Kilroy, an insurance executive.

Nonpartisan campaigns, it is sometimes said, tend to be "personality contests" and often to be name-calling contests as well. This was the case in Boston in 1959. That the candidates discussed issues did not prevent them from

discussing other things as well. Immediately after the preliminary, Powers and Collins were still on good terms. "You're a decent, wonderful fellow and, I hope, always a friend of mine," Powers told Collins when they met on a TV program early in October. "Johnny, that's very nice of you," Collins replied, "and...if I happen to be elected mayor and you happen to remain the President of the Senate, we'll make the greatest contribution for the City...." By the end of October, however, the "friends" were clawing at each other. Collins was then saying (Herald, Oct. 27) that not a cent of bookmakers' money had come to him in contributions "and there are only two men in the race." Powers was saying that in calling the Collins supporters "goons" he had not "used a term despicable enough."

The Powers people were sensitive from the start to rumors that their man was the "darling of the mob." (See Danner, Campaign Decision-Makers, Related Document #4). When, the day before the election, U. S. Treasury agents raided a joint run by a friend of Powers, the Powers side was sure that Collins had arranged the raid to embarrass Powers. Whether or not this was the case, the raid hurt Powers by reminding voters of his alleged connections with the underworld.

Collins, on the other hand, had the advantage of being physically handicapped. He and four of his children had had polio four years before, and he was confined to a wheelchair in the manner (obviously) of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Whether for this or other reasons, he was understood from the beginning to be the favorite of the women. Of the registered voters,

177,726 were women and 151,772 men, and women outnumbered men in all but one of the 22 wards (the exception was ward 3). Collins' alleged appeal to the women may therefore have given him a real advantage.

Collins made a particularly good impression on TV and he used TV a great deal. He was frank, open, and boyish--all qualities that set him apart from Powers, who looked and sounded like what he was--a professional. (Collins was also a professional, although one of less experience, but he did not give the impression of being one.)

A Boston University political scientist, Murray B. Levin, who made a postelection survey of voter opinion, concluded that many people switched from Powers to Collins as a result of the raid, and that much of the Collins vote was a vote against Powers. (Levin's study, The Alienated Voter, is attached as Document #3.)

#### Candidates for City Council

To get elected to the City Council, a candidate must be Irish or, possibly, Italian, and of course a Democrat. Of the 45 Councilmen elected since Plan A went into effect in 1951, six have been Italian and all the rest Irish. Of the 18 candidates for the Council in 1959, 14 were Irish, three were Italian, and one was a Negro Republican. There were no Jews or Yankees, and no candidates from outlying parts of the city like Charlestown, Brighton, Allston, and Hyde Park. Candidates who are not Irish or Italian do not come close to winning.

It is not too much to say that one-third of the electorate, including of course the most highly educated and prosperous part of it, is excluded from office.

Issues are not important in Council campaigns, and there is of course no party machine to help the candidate. He must, therefore, find some way to differentiate himself from the many other candidates. If he has a "magic name" (like William Foley), the support of a city-wide pressure group (like ex-policeman McDonough), the attention of the press (like McDonough), or a long record of political activity (like ex-Acting Mayor Kerrigan), his name may mean something to the voters. Most candidates, however, do not have these advantages, and the ethnic ring of their names is especially important. "Unless I know someone," a Dorchester wife recently told an interviewer, "I just look for the best Irish names."

Incumbents have a great advantage. In the four elections prior to the introduction of at-large voting, approximately 16 per cent of the incumbents were defeated (3.5 candidates per election on the average); under the at-large system, less than six per cent (0.5 per election) have been defeated. An incumbent has had an opportunity to make himself known, and he may even have been able to raise a campaign fund of \$1,000 to \$4,000 by that favorite device, the testimonial dinner. Some are so sure of themselves that they did not campaign at all. In 1959, virtually no rallies were held by Council candidates. Instead they tagged along with the mayoralty candidates and spoke a few words before the main bouts when they got the chance. Usually they confined themselves



to safe subjects like efficiency and the need for more state aid.

As election time approaches, the incumbents develop fellow feeling and express it by recommending each other to the electorate. If they can create the impression that the Council has done a good job, they all stand to gain. This strategy permits a certain division of labor, each incumbent councillor recommending the Council as a whole in regard to those matters about which he is known to be especially well versed. No such opportunities are open to the challengers, of course. They cannot hope to beat the incumbents en masse. About the best a challenger can do is to pick off the weakest incumbent or to fill a vacancy. Of the three members newly elected in 1959, two had had the advantage of interim appointments and the third made it after three unsuccessful tries.

Council candidates get little help from the newspapers. In 1959, all papers published brief biographies of all candidates, but that was about all. The Globe did not mention that one candidate had served a jail sentence in his last term of elective office for selling jobs. The Traveler made endorsements, but it did not explain on what grounds. When the Negro candidate, Harry Elam, asked the editors of the Traveler to let him present his views to them before they made their endorsements, they declined.

In 1959 one of the mayoralty candidates, Powers, contributed \$500 each to the campaigns of two councillors, McLaughlin and Kerrigan. This was unusual. As a rule, mayoralty candidates do not trouble themselves to get the support

of Council candidates.

Considering how little prestige or power a councillor has, it may be hard to see why anyone would want the job. With respect to the present membership of the Council (see brief biographies above), it is possible to offer three general accounts of motivation. Four councilmen (Coffey, Kerrigan, White, and Connolly) are old-time politicians. They have been in politics for years, and probably none expects to rise any higher. Some may need the \$5,000 salary. But probably most run for office because they find it a fascinating game. "I love politics," one of them told an interviewer. "I thrive on it."

Two of the councilmen (Foley and McLaughlin) are sons of politicians. They are ambitious. Foley ran for District Attorney ( a post his father once held) and McLaughlin ran for Congress. Both lost. Why do they remain on the Council term after term? "It's like the French deputy from the provinces who's voted out of office and can't bear to leave Paris, Foley says. "You get used to being near the heart of things."

Finally, there are the young newcomers to politics (Hines, Iannella, and McDonough). They are ambitious too, but their ambitions are less well formed. Two are family men who need the salary and the law business the job attracts. The young men appear foolish to the old-timers. "They don't really know what the hell they're doing here," one of the old-timers said.

The voters do not take much interest in the Council candidates. In 1959 (a mayoralty election year) 61 per cent



of the registered voters voted for one or more Council candidates (although allowed to vote for nine, the average voter voted for fewer than six). In 1955 (also a mayoralty year) the comparable figure was 66 per cent. But in 1957 (a non-mayoralty year) only 33 per cent voted for Council candidates and in 1953 (another non-mayoralty year) only 44 per cent did. It is interesting that in the 1930's the vote for Councillors, who were then elected on a ward basis, ran about 80 per cent of the registration in mayoralty years and about 55 per cent in non-mayoralty years.

In the 1959 election, all winning Council candidates except Iannella did best in their home wards. (He had recently moved from one ward to another.)

To illustrate how the voting goes, the 1959 returns from seven precincts are given below. Ward 1 precinct 12 is middle-class Italian in East Boston. Ward 3 precinct 2 is lower-class Italian at the North End. Ward 5 precinct 3 is the heart of the Beacon Hill Yankee stronghold. Ward 6 precinct 1 is lower-class Irish in South Boston. Ward 9 precinct 4 is lower-class Negro in Roxbury. Ward 12 precinct 12 is middle-class Jewish in Dorchester.

			McL	Fol	McD	Ker	Whi	Hin	Ian	Cof	Con	Lan	Elam
W1	p	12	24	29	27	23	23	21	44	73	19	48	12
W3	p	2	11	14	12	13	14	11	73	19	10	75	7
W5	p	3	53	47	45	35	50	48	50	22	21	26	39
W6	p	1	39	64	53	62	28	29	19	35	36	20	12
W9	p	4	23	29	22	15	25	15	23	18	20	18	72
W12	p	12	32	30	25	25	36	29	36	23	16	20	47

These figures suggest that lower-class Italians stuck closely to Italian candidates, while middle-class Italians

were considerably more generous to the Irish. The Beacon Hill Yankees ignored national and ethnic background, choosing rather on the basis of respectability. (Connolly is an ex-convict.) The lower-class Irish shied away from the Italian and Negro candidates, but the middle-class Irish, like the middle-class Italians, were considerably less ethnic in their voting. Negroes, of course, came out strong for Elam. The Jewish precinct also favored Elam.

### 3. The Beneficiaries of the Nonpartisan, At-Large System

It is hard to judge which interests gain and which lose under a nonpartisan, at-large system as contrasted to a partisan, ward-based one. It is even more difficult to judge whether a particular gain or loss is attributable to nonpartisanship or to at-large voting.

Some party leaders believe that the lack of party activity in years of city elections lessens the effectiveness of the parties in state elections. Feeney says, "Nonpartisanship makes candidates appeal to all the electorate and in so doing discourages emphasis upon party affiliation; this has an effect on organization." Charles McGlue, for many years chairman of the Democratic State Committee, says that nonpartisanship has worked against both parties. "It completely wrecks party organization," he told me; "the number of unenrolled voters in Boston is very high because of the de-emphasis of parties."

This argument is plausible. In all wards the proportion of voters who register as independents (i.e., who are

"unenrolled") is high. It is especially so in the relatively Republican wards (4, 5, and 21) and in the relatively Jewish ones (12, 14, and 21).

% of Registered Voters Unenrolled, 1959

<u>Ward</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Ward</u>	<u>%</u>
1	17	12	32
2	15	13	25
3	21	14	21
4	39	15	23
5	42	16	19
6	19	17	22
7	19	18	24
8	28	19	23
9	20	20	26
10	22	21	37
11	26	22	24

Some effects attributed to nonpartisanship are probably properly attributable to the at-large system of voting. (The city has been nonpartisan since 1909, it will be recalled; the change to Plan A eliminated ward voting.) It is hard to say which party gained most (or lost least) by the introduction of the at-large system. Most politicians think it was the Democrats. They point out that since the introduction of Plan A no Republican has been elected to any city office, whereas under the ward system two or three Republicans were usually elected to the Council. Republican State Chairman McLean told an interviewer that under the ward system "the party might well elect councilmen from the 4th and 5th wards, and if the right Jewish candidate was nominated, from the 12th and 14th also."

On the other hand, the Democrats would control Boston under any possible electoral system; therefore a system that

tends to break down party organization in the wards (as non-partisanship and at-large voting both do) is more damaging to them than to the Republicans. Under a partisan, ward-based system, the Republicans could have a strong organization in only three or four wards. The Democrats, however, could have it in almost every ward.

Do minority groups get less representation than they would under a system that encouraged ticket-balancing? Not so far as the principal office is concerned: the Mayor is the only elected executive officer, and he of course must be Irish under any system. With respect to the Council, minorities are excluded. As was said above, except for six Italians, all of the 45 Councillors elected since Plan A went into effect have been Irish. In the five Council elections prior to that, by contrast, the 110 Councillors elected included four Italians, nine Yankees, 12 Jews, and one Negro. Of course, "being represented" and "having one's own kind in office" are not necessarily the same thing (although they are if "ethnic representation" is all the voter wants), and an Irish Councillor is presumably well aware that more than a third of his constituents are not Irish.

Whether it is better to elect a Council at-large or on a ward basis is a disputed question in Boston. The "good government" forces still favor the at-large system. Henry L. Shattuck, a venerable Brahmin who for many years has led reform movements, considers the at-large system a great improvement. "More competent men are elected to the Council," he told an interviewer. "And they take a broad view of city



problems instead of being concerned only with the voters of their own wards." Joseph Slavet, executive secretary of the Municipal Research Bureau, is more specific:

The [at-large] Council gives far closer attention to the budget; it takes our recommendations seriously, which is more than the old Council ever did. And it checks up to make sure that the money is being used properly: when the parking program stalled, the Council refused to authorize more loans until the City used the money it already had.

That the at-large system has turned attention away from the wards and neighborhoods is clear enough. In 1958 the Council passed 20 orders requesting the city to improve particular streets and intersections; before 1951 it used to pass hundreds of such orders every year. There are some, however, who think it was a good thing to have someone paying attention to the wards, and that as a "statesman" the Council is a joke. The at-large system, the critics say, has transferred power from the neighborhoods to the newspapers and to city-wide interest groups like the city employees and, for that matter, the Municipal Research Bureau.

The politicians--some of them--have their own objections to the at-large system. "In the old days a little guy could get elected," one of them recently complained.

All that was necessary was that his neighbors trusted him. I served seven straight terms and never spent more than \$100 in a fight. Now you've got to have money and connections to win. You've got to have a name. It's not right.

Councillors don't speak their minds any more. They're afraid to. They can't afford to offend anyone in the city. Especially the Mayor or the newspapers. If they get on your back, you're licked. But before, as long as you did right by your neighbors, no one could touch you.

In the old days, if the City gave someone a hard time or if a person needed help, he went to his Councillor and got action. The same thing was true for entire neighborhoods

But who is there to go now? There's no representation any more.

To the claim that the ward-based politician was more independent, Slavet replies: "All the Mayor had to do to keep a Councillor in line in the old days was give him something for his ward. It's not that easy now."

True, critics of the at-large system reply. But getting something for the ward was worthwhile: the present councillor--the "statesman"--isn't doing anything as important.

C. The Mayor and the Council\*

The Mayor and the Council are frequently in a tug-of-war. The Council does not have enough weight to pull the Mayor around: its legal powers are very limited, it gets little attention in the press, and Councillors, being elected at-large, have <sup>little</sup> strength in the wards. The Mayor, moreover, has the advantage of any executive in dealing with a legislative body: superior knowledge, decisiveness, and information. On the other hand, the Mayor cannot prevent the Council from tugging, and there are times when this can be a real annoyance.

The Council labors under many handicaps. The salary is too small to secure full-time service (only Coffey puts in a full day at City Hall); although each councillor has a secretary, the Council itself has no staff. The consequence is that the councillors' ideas are generally not backed by research. The Municipal Research Bureau, a civic association, could be used by the councillors more than it is. Most of them are suspicious of it, however. They think it may be too much on the side of the big taxpayer. Now and then a councillor has some research done independently; for example, Gabriel Piemonte, when he was a Councillor, had someone at Harvard dig up some information on city finances. But this is so unusual as to be eccentric.

Even if the Council could get the facts, there is not much it could do with them. It cannot spend anything without

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\*This section of the report is adapted from a paper by Michael Smith.

the Mayor's approval. It cannot fire department heads, or hire new ones. About all that it can do is criticize. And even here its effectiveness depends upon the cooperation it gets from the press.

For the first six years under the at-large system, Mayor Hynes generally had his way with the Council. At first the Council operated in an atmosphere of reform, and made a special effort to be "constructive." Later, when the charm of good government wore off, the Mayor found ways of bringing influence to bear upon it. Having the support of the press and of the public, he had the upper hand.

Beginning about 1958, however, the Council became increasingly independent. The councillors felt that Mayor Hynes had not been generous with them. He had had favors to give, but they had not got them. Such promises as he had made, he had not kept. When there had been publicity to be had, he had grabbed it. He had proposed important undertakings (e.g., a parking garage at South Station) without any prior consultation with them.

Hynes and his department heads, the councillors felt, were insulting in their disregard of requests for interviews and for information. It took Councillor Piemonte five months to get a list of the parcels of land being held by the city in tax title and in the end he had to dig it out for himself. "Hynes wouldn't do a thing for us," one councillor complained bitterly afterward.

The most important piece of Council business is the budget, a matter of over \$100,000,000. A good part of this



is for purposes that are essential by any standard. Another part is for purposes that are politically expedient. A third part is put in the budget by the Mayor so that the Council can throw it out. "The Mayor always throws in a little fat," a City Hall reporter recently explained, "a few extra employees a few unprotected contracts, just to give the Council something to take out." If by mistake or perversity the Council cuts off meat instead of fat, the Mayor repairs the damage by transferring from supplemental appropriations accounts.

This was the arrangement until recently. In Mayor Hynes' last two or three years of office, however, the Council became restive. Instead of cutting \$500,000, it cut twice that or even more.

Another important function of the Council is that of watchdog. During the past eight years, it has carried on rather thorough investigations into the granting of tax abatements, the treatment of wealthy tax delinquents, garbage and parking garage contracts, the West End redevelopment project, the management of hospitals and housing projects, and other matters. These crusades, the crusaders admit, haven't got very far. Publicity is needed to keep them going, and the press soon loses interest. The Boston bureaucrat has learned not to worry about Council investigations. "Hold your breath and it will go away," he tells himself.

The Council is not, some of its members admit, as vigorous as it might be in its efforts to uncover waste and corruption. Except for Councillor Coffey, an unusually candid and crusty fellow, the old-timers are not interested in "making

trouble." The newcomers are timid and uncertain, afraid, it is said, of losing their places. ("They've no guts," a City Hall reporter recently complained.) Most of the watch-dogging has been done by two men, Piemonte, who did not run in 1959, and Foley. Even these two are said to have held their tongues on some important occasions.

There is an annual fight to "organize" the Council. Two members seek the presidency and the others offer them support in the expectation of getting good committee posts. Being President is, of course, an "honor," especially since the President may be Acting Mayor (Kerrigan was Acting Mayor for a whole year after Tobin became Governor in 1944). In election years the title may be worth some votes: Piemonte tried to get it in 1959 because he intended to run for Mayor.

The President is also important because he appoints committee chairmen. The chairmen of an important committee like Appropriations and Finance may get more mention in the press than any other member of the Council, including the President himself. Foley, for example, has got a lot of publicity from being chairman of the Urban Redevelopment Committee. Then, too, a chairman can bottle things up if he gets some cooperation from the Council; in 1958 Coffey delayed Mayor Hynes' order for reorganization of the Assessing Department.

The Councillors seem to agree, however, that too much energy is generally wasted in the fight for the presidency. The stakes are not really high enough to justify all the fuss that is made, they say.

No interests or issues divide the Council into stable

factions. Some Councillors cooperate with the Mayor more than others do, to be sure. Friendships and animosities make some difference (Foley, McCormack, and McLaughlin worked closely for several years, except when two of them were not on speaking terms). On the whole, however, each Councillor decides matters for himself and such alliances as are formed do not persist from one issue to another.

The Council does not readily present a united front. When it was elected from wards rather than at-large, no one expected unity in it, of course. Now some do expect unity, and they are often disappointed. "Everyone cuts each other up," a Councillor recently said. "They're all out to get what they can for themselves, and to hell with the rest."

Although they are elected at-large, Councillors are sometimes called upon by their constituents for favors--places in housing projects, temporary jobs, welfare assistance, and so on. Most voters, however, do not think of any Councillor as "their" man, and they usually turn to their state representative. Councillors, moreover, are not as obliging as they were when they were elected on a ward basis. "I'm here at City Hall seven hours a day, five days a week," says Coffey, who was brought up in the old school. "People come to me from all over the city. They know that I'm available. But do you see any of the other Councillors around? You bet you don't. They're statesmen, not politicians."

If you ask a "statesman" what he does in the way of favors for his constituents, he refers you to his secretary. "He handles all that nonsense," the "statesman" says.

People sometimes go to those Councillors who are lawyer for legal advice. To be represented by a Councillor in a case involving the city is presumably advantageous: so, at least, a good many people seem to think. This is one way in which the lawyer-Councillors augment their salaries. The non-lawyers wish that they could do so too. "If a lawyer takes a buck everybody calls it a 'fee,'" a non-lawyer recently complained. "If I were to take one, they'd call it 'graft'."

No one goes to a Councillor for anything really big, however--for a big contract, a big tax settlement, or a big job. The Council doesn't distribute any of the real gravy. "The Mayor keeps it all to himself and to his little ring of pals," a Councillor said sadly not long ago.

D. The Mayor in Action

When John F. Collins became mayor of Boston on January 4, 1960, he not only acquired all the usual burdens of that office but also brought to it the additional burden of public anticipation. He entered office as the beneficiary of a protest vote against a powerfully-backed, long-time politician, John E. Powers. On him Boston's disillusioned voters staked their chances for a change from government by "the pols." Collins has sought to satisfy their hope, if hope it was.

In the first months of his administration, he:

(1) inaugurated a rigorous austerity program, cutting \$13 million from the budget requests of the city departments and reducing the number of city employees by more than 300. The austerity drive was complemented by an effort to collect delinquent taxes and other funds owed the city, such as hospital bills;

(2) submitted a detailed program to the Massachusetts legislature and appointed two attorneys, Paul J. Burns and Louis K. Nathanson, to lobby for it;

(3) appointed a full-time press relations man and held daily press conferences, monthly TV shows and a variety of public meetings inside and outside of Boston in an effort to gain wide support for his program;

(4) made a trip to Washington in the interest of urban renewal and another to Philadelphia to observe the administration of that city and the results of its reform;

(5) appointed several persons with outstanding qualifications to major positions in his administration. These

appointees include Edward J. Logue, formerly director of urban redevelopment in New Haven, as coordinator of redevelopment; James W. Haley, who had been outstandingly competent as director of the survey division in Boston's Public Works Department, as head of that Department; Colonel Robert E. York, a retired member of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, as head of the Building Department; and Dr. F. Robert Freckleton, former consultant to the U. S. Public Health Service regional office in Kansas City, Missouri, as Commissioner of Health. By exercising his influence as a member of the MTA advisory board, Collins was also instrumental in getting the MTA trustees to obtain a highly qualified general manager, Thomas J. McLernon of New York.

This activity has not transformed Boston. Nobody is calling it a "reform movement." It has, nonetheless, alleviated the political pessimism with which the city has long been afflicted. The morale of city employees has improved, even though they have been forced to put in a full day's work. Businessmen, in a mood of approval, have bestirred themselves to measures of support for the mayor such as formation of the Civic Fund to finance civic projects. The Monitor's Michael Liuzzi has suggested that the day of antagonism between the Irish politician and the Yankee businessman may be over. Editorials in the Boston dailies reflect an unusually optimistic tone.

One spectacular event accounts more than anything else for the current mood of hope. On July 6, 1960, Mayor Collins announced that Boston's tax rate would be cut from \$101.20 to \$100.70. Even the most sanguine Bostonians had hoped for no



more than an end to the spiral. The reduction was greeted with grateful surprise. Collins' accomplishment was the more remarkable because his administration had inherited budget increases variously estimated at \$4.4 million to \$10 million, though this was partially offset by a scheduled reduction of \$1.9 million in debt retirement.

In the legislature, Collins was less successful. None of his program was adopted, although in May a bill to reappropriation the MTA deficit lost in the House by only twelve votes. When the vote began the Collins forces believed that they had a majority, but as it proceeded they lost the votes of some members who evidently had committed themselves to support the bill in the belief that it was certain to lose. So close an approach to victory added to Collins' prestige and suggested that his influence in the legislature was on the increase.

By contrast, early in the session he had been badly beaten on a bill to increase his power over the expenditures of the city's police department. The odds were heavily against Collins on this measure. Police Commissioner Leo J. Sullivan, whose department is said to view indulgently the petty parking offenses of legislators on Beacon Hill, has some personal support in the legislature, and his lobbyist there is highly popular. Furthermore, Collins was opposed on this issue by his opponent in the mayoralty election, Senate President Powers, and by a majority of the Boston delegation, which had overwhelmingly supported Powers in the campaign. Resentment against Collins was strong.

A few months later, after election passions had waned

and Collins' strength had waxed, Boston legislators including Powers were behaving more cooperatively towards the mayor. There was heavy editorial condemnation of the Boston vote against Collins on the police bill and speculation that obstruction of the Collins program would become an issue in the fall elections. According to Mr. Burns, who has managed several campaigns for Collins and advises him on political questions, the mayor has decided not to become involved in the selection of Democratic candidates for state office, either the governorship or Boston's seats in the legislature. The disadvantages of backing a loser are great. But Collins' strength in Boston is now such that legislators who have opposed his program are vulnerable to attack on that account.

Collins, according to those who know him well, is tireless and tough, a man deeply absorbed in politics. He works long and intensively, with little time off. This was true even before a polio attack in 1955 confined him to a wheel chair, denying him many of the usual recreations. He was admitted to the bar in 1940 at the age of 21 and has been involved in law and politics ever since except for four years of Army service in World War II. He entered as a private and was discharged as a captain in the counter-intelligence corps.

A native of Roxbury now resident in Jamaica Plain, Collins attended Boston public schools and Suffolk Law School. In 1941, on his first try for public office, he failed to win election to the City Council. In 1946 he was elected to the House of Representatives from Ward 11 in Roxbury. After a second term in the House he served four years in the Senate.



In 1954 he was defeated as the Democratic candidate for state attorney general, but he reentered office the following year as a member of the City Council. He was appointed register of probate of Suffolk County in February 1957 and elected to the office in 1958. According to Joseph S. Slavet, executive secretary of the Municipal Research Bureau, Collins as a City Councillor was alert, able, and open-minded to suggestions for economy. Nevertheless, he has shown more decisiveness and administrative ability as mayor than had generally been anticipated on the basis of his record.

Collins has a genial Irish exterior. With a frank manner and a pleasant smile, he is effective in TV and public appearances. He enjoys his encounters with the press and public. Both have been good to him, the public by electing him and the press by supporting him since. In May he began to extend his public appearances outside of Boston with an "Essex County Get-Together" at a private home in Beverly Farms. About 200 persons were invited to hear him speak. The purpose of such meetings, which have been scheduled monthly, is to win statewide support for Boston's program in the legislature. They will also extend Collins' acquaintance, laying the ground for a possible campaign for the governor's office. It is generally assumed that he wants to be governor.

Confidence and optimism are the themes of Collins' speeches. In his inaugural address he declared:

I enter upon the performance of my duties undeterred by prophecies of doom, ready to meet the challenge, and ready to launch 'Operation Revival' for Boston.... we must move forward with confidence.... We must restore, rebuild, and redevelop....

The mayor's cheerful face and his manifestly determined response to a physical handicap tend to credit his confident tone in the eyes of the public.

Underneath the genial exterior, it is said, lies a tough interior. Those who have worked closely with the mayor and observed him in action agree that he has an ability unusual among politicians to say "no." Though he is often receptive to advice, especially on measures for economy, he places most confidence of all in his own judgments, tending to exercise a great deal of independent authority rather than using his authority in support of the actions of his subordinates. It remains to be seen, for example, how far he will go in supporting Mr. Logue in the development of an urban renewal program. Collins has been interested in renewal and was prepared, at the suggestion of a few influential Bostonians, to bring Logue to the city; he may or may not team up with him in pushing a program. As of late July, Logue had not begun work, but was still attempting to obtain the authority he desired to go with the job.

Collins' toughness has been displayed to the public most clearly in his six-month struggle with the School Committee over its budget. According to law the mayor of Boston must approve School Committee expenditures in excess of \$21.2 million a year. Since the budget is always well above this figure, the mayor is enabled to exercise considerable authority over school expenditures. From the request of over \$35 million submitted by the Committee in 1960, Collins ordered a reduction of about \$3,200,000. All of the cut but \$664,000 that was to

come out of the general purposes budget was accepted by the Committee, though not without strong criticism of the mayor. (In January, when Logue's appointment was announced, School Committee Chairman John J. Tierney, Jr., observed that "Progress winds up in the gutter when you make an urban renewal director from out-of-state the highest paid public official in Massachusetts, especially when Mayor Collins plans to do it at the expense of children's education.") For several months the Committee refused to yield on the \$664,000. It finally capitulated in May, but in doing so it voted unanimously to ask the legislature to raise the \$21.2 million statutory limit on its spending to \$34 million.

The outcome of the Collins mayoralty, which is still young, remains in doubt. A dramatic reform does not appear in the offing. On the other hand, a strong administration appears to have arrived.

## PART III - ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

### A. Voting

Voting statistics for Boston--including ward and precinct population, registration, and votes cast in city, state, and national elections--are published in the annual reports of the City Election Department. The report for 1959 is attached as Document #5. Reports for a few previous years may be obtained from the office of the City Messenger, City Hall. Complete sets are available at the main branch of the Boston Public Library at Copley Square and the State House Library on Beacon Hill.

Included in this section are:

- Table 1 -- Votes Cast for Firefighters' Salary Increase Nov. 4, 1958 (along with a discussion of this vote).
- Table 2 -- Votes Cast for Pari-Mutuel System of Betting, Nov. 4, 1958.
- Table 3 -- Votes Cast for President and Vice President Nov. 6, 1956.
- Table 4 -- Votes Cast for Governor, Nov. 6, 1956.
- Table 5 -- Votes Cast for Senator, Nov. 4, 1958.
- Table 6 -- Votes Cast for Governor, Nov. 4, 1958.

#### 1. The Firefighters' Salary Increase

Gazzetta del Massachusetts, an English-language weekly that circulates among the Italian community in Boston, recently observed:

The firemen have representatives of their union who are outspoken and unafraid of who is Boston's Mayor. They got themselves a substantial wage increase by decision of



the voters after their requests for such a raise had been refused by former Mayor Hynes. There are many astute politicians among the firemen and their successes stress their ability to play politics with a professional touch.

The wage increase was voted in 1958 by nearly a two-to-one majority, 121,711 to 67,956. Every ward returned a majority for it except Ward 20 in West Roxbury, which is a high income ward with a high owner-occupancy rate.

According to Joseph Slavet of the Municipal Research Bureau, an organized campaign against the increase would probably have produced a much larger negative vote. The Bureau opposed the increase both because it was "unreasonable" (\$790 a year, bringing the minimum starting salary to \$4880) and because the Bureau objected on principle to having the question decided in a referendum. The Bureau issued a six-page fact sheet on the pay raise in mid-October, summarizing its effects on the city's budget and comparing Boston firemen's salaries to those in other cities. The statement was thoroughly covered by the press. However, the only organized campaigning on the question was done by the firemen, who distributed pamphlets and posters throughout the city. The result of the referendum probably reflected a response to their campaign and a tendency of voters to cast "yes" votes on referendum questions, in Slavet's opinion.

The firemen had little difficulty in obtaining the state legislation that put the question on the ballot. They were supported by Boston legislators including Senate President John E. Powers, whom the firemen had backed in his 1955 mayoralty campaign against John B. Hynes. (The firemen, who are

organized in an AFL-CIO local, are usually aligned overtly with a mayoralty candidate even if they do not make a formal endorsement.) Mayor Hynes did not oppose the referendum bill. The Municipal Research Bureau did oppose it but succeeded only in expanding the language of the referendum question.

TABLE 1

Votes Cast for Firefighters' Salary Increase  
State Election, November 4, 1958

QUESTION NO. 4

Shall fire fighters and uniformed fire alarm personnel employed by the city of Boston, who now receive a yearly salary of \$4,090 to start, \$4,450 after two years' service and \$4,710 after eleven years' service, receive an increase of at least \$790 to a minimum yearly salary of \$4,880 to start and \$5,500 after two years' service, with salary increases of at least \$790 for their uniformed superiors?

WARDS	YES	NO
1. . . . .	7,793	3,413
2. . . . .	4,373	1,497
3. . . . .	4,834	1,561
4. . . . .	3,995	1,926
5. . . . .	4,779	3,621
6. . . . .	5,064	1,639
7. . . . .	6,111	2,579
8. . . . .	3,642	818
9. . . . .	3,045	539
10. . . . .	4,930	2,007
11. . . . .	4,440	1,968
12. . . . .	4,540	1,406
13. . . . .	5,282	2,574
14. . . . .	7,159	3,675
15. . . . .	4,966	2,419
16. . . . .	6,109	4,373
17. . . . .	6,104	4,494
18. . . . .	9,507	7,330
19. . . . .	5,296	4,265
20. . . . .	7,387	7,997
21. . . . .	6,416	3,929
22. . . . .	5,939	3,926
Totals . . . . .	121,711	67,956

2. Pari-Mutuel Betting

Under a state law passed in 1934, voters in Massachusetts counties pass every four years on the questions of whether pari-mutuel betting will be permitted on horse racing and on dog racing. Returns from Boston for the most recent betting referendum in Suffolk County are given below, from the Report of the Election Department for 1959. (The vote on betting on dog races was similar to that on betting on horse races, though fewer ballots were cast. It carried by 100,615 votes to 23,791.)



# Memorandum

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

TO : Mrs. Virginia J. Williams  
 Descriptive Cataloging Division, Processing Department

DATE: Feb. 13, 1961

FROM : Waldo H. Moore *W.H.M.*  
 Head, Book Section, Examining Division

SUBJECT: The work entitled A REPORT ON THE POLITICS  
 OF BOSTON

We have written to the publisher of  
 this work and he answers that the work was  
 published without the documents.

TABLE 2

Votes Cast for Pari-Mutuel System of Betting,  
State Election, November 4, 1958

QUESTION NO. 3 (A)

A. Shall the pari-mutuel system of betting on licensed horse races be permitted in this county?

WARDS	YES	NO
1. . . . .	7,174	1,488
2. . . . .	4,128	613
3. . . . .	3,555	834
4. . . . .	3,720	1,365
5. . . . .	5,057	2,248
6. . . . .	4,851	624
7. . . . .	6,299	926
8. . . . .	2,969	448
9. . . . .	2,159	363
10. . . . .	4,771	773
11. . . . .	4,506	821
12. . . . .	3,237	706
13. . . . .	4,886	816
14. . . . .	6,666	1,256
15. . . . .	4,743	712
16. . . . .	6,545	1,134
17. . . . .	6,336	1,346
18. . . . .	11,496	2,207
19. . . . .	6,196	1,328
20. . . . .	10,158	2,436
21. . . . .	7,207	1,667
22. . . . .	6,654	1,158
Totals . . . . .	123,313	25,269

TABLE 3

Votes Cast for President and Vice President,  
November 6, 1956

Ward	Stevenson-Kefauver	Eisenhower-Nixon
1	10,650	7,576
2	5,387	2,980
3	7,308	5,721
4	4,429	7,257
5	4,974	10,467
6	6,054	3,911
7	7,757	5,285
8	4,474	3,367
9	3,989	3,720
10	6,482	4,733
11	5,937	4,853
12	7,257	5,523
13	6,941	5,310
14	17,017	4,463
15	6,078	4,818
16	7,700	7,214
17	8,108	7,294
18	12,228	11,415
19	6,596	7,629
20	8,276	13,408
21	9,673	9,374
22	8,215	6,876
Totals	165,530	143,194

TABLE 4

Votes Cast for Governor,  
November 6, 1956

Ward	Foster Furcolo (D)	Sumner G. Whittier (R)
1	15,061	3,006
2	6,458	1,769
3	10,317	2,565
4	5,264	6,183
5	5,626	9,505
6	7,722	1,975
7	10,033	2,731
8	6,074	1,769
9	4,680	2,774
10	8,056	2,843
11	7,599	2,947
12	7,874	4,532
13	8,929	3,103
14	16,729	4,325
15	8,132	2,671
16	10,557	4,350
17	10,278	5,000
18	15,830	7,586
19	9,013	5,093
20	12,003	9,564
21	10,928	7,763
22	10,674	4,298
Totals	207,837	96,352

TABLE 5

Votes Cast For Senator,  
November 4, 1958

Ward	John F. Kennedy (D)	Vincent J. Celeste (R)
1	11,067	1,772
2	5,806	343
3	6,295	1,106
4	4,618	2,228
5	5,473	4,015
6	6,523	392
7	8,623	592
8	4,310	372
9	3,393	560
10	6,652	762
11	6,107	892
12	6,114	1,216
13	7,770	885
14	12,066	1,239
15	7,100	751
16	9,916	1,291
17	9,596	1,726
18	15,692	2,751
19	8,472	1,790
20	12,904	3,585
21	9,037	2,351
22	9,877	1,246
Totals	177,411	31,865

TABLE 6

Votes Cast for Governor,  
November 4, 1958

Ward	Foster Furcolo (D)	Charles Gibbons (R)
1	12,595	1,645
2	5,883	816
3	7,343	1,423
4	4,256	3,658
5	4,208	6,363
6	6,736	978
7	8,822	1,437
8	4,634	704
9	3,759	1,048
10	6,813	1,575
11	6,147	1,585
12	5,845	2,479
13	7,550	1,718
14	11,498	3,036
15	7,026	1,393
16	9,534	2,356
17	8,889	3,152
18	14,346	5,208
19	7,753	3,379
20	11,174	6,642
21	8,012	4,950
22	9,038	2,680
Totals	171,861	58,225



B. Campaigns1. The Mayoralty Election of 1959

The election of 1959, in which John F. Collins, who had few endorsements of importance, beat John E. Powers, president of the state Senate, who was heavily backed and expected on every side to win, is described in two documents which accompany this Report. Bryant C. Danner, Campaign Decision-Makers, Mimeographed, Cambridge, 1960 (Document #4) gives the inside story of how Powers' campaign strategy was formed. Danner, then a senior in Harvard College, did research for the Powers managers during the campaign. Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter; Politics in Boston, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York 1960 (Document #3) explains the outcome of the election and draws some conclusions about the mentality of the electorate. Levin is assistant professor of government at Boston University. The first chapter of The Alienated Voter (written by George Blackwood, associate professor of government at Boston University) deals with the structure of Boston politics; it includes brief biographies of the candidates, an account of the preliminary election, a map of the socio-economic characteristics of Boston wards, and a description of the main events of the campaign. Chapters 2 and 3 report on and analyze 500 interviews taken within three days after the election.

Levin concludes that the election was not "won" by Collins, but lost by Powers:

Many individuals voted for Collins, not because they

were convinced he was the superior candidate, but rather because they disliked him less than his opponent. Collins was seen by many as the lesser of two evils. He received more votes than Powers because many of those who did not vote in the preliminary voted in the final and supported him more than two to one. In this election the most important effect of the campaign was to activate the nonvoters. Collins did not win because large numbers of Powers' supporters switched to Collins (p. 45).

From this Levin goes on (in a last chapter written in collaboration with Dr. Jason Aronson, assistant in psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School) to conclude that the voters' behavior expresses "political alienation"--the feeling that one is not a part of the political process and that his vote makes no difference. He lays great stress on "the profound cynicism of the electorate toward professional politicians and the deep-seated feeling that the voters are politically powerless."

In this election, a very large part of the electorate believed that voting was meaningless because neither candidate was really desirable. Many, therefore, stayed away from the polls, or if they did vote, believed that their vote would make very little difference in the way the city is run. Many feel that Boston is controlled by a tightly knit group of selfish and powerful people who are not and cannot be displaced by the voters. The politicians are viewed as corrupt and greedy individuals who use their public position to advance their private interests. A note of desperation, which is not so quiet, pervades the Boston electorate (p. 46).

Readers of this Report will find the background information and poll data in the first three chapters of The Alienated Voter particularly useful. The method and conclusions of the book are discussed in the following review.

## 2. A Review of The Alienated Voter

by Bryant C. Danner

My main criticism of The Alienated Voter is that the



conclusions are not supported by the data. Before discussing this major matter, however, I would like to point out what I believe to be a flaw in the construction of the sample. Levin draws two quite different types of data from his sample. First, he describes the voting behavior of certain groups and evaluates the relative importance of these groups in the outcome. Second, he analyzes the responses to determine why people voted as they did and thus to discover why Powers lost. The sample was especially designed to provide the second type of data (the author so states on p. 77): 46 of the 50 precincts sampled were precincts won by Collins. The relative lack of interviews in places where Powers was strong raises a doubt whether the sample was adequate to provide the first type of data, that describing the relative importance of the various groups within the electorate. No precincts in the wards won by Powers (6, 7, 8, and 9) were sampled, although these contained 12 per cent of the vote and are quite different from the other wards (wards 6, 7, and 8 are Irish strongholds in Powers' senatorial district, and ward 9 is the most heavily Negro of the wards). If these wards had been sampled, Levin would probably have got a somewhat different picture of how opinion changed between the preliminary and the final election. The percentage of votes switching from Powers to Collins would probably have been lower.

This is no more than a flaw, however. A well conducted poll in the precincts that were selected would give an adequate picture of the Collins vote and would suffice to explain many of the reasons why Powers lost.

The "Anti" Vote

The poll showed that many of those who voted for Collins did so because they actively disliked Powers. "Exactly half of those who voted for Collins mentioned that they supported him because they did not like his opponent" (p. 37). "The majority of those who switched from Powers to Collins mentioned some anti-Powers reason for so doing rather than a pro-Collins reason" (p. 33).

From this undeniable evidence of an anti-Powers vote, Levin makes two generalizations:

1. The anti-Powers vote was really an anti-Politician vote.
2. The voters feel powerless, alienated from the political process.

The reader will search in vain for significant evidence to support these intriguing generalizations.

Levin suggests that anti-Powers sentiment was really anti-politician sentiment by several quotes from interviewees:

"...they're all a little crooked" (p. 33).

"...the typical Boston politician is a crook" (p. 35).

But such quotes are few, and they do not add up to a convincing account. Furthermore, Levin does not relate this sentiment to party affiliation. Very likely Republican voters, faced with a choice between two Democrats, did feel that neither candidate was desirable. On page 38, Levin quotes a "college-educated respondent from Ward 5" as saying, "I wasn't impressed with either candidate." It would be interesting to know if this respondent was a Republican. Ward 5 is the most

Republican in the city.

Nor does the author present evidence to support his statements that:

"[there is] a widespread cynicism toward politics and politicians..." (p. 38).

"...a large proportion of the electorate feels politically powerless..." (p. 58).

Table 6 reports that only 13 per cent of the Collins voters said that their man was the "lesser of two evils." Certainly this is not a "large proportion" or evidence of "widespread cynicism."

Most of the comments cited by Levin suggest that voters objected not to politicians in general but to Powers in particular when they voted for Collins. They thought that Powers was too powerful, that he was sponsored by too many people, had been too long in office, was part of the South Boston crowd, and had forced himself on everybody (see pp. 34-40). Many respondents apparently thought in terms of political types--good and bad, old and new, South Bostonian and other--but these did not think that all politicians are evil.

There can be no doubt, from Levin's data and from other evidence, that some people disliked Powers because he appeared to them to be a typical representative of the "bad" category. On the other hand, there is ample evidence that other people voted against him for reasons that were altogether different. Levin's study shows that almost one-third of the voters gave a "visceral" reason for their vote (p. 44). These "gut reactions" were diffuse responses to the candidates'

public personalities. Most of them went against Powers. It is, of course, impossible to weigh the relative importance of the "personality" and the "power-politics" factors. One cannot help wondering whether, if Powers had had more personal appeal, this would have counteracted his reputation as a "power politician."

That Boston voters feel powerless or "alienated" from the political process is shown, Levin says, by the evidence of the poll that almost 50 per cent of the voters were not certain that their preferred candidate would be a better mayor. This, he says, implies "...a low sense of confidence among many voters that their voting decision was correct" (p. 63). The inference does not necessarily follow. Even though he admits that his candidate may not make a better mayor, a voter may nevertheless be confident that his choice was correct.

The alienation theory is made even less convincing by direct contradictions in the account of the sample data. It is important to know which groups felt powerless. On page 53 this passage appears: "Those who switched from Powers to Collins were not preponderantly from the lowest group but evenly spread among all income levels." But on page 65 the direct opposite is said: "The data collected in our survey shows that the lower-income groups switched from Powers to Collins in larger proportions than did the middle or upper income groups."

Another confusion develops when the responses of various religious groups are analyzed. The reader finds on page 56: "There is no statistically significant difference between

Catholics, Protestants, and Jews with respect to vote turnout...." But he is assured on page 66 that the alienation theory is supported by "...the fact that a smaller percentage of Protestants and Jews voted than did Catholics."

Powers' campaign managers have read Levin's book avidly searching for support or refutation of their basic campaign decisions. They have found several of their assumptions supported. Other crucial questions remain unresolved.

Although he was the front runner in the 1959 campaign, Powers adopted a defensive strategy. He did this because of his analysis of the reasons for his defeat in 1955. He and his advisers believed that that campaign was lost because he was thought to have no program, to be opposed by all civic leaders, including the Catholic Archbishop, and to be associated with "the mob." He was convinced that he could win in 1959 if this image of him were changed. His 1959 campaign strategy, therefore, was intended to prevent opponents from developing these old themes. He and his advisers were aware that there was a great deal of vague suspicion of him. But they were confident that he would win if this suspicion could be kept from crystallizing into something definite and concrete. His association with civic leaders, the appearance of Cardinal Cushing at his testimonial dinner, and his "high-level," programmatic campaign were all intended to prevent his opponents from bringing the suspicion of him to a head.

The Powers strategists did not believe that the presentation of a program would, by itself, convince voters to vote for Powers. Rather, they thought that it would prevent



opponents from damaging Powers with the argument that he lacked a program. This appears to have been correct. There was no criticism of Powers on the grounds that his program was inadequate. On the other hand, the Levin study shows that only 19 per cent of those who voted for Powers mentioned his program as a reason. Therefore the assumption of the Powers strategists that a program would be a defensive asset, rather than a positive one, was sound.

Levin's sample indicates that Powers was unable to escape the reputation of being the "darling of the mob." As Levin notes, the last minute bookie raid tended to confirm the general suspicion on this point. The sample revealed that 36 per cent of the Collins voters "liked least" about Powers "his tie up with unsavory elements" (p. 39). Powers' strategists were aware of this danger but they could not escape it.

Powers' staff expected the women's vote to be against him. They came to this conclusion from their analysis of the 1955 campaign, from expressions of opinion during the 1959 campaign, and from evidence that the election-day turnout was heaviest during those hours of morning and afternoon when women were most likely to vote. During the campaign the Senator had tried hard to woo the women. Special women's committees were organized, and fashion shows were held. According to Levin, women voted 59 per cent, while men voted 52.8 per cent for Collins. But the larger number of women who turned out made no difference. An increase of over 10 per cent in the number of women voting, Levin says, would have effected a change of only 0.3 per cent in the size of Collins' majority. This

does not mean, however, that the greater preference among women for Collins was not important. If they had voted for Collins in the same proportion as did men, his margin of victory would have been reduced from 24,000 to less than 10,000.

If Levin is right about the alienation of the voters, the Powers' strategists were wrong in one important respect. Although they knew that many voters were suspicious of Powers, they did not think that this suspicion extended to all politicians. They thought that voters who disliked Powers did so for reasons that had to do with him as an individual, especially that he had no formal education and came from South Boston. His staff expected the voters to respect some politicians, and a major part of his campaign was intended to show that respectable politicians like John Kennedy, District Attorney Byrne, Attorney General McCormack, and ex-Governor Paul Dever endorsed the Senator. Levin says that these efforts only made matters worse, since people are skeptical about all politicians. Powers and his advisers do not accept Levin's theory. They still think that the public has a high regard for some politicians.

Levin and his collaborator suggest (p. 68) that political strategists should beware of alienation in the electorate. Presumably the strategists will then be able to formulate more rational campaign tactics. It is hard to see how this can be, however, for the alienation theory leads to vague and ambiguous conclusions. There are, the author notes (pp. 66-68), several mechanisms by which voters express their feeling of powerlessness. First is "rational activism", in which the



alienated become politically active in an attempt to reform politics. Second, they may "withdraw." Third, they may vote in accordance with a "conspiratorial theory," expressing opposition to those who are powerful. And fourth, they may vote for a "charismatic leader" in an attempt to identify themselves with one who is powerful.

While these four possibilities seem plausible, the politician has no way of knowing which of them will be chosen. And since they cover the entire field of possible voting decisions, the alienation theory offers no practical guidance.

The alienation thesis must be consistent with the overall context of electoral behavior in Boston. Such questions as these must be answered:

If the voters are alienated, is their alienation limited only to the 1959 mayoralty election or does it extend to all elections on a state, national and local level? The authors suggest (p. 63) that meaninglessness may be especially significant in municipal politics. However, this point is not developed.

Is the "powerlessness" explanation consistent with a 65 per cent turnout in a municipal election the outcome of which is thought to be a sure thing? Does it explain why Powers received such a heavy preliminary vote in 1959, or why he made such a strong showing in 1955, when he was also called a Professional Politician? Does it explain the great personal loyalty to various politicians in Boston? Why, if it feels powerless, does the Boston electorate vote overwhelmingly Democratic in partisan elections? Why does it not vote for the "least powerful politician" regardless of party?

PART IV - EXTERNAL RELATIONS\*

A. City-State

1. Boston's Special Position

More than most central cities in the U. S. and more than any city or town in Massachusetts, Boston is dependent upon the state. For example: the mayors of other Massachusetts cities appoint police chiefs; Boston's police commissioner is appointed by the Governor, and although the mayor and the police commissioner must agree on any increase in the number of patrolmen and on any general pay raise, the Mayor has nothing to say on other items of the police budget: these the city must pay "upon the requisition of the commissioner." Again, Boston, but not other cities, is subject to continuous scrutiny by a Finance Commission appointed by the Governor; the Commission has the power of subpoena, and it may conduct investigations of whatever kind it pleases. (In practice, the Mayor is always consulted in the choice of Commissioners; the power to ignore him is there, however.) Boston--and Boston only--has its Licensing Board appointed by the Governor; the regulation of liquor sales and of the operation of hotels, restaurants, employment agencies, bowling alleys, shooting galleries, and other such enterprises is therefore beyond the reach of the city electorate.

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\*This part of the report is adapted from a paper by Richard Takasaki.

The actions of Boston's Zoning Commission, but not those of the zoning commissions of other cities, remain without effect until 12 months after they have been filed with the clerk of the Senate. The legislature (General Court, as it is called in Massachusetts) thus in effect reserves the right to pass upon the acts of the Boston commission.

Boston has little part in the management of the special function districts which serve it. The Metropolitan District Commission, which furnishes water, sewer, park, and parkway services to 45 municipalities (not all of these subscribe to all services), is run by five commissioners appointed by the Governor. The Metropolitan Transit Authority, which runs the Boston subway system as well as a rapid transit system serving 14 municipalities, is run by three commissioners appointed by the Governor.

The state constitution provides that all laws made by towns and cities are subject to annulment by the legislature. That is, the legislature is free to legislate on all city and town matters. However, Boston was singled out for special treatment when the legislature passed the general laws on the powers of cities. Any city except Boston may adopt any one of five charter forms. These are Plan A (strong mayor - weak council), Plan B (weak mayor - strong council), Plan C (commission), Plan D (city manager), and Plan E (modified Plan D). Boston was not given this option. Its charter was fixed by special legislation. (See Part II, Section A1 of this Report

Boston's property tax rate has risen so fast and so far (from \$69.80 per \$1,000 of assessed valuation in 1955 to \$101.20 in 1959) that most everyone believes further increases in revenue must come from other sources. But other sources are not open to the city without action by the legislature. Thus almost anything the city wants to do depends, if it costs any money at all, on the approval of the legislature.

That Boston is so much at the mercy of the state and so little regarded by it is partly a function of its size: by the accidents of history, the city is a small part of the metropolitan area. In most large metropolitan areas, the central city population makes up about two-thirds of the total. In Boston, it makes up only one-third. If Boston had expanded according to the normal pattern, it would include such places as Brookline, Cambridge, Somerville, Medford, and Quincy, and it would therefore be large enough to dominate the agencies managing water, sewage disposal and rapid transit or indeed to manage these matters itself. But as matters stand, it is not large enough to have much more weight than do several of the suburbs.

Another and more important reason for Boston's special position is the character of its politics and, especially, of the political divisions which have existed, and to some extent still exist, between it and the rest of the state. For a century Boston has been heavily Irish-Catholic and Democratic. The rest of the state has until recently been heavily Yankee, Protestant, and Republican. The Yankee Republicans long ago saw that they would lose Boston to the Irish Democrats.



Accordingly, they established indirect control over Boston through the legislature, which they were sure of controlling for some time to come. The legislature was carefully gerrymanded to perpetuate their control, and Boston's powers were reduced and kept under the legislature's domination.

The thing that concerned the Yankees most was the regulation of liquor. The city lost control of the police department in 1885 because the Brahmins felt that the Irish were drinking too much. The licensing power was transferred to the state in 1906 for the same reason. The Finance Commission was created then also. In this instance, the Yankees had the help of an Irish leader, Mayor John F. Fitzgerald (grandfather of U. S. Senator Kennedy), who appointed a seven-man commission to examine the affairs of the city. His efforts led to what amounted to a new charter in 1909. The Finance Commission became a permanent institution and was required to make an annual report to the General Court (legislature).

The Republican strategy of running Boston from the State House worked well for a long time. As Duane Lockard shows (New England State Politics, Princeton University Press, 1959), the emergence of the Democratic party as a competitor in Massachusetts politics was a slow process. Because of splits in the Republican ranks, several Democratic governors were elected before 1900. The Democrats did not control the House until 1948, however, and they did not control the Senate until 1958. In that year they had both houses and the Governorship. Whereas the Republicans could never hope to capture anything in Boston, they can still hope to capture one or

more of the citadels of state power. Therefore, they still have an incentive, although less of a one than before, to pursue the old strategy of governing the city from the State House.

## 2. Boston's Representation in the Legislature

Five of Massachusetts' 40 senators are elected from districts entirely within Boston and three others are elected from districts which lie partly in Boston. The House has 240 members, of whom 41 are elected from Boston.

As the following table shows, Boston is slightly over-represented in both houses.

### Representation of Boston in the General Court, 1955

	<u>Legal Voters</u>	<u>Members</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Legal Voters</u> <u>Per Member</u>
<u>Senate</u>				
Boston and part Boston	465,232	8	20	58,154
Rest of State	2,045,353	32	80	63,917
<u>House</u>				
Boston	370,474	41	17	9,036
Rest of State	2,140,111	199	83	10,754

The last redistricting was in 1947. Since then Boston has lost population and the suburbs have gained it; redistricting would probably reduce Boston's strength by six in the House and one in the Senate. (See part VI, section D for a discussion of redistricting.)

As the following table shows, Boston and the inner core suburbs are heavily Democratic in their representation

in the legislature. The rest of the state is more evenly divided.

Party Composition of the  
General Court, 1958

	Representatives			Senators		
	R	D	All	R	D	All
Boston and Part Boston	4	37	41	1	7	8
14 Inner Core Suburbs	11	27	38	-	-	-
Rest of Metropolitan Area	22	12	34	8	5	13
Rest of State	58	69	127	7	12	19
	95	145	240	16	24	40

Boston is important to a Governor. The rule of thumb is that a Democrat must come out of Boston with a lead of 100,000 votes to carry the state. Furcolo showed in 1956 and 1958, however, that a Democrat may do well enough in other cities to offset the Republican advantage in the suburbs and rural places. As the table shows, Furcolo's majority in the 11 core cities and towns around Boston and in the four large cities elsewhere in the state (Fall River, New Bedford, Springfield, and Worcester) was greater than his opponent's majority in the suburbs and rural places.



GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR BOSTON,  
GREATER BOSTON, AND STATE  
1954, 1956, and 1958

1954	Republican	Democrat	Margin	% Distribution	
	(Herter)	(Murphy)		Repub.	Dem.
Boston	90,794	164,936	74,142 (D)	9.2	18.1
Core (11 cities and towns)	113,288	139,605	26,317 (D)	11.5	15.3
Inner Band (41 cities & towns)	230,567	144,564	86,003 (R)	23.4	15.9
Outer Band (96 cities & towns)	209,641	166,729	42,912 (R)	21.3	18.3
4 cities over 100,000*	108,397	118,610	10,213 (D)	11.0	13.0
Other cities & towns	232,652	175,643	57,009 (R)	23.6	19.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>985,339</b>	<b>910,087</b>	<b>75,252 (\$)</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<u>1956</u>	(Whittier)	(Furcolo)			
Boston	96,353	207,837	111,485 (D)	8.8	16.8
Core	121,391	179,215	57,824 (D)	11.1	14.5
Inner Band	262,166	212,044	50,122 (R)	23.9	17.2
Outer Band	249,880	225,205	24,675 (R)	22.8	18.2
4 cities over 100,000*	105,102	160,035	54,933 (D)	9.6	13.0
Other cities & towns	261,868	250,282	11,586 (R)	23.9	20.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,096,759</b>	<b>1,234,618</b>	<b>137,859 (D)</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<u>1958</u>	(Gibbons)	(Furcolo)			
Boston	58,225	171,861	113,636 (D)	7.1	16.1
Core	82,730	155,046	72,316 (D)	10.1	14.5
Inner Band	201,457	193,482	7,975 (R)	24.6	18.7
Outer Band	186,904	210,444	23,540 (D)	22.8	19.7
4 cities over 100,000*	83,242	127,197	43,955 (D)	10.2	11.9
Other cities & towns	205,905	208,990	3,085 (D)	25.2	19.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>818,463</b>	<b>1,067,020</b>	<b>248,557 (D)</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

\*Fall River, New Bedford, Springfield, Worcester

### 3. Boston's Troubles with the Legislature

Every year numerous bills are proposed by the Governor, the Mayor, members of the City Council, and members of the legislature to relieve Boston of charges that have been unfairly imposed upon it or to give it new sources of revenue or other assistance. And every year the "Boston bills," almost without exception, are defeated.

At least five reasons may be given for this record of chronic and almost complete failure in a legislature in which the city is over-represented:

1. The rest of the state is either indifferent to Boston or actively hostile towards it. The suburbs, whose cooperation is required for passage of most bills dealing with Boston matters, are notoriously unhelpful. The suburban image of Boston is, as the Herald recently remarked editorially (1/5/60), a shabby one:

It is an image compounded of favoritism, laxity, poor service, bad management, and even, alas, corruption.

This is the image that makes suburbanites "leery of Boston politics" even to the point that they blame Boston officials for the sins of state officials. It is the image that assures continued legislative discrimination against our city....

The suburbs, their spokesmen often say, will help Boston only when it shows some signs of helping itself. This kind of talk riles Boston, of course, since it feels that it is subsidizing the suburbs. The editors of the Herald recently expressed the Boston view in an editorial (11/27/59):

#### OUR SUBSIDIZED SUBURBS

Anyone who sponged on a man and simultaneously criticized him for his extravagant ways would be considered

an ingrate and a hypocrite.

Yet this, essentially, is what Boston's suburbs are doing. They are constantly calling on Boston to clean house, and just as constantly partaking of the hospitality of that house.

Take the "mutual aid" system of fire protection. Not long ago the Boston Fire Department dispatched eleven pumping companies to a major fire in a neighboring community. This community could not possibly have fought the fire alone, for it maintains only five pumping companies. Nor could it have returned the favor. Indeed, rarely, if ever, is more than one fire company from outside of Boston called on to fight a Boston fire.

The Boston Public Library is demonstrably an asset to the people of the entire metropolitan area. Each year Boston taxpayers shell out about a million dollars to support its unexcelled reference and research facilities, yet one of every three persons who uses these facilities lives outside Boston. (The library does charge a \$5 fee for registered borrowers who live outside the city. But even here there is a large subsidy, for the cost of running the library, per registered borrower, is \$17.)

Every time a resident of a community outside the MTA district rides our transit system, he is being subsidized by Boston and the 13 other communities within the district. His 15-cent or 20-cent fare does not cover the cost of the service given to him.

Boston's fire department could be run less extravagantly. So, perhaps, could its public library. And so, certainly, could the MTA.

Some of Boston's housecleaning must be done by Boston alone. Of this, there is no doubt. For example, Boston can and should face up to the fact that its fire department is badly overmanned.

But it is noteworthy that the Legislature, in which the suburbs have a much larger representation than Boston, contributed to fire department costs by approving, over the protest of city officials, a referendum to increase firemen's pay.

The Legislature has consistently refused to give Boston a break by spreading a part of its library costs among neighboring cities and towns.

And the suburbs could clean up the MTA tomorrow, if they so desired, merely by demanding that their legislators pass a law to reorganize it from top to bottom.

Pious suburban cries against Boston's fiscal irresponsibility will have a hollow sound until the suburbs act more responsibly themselves.

The sad truth is that the suburbs like being subsidized and don't want to stop. When Mayor Collins proposed a rigorously severe program of economy for Boston, there was no



evidence that the suburbs, seeing now that Boston was ready to help itself, had changed their attitude. When a Monitor reporter asked Senate President Powers what the chances were of Collins' program being adopted, he said:

If you were a representative from Newton, how would you vote? We can't expect these people to be "statesmen," and go back to their constituents and tell them, "I voted for a bill to help Boston, but it may add to our tax rate."

Only about half of the 32 bills filed by Collins would have cost non-Boston people anything. Other reasons must therefore be found to account for what happens to Boston year after year.

2. Though the Mayor of Boston has some patronage to offer as an inducement to legislative favor, he does not swing enough personal weight with the legislature to secure bills for Boston.

Mayor Hynes, apparently believing that nothing he did would make any difference, did not propose a comprehensive legislative program and paid little attention to the legislature. In 1959 he filed 21 petitions, all on minor matters. Seven were acted upon favorably.

Mayor Collins was determined to at least make a show of trying. He appointed two "legislative liaisons," Attorney Paul J. Burns, a Boston College Law School graduate, and former Representative Louis K. Nathanson, a Harvard Law School graduate, and he invited small groups of legislators to his office for snacks and informal discussion of the city's affairs. Never before, some legislators said, had they been asked into the office of the Mayor of Boston.

3. The legislature is over-burdened with picayune matters. Meeting annually from January often until September, it acts upon several thousand bills, at least a third of which are on trivial matters of purely local interest. The constitution gives every citizen the right to petition the legislature, and it requires the legislature to act upon every petition: nothing can be pigeonholed.

On a single day (1/24/60), the Herald listed 143 bills on which hearings were being held. These were some of them:

H. 1918 That Fall River be authorized to appropriate money for the purchase of uniforms for the park police and watershed guards of said city.

H. 848 That the Department of Public Works be authorized to widen River Street in Hyde Park.

H. 2027 For repeal of the law requiring the cooking of garbage before feeding to swine.

H. 2451 That cities and towns be authorized to make one appropriation when making a loan for the construction, reconstruction, surfacing, and resurfacing of streets and sidewalks and for the installation of curbing.

Proposals have been made to cut down on the vast number of bills by prohibiting special legislation which has not had the prior approval of a town meeting or of a mayor and council. These proposals get nowhere, however, because some interests can do better in the legislature than they could with their local governments. (In 1958, for example, the Boston firemen, having been turned down by the City, got the legislature to put the question of a pay increase before the electorate in a referendum. The proposal was approved by the voters, and so the firemen got a raise that they would not have got if they had not had direct access to the legislature.)

4. Boston legislators must spend a large part of their time--90 per cent of it, some say--running errands for constituents, errands of a kind that would be run by City Councilmen if the Councilmen were elected on a ward basis. Since the legislative district is now the only electoral unit that is less than city-wide, representatives (and to some extent senators) cannot escape demands for service in what are essentially neighborhood matters.

5. The Governor cannot keep a tight rein on the legislature, and he sometimes does not choose to exercise as much control as he might. Elected for a two-year term, the Governor can never stop running for office and is under constant temptation to use the legislature as a publicity-getting device by offering it a constant stream of spectacular and ill-conceived proposals which have no chance of passage. A Democratic Governor is in an even weaker position than a Republican one (Lockard maintains the contrary; New England State Politics, pp. 156-57) because the Democrats have no state-wide party machinery that he can control. Even a Democratic Governor, however, could exercise considerable power in the legislature if he made full use of the patronage at his disposal. Governor Furcolo has not done so. He has ignored and exasperated the party professionals by appointments that hurt the party, and he has left routine patronage in the hands of department heads, who have used it for their own purposes. The Governor, according to his staff, is "sick and tired" of discussing policy matters with legislators because the talk always gets around to jobs. The Governor, his staff says, wins elections by TV

appeals, not by organization, and he wishes he had less patronage to dispense.

In 1960 the Democratic legislature cut the Democratic Governor's \$454 million operating budget by five per cent (\$11 million in the House and another \$11.5 million in the Senate) and increased his \$22 million capital budget by \$14 million. When he vetoed the increases, it overrode the vetoes. The Governor's major tax programs were also defeated. His response to all this was characteristic: he appealed to the people by TV. There were those who thought that the worse his success in the legislature, the more sympathy he might expect to gain with his TV audience.

Democratic politics is still a matter of personal following. One politician cannot deliver votes to another. No politician can woo away or steal away the following of another. And no politician will accept the discipline of a party hierarchy: he is accountable, he feels, only to his following.

The Republicans are much better organized. They choose a single slate for state offices at a pre-primary convention--something the Democrats can never do. Being able to agree in this way, they can present a slate in which ethnic, geographical, factional, and personality differences are nicely harmonized or balanced. This campaign, moreover, is financed by contributions to the party. Each Democratic candidate, by contrast, collects and disburses his own fund.

There are built-in antagonisms which prevent the Mayor of Boston, the Governor, and the leading Boston Democrat in



the legislature from getting along together. They are not all at odds with each other all of the time, but at least two of them are at odds at any one time, and this is enough to prevent the legislature from doing anything for Boston. For many years the split was between Walsh and Curley. Lately it has been between Governor Furcolo and Senate President John E. Powers of South Boston. Since his defeat by Collins in what he considers to have been a dirty campaign, Powers has been at swords' points with Collins also, although by late May 1960 there were indications that Powers was ready to forgive Collins and cooperate with him.

The difficulties of cooperation between the two in the early months of Collins' administration may be judged from the following account by Monitor reporter Michael Liuzzi (2/8/60) of separate interviews with them:

Question: Senator Powers, you said you might retaliate. What would that involve?

Powers: There are investigatory rights that go along with this chair right here. We can have investigations. I don't have to go through the Governor or anybody else.

Collins: He can investigate anything he likes.

Powers: And there could be an atmosphere of reprisals in the Legislature that would affect Boston bills. I didn't create this atmosphere! It's not me that's doing it!

Question: What would have to happen to eliminate this bad atmosphere?

Powers: Stop playing politics. They're the ones who are playing it. They'll just have to stop. If someone's going to come to the Legislature asking for certain things, they have to show they're on the level.

Collins: The campaign ended on Nov. 4, as far as I'M concerned.

I don't want to be put in the position of becoming involved in a personal fight with Powers. That's the worse thing that could happen. I seek the cooperation of all Boston legislators in getting bills enacted for the good of Boston.

I have invited Powers to have dinner with me, or to meet with me anytime, at his convenience, to talk this over. That invitation still stands.

Powers: Why should I sit down and dine with a man who said such things about me. He talked as if I were someone not fit for anybody to associate with. He said things about me that he knew were not true.

Collins: I took special care not to say anything I couldn't prove. I have affidavits to back up everything I said.

Question: Senator Powers, is there anything that could happen that would make you willing to talk with the Mayor?

Powers: I don't want to talk with him.

Collins: If he keeps on killing our legislation, something will have to be done.

Powers: I'm not going to do anything that would hurt Boston.

I had nothing to do with that police-budget bill being defeated in the House.

Collins: Everybody knows he was getting reports from the lobbying on that bill every 15 minutes--people running in and out of his office constantly.

Powers: There's a deliberate attempt being made to create a bad atmosphere--by blaming defeat of Boston bills on me.

Question: Who's creating this atmosphere?

Powers: It's the newspapermen, certain ones at least. Some of them are so much in favor of the sales tax, they'll do anything they can to hurt a strong opponent of the sales tax such as myself.

If there were any who supposed that Mayor Collins' warm smile and mid-morning snacks might charm the legislature into passing the Boston bills, they were very soon disappointed. In his inaugural, Collins made the usual requests for relief from various "unfair" financial burdens and asked for a sales tax, something which had been in his campaign platform. Within two weeks he met an embarrassing failure in his first attempt to get a bill passed. It was an important bill (he wanted to have the Fire Commissioner on the Traffic Commission in place of the chief of Parks and Recreation), but after being passed in the House it was defeated in the Senate 9-3.

The next week Collins suffered another defeat. He wanted Leo J. Sullivan, the police commissioner (whose wife had been an active supporter of Powers), to make a substantial

cut in the department's 1960 budget. Sullivan was not inclined to do so, and the Mayor had no way of making him. Collins accordingly asked the legislature to give him full control of the police budget. The legislature not only refused, but went so far as to deny him the opportunity to testify on behalf of his proposal.

Another "Boston bill," one which would have assessed a portion of Suffolk County costs on the three cities in the county other than Boston, was defeated in the House 150-59 with only 22 representatives from outside Boston joining the solid Boston delegation. Because Boston's Mayor and City Council serve as the county officials, it would be "taxation without representation," the representatives of the three cities claimed, to charge them with any part of the cost of county government. The next day the Senate rejected the bill with only six senators from outside Boston voting for it.

By far the most important defeat, however, was one inflicted upon Governor Furcolo and Mayor Collins jointly. Early in January, Furcolo proposed a 3 per cent limited sales tax, the proceeds of which would be used solely for reduction of local real estate taxes. During the mayoralty campaign, Collins had favored and Powers had opposed a sales tax. If the Governor's measure passed, Boston's \$101 real estate tax rate could be reduced by \$15 to \$21. This, of course, would send the Collins administration off to a flying start.

When he made the tax proposal, the Governor said he expected Powers to vote for it. "I'm satisfied," he said, "Senator Powers is not going to vote against what Mayor Collins

wants and is good for the City of Boston." Within a matter of minutes, however, Powers announced that he was unalterably opposed to the tax. Although it was ardently supported by the Boston press and by business and good government groups, the proposal was badly beaten.

The Mayor was expected to try a new tactic in the 1961 legislature. Rather than identify important measures as "Boston bills," he would try to associate Boston's measures with those of other communities. If a bill benefitted other communities mainly and Boston only incidentally, the incidental benefits to Boston might possibly be overlooked by the legislature in its desire to help the other communities. That, at least, was the theory.

The table on the next page shows how the rest of the state lined up against Boston on three important matters in 1959:

House Vote on Certain Boston Bills,  
1959

	<u>Library</u> <sup>1</sup>		<u>MTA</u> <sup>2</sup>		<u>County Expense</u> <sup>3</sup>	
	<u>Repub.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Repub.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Repub.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>
Boston						
For	3	35	3	26	3	31
Against	-	-	-	1	-	-
Not Voting	-	2	-	10	-	6
Rest of Metro- politan Area						
For	-	3	2	5	4	4
Against	27	33	22	25	22	31
Not Voting	4	4	8	9	5	5
Rest of State						
For	10	21	4	14	10	57
Against	39	39	24	31	73	67
Not Voting	10	10	31	25	10	23

<sup>1</sup>To require cities and towns in the Metropolitan Transit District to reimburse Boston for certain expenses of the public library.

<sup>2</sup>To allocate the MTA deficit among cities and towns according to population rather than by passenger count, a formula which discriminates against Boston.

<sup>3</sup>To charge some part of Suffolk County expense to Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop, the other towns which with Boston comprise the County. At present Boston bears all County expense.



PART V - INTEREST GROUPS AND INFLUENCE

A. The Press

by Peter Braestrup

1. General

In many American cities daily newspapers are a vital force in civic life. Not so in Boston. In Boston they are a minor, almost an inconsequential, factor. They do not consistently try to lead, and this, many people think, is one reason why Boston is so beset with tax, housing, and other problems. "If we had a Providence Journal or a St. Louis Post-Dispatch," Gabriel F. Piemonte, former city councillor and candidate for mayor, recently told an interviewer, "we could solve most of our problems in a very short time."

No Boston newspaper has won a Pulitzer prize for public service since the now-defunct Post won one in 1923. None has ever won a Pulitzer for reporting.

One might expect the conditions that exist in Boston to produce crusading journalism in the great tradition. More perhaps than any other American city, Boston needs leadership. With its boundaries narrowly drawn, crosscut with deep cleavages along class and ethnic lines, and with a political system dominated by petty factional chieftains, Boston obviously needs an institution that can formulate, and win acceptance for, a coherent view of what is good for the whole city. In many cities the press serves this need to some extent. In Boston it might be expected to serve it unusually well, for Boston is one of the very few American cities that does not

have a newspaper monopoly. It has three morning and evening combines--the Globe papers, the Herald-Traveler, and the Hearst Record-American--and the church-owned Christian Science Monitor Only New York, which has ten times Boston's population, has as many newspapers. Diversity of ownership and competition are supposed to insure good coverage and the aggressive championing of every point of view. In Boston, however, they seem to lead to just the opposite.

The reader of the Globe or the Herald (the best papers, leaving out of account the non-commercial Monitor) is fairly well served with the top of the national and international news. But he gets only surface coverage of Boston's governmental and other affairs, and not much of the surface at that. On a big day he may find three columns of city affairs news--housing and urban renewal, City Hall, School Committee, city-related state legislation, juvenile delinquency, the activities of the metropolitan district commissions, and so on. But most days the ration is considerably less. (See Appendix, Table 1.)

If the reader is a suburbanite, he gets news of his own small community from its weekly newspaper. He is informed, then, about sewer assessments and about foreign policy. But nowhere can he turn for full and consistent coverage of the community that is neither very local nor national--the metropolitan area and its heart, the central city.

Not only do the newspapers fail to keep him informed, they fail also to exert influence when the public interest is at stake. Former Mayor Hynes was extremely sensitive to



press criticism. So is the present Mayor, John F. Collins. The newspapers, however, have never pushed either man very hard.

The Boston Police Department is widely believed to be inefficient and petty-corrupt, but the newspapers have not investigated it or, except for the Herald, criticized it editorially.

Housing experts say that one-third of Boston's residential housing is slum or near-slum, but the newspapers, on the whole, ignore both the residential housing aspect of urban renewal and the operation of the city building inspection service.

The annual quarrels between City Hall and the School Committee are reported the easy way, in terms of the official statements issued by both sides, and on occasion the formal criticisms by such civic groups as the Boston Municipal Research Bureau. But the working of the schools goes unreported.

Richard Cardinal Cushing is a public figure of first importance whose pronouncements on such matters as the Prudential Center and the Metropolitan Transit Authority are heard with great interest. The press, however, does not report the Archdiocese in a serious way. Instead it records exhaustively the Cardinal's cornerstone-layings, his trips to Lourdes, and his views on communism. Some prominent Catholics believe this pandering to the Catholic reader not only misleads but helps to create suspicion of "Irish Catholic power."

When a civic association like the business-supported Municipal Research Bureau talks about parks or municipal waste the newspapers perk up. The appropriate spokesman is quoted.

Then the matter is dropped.

The Boston Negro population and its problems--slums, civil rights--are invisible to the press. When college students picketed Woolworth's variety stores in support of Negro lunch-counter sit-ins in the South, the Boston papers played up similar demonstrations in Wisconsin while ignoring or playing down those at home.

The Boston commercial press suffers by comparison to the Christian Science Monitor, which has produced municipal reporting that newspapers anywhere might respect. In a series of running stories on Boston's tax abatement scandal, the Monitor (August 9, 1954) ran a page one story citing a newly-issued Boston Finance Commission report that abatements were at a record high. In most cities this story would have been seized upon in a "recovery" by the other papers, which would have tried to exploit it further. The Boston commercial press, however, left it to the Monitor. During the bitter Powers-Collins mayoralty fight in 1959, the Monitor ran at least two stories daily on the issues, the political background, and the candidates. The commercial press, by contrast, mostly printed excerpts from the candidates' daily utterances.

The commercial papers share a common set of city room priorities, which favor "soft" local news of crime, disaster, fire, traffic accidents, and "human interest." Human interest means Boy Scouts, parades, Cardinal Cushing, treed cats, visitors from Hollywood, and hero cops. Serious local news--news of local government, social and economic problems, trends, and so on--is played down. Interpretation and commentary on local

politics is mostly name-dropping and gossip.

The Globe, for example, sent ten reporters to cover the hunt for the homicidal Coyle brothers and it had a staffer go from London to Holland to interview the parents of a Dutch merchant marine officer who was held in Boston on a murder charge. It spared no expense in reporting the Canadian tour of Queen Elizabeth, the prison riots at Walpole, and a series of explosions in downtown saloons ("EXTRA"). The 1959 Boston mayoralty campaign, however, got surface coverage; the Globe (like its competition) ran a routine story on each of the two candidates, one or two texts of TV interviews, a "who's who" of the candidates the day before the election, and scattered uncritical notes on School Committee and City Council candidates.

Each paper has but one City Hall reporter. He usually covers not only the Mayor's office but the City Council, all municipal departments, and everything else pertaining directly to city government.

Unlike the Chicago and New York newspapers, the Boston press has no local Associated Press or City News Bureau to handle routine court, crime, accident, and disaster news so that the newspapers' reporters can concentrate on other things. A proposal several years ago to create such a "pool" service was rejected because, a Globe editor said, "Nobody felt they could trust the others."

As a result, the majority of Boston newspaper reporters are tied up in police stations and courts, or sitting around City Rooms waiting for something to happen. The police

reporter, a figure of decreasing importance in most cities, is still the basic soldier of Boston newspapering. "We just don't have the staff to go out and dig," said a managing editor.

"I have to keep my few spare reporters on hand for an emergency

From the ranks of the police reporters, therefore, come the men who man the city room desks where the day's possibilities are evaluated and the tradition of Boston newspapering is created.

The City Hall reporters hang out in a press room on the third floor. They have an informal agreement (the Traveler and, of course, the Monitor are not party to it) not to "beat" each other on stories. City Hall news is therefore pretty much the same for all papers except the Traveler and the Monitor. By mutual consent, a good deal is left uncovered.

The reporters at City Hall and on Beacon Hill, politicians and newspapermen say, are mostly hand-out men. "They are lazy," a state senator said. "If I give them a good sharp handout, it always goes in, sometimes almost as I wrote it. They'd rather print gossip than do any digging. And most of the time nobody pushes them from the top."

The fellow-feeling of the reporters extends to the politicians whom they are supposed to cover, and this further reduces the quality of the reporting. A press conference with the Mayor is amiable chit-chat. Tough questions are never asked. He dominates the meeting, and reporters have been heard to complain, "The Mayor didn't give us any story today."

"The editors don't want eager beavers," a City Hall



veteran observed, "so after a while they stop being eager beavers."

Mayor Collins puts the reporters to work even if their editors do not. He is the first Boston mayor to have a full-time public relations assistant (Richard Sinnott, formerly of AP), and he has produced a flow of "news"--12-14 speeches a month and as many as 50 press conferences--that forces the newspapers to give space to city affairs--on his terms.

The bad old days of payoffs to newsmen have gone, but it is not unusual for a reporter to use his assignment as an opportunity to secure minor favors (e.g., to get a friend off jury duty) or to get remunerative research or hack jobs. In May, 1954, the Providence Journal broke a series of articles by John Strohmeier detailing Massachusetts state payments to ten reporters of \$60,000 in a four-year period "for services ranging from issuing publicity releases to work on politically appointed legislative committees." The ten men represented all of the Boston commercial paper combines and the State House News Service, a news-gathering pool on Beacon Hill financed by Massachusetts newspapers. In another article, Strohmeier showed even bigger payoffs by racetracks to members of Boston newspaper sports staffs. In every case, the newspapermen were taking money with the full knowledge of their superiors. At least four of them are still on their newspapers' payrolls. "It's not a good thing," a newspaper executive said, "I'm against it. But it's hard to smoke out."

"The problem is," said a reporter, "the newspapers would rather have the reporter earn extra money on the outside

than pay him above the Newspaper Guild scale." Perhaps the worst feature of this conflict-of-interest problem is that it lessens the prestige and self-esteem of the newspaper. "It makes it damn hard for a Boston newspaper to play watchdog," said a reporter, "when it can't keep its own house in order." Managements are extremely reluctant to pay more than the Guild minimum. The Hearst papers do not have a single reporter over the minimum; the Herald-Traveler is not much better.\* Except on the Globe, there is heavy turnover. Industry, public relations, the state and municipal governments, and newspapers elsewhere lure away some of Boston's most able newspapermen. None of the Herald's four Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial writers is still with it; none of its Nieman Fellowship winners remain either. "I find it very difficult to hold bright reporters," an editor said. "I have to go out and hold their hands, sometimes."

That the Boston papers can exert influence when they really try has been proved beyond doubt. The publisher of

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\*Under various union contracts (the Globe is not organized by the Newspaper Guild), the "top minimum" weekly pay for reporters with five years of experience ranges from \$134.50 (the Record) to \$137.25 (the Herald) to \$138.75 (the Globe). The minimum is, for all practical purposes, the maximum. On the Herald-Traveler, only 15 per cent of the "top minimum" pay employees have received any merit increase whatsoever; the average for 112 "top minimum" employees is only \$2.44. Only one feature writer makes over \$17.

In Boston, not surprisingly, sports reporters do better than general assignment reporters. Ad salesmen do better than both.

By way of contrast, on comparable papers, the estimated average at the Buffalo Evening News is \$154.03 for experienced hands, 57 per cent of whom are "above scale," and at the Washington Evening Star, \$162.06. At the Cleveland Press, 95 per cent of the staff is paid over "top minimum scale," averaging \$176. The Buffalo Evening News has 25 editorial employees who earn over \$200 a week.

the Herald and Traveler decided early in 1958 to push: 1) construction of a new state office building in downtown Boston, 2) a parking garage under Boston Common, and 3) a second vehicular tunnel under Boston Harbor. He realistically buried the hatchet he had been using on William F. Callahan, boss of the Turnpike Authority, and he and Callahan together enlisted State Street aid for the projects and got them through. (In March, 1960, the state Supreme Court knocked out the office building.)

Such successes, however, have not given any of the papers a reputation for civic leadership. There is usually some suspicion that the newspaper campaign is motivated by some private commercial interest (cynics pointed out that the value of the old, vacated Herald-Traveler building would increase with construction of a Common garage), and the campaigns are often called "opportunistic," meaning that they are intended mainly to enhance the glory of the newspaper and are therefore apt to be ill-conceived and erratically conducted.

"The newspapers get 'projectitis,'" a civic association man told an interviewer. "The developers of a downtown project, like the West End, come in and get a few unsophisticated businessmen and the newspapers to go along with them. They show the idea to the Mayor [then John Hynes], and he shrugs and goes along with them. Nobody stops to look twice. Consequently, the urban renewal program has been snarled up by lawsuits and delayed by problems that a closer look might have eliminated in advance. Then the newspapers hammer the City Council for not acting quicker."



The Herald and Traveler are especially prone to 'projectitis,' but all Boston newspapers give "proposals" profuse illustration and uncritical coverage, treating them as if they had ample financial, legal, and political backing when in fact they are hardly more than a set of blueprints. Typical of this sort of irresponsible boosterism was a Herald story (Jan. 14, 1959) beginning, "Intown Boston now flexes mighty muscles like a giant rousing refreshed and vigorous from a quarter-century sleep...." A year after this story appeared, the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce published a report saying that the city's 10-year-old renewal program had resulted in the demolition of 2,800 structures and the completion of only one new building, the Herald-Traveler plant.

Boston editors are even more conscious of advertisers than are editors elsewhere. They frequently refer matters to the front office for decision, and in general they take care to avoid controversy that might stir up "important people." Advertisers are coddled with puffs presented as news. In the first week of April, 1960, the Globe, for example, devoted some of its scarce news space to a puff under the headline:

Only 2 Days Left to Win  
Pontiac's Easter Outfit

"Only two more days remain," the story said, "in which to win a complete \$1,000 Easter outfit for the entire family at your nearby Pontiac dealer...."

In most cities newspapers no longer spend money and newsprint on contest gimmicks to build circulation. In Boston,

however, contests go on most of the time.\*

## 2. A Closer View of Particular Newspapers

a. The Globe (circ. 191,000 a.m.; 150,000 p.m.; 410,000 Sunday). After two years of disastrous losses, the new Globe was taken over by General Charles H. Taylor in 1874. His object was to make it:

A cheerful attractive and useful newspaper that would enter the home as a kindly helpful member of the family. ...My temperament has always led me to dwell on the virtues of men and institutions rather than upon their faults and limitations....

Democratic at the start, the Globe split with the party of William Jennings Bryan over the free silver issue, became "independent," and often neutral. By 1890, the one-cent Globe was one of the nation's ten biggest dailies (circulation

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\* The Herald-Traveler in 1958-59 specialized in contests involving tie-ins with its advertisers, including a "You Auto Buy Now" contest (total prizes: \$4,774); a "Buy Your New Home Week" contest (\$1,043) in conjunction with the Home Builders Association of Greater Boston in which contestants were offered daily awards of portable radios and baseball tickets and a grand prize of a 7-day cruise to Nassau. Contestants were required to fill in the coupon which appeared in the Herald-Traveler each day and deposit it at one of the homes listed in the contest advertisement. Holders of listed Social Security numbers received a total of \$10,710 in a "daily double" contest. All-coverage accident insurance policies at cut rates were sold to Herald-Traveler subscribers; baseball score cards went to single copy buyers on days when baseball games were played in Boston. All in all, some \$35,000 (roughly the equivalent of the Guild-scale salaries of five Herald-Traveler reporters with five years' service) was paid out by the Herald-Traveler management for such contests in the 12 months ending March 31, 1959. During the same period, combined daily circulation of the Herald-Traveler fell by almost 10,000.

The Hearst papers, during this same period, paid out or offered prize moneys totalling \$100,000 in picture puzzle contests and a number "payoff."

The Globe stuck to insurance for subscribers, and showed Boston's only combined daily circulation gain (3,000) during the period.

150,000), with screamer headlines in the new Hearst style and a reputation for soberness and fair play. It was the first New England paper to make extensive use of illustrations, political cartoons, and women's features. It became known as a "solid," low-turnover, slow-moving, somewhat paternalistic organization. Today one-fourth of its employees, including Editor Laurence L. Winship and Managing Editor Victor O. Jones, are veterans of at least 25 years' service.

General Taylor's hardworking grandson, William Davis Taylor, who came up through the business side, is now the Globe's publisher. A sailing enthusiast and Boys Club backer, he wrote in his Harvard Class' 25-year history: "My social, political (independent) and religious convictions [are] normal, I hope, for a Harvard man...." He is mainly concerned with the business operations of the paper. His younger cousin, John I. Taylor (Harvard '37), vice-president and treasurer, came up through the news side. John is "front-office" liaison with the editorial departments, and he takes a keener interest than his cousin Davis in Boston's problems and in national politics. A good deal of John's time is also taken up with financial problems rather than editorial policy, however.

The Globe executive who is most active politically is Andrew Dazzi, its highly capable classified advertising manager (he has got for the Globe the lion's share of this advertising in Boston). Dazzi was a close friend and advisor to John B. Hynes when he was mayor, and he joined Mr. Hynes' successor, John F. Collins, during the latter's 1959 campaign. His critics later claimed Dazzi influenced Globe coverage of



the campaign against Powers. Globe staffers concede that on occasion he tried to get stories in the paper, but they say he had little success. Globe coverage of the 1959 campaign appears to have been impartial. Dazell's influence at City Hall, whatever it may have been, seems to have disappeared.

Housed in a new \$12,000,000 brick-and-glass plant (financed with a loan from Boston's John Hancock Insurance Co.) on the city's southern edge, the Globe is still very much a "family newspaper." "We're putting out a paper for the bottom half of the upper class, the middle class, and the top half of the lower class," an executive said. "We try to give everyone a chance to be heard in our pages."

Like its competition, the Globe relies heavily on outside sources to fill up its news pages. Behind its chaotic, dark page one "circus makeup" of advertising and its heavy play of disaster and human interest news, the Globe offers a fat menu of syndicated features (Eleanor Roosevelt, Walter Lippmann, Joseph Alsop, Roscoe Drummond, John Crosby, Doris Fleeson, Ed Koterba, Clementine Paddelford, Mary McGrory, and Ralph McGill). To supplement its UPI, AP, and Reuters wires, it gets the Chicago Daily News and New York Herald Tribune news services.

The space allotment for Washington and foreign "hard" news runs from six to ten columns. The space given to New England and metropolitan area news runs from eight to twelve columns. This includes crime and human interest. The comic page may take up 16 columns, the sports page 18. A Globe copy control sheet will consistently show twice as much space

devoted to sports and comics as to all other "hard news" combined.

The Globe spends lavishly for staff coverage of politics and specialized out-of-town news. Its political writer, John Harris, is free to roam and he does--to Europe, Alaska, and throughout the nation with Senator John F. Kennedy. Similarly, its lone Washington reporter, Robert Healy, travels widely to cover such "prestige" stories as Kennedy or Khrushchev's U. S. tour. Globe specialists in medicine, labor, education, and science attend distant out-of-town conventions. The Globe's respected financial writer, John Harriman, and its foreign affairs expert, Otto Zausmer, take reporting-interpretation trips abroad. But the Globe does not seriously explore its own back yard, although among the three morning papers, it has the highest percentage (64 per cent) of its readership in the city and commuter-belt, e.g., Brookline, Cambridge. On the average, less than two columns (of a weekday average of 118 news columns in 1959) are devoted daily to city news. This is true even if such Beacon Hill, state-wide matters as a sales tax are counted (as they should be). The morning Globe is no better in quantitative coverage of city affairs than the Herald, although it has a far heavier city circulation and a slightly larger city staff.

The Globe does not think of itself as a "public service" newspaper. "We don't go in for crusading or for exposes," said a top Globe editor. "Maybe we should do more. But if the district attorney or somebody else launches an investigation, we cover it in full. Of course, if the DA is crooked,

or if law enforcement officers don't move in, there's a problem...."

The editorial page of the Globe reflects the same low energy flow. This results in part, according to Globe veterans from the Globe's long-term policy of "impartiality." For years it has not endorsed candidates, local or national. Its editorials are known for fuzziness and caution. During the in-and-out regimes of the late, controversial James M. Curley, the Globe did not take sides; its management on occasion even chided staffers for writing critical pieces on Curley for magazines.

"We think this (neutrality) has paid off for us," a Globe editor said recently. "We don't get identified with someone who may turn sour."

Globe editorials are written after consensus has been reached among five veteran editorial writers. Editorials are usually signed, folksily, UNCLE DUDLEY, a device which embarrasses some Globemen but apparently suits readers.

The morning Globe, on an average, runs three editorials a day, (usually repeated, like most Globe features, in the evening edition). The Herald's editorial output is roughly the same. Yet the Globe runs roughly half as many editorials on city-related issues as the Herald. Even when local controversy flares, the Globe may only run three editorials on city-related matters over a two week period.

Although they rate the Globe high for fairness, politicians pay little attention to its editorials. "Nobody is really afraid of the Globe up here," a Beacon Hill figure said



"It may be the fairest paper in Boston, but the Herald and Traveler have more punch."

"The Globe," a Boston reporter said, "thinks twice before printing the weather report."

Readers trust the Globe, a civic association professional said. "When it says something, they believe it and they react. The trouble is, it seldom says much on any matter that counts."

Recently, the Globe has shown increased energy on some state-wide issues. The initiative came not from management but from a few young specialized reporters and from their executive supporters outside the city desk (which controls local coverage). In 1958 medicine reporter Frances Burns and science writer Ian Menzies wrote a series on Massachusetts' slipping public health services. The stories helped put a new health commissioner in office. In the summer of 1959 the Globe campaigned for legislative approval of a controversial University of Massachusetts faculty pay raise. With the support of Assistant Managing Editor Tom Winship, son of the Globe's editor, Menzies and education writer Ian Forman pressed for, and obtained, management's approval of a continuing series of reports on the University's plight. Fourteen editorials were published in support of a score of major articles. The success of the University of Massachusetts campaign emboldened the Globe to launch another and more difficult campaign -- a front-page series by John Harris in early 1960 on the need to overhaul the Massachusetts constitution. Despite

Governor Foster Furcolo's support, and the Globe's lobbying, the legislature turned this down.

As yet, the Globe has done nothing comparable on the city scene. At young Tom Winship's prodding, however, interpretive Sunday features on local affairs have been appearing more often.

"The Globe is a sleeping giant," a Globe man said. "We just have to wake up to our potential."

b. The morning Herald (circ. 178,000; 297,000 Sunday) and evening Traveler (circ. 183,000) are the most aggressive newspapers in local matters. The Herald ("Greatest Newspaper in New England") a powerful penny-paper at the turn of the century, was given its present character by Sidney W. Winslow, Jr., a Boston businessman whose wide interests included the United Shoe Machinery Co. The Herald early appealed to Boston's considerable group of immigrants from the United Kingdom and English Canada (it still runs special columns of "home-town" news from Canada). After the death of the Transcript in 1931, it picked up the "old Yankee" Republican readership. Although it had been sympathetic to "reform," it turned conservative at the coming of the New Deal.

Identification with the G.O.P. and "State Street" seems to have hurt the Herald. It has the lowest city circulation of any Boston paper. According to one old-time Herald staffer, its turn-of-the-century link with the long defunct American Protective Association, an anti-immigrant group, still hurts it in Irish-Catholic districts. "You can't buy the Herald in Chelsea and parts of South Boston," a politician said

"people hate it out there."

The Herald-Traveler Corporation showed a profit of \$895,139 in 1959 on net revenues of \$31,083,273. Roughly one-fourth of the revenues came from its radio-TV affiliate, WHDH. This is said to have kept the parent corporation in the black in at least one recent year. The Herald-Traveler was able, with an \$8,000,000 loan from the Prudential Life Insurance Co., to build a new plant, somewhat less pretentious than the Globe's in Boston's subsidized (New York Streets) urban renewal district.

The Herald-Traveler Corporation board of directors is solidly Republican and solidly Boston. It includes Carl J. Gilbert, head of Gillette (razor blades) and three executives of United Shoe, one of the state's dominant corporations. Its driving force is Robert B. Choate, 62, president and publisher.

Choate, sometime Washington correspondent and managing editor, has all the credentials of a proper Bostonian. He is the son of a prominent Boston lawyer. He is Harvard, Somerset Club, et al. But he is no Marquand Bostonian. He is the city's toughest and most politically-active publisher, and his critics are many. Far more than any other Boston publisher, he participates actively in local affairs, often on the other side of the issue from such blueblood reformers as Henry L. Shattuck, a former treasurer of Harvard, and Christian A. Herter, Jr.

Choate's newspapers, particularly the Herald, reflect his political views--stoutly Republican, internationalist, anti-"big-spending" and "big labor," and pragmatic (or

"opportunistic") on local issues.

The morning Herald and evening Traveler, while not "Different as DAY and NIGHT" as their billboards claim, are more different than are the morning and evening Globes. Each has its own staff, its own editorial writers, and a different approach to the news.

The Herald is widely regarded as the "Old Yankee, Protestant, businessman, and Chamber of Commerce" paper. Its circulation is relatively concentrated (49 per cent) outside of Boston and its immediate environs. (See Appendix, Table 2). Its country edition carries six columns of Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire news; one-fourth of its readers are in this hinterland. With almost one-third more readers than the rival Globe in Boston's outer suburbs (e.g., Dover, Newton, Wellesley) it is experimenting with North Shore and South Shore editions to draw still more.

The Herald is trapped between the morning Globe, with 30,000 more weekday and 127,000 more Sunday circulation, and the Hearst Record, with double the Herald's readership and a firm grip on the New England tabloid market. "We're in something like the same bind as the New York Herald Tribune," said George Minot, veteran Herald managing editor, referring to the Trib's precarious position between the New York Times and Mirror. "We have to carve out our home delivery market in Newton, Brookline, Wellesley."

The Herald, like the Globe, carries page one advertising. In the midst of the breakdown of the 1960 Summit talks, it carried a quarter-page ad for frozen orange juice, with the



appropriate blaze of color, on page one. "Why do we carry front-page advertising? That's simple," a Herald executive said. "It brings in money."

The Herald front page, above the ads, looks clean and bright, with horizontal make-up instead of the Globe's patchwork quilt. The headlines are big and black, as they are on all Boston papers. "This is a big headline town," said another Herald executive. "One editor tried using smaller headlines, but he lost us circulation, and he lost his job."

The Herald has the world-wide New York Times News Service. Thus, during moments of international crisis, it can and does provide the best coverage in Boston. "We could reproduce the first ten pages of the Times," one of its editors said, "but then we wouldn't have any news closer than Havana."

The Herald scatters less Washington punditry and more foreign news through its pages than does the Globe, and it has slightly more "hard news" in all areas. It carries Drew Pearson, Leonard Lyons, Holmes Alexander, lovelorn columnist Doris Blake, two pages of comics, and the usual heavy dose of women's features and sports. "The sports pages pull reader in Maine and New Hampshire; we can't really compete with local news up there," said Minot.

The Herald unblushingly plays up G.O.P. functions, e.g., "dinners with Ike," and setbacks to Democratic Governor Furcolo. In page one play of human interest news (crime, disaster, courts) it and the Globe are matched. Each gives one-fourth of its front-page headlines to these.

"We have too many crime and fire stories," Minot says.

"When I ask the news editor about it, he argues we have to have something to balance off the heavy (political, foreign, state) stories. If a big crime or disaster came along, it would get 15 of the 40-odd columns in our news hole."

In quantity of city coverage, the Herald, considering its different circulation pattern, does better than the Globe, although the assigned space runs roughly the same. Like the Globe, it usually runs one city-related news story on page one and two shorter stories on the inside pages; these take from one-and-a-half to two columns of its 40 to 45-column "hard news" allotment. It plays up tax stories and "urban renewal" projects favored by Publisher Choate; e.g., the Prudential Life Insurance Co. development and the public garage under Boston Common.

It is not in city news, but in "canned features," sports, and police reporting that the Globe and Herald compete.

Under Editor Alden Hoag, the Herald's proudest ornament is its editorial page. Herald editorial writers have won the Pulitzer Prize four times (1924, 1926, 1949, 1954), a record no other newspaper can match. Choate personally conducts editorial conferences, and the editorial page reflects his interests, even more than does page one.

The Herald early endorsed Dwight Eisenhower for the 1952 Republican presidential nomination less because Mr. Choate preferred the General to Senator Taft than because he thought Eisenhower could win and Taft couldn't. The Herald also endorsed Democratic Senator John F. Kennedy and, according to James MacGregor Burns' biography of the Senator, Kennedy gave



Choate's application to the Federal Communications Commission for contested TV Channel 5 his personal attention in Washington. The Herald, meanwhile, bitterly attacked Democratic Governor Furcolo's state administration. In the 1959 Boston mayoralty elections, it backed the loser, State Senator John E. Powers. It has since cheered on the upset winner, John F. Collins.

The Herald runs at least one editorial daily on city-related matters. It needles the City Council, pushes favored projects, and urges the metropolitan area to get together on rapid transit. It has advocated passage of a state sales tax to reduce Boston's high property tax. Its editorials are often forceful and clearly written and they may list legislators who vote against Herald-backed bills. When Boston's late, popular Mayor James Curley went to jail in 1946 for fraud, only the Herald commented on the incongruity of the city's being run from a jail.

The Herald editorial page generally displays more initiative in reporting and in interpreting city affairs than does the city desk, which boasts that it was the first city desk in Boston to send reporters out in radio-equipped automobiles to wait for crime and disaster.

The Traveler ("First News First") is the gaudy afternoon sister of the Herald. It competes not only with the evening Globe (a splashier "remake" of the morning edition) and the weak Hearst tabloid American, but also with the afternoon suburban newspapers. Its circulation, the biggest in the afternoon field, is the most urban-concentrated (78 per cent) of any Boston newspaper. Like most big city afternoon

newspapers, it depends on big black headlines over crime and human interest to pull newsstand sales. Its headlines are bigger and blacker than most.

Hal Clancy of the Traveler, at 39, is the youngest managing editor in Boston. Once an award-winning investigative reporter, he is now an off-stage confidant of Boston politicians, notably John Powers. The Traveler has the city's most aggressive City Hall reporter in Rod McDonald. Its cartoonist, James Dobbin, wields a savage soft-lead pencil on the City Council.

The Traveler runs about the same number of city-related news stories on page one as does the evening Globe. It tends, however, to give city affairs stories, especially those about redevelopment projects, more prominence and slightly more space amid the comics and features than does the Globe. It runs fewer editorials on city affairs than does its suburban-oriented morning partner, the Herald.

Recently the Traveler under Clancy has hit scandal more aggressively than has any other commercial newspaper in Boston: on "Boston at the Crossroads" (which, incidentally, implied that slum-dwellers come to the slums to get welfare benefits), on lax city tax collections, on bonding kickbacks, on liquor smuggling at the Boston airports, on discrepancies in city hospital operation, and on welfare finances.

The Traveler, more than any other Boston paper, has sought out malfeasance and waste. Unfortunately most of its energy has been devoted to the more accessible fringes of Boston problems. Lack of time, a tight budget, and priorities

in other areas have, according to Traveler editors, make more thorough reporting of city affairs a luxury the newspaper cannot afford.

Rivalry between the Herald-Traveler and the Globe is bitter. During the 1958-59 Congressional investigations of the Federal Communication Commission's allocation of TV channels, the Globe management fought (in vain) to reverse a decision by which Boston's Channel 5 had been given to the Herald-Traveler Corporation. The Globe charged that Choate was trying to force it out of business. He retorted heatedly. Both papers have since devoted pages of space to charges and counter-charges and the Globe still plays up the Channel 5 case.

The feeling between the papers causes them to undercut each others' public service ventures. "We dig something up, say on liquor smuggling at the airport or sloppiness in the department of public works, and the Globe either ignores it or tries to knock down the story," a Traveler editor complained. This works both ways. When the Globe, which was campaigning for a constitutional convention, played up legislative hearings on the proposal in February, 1960, the Herald played them down and gave space instead to people who were opposed to a convention.

This undercutting reduces the influence of both papers. "When both papers are for or against something," a civic association professional said, "City Hall generally tries to make a move in their direction. But if the newspapers are divided, they tend to cancel each other out. Then nothing happens."

c. The Hearst newspapers, the tabloid morning Record (circ. 364,000), tabloid evening American (180,000), and the standard-sized Sunday Advertiser (476,000), produced in a shabby downtown plant on Winthrop Square, are in the tightest squeeze of any Boston papers. The thinning Sunday Advertiser, for example, although packed with Hearst features is put out by only two men. All of the Hearst newspapers have lost circulation and advertising. Economy waves have decimated the staff. Only the Record, with the largest morning circulation in New England, is a sure moneymaker, and its circulation has declined about 50,000 since 1947. There are constant rumors of sale or merger.

The Hearst papers run heavily to sports, racing, comics, crime, disaster, and girls, although "heavy Church influence," in the words of an editor, tones down the fleshy display that would pass elsewhere in the Hearst Empire. Since it prints the daily Treasury number, the Record is the payoff sheet for the betting crowd. It features William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Jim Bishop, Fulton Lewis, Jr., Dorothy Kilgallen, Bob Considine, Victor Reisel, George Sokolsky, and a heavy dose of lovelorn columnists, astrologers, and Broadway gossipists. In the midst of all this is the column of Elliot Norton, the city's top drama critic. Catholic news is played up in the Record even more than in the other Boston papers.

"You see the Record left behind all over the M.T.A. It's not a takehome paper. They hand it out on the way to the dogtracks," a City Hall politician said.

The Record sells 66,000 papers in the outer suburbs (equal to the total sold by the morning Globe and the Herald).



Many suburban readers, says a Record editor, "are wall-to-wall Irish who put the Record inside the Globe or Herald, but read it just the same." The Boston Hearst papers, more than any of their competitors, reach south into Rhode Island, west into Massachusetts, and north to the industrial cities and towns of Vermont and New Hampshire (see Appendix, Table 2).

To compare a tabloid with other newspapers, its page one and page three must be considered together as the "front page." The comparisons then are striking. Crime, fires, disaster, etc., account for roughly three-fourths of all Record "page one" stories as against 25 per cent of Globe and Herald page ones. Washington and overseas datelines are virtually non-existent on the Record's first pages.

"We count pages two through five as our 'display' pages," said a Record editor. "Usually 20 per cent of the news space in here will go to international and national news." The rest goes mostly to human interest.

City-related news gets little attention either on the editorial page or in the news columns. The Record runs half as many city-related news items as the Globe or Herald. The afternoon American more nearly matches its competitors in this regard. Yet, a city story makes the "front page" maybe once every three days in a Hearst paper. City editorials are rare. The Advertiser carries no editorials at all. Political columnists concentrate on state gossip.

Hearst City Editor C. Edward Holland, however, is widely regarded as one of the newspapermen who know the city best. On occasion, notably in unsuccessful fights on Beacon Hill for

sales taxes, he has personally lobbied skillfully for measures. The Record in 1949 fought for the building of Storrow Drive along the Charles River when Back Bay residents said that it would ruin their backyards. The Record impudently showed photographs of Back Bay backyards cluttered with garbage cans and refuse. The Record also fought for an under-the-Common garage in 1946, before other newspapers got on it, and recently it supported the University of Massachusetts pay raise bill, for passage of which the Globe got credit. The Hearst press nevertheless is looked down upon by the other newspapers.

Holland has the smallest staff in Boston. The Hearst city desks, on a given day, have only a half-dozen general assignment reporters and these must usually be reserved for emergencies.

Politicians, and, to a greater extent, civic association leaders discount the influence of the Hearst papers. "They don't seem to care much about city news," said a Beacon Hill professional, "and they don't carry anything that the other papers don't have."

d. Mention should be made of the late Boston morning Post which died in agony, as newspapers do, in 1956 at the age of 125. Its heyday began in 1891 under Edwin A. Grozier, private secretary to Joseph Pulitzer of the New York World. The Post showed New England newspapers the way to mass circulation. In the 1920's it led all U. S. newspapers in sales, with 500,000 readers. It was "New England's Breakfast Table Paper."



Under the Grozier family, the Post played an aggressive and often effective role as the loudest Democratic voice in New England until after World War II. It was a crusading newspaper. It feuded with Curley, and on occasion, helped defeat him. It furthered the political career of Maurice J. Tobin, who beat Curley in 1937 to become Boston's mayor, then governor, and then secretary of labor in the Truman Administration. It played up cat-and-dog stories and crime news in its "shotgun" make-up to attract what Oscar Handlin has called the Irish "upper working class" in Boston and a vast out-of-town circulation as well.

After Grozier's death and World War II, the Post's vigor and financial health declined. In 1952, a South Boston Irish self-made millionaire, John Fox, bought it. He turned it toward McCarthyism and he endorsed Eisenhower, alienating many Boston Democrats. He cut down on the dogs and cats and pared the payroll. Circulation and advertising skidded. Fox was soon deep in debt. Amid a welter of litigation, scandal, and financial tangles, he finally killed off the Post in 1956. When he bought it, its circulation was higher than that of the Herald and morning Globe combined. When it died, its circulation was down to 255,000.

The other Boston papers vied for the Post's circulation and features. The Herald ran two lines in red ink on page one announcing that it had obtained several of the Post's syndicated comic strips. The Record took on Elliot Norton, the Post drama critic. But no Boston newspaper--unless possibly the Traveler--ever tried to take over the Post's old crusading

role. That was regarded as a liability. "The Post, toward the end, became regarded as a scold," a veteran observer said. "It made people mad. And it wound up going out of business."

e. The Christian Science Monitor (circ., 160,000) is a church-subsidized, international evening daily which sells less than 20,000 papers in the Boston area, but its "Atlantic" --or Boston--edition prints two or three full columns (and more) of analysis and reportage of Boston municipal problems and politics. Its editor, Erwin D. Canham, and its publisher, John Hoagland, are active in civic affairs. Under the direction of City Editor Robert Bergenheim (recently promoted out of the City Room) the Monitor has done by far the best job of covering City Hall (Bergenheim's old beat) and general municipal problems. Its stories are usually complete and clear, and they often name names.

"We give all this to Boston," a Monitor editor remarked "and yet we don't get the circulation. I can't understand it."

The Monitor is read, politicians say, by almost everyone of influence. "If it had circulation," one said, "it would get more things done. But it has some influence among the civic organizations."

The Monitor is handicapped by its religious coloration, by lack of features, and by a highbrow tone. It flies in the face of what to the other papers are laws of self-preservation. It favored repeal of anti-birth control statues in 1948, it has needled horseracing, pinball machines, and gambling; it printed names of the downtown firms seeking tax abatements. It is strong on civil rights, critical of Governor Furcolo and

fiscal "liberals," and willing to ignore prelates of the Catholic Church.

The Monitor is widely read by the newspaper trade. A Herald editor reads the Monitor "for the full story on something (in city affairs) that we can't give much space to." A Globe editor said: "The only way I know what's going on in Boston is by reading the Monitor." Monitor staffers claim that frequently, on city matters, the Herald or the Traveler will take editorial page stands on subjects which neither of them has covered with more than a dab of news, but which the Monitor has covered intensively.

The Monitor continuously explores subjects which turn up only now and then in the commercial press: the police department, housing, hospitals, schools, urban renewal, tax abatement, the city's fiscal woes. Occasionally it stimulates other papers to go along on municipal issues. By doing this and by alerting civic associations, it exerts influence disproportionate to its Boston circulation.

f. Unlike their counterparts in New York or Chicago, community and "ethnic" newspapers are not influential in Boston. The Chelsea Record, the Charlestown Patriot, the Brighton Citizen, and a half-dozen other community weeklies concentrate on blurbs, advertising, and local chit-chat. The "ethnic press," led by the Italian Gazzetta del Massachusetts, concentrates on federal naturalization regulations, immigrant success stories, and happenings in the old country. These papers print virtually no news or editorials about the city where their readers live. Boston has no equivalent of Chicago's

crusading Negro Daily Defender or Harlem's Amsterdam News.

The Pilot, weekly organ of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese is one of the nation's better church weeklies. Its editor is Monsignor Francis J. Lally, noted among Catholic intellectuals. With over 80,000 circulation in the Boston area, it occasionally takes issue with the Boston press on such matters as censorship and "public morals." In the early '50's, it took a dim view of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. The Pilot's stands on social and economic issues sometimes draw complaints from conservative readers. On the other hand, many of its readers "reflect the old Catholic training," as a Pilot editor put it. "They don't take what the Pilot says as one viewpoint, but as the Truth." The Pilot (like Cardinal Cushing) does not try to exert much influence on the local secular scene. Editor Lally is an active member of the Boston Redevelopment Authority and his paper runs occasional guest articles on urban renewal and slum problems. But the Pilot remains essentially a "house organ" for the Archdiocese, not a community newspaper in the true sense.

### 3. What's Wrong?

Newspaper competition, the lack of which is considered a problem in most cities, is the most general factor accounting for the inadequacies of the Boston commercial press. When Boston newspaper executives are asked why they don't do a better job of covering and interpreting the metropolitan news they usually explain that competition is too tough. "I like competition," a managing editor said. "Competition is good for newspapers, if it's the right kind. But here in Boston we



have the wrong kind. Until this kind of competition changes, we'll never have the kind of press we ought to have. We're stretched too thin."

The "right kind" of competition would exist if each paper dominated a sector of the market--a sector large enough to support it comfortably. If, say, one was the paper of the working class and another was the paper of the middle class, then each, not having to fear the competition of the other, could afford the luxury of a public service role, i.e., of giving its readers a sizeable dose of what they "ought to have" along with what they really want. But in Boston the middle class is not large enough to support even one newspaper. The old Transcript was a class paper, but there has been none since. All papers must therefore compete for readers of all classes, and all must therefore be common denominators.

A Globe deskman said:

"When I make up page one, I try to find a story for everybody. A crime story for Joe Blow. A woman's feature, something for the businessman, something for the kids, maybe. Sometimes we have to stretch to come up with something but this is the formula we generally follow."

This competition is all the harder because the total market is contracting. The combined circulation of the Boston papers has declined since the war although (outside of Boston proper) population has increased. In March, 1954, the weekday morning and evening sales of all papers (excluding the Monitor were 1,436,000. Of these, 281,000 were accounted for by the late Post. By September 1959 combined sales (with the Post now dead) were roughly 1,240,000, a drop of almost 200,000. The chief sufferers were the big-circulation Hearst papers.



Competitive TV entertainment, the growth of suburban evening papers, and increases in the sales price of Boston evening papers all hurt them. The Globe papers and the Herald-Traveler made small gains: the Globe's combined daily circulation in March 1953 was 281,000 and the Herald-Traveler's was 335,000; by September 1959 the Globe had almost caught up: it had 341,000 and the Herald-Traveler had 342,000.

The geographical dispersion of the readers adds to the heterogeneity of the market. This dispersion is greater in the Boston area than in any other metropolitan area in the United States. In Boston no morning paper has more than one-third of its circulation in the city proper. The evening papers, which are up against hard competition from suburban evening dailies (11 of these have combined circulations of about 200,000), are more Boston-oriented, but none of them has more than half its circulation in Boston proper. (See Appendix Table 2.) In percentage of daily circulation beyond the retail trade zone of the central city (in Boston about 30 miles from City Hall) Boston leads the nation. Nearly 23 per cent of its circulation is in the hinterland. (Next highest is Chicago, with nearly 15 per cent; New York runs 13.5 per cent, but this figure is swollen by the unusual circulation patterns of the two "national" newspapers, the Times and the Herald-Tribune.)

This dispersal means that the newspapers cannot speak with a Boston accent. The suburb and the hinterland are not interested in the central city; if they have any feeling toward it at all, it is hostility.

The evening papers, which depend largely upon street sales, must compete with eye-catching headlines. None can afford to banner a municipal "exclusive"--even if it has one--when its rivals are bannering a Hollywood romance or an international crisis. A Traveler editor told what happened when he made a mistake in judging the popular taste:

One day a wire story came in from New York about (TV personality) Arthur Godfrey. He was having another squabble with someone on his show. The American and Globe led with the story. We put it below the fold with a two-column head. The competition sold thousands of extras and we got returns.

A basic trouble, then, is that the size, geographic distribution, and class character of the Boston newspaper market, by throwing all of the papers into direct competition, forces them to compete for circulation and advertising and not for Pulitzer Prizes. Apparently it is when editors are free to ignore tastes of readers that "public service" journalism flourishes.

"We have too many newspapers in Boston," an editor remarked. "What we need is one strong morning newspaper and one strong evening paper. Then we could produce two really good papers instead of what we've got."

## APPENDIX

TABLE 1

The space priorities of the Globe may be seen in the copy control sheets for Thursday, April 15, 1960:

Total number of columns in the newspaper: 320 (40 pages).  
 Total advertising: 206 columns  
 Total editorial matter: 114 cols.  
 Total "reserved": 76, including:

Editorial page and columnists: 14.5 cols.  
 Comic page: 15 cols.  
 Women: 7 cols.  
 Financial: 18 cols.  
 Amusements: 2.5 cols.  
 Society: 1.5 cols.

Headlines P. 1:  
 and continued's: 6 cols.

Total remaining to news: 38 cols.

Pictures:	4 cols.	
Sports:	17 cols.	
Foreign		} 6 cols.
Washington		
General non-local		
Obituaries:	1 col.	
"Readers":	1 col.	
New England		} 8.5 cols.
City		
Suburban		

The Herald is not vastly different, but it has a news hole of 43 to 45 columns.

TABLE 2

## BOSTON NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION (A.B.C. 3/31/59)

In thousands, rounded off to the nearest thousand.

MORNING	Globe	Herald Traveler	Hearst
Total	191	178	364
Boston	58	35	88
*City Zone (incl. Boston and 15 m. radius)	126	98	154
*Retail Trade Zone - "Suburban" (15 to 30 m.)	28	36	65
Other (inc. rest of New Eng.)	36	43	145
AFTERNOON			
Total	150	183	180
Boston	67	80	90
"City"	122	146	136
"Suburb"	23	27	24
Other	5	9	19
SUNDAY			
Total	410	297	476
Boston	103	39	70
"City"	249	144	156
"Suburb"	86	76	98
Other	75	77	221

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\*The two main zones as defined by the A.B.C.:

(a) Area included in "City Zone" is the corporate limit of Boston plus the area within approximately a fifteen mile radius of the Boston City Hall, comprised of the following: in Suffolk County, cities of Chelsea and Revere, and town of Winthrop; in Middlesex County, cities of Cambridge, Everett, Malden, Medford, Melrose, Newton, Sommerville, Waltham and Woburn, towns of Arlington, Belmont, Lexington, Reading, Stoneham, Wakefield, Watertown and Winchester, and town (townships) of Cohasset, Dover and Westwood; in Essex County, city of Lynn, towns of Saugus and Swampscott, and town (township) of Nahant; and in Plymouth County, town of Hingham and town (township) of Hull. 1950 population: 2,101,000.

(b) Area included in "Suburban" or Retail Trading Zone

extends north to Haverhill, south to Taunton, west to Northborough, east to Massachusetts Bay, and includes, with exception of city zone:

In Massachusetts - Essex County, excepting the city of Newburyport, town of Amesbury and towns (townships) of Merrimac and Salisbury; Middlesex County, excepting towns (townships) of Ashby, Pepperell, Shirley and Townsend; all of Norfolk County; in Worcester County, towns of Hopedale and Milford, and towns (townships) of Berlin, Bolton, Harvard, Mendon, Northborough, Southborough, Upton and Westborough; in Bristol County, cities of Attleboro and Taunton, towns of Mansfield and North Attleborough, and towns (townships) of Easton, Norton and Raynham; and Plymouth County, excepting town of Plymouth, and towns (townships) of Carver, Lakeville, Marion, Mattapoisett, Rochester and Wareham. In New Hampshire - In Hillsborough County, towns (townships) of Hudson and Pelham; and in Rockingham County, town (township) of Salem. 1950 population: 1,040,000.



TABLE 3

## ADVERTISING AND EDITORIAL MATTER

	Average Pages		Average Cols. Adv.		Average Cols. Edit.	
	1959	1958	1959	1958	1959	1958
Morning <u>Globe</u>	36.1	32.6	170.7	154.9	118.	105.9
Evening <u>Globe</u>	39.4	36.7	200.2	189.9	114.9	103.7
Morning <u>Herald</u>	37.9	35.6	179.8	167.3	123.1	117.6
Evening <u>Traveler</u>	40.9	40.	204.9	205.	122.5	114.8
<u>Record</u>	25.5	25.3	99.9	97.9	103.9	104.7
<u>American</u>	(unavailable)					
Sunday <u>Globe</u>	190.3	167.7	960.7	851.6	500.	435.9
Sunday <u>Herald</u>	186.1	177.7	932.4	874.5	491.2	482.
Sunday <u>Advertiser</u>	76.	78.6	250.6	269.4	313.3	308.4

TABLE 4

## ADVERTISING LINEAGE

## 12 MONTHS TOTAL

	1959	1958	Change	%
A.M. <u>Globe</u>	15,599,103	14,638,871	+960,232	6.6
P.M. <u>Globe</u>	17,808,498	17,531,962	+276,536	1.6
Sun. <u>Globe</u>	14,677,101	13,362,666	+1,314,435	9.8
Comb.	2,334,097	2,893,091	-558,994	-19.3
<u>Herald</u>	16,406,427	15,706,652	+699,775	4.5
<u>Traveler</u>	18,241,839	18,829,320	-587,481	-3.1
<u>Sun. Herald</u>	14,231,221	13,595,889	+635,332	4.7
<u>Record</u>	8,575,485	8,660,889	- 24,595	-0.3
<u>American</u>	7,766,634	7,946,754	-180,120	-2.3
<u>Advertiser</u>	3,913,247	3,579,334	-333,913	-8.5

## B. Civic Organizations

The major civic groups in Boston are:

1. The Municipal Research Bureau, 294 Washington Street, which is concerned with improving management of the city government. Its board of directors consists primarily of bankers, lawyers, and insurance, retailing and manufacturing executives. It has a staff of five--three professional and two secretarial--and a budget of about \$46,000. Its executive secretary since 1952 has been Joseph S. Slavet, a native of Boston with bachelor's and master's degrees from Boston University and an M.S. degree in public administration from Syracuse University. The Bureau functions as a watchdog over the city administration, frequently making recommendations for the reduction of expenditures.

2. The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, 125 High Street. Prior to 1956 the Chamber was an obscure organization devoted largely to legislative work and shallow civic "dogooding." In 1956 a program was developed and sold to the business groups to strengthen its financial position and to bring in able personnel. Both of these objectives have been accomplished. The budget of around \$460,000 is spread among six major programs: research and business development, legislation, urban renewal and development, civic affairs, transportation, and promotion of conventions and tourist trade. The current president is Charles A. Coolidge, attorney and former assistant secretary of defense. James G. Roberts is the executive vice president.

3. The Greater Boston Real Estate Board, 7 Water Street, which has lately taken an active part in public affairs. Its budget is about \$200,000 a year and it has 21 employees. Walter K. Winchester, assistant executive vice president, spends full time on public affairs. Though its membership is inclusive, the Board tends to be a spokesman for the smaller realtor.

4. The Retail Trade Board, 125 High Street, which represents primarily the large downtown retailer. It has a staff of two professionals and three secretarial personnel headed by Dean Cushing as executive vice president.

5. The Committee on Civic Progress, which was formed by Mayor Hynes in 1956 to obtain coordination of effort among business and professional men. The committee depends on the staff of the Chamber of Commerce. Its chairman is Donald J. Hurley, a lawyer.

6. The Greater Boston Economic Study Committee, 200 Berkeley Street, an economic study group formed in 1958 that is affiliated with the Committee for Economic Development. It conducts some research with its own staff of seven or eight persons and contracts for the rest. It has been concerned chiefly with metropolitan planning. (For the membership of the committee and its research advisory committee, see Document #1.)

7. The Boston Coordinating Committee, formed in December 1959, which brings together representatives of the organizations listed above. The 16 members of the committee are leading business and professional men. Under the aegis

of the committee, representatives of the staffs of the constituent groups meet twice a month. Members of the committee have established the Civic Foundation, the purpose of which is to provide financial support for civic projects. For example, the Civic Foundation has contributed to the salary of the recently-appointed City Health Commissioner.

C. Labor

by David Greenstone

Labor is one of the most powerful interest groups in Boston and Massachusetts. With money, a large membership and a politically skilled leadership, it has gone into politics extensively and effectively. In great part the Boston labor movement has followed the conservative traditions of the AFL and Samuel Gompers, who largely limited labor's objectives to concrete benefits for union members, but Boston and Massachusetts unions have recently begun to follow the national AFL-CIO in its efforts to become a dominant social force, adhering to a comprehensive, ideologically-oriented program of governmental action. Similarly, labor in Boston and Massachusetts has begun to follow the national organization in its increasing involvement in elections and party politics. However, the structure of government, the character of the Democratic party and the political climate and tradition in Massachusetts are powerful deterrents to such change. Labor has impulses toward extensive ideological political action, but the emergence of any real trend can hardly be asserted with great confidence.

1. Factions and Internal Conflict

Part of labor's "split political personality" grows out of its internal divisions, some of which are found across the entire country. For example the Teamsters, who are one of the largest unions in the state, are clearly to the right of the AFL-CIO. Leaders from former CIO unions (which are generally most hostile to the Teamsters) do say that the



Teamsters in Boston, including their leader Nicholas Morrissey, are "clean," unblemished by indictments or public charges of scandal. (The Chamber of Commerce people I talked to were not so sure.) The Teamsters work closely and effectively with other labor representatives on labor bills in the General Court, such as the increase in unemployment compensation and the three judges bill (which is explained below). But according to Joe Cass, director of the political education committee (COPE) of the State AFL-CIO, they may have unofficially supported Mayor Collins, despite his "defective" labor record. At any rate Cass feels that they have been particularly favored by the new administration. Morrissey is also said to have taken no position on the sales tax although labor opposed it as a tax "on the poor." In general Morrissey opposes all increases in taxes because they lead to greater government spending. He favors a withholding tax but not a graduated income tax. He is adamantly opposed to the ADA and the political activities of Kenneth J. Kelley, secretary-treasurer of the former state AFL and a major leader of the newly merged (1958) organization. Morrissey apparently considers Kelley something of a socialist who involves himself in issues beyond "labor's concern."

On the right wing of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO stand the Building Trades, the dominant force in the Boston labor movement. As in other cities, the Building Trades participate politically in order to protect and expand the job market in the construction industry rather than secure broad programs of social welfare. I was not able to discover the extent of

their influence over licensing boards in the Boston area. (Typically the boards are appointed by the state rather than the city.) The Chamber of Commerce informants said that the Building Trades had relatively little influence in this respect and as a result many contractors are able to hire non-union bricklayers, plumbers and electricians. On the other hand, the Building Trades have had considerable success in winning appointment to Boston area agencies which deal with construction. Stephen E. McCloskey, the fiery executive secretary of the Greater Boston Labor Council, who is an Iron Worker and a political leader of the Building Trades, is a member of Redevelopment Authority. John Carroll of the Cement Masons sits on the Housing Authority. McCloskey says, "I like to have my people on the various public agencies." (Another of his allies, William V. Ward of the public employees unions, is an MTA trustee.) Like the licensing boards, these agencies are also filled by state appointment, and a state law prescribes that one MTA trustee be a labor representative.

Given their different approaches to politics, tensions between former AFL and former CIO unions remain, despite the recent merger on state and local levels. But they are probably not as great as in most other states and metropolitan regions. On the state level Kelley, though an officer of the old AFL, evidently has considerable sympathy for the liberalism of the CIO. On the city level bitter battles have broken out in the last year, but the CIO is so small in the Greater Boston Council that the conflict has limited

significance. The biggest battle within the AFL-CIO is between the conservative, craft-oriented Greater Boston Labor Council led by McCloskey and the liberal state organization, led by Kelley and his allies in the CIO unions. (The Greater Boston Massachusetts Labor Council, AFL-CIO, has jurisdiction over Boston and nine surrounding communities -- Brookline, Newton, Needham, Wellesley, Weston, Chelsea, Winthrop, Everett, and Revere. A number of important communities in the metropolitan area, such as Cambridge and Belmont, are not included.) The conflict in great part is a clash of two political styles -- the pragmatic politics of the Boston wards, which has produced self-made men with considerable native shrewdness, and a more ideological politics, practiced by articulate liberals who often have had greater formal education.

Within the Greater Boston Council tensions between the CIO unions, supported by some AFL groups, and the bulk of the AFL, center around McCloskey, the dominant and most controversial figure. Basically McCloskey follows the conservative politics of the highly paid, highly skilled Building Trades. He has fought vigorously for the sales tax despite labor's opposition to it as regressive and unfair to the poor. Partly for this reason, he was reluctant in supporting the arch foe of the sales tax, Senator Powers, in his campaign for the Boston mayoralty in 1959, despite objections by other labor leaders to the labor record of Powers' opponent, John F. Collins. McCloskey is friendly to the rather conservative Teamsters: he tried and failed to get the Greater Boston Council to petition the national AFL-CIO to readmit them.

On many issues McCloskey also shares the political outlook of the Boston business community. When asked to state labor's goals in Boston, he responded with a vigorous program to improve the city's uncertain business climate. He would rebuild the port of Boston, increase the attractiveness of downtown stores to compete with shopping centers, build adequate commuter service to bring shoppers into the city, reduce property taxes (preferably through a limited sales tax), spur redevelopment, and extend the MTA to Hingham and Concord. Every labor leader I talked to recognized Boston's serious economic problems and favored at least lowering the property tax rate. But none had as comprehensive a program to improve the central city.

McCloskey's conservatism has economic roots. More than any other major group of unions, the Building Trades are dependent on the economic vigor of local business. If business is not good, construction and maintenance expenditures lag. In addition, Building Trades workmen often have close associations with their employers, or become employers themselves. A highly skilled plumber or carpenter can form his own company and then abandon it and become an active union worker again with relatively little change in status. Thus McCloskey had kind words for John A. Volpe, the Republican candidate for governor in 1960, who was a member of the Building Trades before he became a contractor. McCloskey thought that many labor people would support Volpe if State Treasurer John F. Kennedy should win the nomination for governor. (The nomination was won by Joseph D. Ward.)



McCloskey has an "enlightened" view of political activities that contribute to greater job opportunities in the whole economy. But he is basically a business unionist, concerned primarily for the economic well being of his own workers. Liberal and "socially concerned" labor leaders charge him with solidifying his own position and power; but in attacking this "drive for power" these critics often show a personal animosity that goes beyond liberal-conservative differences over political issues. McCloskey has one of those personalities that evoke powerful loyalties and hatreds. He is shrewd, resourceful, and a tough fighter. Repeatedly he is called an opportunist. One critic charged that he supported Senator Joseph McCarthy to help maintain his position with his own followers. A more friendly observer felt that McCloskey's greatest offense in the eyes of his enemies may be less his ambition for power than his success in gaining and using it.

McCloskey is involved in many recurrent battles for power. He is on far from cordial terms with the Boston labor official most likely to compete for his base of support -- John Deady, secretary-treasurer of the Building and Construction Trades Council. According to a CIO observer, they often struggle for leadership vis-a-vis the Housing Authority and control of contracts. McCloskey's rivalry with Kelley also has turned in part on questions of jurisdiction.

While the CIO in the Boston area objects to McCloskey's position on such issues as the sales tax and the Teamsters, it kept an uneasy peace with him until the council elections



in December 1959. Then the CIO people charged that McCloskey and his supporters, who have a large majority in the Greater Boston Council, "double-crossed" them by "knocking off" several CIO members from the executive board.

The battle over the sales tax within the Greater Boston Council illustrates the characteristic interplay of issues and McCloskey's personality. What most infuriated the anti-sales tax forces was that McCloskey testified in favor of the tax without approval of the Council. This they felt advertised a major division within labor and hurt their fight against the bill. McCloskey felt that he had a right to testify as an individual and that the liberals' effort to punish him and weaken his position in the Council was simply vindictive. An angry battle followed in which McCloskey was beaten on the tax issue and ordered to oppose the tax -- although "as an individual" he remains an outspoken supporter. But when the CIO people and some AFL allies tried to press their advantage by ordering him not to testify on any issue without Council approval and to give up one of his two jobs (as executive secretary of the Council and chairman of the state labor relations commission), McCloskey, who had made sure his friends were at the decisive meeting, beat them handily. It all ended in a standing vote of confidence for McCloskey. John Cort, business agent of the Boston Newspaper Guild and a member of the Council's executive board, recalls that "It was all on a personal basis -- 'good old Steve -- for all his faults we still love him.'"

It would be a mistake to dismiss the ideological

conflict between the liberal industrial unions and the conservative crafts or to ignore the substantial differences in economic interest and structure which underlie this conflict. But it is evident that McCloskey and most of his enemies (perhaps with the exception of Deady, whom I did not interview) are also divided by radically different political and social styles. McCloskey is self-educated and union-educated and militantly unimpressed by eggheads. A superb politician in the no-holds-barred tradition of Irish politics in Boston, he is fundamentally a pragmatist. Cort, who, at least symbolically, is his chief antagonist in the Greater Boston Council, is a graduate of Harvard College, a convert to Catholicism rather than an Irishman, and an officer of the Newspaper Guild, the "egghead union" in Boston. McCloskey's chief antagonist at the state level, Kelley, is said to be similarly well educated and articulate. While the college-educated legislative representatives of the Boston Chamber of Commerce agreed that McCloskey often worked with them on important local matters they had no particular fondness for him. They too suspected that he was "an opportunist" who primarily took care of his own interests. By contrast they called the more liberal Kelley, who often vigorously disagrees with them, a "businessman's labor leader." Kelley, they reported, is "college-educated and can talk with you and appreciate what you have to say." Kelley's virtue in the eyes of the Chamber of Commerce representatives is not his politics but his ability to speak the same cultural language. Undeniably this difference of cultural language and political style contributes

most of the personal animosity to the struggles within the Greater Boston Council.

McCloskey's defenders suggest that his highly pragmatic brand of Irish politics can have its virtues. While the State AFL-CIO ducked the MTA extension issue McCloskey strongly supported extension for the sufficient reason that it would mean jobs for the Building Trades. For much the same reason he is probably more enthusiastic about metropolitan organization than most of the more liberal leaders in the city. These defenders point out that perhaps because of his politician's concern for personal power and security, he has served the interests of his followers and so won their loyalty. And unlike the CIO unionists in the area, who were badly stung by the internal battles over the Communist party, McCloskey seems to thrive on rather than avoid controversy. As one thoughtful observer put it, this love of controversy -- of the rough and tumble of the Irish wards -- is a "healthy thing for the labor movement," something that the CIO in Massachusetts has not had.

## 2. Labor's Influence

Labor's influence in Boston and the state is considerable but certainly not unlimited. Since Boston is an overwhelmingly Democratic city with few well-to-do residential areas, it is not surprising that the labor movement has considerable power in city government. According to McCloskey, all the members of the present city council are friendly to labor. One councillor, John Patrick Connally, who has served

a jail term, and the two highest runners up in the 1959 election, who will join the Council should any vacancies occur, belong to the Greater Boston Council. A Chamber of Commerce official admitted that relations with the City Council were "less than good" for businessmen. Labor suffered a real defeat, however, in the 1959 mayoralty election, when John F. Collins beat State Senate President John E. Powers. Powers is considered one of labor's best friends in Massachusetts government. Along with labor he led the successful battle against Governor Furcolo's sales tax proposal. Except for McCloskey, who supports the tax, every labor leader I talked to thought Powers's voting record was "perfect." By contrast, they thought Collins's voting record was "defective." Labor leaders are particularly upset by Collins's opposition to cash sickness benefits (which would partially compensate workers for loss of income due to illness as they are now compensated for loss of income due to unemployment). Collins was also criticized for activities on behalf of the insurance industry. The most favorable comment I heard about Collins's first six months in office was that he "wasn't doing as badly as we thought." He had not generated any noticeable enthusiasm among labor leaders except for McCloskey.

Labor's "defeat" in the 1959 election can easily be overemphasized. The press, business community, and leaders of both parties also went down to defeat with Powers. Even today, I was told, labor remains a "force to be reckoned with" at city hall, although Collins has few political debts to it.

Because of Boston's extraordinarily limited powers of



home rule, almost anything labor wants in the city needs prior approval at the state level. Indeed, state action is often all that is needed. As a result, labor's success in non-partisan Boston depends to a great extent on its influence in the partisan government of Massachusetts. This influence is considerable. According to an official of the Chamber of Commerce, labor's legislative agents, notably Jimmie Broyer and Kenneth Kelley, are able and listened to respectfully at the state house. Indeed this C. of C. official feels that the business community is "on the defensive" with respect to labor issues in the present legislature. In the 1959 session labor won an increase in unemployment compensation and a requirement that three judges rather than one must hear when a temporary injunction against a strike is sought. According to McCloskey, this prevents "Yankee Republican" judges from freely issuing anti-labor injunctions. A Chamber official pointed out that the sheer difficulty of assembling three judges will make any quick injunction highly improbable, thus greatly increasing the immediate effectiveness of the strike weapon. Labor's present power in state government may be attributed to the Democratic party's having recently won control of the State Senate.

Labor has not, however, had uniform success at the state level. It is significant that a Democratic governor proposed and repeatedly fought for a sales tax. In 1960, labor suffered bitter defeat when the State Senate rejected two highly prized bills, the cash sickness proposal and a bill to grant unemployment compensation to workers on strike



more than six weeks.

### 3. Labor's Political Activity -- COPE and the Democratic Party

The Greater Boston Council participates in elections through its Committee on Political Education (COPE). The committee is headed by James Boyle of the plasterers and largely acts as the endorsing agency and political policy making organ for the Council. Its endorsements are subject to ratification by the Council and on occasion have been overturned. But, as is so often the case in Boston politics, much of labor's political energy, as well as the authority for political action by labor, is concentrated at the state level. Endorsements of state representatives and senators are made at the state level rather than by county or area COPE's. These smaller groups make recommendations to the state body but COPE bylaws provide that they shall not be published until state action is taken. Local COPE's make the final endorsement for local officials.

The State COPE consists of a representative from each international union in the state and each local or regional council (such as the Greater Boston Council). Joe Cass is the full-time director of the State COPE. He directs labor's comprehensive program to stimulate the participation of union members in politics, rather than leaving the initiative to the local COPE's. As Cass put it, "We are thus able to bombard each local from several directions -- the State COPE, national COPE, the international union, the international representative on the State COPE and the local COPE unit."

The Massachusetts COPE tries to provide the tools for the local union's program of political education -- movies, literature, institutes and the like. It compiles voting records in the legislature and distributes them throughout the state. Cass is also concerned with encouraging actual campaign work such as plant registration and chain telephoning.

Most of labor's political influence probably depends on its ability to influence elections. Labor can offer political candidates three main benefits, money, formal endorsements, and campaign work.

Since the non-partisan candidates for city offices and Democrats at other levels of government must run and finance their campaigns largely on their own, labor's financial contributions can be very helpful. On the other hand, there are many other interests which can also contribute funds.

Unfortunately I found no study of the effectiveness of labor's endorsements. Labor's participation in the Powers campaign suggests there are real and important limits to this kind of influence. In partisan elections most union members probably see the Democratic party as "their" party anyway, so the net effect of endorsements in partisan general elections seems small. In non-partisan elections such as for city council, or in primary contests for the Democratic nomination, the voter is often faced with a confusing multitude of candidates. In this situation endorsements may have some effect. But even here an endorsement may be meaningful only if it is publicized and argued for in person. Thus the most important effect of COPE endorsements may be to authorize and

encourage union members to campaign in the precincts for the favored candidates.

Labor's ambiguous political role in Massachusetts is clearly illustrated by its campaign work. Its greatest efforts are devoted to mobilizing its own members rather than converting the electorate at large. It acts in the spirit of Gompers' craft unionism, as a traditional interest group devoted to maximizing its own impact. Thus COPE devotes great energy to getting literature into the plant. The IUE, biggest union in the state (though not in the Boston region), sees its "number one job" as getting the people in the plants registered. Labor has secured a law which allows registration in a plant for those workers who live in the municipality where the plant is located.

COPE also considers union members' wives. As one informant put it:

We try to explain to the men that just because they vote right there's no reason to think their wives will. We work on the premise that with the right kind of information the men will be able to make things clear at home and explain the issues to their wives. If they can't do the job at home they can't do it in the precinct.

But the limited extent of COPE's work in the precinct is suggested by the fact that despite the existence of a women's activity division, there is little of the emphasis on using housewives for precinct work which is characteristic of middle class liberal groups and COPE in Michigan.

On the other hand, labor does make some attempt to convince other groups in the electorate. Labor can work in the precincts and work with great effectiveness. Typically

labor's precinct activities fluctuate according to the personalities of the candidates, the predicted closeness of each particular campaign, the internal divisions of labor itself, and the geographical distribution of the international unions within the AFL-CIO. The difficulty is that COPE has no real precinct organization of its own. The State COPE functions largely as a coordinator of independent political efforts rather than as a leader of a powerful political organization.

The State COPE organization operates through local unions by requesting volunteers. Union members are requested to work only on their own blocks in order to take advantage of personal acquaintance with their neighbors. But because the basic unit is the local union, it is impossible to avoid some duplication and lack of cooperation, if several active union members should work in the same block. In practice of course, adjustments are often made in the field; sooner or later union members will find out about each other's activities. Or the COPE-endorsed candidate may himself help coordinate the activities of his union supporters.

There is considerable reliance on staff participation. "Every staff man in our union," one informant said, "is supposed to spend his time in political activities." In the Greater Boston Council, the extent of this kind of activity depends on the quasi-social network of friendships among the leaders of the former AFL unions.

Political activity also greatly depends upon the efforts of individual unions. Since there is no single dominant international, these efforts vary with the strength of



particular unions in different places. The IUE is powerful in Western Massachusetts, particularly around Springfield. There the IUE has its own political organizations which man polling places and provide car pools and baby sitters to get voters to the polls (although their activity often depends upon the political interests of a particular local union president).

The Greater Boston Council COPE maintains its own list of union members who have volunteered for political activity. McCloskey and his associates call on them when they are needed. Ordinarily, according to McCloskey, the Council can put 300 to 400 workers into the field. But these men are not called upon at every election. When candidates endorsed by the state COPE are not viewed enthusiastically by the Boston Council, the workers sit on their hands. On the other hand, McCloskey said, in a tough fight when candidates popular in Boston were running, the Greater Boston COPE has put over 1300 workers into the field. He cited Governor Furcolo and Attorney General Edward J. McCormack as favored candidates.

Labor was overconfident in the 1959 mayoralty election, according to one informant. It was solidly for Powers but was so sure he would win that it ran only a "top level" campaign. Staff members participated, but little effort was made to involve the rank and file.

In sum, labor's political organization in Boston does not give the extensive and unremitting attention to politics that is necessary for consistent success. Labor has no organization of its own that lives in the precincts. Rather it



goes into the precincts -- at times -- with its manpower.

Variable as its election work may be, labor does exercise considerable political power. To enter politics, specifically political campaigns, on a massive scale might expose the Massachusetts labor movement to damaging charges of trying to take over the government. This danger inhibits labor from moving even farther from its traditional interest group role, characterized by limited objectives and limited commitment to political action. Nevertheless labor leaders are often openly dissatisfied with the Democratic party as a vehicle for realization of labor's objectives and there is considerable talk of "doing something" about it. Some leaders I talked to were most bitter about the Democratic state senators who had deserted labor on the cash sickness proposal and unemployment insurance for strikers after six weeks. An industrial union leader complained, "The Democratic party isn't representative. . . . I think something will happen, but I don't know what the vehicle will be." Another leader echoed John L. Lewis: "These Democrats shouldn't sit down and dine at the table and then steal our silverware. The Republicans are at least faithful to their principles."

If labor is bitter about legislative defeats it is also worried about the internal health of the Democratic party. Everyone agrees that the state Democratic organization is ineffective and inoperative. With seven candidates running for the gubernatorial nomination in 1960, it is obvious that the pre-primary convention has not helped to introduce any discipline into the party organization. Only McCloskey said

it was "healthy for the people" to have so many candidates. But he also thought that from the party's standpoint, it was very serious since much bitterness inevitably follows the election. Another leader feared the possibility of open division between Italians and the Irish voters which might wreck the entire state ticket and elect the Republican Volpe. Of course the scramble for the nomination in part reflects the popular appeal of the party, heading for nearly certain victory in 1960 on a ticket headed by Senator Kennedy. John Cort characterized party competition in Massachusetts as a contest between well-organized Republican mice and quarreling Democratic cats.

Labor does not often enter overtly -- as a united movement -- in the primary elections which determine the Democratic nominees. Its participation in the primaries is "spotty and varied." In overwhelmingly Democratic areas -- for instance, most Boston wards -- where primary victory is tantamount to victory in the general election, labor does participate. It would have no political effect at all if it didn't act in such cases. I was also told of one occasion in Western Massachusetts when the IUE (rather than COPE itself) led a successful battle to defeat a "particularly reactionary" Democratic state representative.

Labor faces two main practical difficulties in entering the Democratic primary as a unified movement. First, it would have to decide between candidates with equally good (even perfect) labor voting records. At least four of the seven candidates for the gubernatorial nomination in 1960

have such records. Second, so many friends of labor often run that the individual unions commit themselves to many different candidates. In Massachusetts personalities are often decisive. "Labor doesn't pick the candidates," Cass said. "The candidates pick themselves and individual unions support their favorite nominees."

A number of union leaders recognize the problems that this presents for labor's political activities. First, because labor's energies are divided among a number of its friends, the likelihood that the man with the best chance of winning the general election or best serving labor's interests once elected is reduced. Second, the Democratic party, to which labor has tied much of its political fortunes, periodically tears itself apart in confused primary battles. Third, by reducing the net influence of the labor movement and the party, the division of labor's strength increases the influence of the individual politician and office holder. One Chamber of Commerce official flatly asserted, in perhaps something of an exaggeration, that individual politicians in Massachusetts are stronger than both labor and business. They are loyal first to themselves, then to their personal political organizations, and finally to their interest group support. However this may be in general, one labor official made this point specifically about William F. Callahan of the Turnpike Authority.

#### 4. Labor's Political Beliefs

If labor's refusal to risk a continuous and powerful

role in Democratic primaries in Massachusetts is partly a result of practical obstacles to such a role, this refusal is also related to labor's own beliefs about what its proper role in politics ought in fact to be. When labor leaders talk of their day-to-day political activities most of them, except perhaps for the Building Trades, unequivocally identify themselves as Democrats and COPE as a natural ally of the party. An integral part of the IUE's political education campaign among its members was "to get Democrats into the plants" to meet the members of the union. Labor is bitter about its legislative defeats this year partly because they seem a betrayal by "their" party. Yet when labor leaders talk explicitly about labor's proper relation to the two parties they take a position with very different implications. Joe Cass, who comes from the Steelworkers, agreed that the vast majority of candidates supported by COPE are Democrats, but he named a couple of Republican state representatives with perfect labor voting records whom COPE had supported consistently. "We're not concerned with party -- if the voting record is right, the guy gets our support," he said. He agreed that this was really close to the Gompers-AFL philosophy of "reward your friends and punish your enemies." Earl Riley, New England regional director of the IUE, more strongly emphasized that labor was "not automatically tied to the Democratic party." "We might be misinterpreted," Riley said. "We don't want to try to overemphasize our choice -- to try to force it down the voters' throats."

Another reason for labor's reluctance to expand its



political role is its success even in the absence of a comprehensive, ideological program. Despite its defeats and problems, labor after all is doing very well in Massachusetts as a limited interest group. The measures defeated this year may well pass in another year or two. And as long as it restricts its demands to measures more or less directly benefiting its own members, labor can still deal rather successfully with free agents in the legislature. State senators and representatives can satisfy many of labor's limited demands and still work with other powerful interests in other fields. Labor must necessarily control the nominating and electing process only if it seeks to influence all or at least a wide range of government decisions.

But the lack of a comprehensive program probably contributes to labor's difficulty in choosing among candidates. A perfect labor record can be maintained with relative ease by Massachusetts politicians. It is therefore difficult for labor to distinguish among candidates on the basis of their friendliness or their effectiveness as representatives of labor. Were labor's program broad and comprehensive, ideological as well as specific, different degrees of loyalty, enthusiasm, and effectiveness would be much more apparent. According to one observer, labor lacks this kind of program totally -- only the ADA produces a really coherent discussion of all the issues from a consistently liberal perspective. COPE has a set of issues that it supports but they are rarely debated or considered exhaustively.

In a special sense of the word, this means that labor



in Boston and Massachusetts is conservative compared to strong labor movements in other northern states. One informant pointed out that "We are not like Michigan, where they are pseudo-socialist." Symptomatically perhaps, the labor leaders I talked to had very little to say about a traditional complaint of urban liberals -- relocation. One informant thought relocation of displaced families was a "hell of a problem" but he was mostly critical of politicians from areas being redeveloped who, he said, attacked relocation policies just to get votes, and thus obstructed progress. Another labor leader simply felt that relocation was no great problem at all, or certainly no concern of labor.

From another point of view labor is not conservative, but pragmatically rather than ideologically liberal. Labor seems in fact typical of Massachusetts Irish Catholic Democracy (and its representatives in Congress) which has given enthusiastic support to many traditional kinds of social welfare activities by government, such as public housing, but which is not ideological and not concerned with the more remote liberal programs which do not provide relatively immediate and concrete benefits.

Labor's limited approach to politics is demonstrated by its role in a number of important local issues. In the case of the proposed expansion of the MTA district, labor played no role at all. In part this paralysis resulted from the geographical divisions between the MTA district and out-state which were reflected in debate in the General Court. More immediately, labor in Greater Boston was split by intense

conflicts of interest among constituent unions. Paul McBride of the Chamber of Commerce recalled that when the Chamber supported a one-year extension of the Old Colony Line commuter service, it was supported by the rail unions and opposed by the bus unions which worked on the South Shore, while the MTA unions maintained a benevolent neutrality. When the Chamber of Commerce subsequently urged expansion of the MTA district and abandonment of the Old Colony Line, it was supported by the MTA and violently opposed by both bus and rail unions. In each case the unions were thinking of their members' jobs. In this situation labor at the state level declared its neutrality and refused to take any stand on the matter. On an issue of this sort the genuine difficulties preventing labor from taking a solid stand are obvious. But it is probably relevant that on the sales tax issue, despite the support of public employee groups who stood to gain wages and possibly membership from a sales tax, labor fought successfully to defeat the tax. Significantly, labor's quarrel with this tax was to a large extent ideological. (See below.)

Labor has been traditionally interested in the public schools, though it evidently devotes considerably less energy to school politics than even to the relatively weak city council. It has made no attempt to nominate a "blue ribbon" slate for the School Committee, nor has it proposed any comprehensive program for improvement of the school system.

Yet the problems of the Boston school system visibly disturbed every labor leader I interviewed. One liberal leader frankly blamed labor itself for much of the trouble.

He said that the American Federation of Teachers in Boston has provided little leadership, perhaps because it is relatively small compared to the Teachers' Alliance. And as a whole, he felt labor has had "no crusading interest" and has done "nothing more than endorse candidates." (At least three labor-supported candidates are on the five-man Committee.) Before merger, he said, the CIO did fight for increased state aid but the AFL was not interested. Tom Mosher of the Chamber of Commerce agreed. He felt that labor, aside from some public employee groups, has done little to influence the School Committee.

The reasons for labor's relative inaction in school affairs are complex, but it is relevant that this inaction is consistent with labor's general emphasis on improving working conditions and obtaining direct benefits for working people. By contrast, a broad ideological program might well lead labor to more activity in school affairs.

Similarly, labor has played no major role in the admittedly very difficult problems of metropolitan government in the Boston area. One leader suggested that labor was immobilized by the fear of high taxes among members in the communities surrounding Boston. His main hope for a change in attitude lay in the rising suburban tax rates which would convince union members that the metropolitanization of city services would benefit the entire region. But it is significant that labor is waiting for a change in conditions in the Boston area, rather than working on the basis of a general program for major changes in metropolitan government.

Nevertheless, labor's lack of ideological orientation can easily be overemphasized. Just as it in fact does operate in the precincts, so labor is sometimes motivated by considerations only indirectly related to the benefit of its members. At the end of an interview, John Horan, a steelworker and president of the Greater Boston Council, volunteered that "Labor's problems are not different from the people's problems -- we're part of the community, we engage in all the activities in the community, and we are interested in helping the people." Consideration of the internal divisions in the labor movement similarly suggests elements of ideology.

The arguments over the sales tax illustrated a conflict between pragmatic and ideological unionism. McCloskey supported the tax because it would directly help the public employees who were strongly represented in the Greater Boston Council and might benefit the Building Trades by increasing public construction. (McCloskey says the Building Trades were actually neutral on the issue.) He stressed that the tax was limited -- that is, it exempted necessities such as food, children's clothes and medicine, which form a relatively large part of the budgets of poorer families. The liberal leaders opposed the tax because, as Horan put it, it was "cancerous." They cited states where the rate of the tax increased although the number of exemptions decreased. But the liberals were less clear on why labor could not maintain the exemptions and the proposed 3 per cent rate, since it had so convincingly demonstrated its power to block the entire tax. To the pragmatic McCloskey, channeling funds into local

government to raise salaries and improve the school system were the dominant factors. His opponents defeated him on the issue, for the sake of a principle of social justice.

## 5. Conclusions and Prospects

In sum, a number of factors conjoin to keep labor's role in politics limited: 1) The power in Boston of the conservative, pragmatic Building Trades. 2) The equivocal nature of labor's commitment to the Democratic party. This seems to be a case of a formal theory or official attitude inhibiting the development of an informal alliance with the party. 3) The emphasis on bread and butter issues rather than broad governmental programs and principles. 4) A tendency for labor's activities to reflect the structure of government and politics in the state. Thus labor tends to emphasize these areas which are already important politically and spend less energy on such matters as schools and metropolitan organization. 5) A tendency for labor's political activities to reflect the factionalism and emphasis on personalities of the Democratic party. This not only means personal conflicts within the labor leadership but the diffusion of labor's energies among many candidates. To some extent this produces circular causation. So many political resources are devoted to supporting individual candidates that few are left to apply to changing the system of individual candidacies.

Labor has conformed in order to succeed and has succeeded well. But a number of factors familiar across the country have joined to undermine -- though not destroy -- its



traditional role. These include: 1) the rise of industrial unions whose political demands are often broader than those of craft unions; 2) the rise of an idea-oriented leadership which dislikes to bargain and deal over limited issues in the traditional way; 3) the increased economic and social role of government which in turn has stimulated greater political participation by labor; and 4) (perhaps) the rise of union officialdom which by its own momentum constantly seeks new areas of influence and so new areas for labor's political participation. What seems to be happening in Massachusetts is that this growing involvement in politics is to some extent self-sustaining. The more labor demands the more it must control the state senators whom it elects. The more it helps elect them the more it feels it can demand and the more upset it becomes when its demands are rejected. The more it supports the Democratic party, the more it is led to try to order and control the party. The greater the number of specific policies it favors the greater are the pressures toward a general program based on political principles. But the defenses of the present order are strong.

#### D. Interest Groups and the Public Schools

The interest groups concerned with school affairs are 1) The Boston Teachers' Alliance. The Alliance was organized in 1946 to defeat a School Committee member who had tried to fire a teacher. At first most public school teachers were members. Soon, however, some constituent elements -- notably principals -- withdrew. When about 1948 the Alliance supported equal pay for women, it became popular with elementary teachers, most of whom were women. Its 1600 members are now mostly elementary teachers, but there are among them many junior and senior high school teachers. The Alliance is now trying hard to represent "a unified profession" once more.

The Alliance is a trade union interested in bread and butter questions. It doesn't like to be called this, of course: a recent (3/7/60) newsletter says, "The Alliance is essentially a professional organization for professional men and women, operating on a professional basis." (Italics added.) But the same newsletter asks:

Should we not all now look forward to the future with the one thought of unifying and strengthening the teachers of Boston, so that we can move forward to establish salaries at the professional level prevailing in other cities and towns? Should we not now be united in our drive for a just Sick Leave program so that those absent for illness or injury will not suffer the serious loss of pay which is now incurred?

The Alliance maintains an office at 114 State Street, Boston, staffed by an office secretary and an executive secretary. Dues are \$15, and the organization's cash balance May 31, 1959, was \$10,692. Through its executive secretary,

*see next page*

a lawyer, it represents its members at all hearings before the School Committee, the legislature, and the mayor and city council.

The Alliance has successfully supported legislation permitting cities to assume financial responsibility from teachers' liability for classroom accidents. It is now trying to get sick leave with pay and contributory medical insurance. It favors legislation requiring itemization of school appropriations (this would make it clear earlier in the year what teachers may expect), raising the school entrance age, and raising the statutory limit for school appropriations from \$21 to \$34 million (this would eliminate the opportunity for intervention in school affairs that the Mayor and Council now have).

The officers of the Alliance do not have an exaggerated opinion of the School Committee's qualifications. In making endorsements they take a candidate's "educational views" and "concern" into account along with his stand on salary questions. But there is no doubt which is more important to the organization.

2. High School Teachers of Boston (formerly Men's High School Teachers' Association) has a membership of 700 and has been the Alliance's arch foe on the salary question. The Association endorsed a slate of candidates for the School Committee three years ago, and the teachers supported Joseph Lee in 1959. It did so, a former president said, "in a manner consistent with its position as a professional group."

3. The Boston Teachers' Union. Affiliated with the AFL, the

Union has about 600 members. Its connection with the trade union movement and an insurance program which covers teachers for liability in the classroom are said to be its chief drawing cards. One source said, however, that it "has been working on progressive educational matters for the benefit of the school system - discipline, curriculum improvement, and ratios as salary differentials for supervisors and teachers."

4. Citizens for the Boston Public Schools. This group held its first meeting early in 1960 and several months later had 170 members who paid \$1.00 dues. It was formed by people who had worked for election of Mrs. Dorothy W. Bisbee to the School Committee and who wanted to support continuing studies of school matters. The Citizens have three principal purposes: to make studies of the schools and to provide analyses showing how they may be improved within the appropriations available, to stimulate public interest in better education, and to recruit and elect the best possible school committee.

5. The School Committee. Nomination to the School Committee is by petition, the signatures of 2,500 registered voters being required. All but 10 of those nominated (13 were nominated in 1959) are eliminated in the September preliminary. Five of the survivors are elected at-large in November.

Most candidates appear at rallies held for the mayoralty candidates (at Collins' rallies school candidates could speak for a few minutes; at Powers' they could only shake hands) and speak at meetings of the West Roxbury Civic Association, League of Women Voters, the Home and School Association, the South End Association, a special dinner given by the High

School Teachers' Association and a few other such affairs.

Candidates are endorsed by prominent individuals, the press, and labor, professional, and civic associations. The most important endorsement is that of the Boston Teachers' Alliance. It endorses some candidates before the preliminary and others after it. This insures that it will have a slate in the final election. The Alliance works actively for its candidates among teachers and with the public at large. It does not buy TV time, newspaper ads, or posters and billboards, but it is lavish with the time and energy of its members. In the fall of 1959, Alliance workers distributed thousands of mimeographed slips on street corners, in supermarkets, and at polling places. Two years previously its workers<sup>2</sup> canvassed Boston door to door.

Candidates who have no other organizational support and no ready-made audience can usually be made or broken by the Alliance. In 1959, for example, it demonstrated its power by very nearly electing a 24-year-old junior at Boston University Law School, Thomas S. Eisenstadt, who was completely unknown. Eisenstadt astounded everyone by running ahead of two candidates with the "brand" names of Kennedy and Callahan.

A candidate running for the first time and without Alliance support relies heavily upon subway posters and expects to spend about \$2,000 in the preliminary and final elections. Alliance-endorsed candidates spend much less, particularly if they are incumbents. In 1959 Madeleine Reilly, the Alliance-supported incumbent who topped the poll, reported only \$211 expenses.

One member of the Committee has the distinction of being the only Yankee elected to office in Boston. He is Joseph



Lee, Jr., the well-off son of a wealthy and civic-minded father who half a century ago was known as "the father of the playground movement." Despite bitter opposition from the Alliance, Lee was elected in 1959 to his fourth term, getting more votes in the preliminary than any mayoralty candidate. He made extensive use of large subway posters, which carried his picture and the words "16 Years of Unpaid Public Service." Because he was ill during the campaign, he was represented at public gatherings by Albert West, a lawyer and "professional Irishman."

After his election in 1959 Lee told the press he hoped "through people who sit in on the school committee meetings and through school supervisors" to change the concept of the United States from one of "gloom, cynicism, and discontent" to a picture of "an extraordinarily compassionate civilization." He said he hoped the committee would adopt for use in the schools a book he wrote titled, American Manifesto.

Another Yankee candidate, Mrs. Dorothy Bisbee, a former president of the Boston League of Women Voters and a former teacher in a fashionable private school, survived the preliminary and was defeated in the final election. She also was opposed by the Alliance.

Most candidates for the School Committee are lawyers who want to get into politics or to enlarge their law business. Under the old city charter, the Committee was the only body elected at-large; it therefore offered a test of the appeal of a prospective mayoralty candidate. (Maurice Tobin used it as a place from which to challenge Curley). The 1951 charter chang

this, but some school committeemen regard the Committee as a stepping stone to the City Council, and last year a committee<sup>1</sup> man ran for mayor in the preliminary.

Informed people say that the School Committee is neither competent nor interested in its job. Able people who are seriously concerned about schools do not try to get elected to it. In 1959 a woman civic leader tried to persuade several prominent men to run. One said he would serve if he could be appointed. The others declined to have anything to do with the Committee. (For an account of the School Committee refer back to Section II.)

## PART VI - ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

A. Finance

by Stephan Rubinstein

1. The Property Tax Rate

The property tax rate is generally considered to be Boston's most urgent and serious problem. It is a problem because it is very high -- \$101.20 per \$1000 of assessed valuation in 1959 --, and because it has been climbing rapidly (it was \$78.70 in 1956).

The rate is high by both metropolitan and national standards. In 1959 the average rate for the 76 towns and cities of the metropolitan area was \$63.12, \$38.08 less than the Boston rate. The Boston rate, moreover, was increasing faster than the others. In 1947, nine cities and towns in the metropolitan area had rates higher than Boston's; in 1959 Boston's was the highest. Between 1947 and 1959, the gap between the average rate in the metropolitan area and the Boston rate widened by nearly a third.

Compared to cities elsewhere in the United States, the Boston rate is high. In 1959, when the Boston rate was \$101.20, Chicago's was \$42.30, New York's \$41.60, and Philadelphia's \$34.60.

By itself the property tax rate tells nothing about the real cost of property taxation. One has to take into account the ratio of assessments to market valuations: obviously if property is assessed at a small fraction of

its market value the cost of taxation may be low even if the tax rate (i.e. the amount to be paid in taxes for each dollar of assessed value) is very high. The Massachusetts General Laws (Section 38 of Chapter 59) require assessors to make a "fair cash valuation" of all property. In practice, however, property is not assessed at full value in most of the towns and cities of the state. In 1959 a researcher asked assessors in all of the 351 towns and cities to state what percentage of market valuation they used in making valuations. About half the assessors responded, and the figures they gave ranged from 20 to 100 per cent. The Boston assessors said they valued property at two-thirds of its market value; this proved to be the case when the last 25 recorded property sales made on a certain day in 1959 were checked by the researcher against the assessor's valuations.

The cost of Boston property taxation, therefore, is about \$67.00 per \$1000 of market value. The Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers has estimated that the equalized rate (i.e. the rate that would obtain if all property were assessed at full market value) of the other 75 communities in the Boston Metropolitan area is \$32.27. On this equalized basis, then, the Boston property tax is about twice that of the other metropolitan communities.

Data are not available by which to compare the equalized 1959 Boston rate with the equalized rate of other cities. However, a study made in 1956, when the

Boston property tax rate was only \$78.70, showed that even then it had the highest equalized rate of the 21 cities compared.

TABLE I

EQUALIZED PROPERTY TAX RATES OF 21 SELECTED AMERICAN CITIES PER \$1000 OF EVALUATION, 1956

Rank	City	ETR
1	Boston	50.69
2	Newark	43.25
3	Portland, Ore.	30.25
4	Buffalo	28.75
5	Milwaukee	25.95
6	Pittsburgh	23.88
7	Baltimore	20.08
8	Denver	18.87
9	St. Paul	18.32
10	Oakland, Cal.	17.90
11	Indianapolis	16.31
12	Dallas	15.91
13	Houston	15.05
14	Memphis	14.25
15	Atlanta	13.57
16	St. Louis	13.08
17	Louisville	12.43
18	Kansas City, Mo.	11.66
19	New Orleans	11.53
20	Columbus	8.86
21	Birmingham	8.28

Source: David P. Rollands, Property Taxes in Atlanta and Other Large Cities, City of Atlanta, 1957.

Many think that the high property tax is driving business out of Boston. There is evidence to support this view. In the decade 1947-57, employment in downtown Boston decreased 7.2 per cent while elsewhere in the



metropolitan area it increased by 24.9 per cent. In the same period, the number of firms in Boston declined slightly more than six per cent.

Recently a Harvard senior asked 20 persons who could be presumed to know something about locational decisions in the Boston area -- realtors, officers of firms that had recently moved, research committee executives, city and state officials, and newspapermen -- whether businesses are avoiding Boston because of its high property tax. All but one said that the tax keeps firms from locating in Boston and that it may cause some Boston firms to move away.

Some cited specific cases. Mr. David Pokross, counsel for the Walworth Company, a steel fabricator, said that when that company decided to relocate in order to expand its facilities, it ruled Boston out because of its tax rate. In 1955, General Robert Wood, then chairman of the board of Sears Roebuck, told an executive of Filene's department store that Sears would not consider additional sites in Boston because of the high property tax (then \$31.40 less than in 1959).

The sole dissenter was Oliver W. Park, executive director of Assessing for Boston. He thought the property tax was too small an item to make a difference in locational decisions.

Some informants said that the high tax rate had set in motion a vicious circle: by causing some firms to

move away, it reduced the tax base, and this of course forced a still higher tax rate.

## 2. Other Taxes

If one takes into account that the property tax is virtually the only city tax in Boston and that most other cities have several additional tax sources, the situation is seen to be somewhat less serious than at first appears.

The Boston property owner, qua property owner, is subjected to only one tax. This is not the usual case outside of New England. Property owners in Indianapolis, for example, pay not only a city property tax of \$17.71 but also a \$23.88 school and a \$2.54 park tax. Thus, although only \$16.31 (the equalized city tax) is shown in the table above, the total paid by the Indianapolis property owner is about \$44.

Property, moreover, is for all practical purposes the only thing taxed by Boston. In 1958 the property tax yielded \$120,900,000. The only other tax, a \$2 tax on males 21 and over, yielded \$191,600. (About half the male voters did not pay, and since the cost of enforcement would be more than the tax would yield, nothing was done about it).

The property tax accounted for 76 per cent of Boston's operating revenue in 1958. (The rest came mainly from state and federal aids, licenses, charges for special services, etc.). Most other large cities have

long since ceased to rely so heavily on the property tax. (As long ago as 1929, New York, for example, got only 65 per cent of its revenue from the property tax, and in 1958 it got only 24 per cent from it; New York had 13 other tax sources in 1958).

The reason Boston has stuck to the property tax exclusively is simple: the legislature has not permitted it to tax anything else.

When the total tax burden of Boston is compared to the total tax burden of other cities, Boston is by no means as badly off as it appears when only property tax rates are compared.

### 3. Why Taxes Are High

Still, there is no doubt that taxes are very high in Boston. One reason for this is that Boston is lavish in its expenditures. As the following table shows, per capita operating expenses are higher for most functions in Boston than in four other large cities:

TABLE 2  
PER PERSON OPERATING EXPENSES OF SELECTED CITIES  
1957  
(in dollars)

	New York	Baltimore	Washington	Boston	San Francisco
Public Safety	28.2	29.4	27.5	35.5	31.1
Highways	13.2	18.5	18.9	1.27	7.6
Sanitation	14.7	10.7	7.7	10.5	6.6

TABLE 2 (continued)

PER PERSON OPERATING EXPENSES OF SELECTED CITIES  
1957  
(in dollars)

	New York	Baltimore	Washington	Boston	San Francisco
Health & Hosp.	18.9	5.3	15.2	26.0	10.5
Public Welfare	19.6	12.9	8.9	36.4	2.20
Schools	63.5	57.0	46.3	46.5	
Libraries	2.4	2.6	2.5	5.3	1.9
Parks & Rec.	6.2	5.6	7.4	7.4	12.2
Misc.	9.5	6.7		35.8	7.6
Total	176.2	148.7	154.3	214.1	100.1

Source: Arnold Soloway, "What Boston Needs Now," unpublished paper, 1959.

These figures alone do not prove that Boston is wasteful. Conceivably the Boston taxpayers get more for their money than do taxpayers elsewhere: they may want and get higher levels of public service.

Other figures, however, suggest that this is not the case. Although Boston paid its firemen less than did any of 18 cities, it ranked highest in per capita expenditure for fire protection. Even this does not prove inefficiency (conceivably a large force of low paid firemen does a better job of putting out fires than a smaller force of higher paid ones), but it certainly raises doubts.

Certainly there has in the past been a great deal of inefficiency in Boston's municipal services, and a great deal of corruption as well. Very likely there is still a good deal of both.

Another general reason why taxes are high is that the tax base, which was small to begin with, is shrinking. The tax base of New York City has increased about two per cent a year for the last several years, but that of Boston has been growing smaller since 1930 (it was then \$1,972,000,000; now it is \$1,462,000,000).

The Boston tax base was small to begin with because a large part of the property in the city -- some say 50 per cent of it -- belongs to churches, **governmental** institutions, and other tax exempt bodies. The high concentration of tax exempt land uses is of course an aspect of Boston's almost unique position as one of the country's oldest cities and as "Hub of the Universe,"

The tax base has shrunk because the New England economy as a whole has declined. There has been less construction in Boston than in most cities. Between 1927 and 1958, for example, no new office building was erected. In addition, much assessed value was lost because of highway demolitions.

#### 4. The Over-Assessment and Abatement Game

Mayor Curley fell into the habit of over-estimating city receipts and of over-assessing commercial



properties in order to postpone tax increases until after election day. His practices got the city further into financial trouble than most people realized and, incidentally, produced a public cynicism about the city's financial affairs which is still strong.

Curley used to order his assessors to add a million or so to the assessments of various large properties. The owners could apply for abatements and if necessary could appeal to the City Review Board and then to the State Appellate Tax Board. In the end they usually paid a fair tax. In the meantime, of course, they had to hire lawyers who specialized in tax appeals. There were six or eight such lawyers in Boston, all with connections at City Hall.

Curley was well aware that the over-assessments would in most cases be reduced by the appeal bodies. But as long as they stood, he could announce a tax rate based upon them. When in due course reductions were granted, he could have other properties over-assessed. It was not unusual for 30 to 40 per cent of the commercial property owners to file for abatements every year.

Some properties, meanwhile, were under-assessed, and some apparently were not assessed at all. In 1946, for example, an investigator found that the Boston Post was not listed on the tax rolls.

When John B. Hynes was elected mayor he promised to stop the over-assessment game. "I announce now, without

equivocation," he said in his inaugural in 1950, "that a halt will be made to the circle of assessment increases and that the values fixed by the incoming Board of Assessors will be honest appraisals." This did not happen. Instead, Jerome Rappaport and other lawyers who had been leading spirits in the New Boston Committee, the reform movement that had elected Hynes, appeared at City Hall as tax abatement specialists.

There was pressure for reform, especially from City Councillor Gabriel Piemonte and from Robert Bergenheim, a staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor. In his message of Jan. 3, 1955, Mayor Hynes said that "a thorough, city-wide equalization of real property should be made, but should be held in abeyance until such time as a new source of income is available to the city. To do otherwise would merely shift the present heavy tax burden to those least able to assume it."

In 1957, when Mayor Hynes found it necessary to go to the legislature for a \$45 million funding loan, the Boston Municipal Research Bureau, a private organization supported by business interests, presented to him a list of demands as a condition of the business community's support for his funding plan. On July 8, 1957, the Mayor issued a policy statement (the "White Paper," it came to be called) in which he said, among other things, that he would make a determined effort to reduce the number of city employees by 5 per cent within 18 months,

that he would reduce temporary personnel appropriations by 15 per cent, and that he would accelerate the Equalization Survey and adopt its conclusions as soon as a new source of income became available to the city.

A study at this time by the Greater Boston Real Estate Board showed that commercial properties were in some cases assessed at small fractions of their values and in others at two or three times their values. It showed also that assessors commonly reassessed properties at the very figures from which abatements had been granted the year before.

In response to these pressures, Mayor Hynes brought in a tax specialist from a management consultant firm and put him in charge of a new team of assessors. The Equalization Survey was finally begun. It was to establish objective standards for assessments and to "equalize" the assessments of all commercial properties and of all residential properties of five units or more (smaller units were left out for fear that voters might suppose their assessments were to be raised). In 1960 Mayor Collins' administration retained the tax specialist and the Survey continued.

In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, the Appellate Tax Board disposed of 3,832 appeals brought against Boston assessors. That left 11,504 cases still pending. The 1959 tax rate, high as it was, did not allow for the abatements that would eventually be granted

in these cases. It would be up to Mayor Collins to make up the tax deficit somehow.

By the spring of 1960, new assessments had been worked out for 28,000 pieces of business, industrial, and large apartment house property. Mayor Collins would soon have to decide whether to put the new assessments into effect. He might find the decision difficult to make. For if the new assessments totaled much less than the old, the burden of making up the difference would have to fall upon 82,000 homeowners, whose properties were not included in the equalization survey. Mayor Hynes had pledged that such a shift would not be made before a new source of revenue was available to absorb the shock. Presumably Collins would respect this promise. There was little likelihood, however, that Collins and the legislature could agree upon a new tax source. When they ran for mayor, Collins had favored and Powers had opposed a sales tax. Afterward, when Governor Furcolo proposed a sales tax, Powers helped defeat it in the legislature (See Section IV, p. 15). In May, 1960, Powers said he hoped to get enough signatures (32,000 would be required: 200 from each of 161 representative districts) to put the sales tax issue on the ballot in November. ("Shall the representative in this district be directed to vote for a three per cent limited sales tax?"). If, as was not unlikely, the voters opposed the tax, that door would be firmly closed for some time.

Mayor Collins

was opposed to **a payroll tax** on the grounds that it would be regressive. "I am opposed to the payroll tax because it is completely inequitable," he told reporters in March 1960, "but I am for the sales tax and believe it will be eventually passed. If not next year, then it will be in the one after that."

##### 5. The Prudential Formula

The Boston tax rate has long discouraged construction of large commercial structures. Finding a way to encourage construction without discriminating in favor of it and against other properties already on the tax rolls has presented an extremely difficult problem. The problem is especially difficult because of constitutional rigidities.

The Prudential Insurance Company has posed the problem in dramatic form by deciding to build a \$100 million "urban center" in Boston to house its New England regional headquarters. A project on such a grand scale, civic leaders and newspapers said, would restore the city's old prestige and prosperity. For many people the success of the Prudential project was the test of Boston's ability to cope with its problems and to grow.

Tax difficulties appeared in the way of the project. When the Center was in full operation it would gross \$15



million annually. Its operating expenses and maintenance costs would be \$5 million. Applying the Boston tax rate to a property value capitalized in the usual way from this income left no return on investment whatever. Prudential announced that unless some adjustment were made the project would be dropped.

To meet such situations as this, a Proportional Return Method of assessment was devised. The value of a newly constructed property was to be established by capitalizing its expected net income. (To this extent the new method was the same as the old). But in computing net income a "reasonable and equitable return" was to be allowed on the cost (not the market value) of the new structure. This return might vary from six to nine per cent, depending upon the desirability of the project from the standpoint of the city. Seven per cent was agreed upon for Prudential.

By mid-1960, 40 projects had been brought under the method of Proportional Return or, as it was called, the "Prudential formula." Twenty of these were new constructions; the other involved extensive improvements to existing structures.

Naturally there was opposition to the new method. Some real estate owners felt that it subsidized construction which would place their own, old buildings at a competitive disadvantage. (A Christian Science Monitor reporter, Michael Liuzzi, found (1/25/60 and

2/26/60) these fears without foundation; the market for office space was good despite the new construction). Other interests did not welcome Prudential's entry into the labor market. Prudential followed a national wage policy, and its pay to clerical workers would be higher than the going rate.

It was very likely, therefore, that the constitutionality of the new method would be tested in the courts. It was also very likely that it would lose. The Constitution required "reasonable" assessments at 100 per cent of "fair cash valuation." In *Portland Bank vs. Apthorp*, 12 Mass. 52, 53, a court had said,

"These taxes must be proportional upon all the inhabitants of, persons resident and estates lying within the said Commonwealth. The exercise of this power requires an estimate or valuation of all the property in the Commonwealth; and then an assessment upon each individual, according to his proportion of that property. To select any individual or company, or any specific article of property, and assess them by themselves, would be a violation of . . . . the Constitution."

Moreover in 1955 a developer named Roger Stevens had asked for a tax concession on a center he proposed to build on the very site of the Prudential project. He had dropped his project, which was to cost \$70 to \$100 million, when the State Supreme Court ruled in an advisory opinion that the tax arrangement was unconstitutional. The court had said,

"It follows in our opinion that the provisions of the proposed act by which

valuations for the purposes of assessment are to remain the same for five years, regardless of the values added by buildings, while taxpayers in general are required to pay annually upon total value, charge the corporation with less than its share of the public expense, necessarily produce disproportion, are unreasonable in the constitutional sense, and are unconstitutional. We are further of opinion that the other provisions by which the taxes payable by the corporation in any year are in part dependent upon profits .... are unreasonable and unconstitutional."

It seemed unlikely that after ruling this way on Stevens' project the court would approve the Prudential project or, for that matter, the new method of assessment. There was a possibility, of course, that out of regard for what the civic leaders and newspapers said was the general interest those who felt themselves adversely affected might refrain from bringing suit. But this was certainly a tenuous basis upon which to make a \$100 million investment.

The Boston Herald of Feb. 18, 1960 announced in banner headlines that the Prudential was on the point of abandoning the project, in which by now it had invested \$10 million. The story said that the Company believed there was pressure to upset its tax arrangement; it would not continue with the project unless it were reassured on this. It was hard to see who could give it any reassurance: any taxpayer could bring suit if he chose. Apparently the story was intended to test public reaction to the suggestion that the Constitution should

be amended to secure the principle of Proportional Return. If so, public reaction was not encouraging, for no proposal for constitutional change was made.

Instead on April 28, 1960 at a meeting in a Boston hotel attended by practically all of the business and civic leaders of the city, Fred Smith, a vice president of Prudential, explained that the company would have to have legislation safeguarding its position. Otherwise it would abandon the project at once. The state Attorney General, the meeting was told, had devised a plan which, if constitutional, would save the situation. Under this plan, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority would extend its toll road from Route 128 at Weston into downtown Boston to a terminus under the Prudential Center. The Authority would construct a 2500 parking facility there, and it would lease air rights to Prudential. Prudential would build its project as planned, paying to the Authority a "service charge" equal to the amount it had agreed to pay the city in taxes. The Authority would turn over the money to the city. After 80 years, the whole Center would be given to the city. This solution to the problem was possible because the Authority was exempt from city taxes.

The new plan was killed by the state Supreme Court almost at once. In an advisory decision, the Court said the plan was unconstitutional because to tax the property of a corporation on a different and more favorable basis than similar property of other owners would violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. It found other grounds for rejecting the bill which had been proposed to implement the plan: it lacked definiteness and contained inadequate detail as to Prudential's participation, its preamble did not set forth clearly that urban development and renewal were public purposes and that the project was not demonstrated to be of a character reasonably justifying separate classification and treatment for tax exemption. (The decision is given in full in the Herald of June 1, 1960.)

The court said it saw no reason why a new plan could not be submitted, and approved, that would put the project in the category of urban renewal. It had ruled five years before that the site in question was not a blighted area under the law. Now it suggested that the site might since have become blighted.

A bill providing for construction of the Prudential Center under urban renewal laws was filed in the legislature on June 22, and within a month, the state Supreme Court had rendered an advisory opinion that gave qualified approval to the essential provisions of the bill. Passage was completed on September 1, 1960.



## B. Metropolitan Transit

by Mark K. Adams

### 1. The MTA: Background

The Metropolitan Transit Authority provides public transportation for fourteen cities and towns -- Arlington, Belmont, Boston, Brookline, Cambridge, Chelsea, Everett, Milton, Medford, Malden, Newton, Revere, Somerville, and Watertown -- in the metropolitan area. Its district covers 130 square miles, and extends about six to eight miles to the north, west, and south from the State House in downtown Boston. The 1950 population of the district was 1,543,150.

MTA service is built around its  $84\frac{1}{2}$  miles of rapid transit track, divided among five major routes that cross in downtown Boston. Supplementing the rapid transit lines are bus, trolley, and trackless trolley routes. In 1959 MTA carriers covered about 38 million passenger miles.

The MTA is a publicly-owned corporation headed by a three-member Board of Trustees appointed for 10-year terms by the Governor. Chief administrative officer of the system is the General Manager, who is aided by a Treasurer, General Counsel, and General Attorney. These administrative officers have indefinite appointments. In 1953 an Advisory Board, made up of the mayors, managers,

or chief selectmen of the municipalities in the district, was created to give the localities more influence in MTA policy. The Advisory Board's approval is required for MTA extensions, major expenditures, and for appointment of the general manager. Voting in the Advisory Board is in proportion to the share of the annual deficit that each municipality pays; thus Boston's mayor casts 64.38% of the vote, while Milton's chief selectman casts only .78% of it. Boston cannot dominate the Board, however, because no action may be taken without 85% of the vote being affirmative. A separate Boston Metropolitan District, governed by a five-member Board of Directors (four appointed by the Governor, one by the Mayor of Boston), buys MTA bonds with the proceeds of its own bonds.

Organization of the MTA in 1947 was the final step of a long journey toward public ownership. The first step was taken in 1897 when Boston agreed to build the Tremont Street tunnel for lease to the Boston Elevated Company (EL), owned by J.P. Morgan and Kidder, Peabody. In the next 20 years, Boston built four major tunnels for rental to the EL. By 1918, the cost of making surface extensions and providing new equipment had so strained the EL that it teetered on the brink of financial collapse. To keep it operating, the General Court passed the Public Control Act, establishing public control over the EL through a Board of Trustees appointed by the

Governor. Profits on El common stock were guaranteed in exchange for a requirement that the private owners of the system raise \$3 million with another stock issue to rehabilitate equipment and provide a reserve fund to cushion future deficits. Finally, a Metropolitan Transit District (identical in area to the present one) was created to pay the transit deficit should the reserve fund be depleted.

Public ownership of the El was increased in 1931 as the Depression, population movement to the suburbs, increasing automobile competition, and rising costs again brought the El to the verge of collapse. The Boston Metropolitan District (identical to the MTA one) was established to take over the El's credit market activities and to lower fixed costs by retiring expensive corporate bonds and preferred stock with cheaper municipal-type bonds issued by the public authority. At the same time, a Boston Transit Council, made up of the chief political officers of the 14 cities and towns in the Boston Metropolitan District, was created to give the public greater control over the fare structure.

The El continued to stagger between solvency and collapse. In 1946 it hit an all-time patronage record -- 433 million -- but, because of rising costs, operated at a loss. When automobiles returned after the war, the situation became desperate. In February, 1947, the El

had \$2.4 million on hand and obligations of \$3.1 million due in March. Quick action by Governor Robert Bradford and loans from eight Boston banks saved it from bankruptcy, but it was obvious that a major change was required. Following the recommendations of two study reports (the Coolidge reports of 1945 and 1947) and of the Governor, the General Court on June 19, 1947 authorized the Boston Metropolitan District to buy the common stock of the EI and created a public corporation -- the MTA -- to operate the system.

Because of the necessity of fast action to keep the trains running, supporters of the MTA plan compromised on almost everything except the essential principle of public ownership. Control of the system remained in the same hands and the district embraced the same 14 cities. MTA was treated as if it were a private corporation. The cities and towns taxed its property, and the state collected gasoline taxes, license fees, and subway rentals. The state Department of Public Utilities exercised the same supervisory powers over it as over private carriers, including review of proposed bond issues, route changes and extensions, and fare increases and reductions. MTA employees were not covered by state civil service laws, nor included in public pension plans. Massachusetts railroad laws, not public employment laws, governed employer-employee relations in the MTA.

The Trustees were directed to establish fare rates sufficient to cover operating costs, taxes, rentals, interest charges, and depreciation. It was hoped that this provision would eliminate future deficits by requiring riders to bear the full cost of operation. In the event a deficit should occur, the MTA was to borrow from the Boston Metropolitan District. On December 31 of each year, the Commonwealth would pay to the District out of general funds the amount of the Authority deficit; it could then assess the municipalities of the MTA district to reimburse itself. The proportion of the deficit each community would pay was determined by a 1940 origin and destination survey taken on the system's routes. Boston, where 64.38% of the riders entered and left their trains and buses, was to pay 64.38% of each deficit.

The MTA was to raise capital for improvements by selling bonds to the Boston Metropolitan District, as the El had done since 1931. The District, in turn, was to sell its own tax-free bonds to provide funds for purchase of MTA debentures. The District's solvency was insured by prohibiting it from selling bonds at an interest rate lower than that paid to it by the MTA.

The MTA act regularized the procedure for expanding the transit district. If the Trustees wished to extend a line into a municipality not already part of the district, they were required to present their case to the

state department of Public Utilities. If, after public hearings, the Department approved the MTA plans, a referendum was held in each municipality to determine if it would be incorporated into the MTA district. Only after a locality approved could the General Court then approve the plans and authorize the District to raise capital for the project. Thus, every city and town not already in the MTA district could veto action to put it there.

Only three important changes have been made since 1947 in the laws governing the MTA. In 1949, as part of a plan prepared by Governor Paul A. Dever to reduce the system's fixed costs, the MTA was exempted from the payment of local real estate taxes and subway rentals. Under the leadership of Governor Christian A. Herter in 1953, the number of Trustees was cut from five to three and the Advisory Board was established and given important powers.

## 2. The Politics of Expansion

The MTA was established in the expectation that rapid transit lines would be extended in every direction from the inner core area then served. Supporters of the Coolidge proposals envisaged new routes extending 15 miles (three times as far as the longest lines in 1947) into the suburbs and serving the major transportation



needs of the metropolitan area. Powerful pressures opposed MTA extension, however, and only one measure to expand the district has received serious consideration in the General Court. Limited extensions and improvements have been made within the district, but even these have met bitter opposition.

Politicians from the MTA district have almost all supported expansion plans, while those from cities and towns in the rest of the state have been united in opposition to expansion. Since legislators from the MTA district make up only about 30 per cent of the General Court, they have not been able to prevail.

The annual deficit, which in 1959 was almost \$19 million, largely explains this conflict. Politicians from the MTA district want to expand it in order to spread the deficit. Legislators from outside the district oppose spreading it: those from Greater Boston towns because the burden would fall directly on them, and those from other parts of the state because they fear that eventually the MTA area might become big enough to impose the deficit on the state.

Traditional rivalry between the inner core and the suburbs has also been a factor. Most municipalities in the MTA area are separated from those outside of it by economic, political, religious, ethnic, and cultural differences. **This makes** cooperation difficult. Many

suburbanites depend upon the automobile and see no need for rapid transit extensions. Ever since it became a public ward in 1918, the mass transit system has been supposed by many to be corrupt, a haven for machine politicians. Desire to escape the high taxes of inner core cities caused many families to move to the suburbs; these families are determined to escape that part of the tax rate (\$8.80 in Boston) attributable to the MTA. Finally, for many new suburbanites the MTA is probably an unpleasant reminder of a less prosperous and pleasant past.

Opposition to MTA expansion on a purely economic basis has also been strong. Ranged against the downtown Boston interests which stand almost alone in urging rapid transit expansion, are a variety of strong groups. Local merchants, usually an important factor in suburban politics, fear that quick, cheap transit to Boston will take shoppers away from them. The huge new shopping centers around Boston are of course opposed to expansion. Highway contractors (major contributors to both political parties) and others who depend upon the automobile (gasoline companies, garages, insurance companies, and especially the powerful Massachusetts Turnpike Authority) tend to oppose anything that might cut travel by car. Railroad workers unions, which fear that extension of rapid transit will hurt commuter railroads, are also

opposed to expansion.

Party affiliations seem to affect politicians' stands on the issue only when geographic and economic influences are weak. Party loyalty breaks down because the issue is of very great interest to constituents. Party positions do not exist on most expansion issues. (Democratic Senate floor leader Maurice Donahue of Holyoke has often led the opposition to extensions; Democratic Senate President John Powers has led the support for them). Only when strong pressure from a governor (Bradford in 1947; Dever in 1949) is combined with a relative lack of interest among constituents do party lines make much difference.

Because it is almost universally conceded that the vast majority of votes in any local referendum would oppose expansion, opponents of extension are bolstered by the feeling that they represent the will of the people. Proponents must argue for plans that would have to be imposed from above.

Although it has proved impossible to extend the District, transit extensions have been made within it. The East Boston tunnel was lengthened four miles northward through East Boston and Revere in 1952-54. This was done without much opposition. A nine-mile extension was made westward through Brookline and Newton; this, however, aroused violent opposition in the two municipalities and

was authorized only after a bitter fight against opposition led by Newton Mayor Howard Whitmore.

Several factors made it politically possible to make the East Boston extension. Probably the most important was the attitude of voters in the area to be served. Many people in East Boston, Chelsea, and Revere did not have automobiles. Some East Boston residents expected to benefit more directly: their old houses would bring more when condemned for transit right-of-way than if sold on the market.

The obvious need for northward extension strengthened the East Boston and Revere legislators in the General Court. Public transportation was needed to serve the newly developed Logan airport, the race tracks at Suffolk Downs and Wonderland, and the amusement area at Revere Beach. It was hoped that traffic congestion in downtown Boston would be relieved by attracting North Shore commuters and shoppers to the new line, and for this large parking lots were plentifully provided. The demise of the old, narrow gauge Boston, Revere Beach, and Lynn railroad in 1951 influenced the Legislature to authorize the second stage of the extension. Finally, the relatively low cost of the project (\$11.5 million) helped make it unobjectionable.

### The Riverside Extension

The Riverside extension west through the wealthy suburban communities of Brookline and Newton, on the other hand, was authorized only after a bitter struggle. A threat by the Boston and Albany Railroad in 1956 to end service on its money-losing Riverside commuter line started the struggle. In August, the MTA general manager suggested MTA expansion to replace the railroad service. The report endorsed an earlier (Coolidge) proposal to extend the MTA line nine miles from Kenmore Square over Riverside to the western edge of the MTA district on the Newton-Weston boundary. Downtown Boston interests supported the proposal. The Conference of Civic and Business Organizations published a plan for the extension that was almost identical with the legislation later submitted by the MTA Trustees. Within a few days it was joined in its support by the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. Public officials in other MTA district communities hurried to support the extension plan. It was generally agreed that the new line would operate at a profit, thus reducing the MTA deficit and lightening the tax load for the cities of the District. Boston and Cambridge authorities, in particular, were hopeful that the extension, by increasing the proportion of riders boarding cars in Brookline and Newton, would reduce their share of the deficit when a new passenger count was made.

A small but vocal group of believers in metropolitan planning, who had influence in the Boston press and in the House of Representatives, were enthusiastic about the extension plan.

Early in 1957 another heavy weight was placed on the scales favoring extension. Supporters of the new Democratic Governor, Foster Furcolo, concluded that the new route would give the Governor an accomplishment to point to. The most important condition favoring extension was, however, the indifference of most legislators to the matter. Because the proposal would not affect areas outside the MTA district, it was regarded as a purely local problem. Newton and Brookline could not get the allies from outside the MTA area that they could have gotten if the plan had involved expansion of the District. Outvoted 73-8 in the House and 12-2 in the Senate by other MTA district legislators, the Brookline and Newton legislators could not win. Led by Mayor Whitmore of Newton, however, the two communities put up a fight and twice came close to winning. They based their public arguments on the claim that the Riverside line would operate at a loss, thus adding to the already huge deficit and so to the burden on other MTA district communities. Behind this argument several interests worked. Brookline and Newton feared that a passenger count made after the line was built would increase the proportion of the deficit paid by



them (Brookline then paid 3.9%; Newton 0.8%). Local merchants believed that rapid transit service to Boston would cost them customers. Homeowners near the Riverside right-of-way feared that frequent rapid transit service, producing noise and dirt, would reduce the value of their property. The proposed western terminus for the line coincided with the intersection of Boston's major circumferential highway, Route 128, and the state's main east-west artery, the Massachusetts Turnpike. Because this was prime land for industrial development, Newton opposed its use for tax-free MTA facilities. Newton and Brookline were supported by railroad union officials who feared that many of their members would lose their jobs if rapid transit replaced the railroad.

The bill authorizing the \$9 million extension was introduced into the House January 9, 1957. After public hearings, the Metropolitan Affairs Committee on March 29 voted 12-3 against the bill. Its supporters rallied, however, and on April 1 voted 120-107 to recommit the bill to Committee. All seven Newton and Brookline representatives present voted against recommitment. In the next month, six members of the Metropolitan Affairs Committee changed their minds, and on April 29 the Committee voted 9-6 to issue a favorable report. Despite the determined bi-partisan efforts of Brookline and Newton to kill the bill, it survived Ways and Means

Committee consideration, floor fights in both the Senate and House, and on June 20 was signed by the Governor.

Brookline and Newton then turned to the Advisory Board to defeat the proposal. Because the extension was strongly backed by the mayor of Boston, who had 65 per cent of the Board's votes, it was generally assumed that the 85% vote required would be easily forthcoming. As it turned out, however, the representatives of Belmont, Cambridge, and Watertown joined those of Brookline and Newton to defeat the authorization by less than one vote (84.09 per cent of the votes favored extension.)

Belmont's representative explained that he was opposed to rapid transit extension in principle. Cambridge and Watertown said they needed more time to study the problem. By the next Board meeting, the Cambridge and Watertown representatives had been convinced by Mayor Hynes that the new line would reduce the deficit, and they switched their votes. The Riverside Branch was then approved, by 93.95 per cent of the vote, with only Belmont, Brookline, and Newton opposing.

Mayor Whitmore then played his last card. He tried to convince the state Department of Public Utilities and U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission that railroad service on the Riverside Branch should be continued. In this he was unsuccessful. The new MTA line was opened July 4, 1959.

### The Old Colony Line

Only one proposal for expanding the MTA district has received serious consideration. The Old Colony line of the N.Y., N.H. & H Railroad runs south and east from Boston. Named after the area settled by the Pilgrims, the line serves the South Shore commuting area and extends south through Plymouth to Cape Cod. Like other railroad lines relying primarily on commuter traffic, the Old Colony began to lose money when automobiles came into wide use. Beginning in 1939, the New Haven made occasional threats to suspend service. A proposal to extend rapid transit south about 10 miles to Braintree was therefore included in the 1947 MTA law. Early the next year, Governor Bradford was informed by New Haven officials that the Old Colony line would be abandoned October 1. He acted quickly. Assuming that MTA extension over the Old Colony tracks was the best way to meet the problem, he delivered a special message to the General Court recommending legislation designed to make possible a speedy extension of the MTA line. The General Court quickly accepted his proposals. South Shore reaction was adverse. The Quincy Chamber of Commerce condemned the Governor for hasty action. A series of spontaneous public gatherings took place in Braintree and Quincy, and the Republican officials of the two communities attacked the Republican Governor for his pro-MTA attitude.

Unwillingness to share the MTA deficit, which then threatened to reach \$5 million yearly, widespread belief that the MTA was corrupt and inefficient, and fear on the part of local merchants that they would lose trade to downtown Boston accounted for most of the opposition.

Despite the opposition of the two South Shore communities, Governor Bradford continued to expedite MTA expansion. The Department of Public Utilities approved the project, and a date was set for the referendum in Quincy and Braintree to determine if they would become part of the MTA district. Both sides conducted active campaigns. The MTA Trustees, backed by downtown Boston interests and by the state administration, placed large ads in Boston and in South Shore newspapers claiming that rapid transit extension would be the best way of commuting from Quincy and Braintree. They also used radio announcements, personal appearances, and a billboard campaign. Opponents of extension were also active.

The proposal was defeated 8257-1581 in Quincy, and 3206-328 in Braintree.

Impressed, the Governor looked for another solution to the Old Colony problem. Immediate suspension of service was forestalled when the state signed a ten-year option to buy the line's right-of-way at salvage cost. As the option date for public purchase of the right-of-way approached, the New Haven Railroad once again stirred.

Plagued by falling patronage and rising losses, its President, George Alpert, announced June 25, 1957, that Old Colony service would end October 1. The South Shore sprang into action. People in Braintree and Quincy recommended tax abatements and subsidies for the railroad. They were still much opposed to extension of the MTA.

Governor Furcolo's administration, however, persuaded a U. S. District Court in New Haven to extend the deadline for suspension of service to May 1, 1958. When this deadline approached, the Governor got another extension to August.

By the summer of 1958, however, something had to be done. At the Governor's urging, the General Court authorized a \$900,000 subsidy to the Old Colony if it did not suspend service before July 1, 1959. In return, the New Haven extended to August 15, 1959, the Commonwealth's option for purchase of the right-of-way. Boston was to pay 25 per cent of the \$900,000 grant, with 37 South Shore communities served by the line paying the rest. The law created a five-man Old Colony Area Transportation Committee and a 37-member Old Colony Area Transportation Advisory Council to make studies and recommendations.

Realizing that the General Court, with its power of general supervision over MTA policies, and the voters of Quincy and Braintree, with their votes in a referendum on extension, would prevent the MTA from expanding southward,

and concerned over the impending suspension of railroad service in one of Boston's major commuter areas, the Governor late in 1958 appointed a Massachusetts Transportation Commission to survey the Old Colony problem and prepare a concrete solution for it. In its April, 1959 report, the Commission urged creation of a new agency, the Old Colony Transit Authority (OCTA), to operate rapid transit over the Old Colony tracks in Quincy and Braintree. OCTA, with organization and powers similar to but more extensive than those of MTA, would contract with MTA for the use of the Cambridge - Dorchester tunnel through which its cars would run after entering Boston. Quincy and Braintree would constitute the Old Colony Transit District, and would pay the approximately \$30 million in capital costs needed to put the system in operation. The Commission estimated that the new Authority would make a yearly profit of about \$1.35 million, but Quincy and Braintree alone would be responsible for any deficit.

The Commission's proposals were not generally supported in the South Shore communities. In June, the Old Colony Area Transportation Advisory Council, made up of the chief executive officers of the 37 communities served by the Old Colony line, rejected the plan. The high capital costs involved and the requirement that Quincy and Braintree assume responsibility for deficits were the most important reasons. Rapid transit, even when



not directly associated with MTA, was still unpopular along the South Shore. The spectre of enormous MTA deficits (\$18.421 million in 1959) killed any desire for it.

Soon after rejecting the Commission's proposals, the Old Colony Area Transportation Advisory Council voted against further subsidies to the New Haven Railroad. The people of the South Shore communities apparently preferred the end of all public transportation to having to pay part of the cost of it in taxes.

Although no one had produced a plan acceptable to the South Shore communities, the General Court exercised its option to buy the 10-mile portion of the Old Colony system between Boston and Braintree. The Massachusetts Transportation Commission then submitted new plans for an Old Colony Transit Authority that were designed to overcome the objections of Quincy and Braintree; because the communities would still have to accept financial responsibility for the system, the new plan was no more acceptable than the old. Today the state owns 10 miles of good trackage into a major commuting area and cannot find a way to use it.

### 3. Appointment of a General Manager

The retirement of MTA General Manager Edward Dana in the summer of 1959 and efforts to name his successor opened a new area of conflict. In this the Advisory Board, made up of the chief executives of the district's 14 cities and towns, have been pitted against the MTA Trustees and the Governor, representatives of the Commonwealth as a whole. The deadlock lasted almost a year, leaving the MTA without a manager.

The Advisory Board has used the opportunity to try to get more power over MTA operations. It has statutory authority to approve fare schedules, authorize bond issues, and approve appointment of the general manager, and it wants to get de facto authority over MTA administration and operations while reducing the authority of the Governor and of the Trustees. Under the leadership of Boston Mayor John F. Collins, the Advisory Board has insisted that the MTA needs a strong, experienced executive for the \$30,000 a year job of General Manager. This executive, Collins has said, must have "exclusive supervision over the administration of all departments" with power to "preclude the Trustees from interfering." The Advisory Board maintains that the General Manager's position should be similar to that of a city manager or corporation president: he should have full responsibility for operations after overall policy has been decided. Under

the present system, the Board contends, the Trustees meddle too much in administration, make decisions "over the head" of the General Manager, and use their position for political purposes. The Board proposes: 1) permitting the Governor to appoint only one Trustee (he now appoints three); 2) using an annual MTA budget instead of asking the State Treasurer for funds to meet immediate obligations; and, 3) forcing the MTA to advertise for bids on purchases and contracts. By these means the Advisory Board hopes to increase the power of the General Manager and thus, indirectly, its own power.

Although Governor Furcolo did not openly support the Trustees until April, 1960, he acted to preserve their position. Through the Trustees, the Governor is able to exercise a considerable degree of influence over the MTA; by supporting them in their preference for a relatively weak General Manager, he hopes to keep the Advisory Board in its place.

Soon after Mr. Dana's resignation, the Governor announced that he was undertaking a "nation-wide talent hunt" for a new General Manager. Early in August he announced that Earl L. Keister, former President of the Tennessee Central Railroad, was his choice. With the aid of his Trustees, he began to lobby for the Advisory Board's approval. When Mayor Hynes of Boston announced his support of Mr. Keister, it was generally assumed that he would be

approved. Mr. Keister got only 71 per cent of the Board's vote, however; about 15 per cent was against him and another 12 per cent abstained. Board members voting against Mr. Keister feared that he "couldn't stand up to the rough politics of the MTA" and would be unable to prevent further "encroachments by the Trustees on the power of the General Manager."

After Mr. Keister's defeat, the Governor and Trustees sounded out the Advisory Board to see if Willis B. Downey, the MTA's General Counsel and acting manager, could be approved. Most Board members, however, felt that Mr. Downey, who was the MTA's chief lobbyist, had become so close to legislative leaders that he could not assert the independence they desired.

When Mayor Collins replaced Mayor Hynes as Boston's representative on the Advisory Board early in 1960, the Board's resolve not to yield to the Governor was strengthened. With 64 per cent of the vote, the Mayor had a veto power; he became the determined leader of a decided majority of the Advisory Board which held out for a strong General Manager.

The matter was finally settled, 10 months after Mr. Dana's resignation, by the appointment of Thomas J. McLernon, who had been manager of the New York Transit Authority. Meeting in Mayor Collins' office, the Advisory Board voted unanimously to approve this appointment.

"This is the kind of selection we've been asking for all along," members of the Advisory Board were quoted as saying. "We didn't want to name the general manager ourselves; we just wanted the trustees to come up with someone who was clearly qualified to handle the MTA's difficult problems."

#### 4. Apportionment of the Deficit

Attempts to reapportion the MTA deficit have produced political controversy since 1947. Although it has not generated as much popular interest as has rapid transit extension, deficit reapportionment has had the keen interest of politicians and large property holders. Generally, the interests that have blocked MTA district expansion have prevented changes in the deficit-paying formula.

As explained above, deficits are apportioned on the basis of a passenger count taken in 1940. Boston pays 64.38 per cent of the deficit, Cambridge 8.31 per cent, Somerville 5.00 per cent, and the other 11 communities of the district amounts ranging from Brookline's 3.90 per cent to Milton's .78 per cent. Boston and Cambridge claim that the 1940 count discriminates against them because non-residents returning from shopping or work were counted as Boston and Cambridge passengers thus raising the share of the deficit that those two cities had to pay.

MTA equipment purchases are financed on the basis of valuation, not passenger count. The most recent valuation for equipment cost apportionment was made in 1945.

Although Boston claims that this apportionment method is also unjust (Boston's valuation relative to the rest of the District is now only 50 per cent of what it was in 1945) few attempts have been made to change it. The passenger count formula has been the target of those desiring change.

Proposed changes in deficit apportionment have followed two general lines. The first is to assess part of the deficit on towns in the Metropolitan Area that are not in the MTA District but presumably benefit from rapid transit. Usually bills of this kind would levy from 12 1/2 to 25 per cent of the deficit on from 14 to 65 communities in Eastern Massachusetts. Although strongly supported by the large commercial tax payers and the officials of the MTA District, these bills have been easily killed. Legislators from the fringe areas join with those from other parts of the state who fear the gradual increase of MTA voting power in the General Court.

Boston and Cambridge have led attempts to reapportion the deficit within the District. The other 12 municipalities have of course opposed these attempts. General Court votes are almost evenly split between Boston-Cambridge and the other District cities and towns:



the non-district legislators hold the balance of power. In every General Court session since the creation of the MTA, Boston and Cambridge legislators have introduced such bills. Their proposed new apportionment formulas have usually been based on population and/or valuation, not passenger counts. Each year reapportionment bills have been reported favorably by the joint Committee on Metropolitan Affairs only to be killed in the Senate and House Ways and Means Committees, whose members represent a cross-section of the state.

The Boston-Cambridge group changed its strategy in 1956 by pressing for a new passenger count. Catching their opponents by surprise, they prevailed in the Senate by a 17-16 vote, and in the House by another narrow margin. The Boston and Cambridge legislators were certain that because the population of their cities had declined relative to that of the whole District, the proportion of passengers boarding cars in their cities had also declined. When the new count was released, however, it appeared that they had miscalculated. Reapportionment based on the new count would increase the charge on both Boston and Cambridge and on Brookline, Revere, Somerville, and Watertown as well. Fortunately for them, the General Court reinstated the 1940 count.

Not until the 1960 session did the Boston-Cambridge group make another attempt to reapportion. Led from the

wings by Mayor Collins, they got enough support among non-district Senators to pass 18-13 a bill to reassess the deficit directly on the basis of population. This would have saved Boston almost \$3 million yearly, shaving \$1.75 from its \$101.20 tax rate. Cambridge would have saved about \$300,000 (\$1.25 off its tax rate). Boston, with half of the District's population, would pay 50 per cent of the deficit (it was paying 64 per cent); Cambridge's share of the deficit would drop from 8.31 per cent to 6.82 per cent. The share paid by other District municipalities would increase, with Newton suffering most (from .79 per cent to 5.97 per cent). The new formula survived a Senate vote, but was killed in the House on May 17, 1960 by a vote of 116 to 104.

## C. The Negro In Boston

by Ralph Otwell

### 1. General

The Boston Negro is a political paradox.

Nowhere else in the nation, at least in the large urban areas, does he have more guaranteed freedoms. For the Negro, Massachusetts is the "fairest" of the fifty. Fair employment, fair education, fair housing -- all have been enacted in the 15 postwar years that have literally been a "fair deal" for the state's minority groups.

Yet in no other major city has the Negro been the passive political force he has been on the Boston scene. It would appear that as he multiplied in numbers, he dwindled in political weight. Compare his political lethargy with his heritage, and the paradox is even more puzzling; for Boston was the cradle of Abolition, the home of militant Negro agitation, the headquarters of an earlier political ferment.

Its fighting heroes are legendary. The earliest was Crispus Attucks, an Indian-Negro halfbreed who was the first to fall in the Boston Massacre. One of the latter-day rebels was James Monroe Trotter, a fighting Negro editor responsible for the "Boston Riot."

But, where cries of liberty and equality once rang out, caution and complacency have become the order of the

day. Politically, Boston's Negroes are only a shadow of their militant, crusading, sometimes violent past. In a state that was among the first to give Negroes the franchise, the colored vote is regarded with contempt by many white politicians. Despite their increasing numbers, they are of little importance in public affairs.

Whereas Boston's Negroes once pleaded and bargained with Presidents, they now wonder how to convince the City Council the Lower Roxbury Negroes need at least one decent playground.

If one tours the Lenox Street public housing project, the sharp contrast between past and present is given an ironical twist. One of the courts is named in honor of a Boston Negro described as the "most selfless equal rights agitator America has possessed." Yet the occupancy pattern is a damning denial of his life and works: it is entirely Negro.

In view of this complacency, inertia, and subserviency, how does one account for the liberal legislation of the FEPC type? How does one explain the presence of larger numbers of Negroes in responsible government jobs?

These questions are parts of the greater puzzle which is the Boston body politic, and the Negro paradox cannot be viewed entirely apart from the whole.

Nor, in a time when the Negro often is discussed as a

balance-of-power factor in state and national politics, can the Boston colored community be viewed in geographical isolation. Comparisons with outside trends and influences are valuable.

A look at some historical factors also adds perspective to the present situation.

To a great extent, Negro political organization and methods are shaped by the framework of the larger white organization. Where the situation fosters unity and cohesion among the whites, Negroes usually can be found pulling together; where solidarity is lacking in the overall scheme, the Negroes also are handicapped by disunity. In Boston, where politics is based on personalities and factions rather than on an old-style machine, the Negro also is without a solidifying organization. His allegiance to a particular party or candidate is based, like the whites', on personalities more than on platforms or programs.

In Boston Negroes have been even slower to enter big city politics than elsewhere. Four factors are primarily responsible:

- (1) The rate of Negro in-migration has been slower.
- (2) Negroes' dispersal throughout the city has been greater.
- (3) Their voting strength has been dissipated by the nonpartisan elections to which Boston subscribes.

(4) With the elimination of the ward system, they have been swallowed up in a basic political unit that encompasses the entire city for municipal elections.

The extent to which nonpartisan systems and the size of political units have affected the Negro political representation in large cities is evident in a number of comparisons.

In Chicago, with its small wards and partisan elections, a Negro alderman was elected in 1915. In 1928, the Negroes named their first congressman, a Republican.

In New York, where there have been partisan elections but much larger districts than the Chicago ward, the first Negro councillor was not named until 1939. The first colored congressman was elected with Harlem votes in 1944.

In Detroit, which has citywide nonpartisan elections, Negroes did not elect their first member to the city council until 1957. They sent a representative to Congress in 1954.

In both Los Angeles and Boston, which share with Detroit the nonpartisan, citywide council election, the Negroes have not succeeded in gaining either aldermanic or Congressional representation. In Los Angeles, as in Boston, the additional factors of belated migration and wider Negro dispersal also have been at work.



## 2. The Facade of Negro-White Relationships

Boston has escaped major racial tensions like those erupting since World War I in other major cities. It is true that Boston, alone of the major northern cities, has never had a race riot; an impressive package of FEPC-type legislation makes Massachusetts the "fairest" of the fair; whites and Negroes mingle happily in Roxbury. But two factors have played a favorable role: the small relative size of the Negro colony and the distractions created by the arrival of other immigrant groups who drew antipathy customarily directed at the Negro.

Some Negroes will concede that they have enjoyed, in a clandestine sort of way, the flare-ups between groups outside their own. At times, East Boston (Italian) football fans have brawled with South Boston (Irish) rooters, Gentile punks have clobbered Jewish youths, and Father Leonard Feeney has attacked Richard Cardinal Cushing as a "pawn of Jews and Protestants." During these intramural fireworks the Boston Negro has watched from the sidelines, wrapped smugly, if not so securely, in a cocoon of racial harmony.

Through the years Boston has endured a whole rogue's gallery of demagogues and rabble-rousers, among them the Anglo-Saxon Federation of America, the American Fascist Union, and the National Gentile League. But none has gone sniping for the Negro. Even when the Ku Klux Klan began

night-riding in Massachusetts during the early 20s, the Negroes in Boston could sit back, content that Jim Curley was astride his white charger guarding the city's gates against the hooded devils.

Roxbury, like many other slum areas, is plagued with young gangs that establish a reign of terror over their self-declared domain. But many of these groups are interracial, and their internecine clashes seldom develop into racial rivalries.

One Negro businessman said if a white man and a Negro began a rhuarb outside his Tremont St. drugstore, "the bystanders would just hold back and take bets on the outcome." After the best man won, he said, the whole crowd would adjourn to a tavern "without any hard feelings between whites and Negroes."

Evidence of incidents which have promoted greater harmony is plentiful. One of the more recent episodes involved the Daughters of the American Revolution. It occurred when the Boston School Committee took action to bar the DAR from sponsoring contests in the city's public schools. The action was retaliation for DAR policies in denying Negro performers the use of Constitution Hall in Washington.

Some leaders of both races think that racial violence is an ever-present possibility, but most Negroes discount this pessimism, contending that the colored community is a

stable, well-integrated part of the city life.

One Negro said he believed the serenity of recent years has fostered a "false sense of social security" and lulled the Negro community into ignoring injustices which its forefathers would have deemed intolerable.

The racial pacifism of Boston has probably reduced the Negroes' chances for attaining greater solidarity. Without a major incident to draw Negroes together, conditions have been conducive to factionalism, internal tug-of-wars, and indifference.

### 3. Economic Position of the Negro

a. In family income, home ownership, and organized union strength, the Negroes' disadvantage in Boston is pronounced.

The Negroes' economic status has not changed materially, while the Irish, Italians, Poles, and all the others have steadily forged ahead. Dependent primarily for employment on the unskilled and menial occupations, the Negro has seen many of these jobs dry up. Automation and the exodus of many textile and manufacturing operations have been chiefly responsible. Opportunities for employment in the service trades also have dwindled.

The new electronic industry and expansion in some clerical and white-collar fields, such as insurance, have not helped Negroes much because they are largely excluded

from these jobs by lack of training and education, and by their inability to crack color barriers in both business and organized labor.

Craft unions have kept the Negroes out of the building trades. One state official doubts whether there are more than four or five Negroes in the building trade unions in the entire state. Even the apprentices, he says, can be numbered on the fingers of one hand.

With competition keen for scarce jobs, the state FEPC legislation, hailed 13 years ago as the dawn of a new era of economic prosperity for Negroes, has been of limited effect. In both housing and jobs, the scarcity often nullifies the legal guarantees.

A report prepared a few years ago under the direction of a committee headed by Warren Banner of the Urban League stated, "...Your committee has reason to believe that a depressingly large proportion of the employment requests received by the Massachusetts State Employment Service are discriminatory."<sup>1</sup> It cites also numerous instances of apparent exclusion in various governmental agencies, including the Employment Service itself.

Figures on median family income spell out only part of the disparity suffered by Negroes, but are graphic in their implications. Whereas the median figure for all families in Boston in 1950 was \$3,249, the median figure

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<sup>1</sup> See Warren Banner, "A Study Relating the Program of the Urban League of Greater Boston to Community Patterns," National Urban League, November-December, 1953.

for Negro families in 10 census tracts ranged from \$1,267 in the South End to \$2,654 in Upper Roxbury. The difference is underlined by the fact that a higher percentage of Negro women were contributing to the family income.

A recent study supervised by Prof. Morton Rubin<sup>1</sup> of Northeastern University and based on 446 interviews in a cross-section of Negro neighborhoods showed that only slight changes have occurred in the 10 years since the last U.S. Census. For instance, 50 per cent of the families interviewed make less than \$3,000 annually, 74 per cent make less than \$4,500. Only 9 per cent reported a family income in excess of \$6,000.

The Urban League study based on the 1950 figures showed that the major job categories for Negroes, in order of importance, were (1) service workers (2) operatives and kindred unskilled laborers, and (3) craftsmen and similar skilled workers. For the whites, the same occupations were also the most prevalent -- but in reverse order.

The Rubin Survey revealed that 53 per cent of the household heads were engaged in unskilled or service occupations, only 6 per cent in mechanical or technical occupations, and a tiny 3 per cent in white-collar, sales and clerical jobs.

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<sup>1</sup> Morton Rubin, "Negro Migration and Adjustment in Boston," Urban League of Greater Boston, December, 1959.

The white-collar force, including those in Civil Service jobs at one level of government or the other, were even outnumbered by the business and professional classes, which comprised 7 per cent. The size of the professional group is believed to be proportionally as high, probably highest, as that of any Negro community in the North.

As elsewhere, the Boston Negro is "last hired, first fired." The unemployment among families interviewed by Prof. Rubin's teams was a whopping 19 per cent. An additional 10 per cent more characterized themselves as "retired."

The statistics on home ownership bear out the general economic picture. As late as 1950, fewer than 3,000 Negroes owned their own residences, and the proportion of renters in the more heavily Negro areas ranged between 80 and 90 per cent.

The level of rents was consistent with segregation and income patterns. In census tracts with 250 or more non-white persons, the average monthly rentals for all families were in a spread from \$12 to \$97. The figure for Negro occupants, on the other hand, ranged from \$18 to \$41.

The Negro community is virtually devoid of wealth. In 1950, there was no recorded instance of a Negro-owned manufacturing concern or wholesale enterprise. Most of



the small service and retail establishments are marginal, tied closely to the economic ups and downs of the whole Negro populace.

b. The political consequences of the economic distress among Negroes are complex and immense. When life centers largely on a battle for sheer survival, the motivations -- and opportunities -- for participation in political activity are scant.

Dissatisfaction tends to breed political ferment and pressure for change. This has not happened in Boston, however, where Negroes bear their economic yoke with ox-like docility.

For the Negro who would engage actively in politics, the absence of an economic home base is a severe handicap. In the Boston scheme of personally-oriented politics, it is peculiarly harsh. As one high-ranking Negro Democrat explains the problem:

"The old ward system of Boston was based on a practice of buying the leader; campaigns were financed by donations from persons in the wards eager to see their favorite candidates elected. But in the Negro wards, the persons who became politically ambitious had to look to the small party treasuries for the necessary funds. Because of this economic disadvantage, the Negroes have never been able to compete politically with other groups."

He points to the contrast between the political strength of Jews and the weakness of Negroes.

"Although the Negroes have been bound to the Jews by a common cause, they have not been

able to do what the Jews have in financial terms. The importance of Jews as an economic force is expressed in their ability to finance campaigns."

If one set out to raise money from Negroes to wage a political campaign, he said, "the Boston politicians would think you were crazy." By passing the hat in Roxbury, a promising Negro candidate might raise \$500 or \$600, principally from two or three persons. The only consistently reliable source for campaign money among Negro Democrats is Balcolm S. Taylor, present Ward 9 "boss."

The fund-raising challenge is the foremost among the problems of any Negro wishing to run for office. Outside of his personal circle of friends and relatives, he is likely to run into a curt brush-off from those even with slight resources. Political investments by Negroes, measured against the risk factors in the Boston picture, would seldom be viewed as anything sounder than wildcat speculation. Political philanthropy, free of ulterior motives, is apparently rare among the more affluent whites. The promising candidate is usually the one who "promises" the most to his financial backers.

Even to conduct a campaign on the proverbial shoe-string, Negro aspirants resort to all sorts of ingenious fund-raising devices, such as garden parties and musical variety shows.

In this creative challenge of the campaign chest, one of the more enterprising Negroes has been Harry J. Elam, unsuccessful candidate for the City Council in 1959.

When he ran for the lower house of the legislature in 1954, also unsuccessfully, he put together a "Musical Journey" benefit to raise funds and help speed him on his "journey to Beacon Hill."

Described modestly in the program as the product of the "creative ability, organizing ability and leadership ability" of Elam himself, the musical journey was virtually a one-man safari. The producer: Harry J. Elam. The writer: Harry J. Elam. The director: Harry J. Elam. Co-star (in the role of "Harry"): Harry J. Elam.

These jobs left him little time to solicit ads for the program book. So he relied on Clarence R. Elam, his brother -- then executive secretary of the Governor's Council and now chairman of the **Boston Licensing Board.**

#### 4. The Housing Situation

Negroes have been permitted to spread about residentially more in Boston than in most other cities. On the streets of Roxbury one sees white and Negro children playing arm-in-arm; colored women gossiping over backyard fences with their white neighbors, and white and Negro men drinking elbow-to-elbow in corner saloons.

Roxbury is a checkerboard racially. In part this is because of an historic egalitarianism. But it also reflects purely economic factors. Whites have pulled out of decaying neighborhoods whereas Negroes have had to stay.

Insight into Boston's pattern of segregation may be gained from study of occupancy patterns in public housing projects. This is particularly interesting because for several years discrimination in public housing has been illegal.

Figures published by the Massachusetts Council Against Discrimination show that 1,766 Negro families occupied units operated under the Boston Housing Authority in 1959. These families comprised about 13 per cent of the total, but were concentrated in five of the 25 projects. Of the 20 remaining projects, 12 had six or fewer Negro families. One of the bigger developments -- Mission Hill, with 1,019 units -- had no Negro occupants. Charlestown, with 1,117 units, reported only three Negro families. The five projects where Negroes predominated were all in the Roxbury-South End area. The figures for each follow:

PROJECT	TOTAL UNITS OCCUPIED	NON-WHITE FAMILIES		
		1957	1958	1959
Camden Street	72	72	72	71
Lenox Street	306	306	302	300
South End	498	241	253	255
Whittier Street	197	180	185	186
Mission Hill Extension	567	314	386	440

Segregation "in apparent defiance of the state legislation barring such practices" is explained by two factors, the MCAD reported:

1. Negroes in lower economic brackets who qualify for public housing are reluctant to leave Roxbury to claim available apartments in other areas.

2. Whites have rejected available vacancies in projects that are deep inside the Negro sectors, or that traditionally have had a high colored occupancy rate.

"The resulting segregation," said the commission, "is beyond the solution of mere laws, and the factors which created it also tend to make it ever more rigid."

When Governor Furcolo called a conference on civil rights in 1958, the conferees took cognizance of the segregation in public housing but explained that it had become inevitable as a consequence of the locations chosen for the projects.

Segregation in the private housing market was blamed on "explicit" discrimination not covered by state law. At that time, the legal safeguards applied only to public and "publicly-assisted" housing (i.e. homes carrying VA and FHA loan and mortgage guarantees). Although the law has since been strengthened to apply to privately-owned housing, it is doubtful whether the revision will have any effect on the factors cited by the conference as primarily responsible, i.e. bigotry, property owners' concern over

the effects of "invasion" on real estate values, and the inability of minority groups to obtain mortgage money and insurance.

The deplorable housing situation is an issue which dwarfs all others in the minds of most Boston Negroes. Few, apparently, have seriously considered concerted political action to bring about improvements.

Generally, the upper-class Negroes -- most of whom have escaped the Lower Roxbury slums -- view housing as a citywide problem affecting all citizens. But the mass of Negroes lean toward a more parochial, racial view. They know that their housing is far worse than any other.

In 1950, there were approximately 220,000 dwelling units in Boston, about 11,000 (5.2 per cent) of them occupied by non-whites. Of the citywide total, nearly 33,600 units were adjudged substandard, meaning no private bath, no running water, or merely dilapidated. Some 167,000 of the 220,000 units are at least a half-century old.

The Urban League reported that "in more than one-fourth of the census tracts occupied by 250 or more colored persons, the majority of the dwelling units were without private baths or were dilapidated."

The worst housing was found in the South End, the League reported, but "conditions were only slightly better in the heaviest area of concentration in Roxbury."



In some of the more heavily Negro areas, the proportion of substandard units ranged as high as 74 per cent. In the South End, the overall percentage was 49.

In recent years many of the 19th century structures crowding the South End and Lower Roxbury have been collapsing. When a building tecters and has to be dismantled, the adjacent walls of the neighboring houses are weakened. Often a string of tenements begin to crumble in a chain-like reaction. Before they cave in around the heads of their occupants, authorities have to move in and raze the buildings. Often before the bulldozers are summoned, the houses are just abandoned -- by tenant, by landlord. At present, the unpaid taxes on such properties in Boston have reached a staggering sum. Of an estimated \$6,000,000 sought by the city in overdue real estate taxes, some \$1,500,000 is owed in Roxbury's Ward 9 alone. There the city has liens on 800 parcels of land.

As their homes are abandoned to the tax collector, the bulldozer, and the uncertainties of urban renewal, the low-rent Negro populace scurries hither and yon. Financing and fire insurance are virtually unobtainable, except at impossibly high rates, and new construction is at a standstill, while redevelopment plans gather cobwebs.

Very rapid migration has occurred. A study by the Boston City Planning Department covering the period 1940-

1958 shows that in just the last eight years the South End-Lower Roxbury area lost 25,000 persons, and that bulldozer exiles and others left at the annual rate of more than 4,000. Meanwhile, the natural increase rate (births over deaths) was only a little more than one-fourth the exit rate. Such rapid flight by low-income people means the spread of blight and a further weakening of the solidarity of the Negro community.

Of course, many of those forced to flee the South End and Roxbury have been whites. They have had better opportunities than Negroes to find other houses. Negro families have in many cases fled to the fringes of Roxbury. Only those in public housing could stay where they were without worrying about a collapsing roof.

##### 5. Jews and Negroes

The relationships between Jew and Negro help to explain the anomaly of a city in which Negroes are weak and yet politically satisfied. That sweeping guarantees of racial equality in housing, employment, and education have been enacted in Massachusetts may seem to reflect either general enlightenment or power on the part of the Negroes to get what they want in the legislature. Neither condition exists, however. The generous guarantees of minority rights are largely the product of well-organized, persistent, and well-heeled Jewish influence.

Numerically and financially, the Jewish community is far ahead of the Negro one. Comprising about 10 per cent of the city's population (almost the same as the Protestants), the Jews have used votes, funds, know-how, and dedication in the whole arena of civil rights to cut a wide swath through reactionary prejudice and inertia.

"We've done a lot more for the Negro than we could ever hope to do for the Jew alone," said one Jewish civic leader.

The Boston chapter of the American Jewish Congress was especially effective in the recent battle for an anti-bias housing law.

Although the support of other religious groups was valuable, the Jewish leaders, through their representatives on Beacon Hill and their civic spokesmen, were in the forefront -- mapping strategy, lining up allies, distributing literature, and doing a heavy share of the work.

Operating from a position of economic strength, the Jew in Boston has escaped most of the restrictions encountered by the Negro. But Boston has an ugly history of anti-Semitism: in many ways anti-Semitism has been more violent and vitriolic than anti-Negro feeling. (When he was a boy in a Boston suburb, the Negro member of the Massachusetts Council Against Discrimination said, his closest friend was Jewish.

"We were always together and neither of us ran very much with the other kids, who were all white Gentiles. They were nice enough to me, but always were making cracks at him. They couldn't understand why I liked a Jew, and finally one of them said, 'You wouldn't want your sister to marry a Jew, would you?'").

## 6. Catholics and Negroes

Competition for unskilled jobs has generated a certain amount of hostility between the Negro on the one hand and the Irish and Italians on the other. This hostility has never been directed against Irish and Italian political leaders, however (Curley and Walsh charmed the Negro voter long before the New Deal took custody of him, and Negroes have supported John F. Kennedy at least as rabidly as have Irish Catholics, and this although their leaders have been critical of the Senator's record on civil rights), nor has it been directed against the Catholic Church.

Some Negro leaders say that Catholic doctrine, with its unwavering insistence upon the equality of men before God, has discouraged prejudice, not only the prejudice of whites against Negroes but also that of Negroes against whites and against the Church itself.

The Church has gone much beyond merely propounding the dogma and upholding the canon law. It has taken an active hand in promoting anti-bias legislation within the state, most noticeably during the recent battle for private housing safeguards.

A prominent Negro (a friend, incidently, of Senator Kennedy's), in trying to explain to an interviewer how it happens that Negroes have greater freedom in Boston than in other Northern cities, drew a parallel between the treatment of the underlying colored populations of Latin America by a Catholic ruling elite and those of the United States by a Protestant one. In Latin America, he said, the Catholic tradition endowed the colored man with a "human personality" and thus laid the basis for his rapid assimilation. In Protestant North America, by contrast, the colored minority was not accorded the moral status that would make assimilation possible. Boston, the Negro leader thought, was something of an exception. Here the Catholic influence has been strong enough to give the Negro a moral status not unlike that enjoyed by the colored peoples of Catholic Latin America.

Whether this is good sociology or not, that a Boston Negro of influence looks at things in this way is itself significant. It indicates, perhaps, that there are at work moral factors of some kind peculiar to Boston.

#### 7. The Negro and the Parties

Soon after the Negroes became numerous enough in the West End to constitute a Republican majority, their old Ward 9 was split up in 1895. In the process, a hunk was appended to strongly Democratic Ward 8. The remainder was

grafted to Ward 1. As a result, the Negroes were unable to send another representative to the state legislature for about a half century -- with the exception of one year.

Another blow to Negro political aspirations followed in 1909, when the old Common Council was abolished in a city referendum. In years gone by, as many as three Negroes had sat on the body, and the "influence of long custom" had ordained the selection of at least one colored councillor since ante-bellum days.

A quarter century later, after the Negroes had become established as a solid community in the Roxbury area, another gerrymander was skillfully executed by the Republicans. By dissecting Ward 9 in a fashion that chopped up the Negro areas, the white strategists again were able to dash hopes for direct representation.

So reprehensible was this bit of pie-slicing that "Shag" Taylor, the old Ward 9 boss, deserted the Republican Party and took his grievances and organization over to the Democratic side. In making the switch, he lost much of his following, and complained later that his drugstore business even fell off by about 30 per cent.

But even with the Democrats in control of apportionment machinery, there has been no compelling sentiment to make the electoral lines coincide more closely with "logical" color boundaries. The impetus among Negroes for redistricting, of course, has lost much of its



force with the growing spread of their numbers to peripheral areas and the dilution of former strongholds.

Also, with the inauguration of citywide elections, the ward boundaries carry little significance in municipal politics.

Yet the current alignment of wards in the state senatorial districts effectively blocks Negroes from the upper house. On the basis of present electoral strength -- provided the bulk of it could be drawn to a single candidate -- the Negroes could lay claim to at least one Senate seat. But as things stand, Wards 12 and 14 are lumped with Ward 18 in the Sixth Suffolk District, and Ward 9 is a rather insignificant Negro minority in the Fifth Suffolk District.

The early benevolence which sent Negroes in a steady procession to the statehouse and city hall has lost its mass spontaneity in recent times. But the symbolic ritual of installing colored office-holders in conspicuous places has been retained in the appointive custom.

Politicians of both parties, with only a few exceptions, have hewed to the traditions, competing for the honor of naming the most Negroes to state jobs and posting score on their totals in the manner of a tribal chieftain lacing his loin cloth with scalps.

Governor Furcolo only recently added another trophy

to his mantle -- naming a Negro to the Superior Court, the first chosen for a general trial bench. "Admittedly," said an aide, "the appointment was not popular with the organization, since it wasn't considered deserved in terms of deliverable votes. But it was a symbol of the governor's integrity, a sign of his forward-looking, democratic spirit. It was a concession to every Negro, Jew and decent liberal in Massachusetts."

Proof that mundane matters of patronage and political pay-off seldom figure in such appointments is the fact that often the first inkling received by Negro political leaders is the announcements they read in the newspapers.

Although the custom of using the statehouse as a trophy room to display the "bring-'em-back-alive" specimens of liberal crusading has been blamed by many for lulling the Negroes into apathy, it serves at least one major function: It imparts a sense of racial pride to a Negro community now devoid of militant heroes of the old school.

In studying the paternalism and liberalism in their uneven and varying mixture, it is difficult to separate the Negro's symbolic value to whites and his symbolic usefulness to his own race. Often they overlap, or merge into a single image. Certainly a "showcase" officeholder, installed to provide a respectable front, is in a position to do much for fellow Negroes.

But the most valuable symbolism for all Negroes in Massachusetts has been their bipartisan identification with liberalism. Helping Negroes attain a better way of life has become more than merely a campaign badge to wear at election time; instead, it is considered the hallmark of a politician's worth, the evidence of his faith in the American ideal, the proof of his humane instincts.

"Traditionally every politician tries to become identified with racial reform," said one Beacon Hill observer.

"In politics, the Negro, as the Jew, is a symbol of how far Americans have gone in creating a land of opportunity. The Negro is viewed as an accomplishment that each party, every politician, can take credit for.

How do you prove you're a liberal? The only tests left are spending more money to expand services and supporting greater civil rights. Negroes represent civil rights, and they will always have a role as a liberal symbol."

In the postwar years, members of both parties have paid far more than mere lip service to civil rights. The legislation which they have enacted has taken on the dimensions of a five-foot shelf.

Even before the recent open-covenant housing law was added, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination was able to report that it "now includes within its jurisdiction the enforcement of more anti-discrimination laws than any other similar body in the 13 states which

have such statutes."<sup>1</sup>

The gains have been steady and sweeping: In 1946, the fair employment bill was passed; in 1949, the fair educational practices bill was enacted; in 1950, the MCAD received jurisdiction over public accommodations and public housing; in 1950, the FEPC provisions were broadened to bar age discrimination in employment; in 1953, the definition of "public accommodations" was widened; in 1957, the provisions on publicly-assisted housing were added; in 1959, discrimination in the sale or rental of private housing was outlawed.

In putting this impressive Bill of Civil Rights on the statute books, the Massachusetts lawmakers have all but outdone themselves. Virtually the only challenge remaining is, in some way, to repeal bigotry.

The enthusiasm with which members of both parties flock to a liberal banner is shown in the fight over the anti-bias housing bill last year. The only reason there was a real fight at all was the attempted ambush created by the introduction of an even stronger measure.

The moderate law eventually emerging was patterned after the widely hailed New York City ordinance. It prohibits discrimination in the rental of apartments or in the sale (or rental) of single-family houses located contiguously in developments of 10 or more units.

<sup>1</sup> Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 13th Annual Report of the Mass. Council Against Discrimination (Dec. 1, 1957- Nov. 30, 1958) (Doc. 163).

It was filed in the house by Speaker John F. Thompson, a Democrat, and Rep. Frank S. Giles, the Republican floor leader. In the Senate, its sponsor was Maurice A. Donahue, slated to become the Democratic floor leader.

Among the blue-ribbon lineup of supporting organizations were the American Jewish Congress, the Massachusetts Council of Churches and a plethora of lesser civic, fraternal, and religious bodies. Perhaps most important, it carried the explicit blessings of Richard Cardinal Cushing.

But, to the embarrassment of many of the prime movers, a more stringent version was introduced to strip away the "contiguous" feature. The substitute won the governor's support, and succeeded in putting some of the backers of the moderate measure on the spot. It conveyed the idea that some of the liberal boosters, even the NAACP itself, were willing to settle for a watered-down bill, sacrificing their ideals on the altar of political expediency.

The upshot of the political cross-hauling was an ignominious death for the strong bill, by a 47-17 standing vote in the House. But even with passage of the weaker bill, Massachusetts remained in the liberal vanguard, becoming one of four states to enact any kind of anti-bias law applying to private housing.

### 8. Negro Influentials

In the parlor game of politics and public affairs, the "boys up front" should not be classed with those in the back. In the front of the Boston structure one finds lawyers, teachers and some businessmen. These take roles, albeit usually nominal ones, in the activities of the Urban League and the NAACP. Since the atmosphere is prim and proper in the front, there also can be found some women.

For the most part, these front leaders are not close to the lower-class Negroes or to the day-to-day doings of Roxbury. They are willing to take stands on the broad issues of civil rights -- especially in the national context -- and, occasionally they strike heroic poses on local matters. But seldom do they roll up their sleeves and really tackle a problem that is basically racial, primarily Bostonian.

The Negro professional group is intent on its own status drives and fairly oblivious to the goals and needs of most lower-class Negroes. Many are disdainful of partisan politics. When faced with the necessity of a choice, they are apt to be Republicans.

The top-drawer Negro, more than any other, resents allusion to racial restraints. He explains the plight of the less fortunate members of his race in purely economic terms.



In examining the character of Negro civic leadership in Boston it is helpful to use socialized categories. Gunnar Myrdal spoke of "accommodation" and "protest" groups, Guy Johnson described "gradualist" and "revolutionary" classes, while James Wilson distinguishes "welfare" from "opportunity" ends. The Boston Negro tends toward "accommodation," "gradualism," and "welfare" goals.

The Boston-born Negro is proud of his Abolitionist great-grandfather. But for him, racial disarmament -- complete and total -- is the order of the times.

Clergymen adorn the front parlor, but they lack any real significance in the power structure. In the 1959 mayoralty election they took the unprecedented action of endorsing a candidate en masse, but this display of cohesive political intervention was not impressive in its results.

"Never in recent history," said one Negro intellectual, "has there been a Negro minister who could be described as a man with great mental capacity or strong motivations. Never has there been an Adam Clayton Powell nor a Martin Luther King in Boston. In fact, most are quite ordinary, just men who became ministers to make a living."

At the rear of the Boston power structure -- in the back room where the working politicians and their cronies gather -- one finds that the dominant force is a ghost.

The Democratic machine, rusty and decrepit but still

active in Roxbury, is the legacy of the late Silas "Shag" Taylor. His hey-day was in the New Deal, when he controlled much patronage and had easy access to city hall and the statehouse.

As longtime committeeman in Ward 9, Taylor never ran for office himself. Nor did he live to see a Negro protege take office. But his devotion to the Democratic cause was unwavering, and as a personable, outgoing type he developed a close friendship with several leading Irish politicians, among them Curley and John W. McCormack. A former associate says he sometimes contributed as much as \$1,000 or \$2,000 to a single campaign. For his support and donations (the latter made possible by a thriving bootleg liquor business operated in conjunction with his drugstore) Taylor was given a place in the Electoral College.

Upon Shag's death about three years ago, the Ward 9 organization passed to his younger brother, Balcolm S. Taylor, who runs it from a small office in the back of the family drugstore in Lower Roxbury. The bootleg business is gone, but Bal is still the major source of campaign funds in the Negro community.

Taylor is "practical" in his pursuit of Negro goals, and works hard to get more Negroes on the public payroll. He avoids alienating upper-class Negroes, and he recognizes the difficulty of achieving a solid partisan unity embracing all economic groups. Apparently he is

~~content to work within the framework which the bipartisan situation fosters.~~

In his ward, he knows where the Democrats are to be found and what it takes to get them to the polls. His precinct workers concentrate heavily on the housing projects -- easy to solicit, reliably Democratic, and susceptible to firm control.

In the electoral market place, Taylor probably has a greater stock of commodities and services to offer than do most Boston political entrepreneurs. Under the terrific pressures of the housing shortage, Roxbury Negroes respond quickly to promises to pull strings to speed their entry into the projects. Taylor says a "little prodding in the right places" often accomplishes a great deal.

Patronage is scarce, but the governor's office has been generous in recent years, and Taylor has placed several Negroes in state jobs.

He has no illusions about the future of his little Roxbury empire. As Negroes attain a higher level of living, his influence with them will wane. As the deliverable votes drop, his stock in trade will decline.

In the back room of Boston Negro politics there is a Democrat whose appeal to the mass of Negro voters stands out. He is blessed with a name particularly apt for Boston, Lincoln Pope Jr., and is serving his second term as state representative. Pope has parlayed the Taylor

seal of approval and his own winning personality (Irish-like, some say) into a solid standing among the rank-and-file of Roxbury.

Negroes close to the Furcolo administration tend to regard Pope as a lost cause, especially since he turned his back on an opportunity to champion an amended housing bill in the legislature. Pope, they contend, has aligned himself with obstructionist lawmakers who are more interested in maintaining their position as a power bloc than in representing their constituents. Pope concedes that he was willing to settle for a compromise housing bill, even though he realized the "contiguous" proviso was weakening. But in his view, something -- anything -- was better than nothing, and taking one step upward represented progress; standing pat on principle was only heroic.

Pope's detractors point to his failure to introduce a single bill in behalf of Negroes since his election in 1956. It is doubtful whether the masses know this or care, however. They returned him to Beacon Hill by an overwhelming margin in 1958.

Easy-going and affable, Pope rubs shoulders with his constituents as much as any elected official in the state. He never turns down an invitation to a Roxbury "social" if it can be fitted into his schedule, and he is a soft touch for benefit tickets.

He belongs to a church outside the ward, but finds

this no handicap since he is free to circulate among all the churches in the area. He rides religious circuit the year-round.

The 1959 mayoralty race showed how much weight the Taylor-Pope Ward 9 machine carries. Roxbury's Ward 9 was the only ward outside of Powers' senatorial district to favor Powers over Collins. Pope closely identified himself with the Powers' cause and campaigned diligently.

Powers' edge in the ward was not overwhelming but it was impressive when viewed against the citywide Collins landslide:

	Citywide Total	Ward 9 Total	Citywide Percentage	Ward 9 Percentage
Collins	114,074	1,907	55.9	44.8
Powers	90,035	2,354	44.1	55.2

These results do not tell the whole story, however. The Ward 9 organization also went all-out for six of the Council candidates, listing them on a "handicapper's card" passed out to all voters. With the exception of Roxbury's favorite son, the Negro Harry J. Elam, the six who carried the Taylor-Pope stamp of approval did no better in Ward 9 than elsewhere. The figures, therefore, cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Ward 9 leadership in delivering votes to candidates not particularly well-known to the constituents.

The presence of two Negro Democrats in the state

legislature (Pope and Rep. Oswald L. Jordan) and the fact that a Negro (Elam) ran in the 1959 council contest are cited by some as evidence of growing political strength. How real this strength is remains to be demonstrated. Sceptics say the present situation merely reflects a slight quantitative growth in the Negro community and that Negroes in Boston are not developing the political skills that they are in other Northern urban areas.

There is a good deal of evidence on the sceptic's side. Pope frankly concedes that the 1958 election of his Ward 12 colleague, Rep. Jordan, was an electoral fluke that may not soon find conditions favorable for recurrence. The Ward 12 race for two places in the General Court originally involved two Jewish candidates and three Negroes -- Jordan and two Republicans. The candidacy of one Jewish rival was successfully challenged by Jordan on the basis of residency requirements, leaving only one white man in an election to fill two seats. Jordan topped the field of four by a tiny margin on the strength of both white and Negro Democratic votes. Probably he will not find the going so easy when the majority party voters are offered an alternative.

For that matter, Pope -- the first Democratic Negro to be elected to the Massachusetts House in commonwealth history -- has no illusion about his own 1956 victory. The incumbent was not running and the white vote in Ward 9--



smallest of any in the city -- was split among Pope's rivals. In 1958, Pope, as incumbent, won easily over a single opponent. Then he waged an intensive campaign, capitalized heavily on the publicity he had received in a housing investigation, and was supported strongly by Bal Taylor's organization. Whether he can do it again is anyone's guess.

#### 9. The Negro Vote

Theoretically, Boston's Negro vote could be a powerful one. In fact, Walter White, head of the NAACP, has listed Massachusetts as one of 17 states where the Negro voters can swing a reasonably close election. Such a judgment assumes, of course, that most Negro voters will go to the polls and that they will cast a one-party vote. These conditions are probably less likely to be met in Massachusetts than anywhere else.

Yet, there have been some notably close elections in the Bay State in recent times. If the Negro vote was not a balancing factor, it probably was somewhat of a teetering influence.

In the last eight presidential elections, beginning with the Al Smith "Revolution" of 1928, the winning margin in Massachusetts has seldom exceeded 2 per cent of the major-party vote. Smith's plurality was a scant .05 per cent of the popular vote.

Of the 16 gubernatorial elections since 1928, nine have been won by a Democrat, seven by a Republican. The winning edge in six races was less than 1 per cent.

In 1952, for instance, Christian A. Herter nosed out Paul A. Dever for the governorship by a scant 0.3 per cent of the two-party total. His plurality was only 14,456 votes.

These nip-and-tuck contests also can be found in the returns on recent races for the U.S. Senate. When Foster Furcolo challenged Sen. Leverett Saltonstall in 1954, he lost by only 28,706 votes. The senator returned to Washington on the strength of a 0.5 per cent edge of the total vote.

Two years earlier, when John F. Kennedy defeated Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, the Democratic victory margin was less than 71,000 votes, only about 1.5 per cent of the total.

In statewide contests where victory hinges on such minute fractions, no minority group -- Negroes included -- can safely be conceded to the opposition.

In the Boston area, the district most susceptible to a Negro power move is the 10th, which is now represented by a Republican, Laurence Curtis. In recent races, Curtis has emerged victor by as little as 0.7 per cent of the total vote. In comparison, the Negro proportion of the district electorate probably is in excess of 5 per cent -- largely on the strength of Wards 4 and 12.

Also there are substantial Negroes, by Boston standards, in the 12th District. There the Negro population is about 10 per cent of the total. (The perennial winner is John W. McCormack, often unopposed.)

Limiting the actual political power exercised by the Negroes at present is the bipartisan character of the vote.

In choosing between the two major national parties, the Negroes in Boston -- as elsewhere -- have been predominantly Democratic since the early 30s. But most observers point out that colored support has been ebbing away from the Democrats during the post-Truman era at a faster rate in Boston than in other large cities.

While Stevenson was receiving an estimated 70 to 75 per cent of the total Negro vote in 1956, he was rewarded with only about 55 per cent of Boston's colored vote. At the same time, the voters in the city's two most heavily Negro wards were giving about 63 per cent of their ballots to the second Democratic nominee on the ticket, the gubernatorial candidate.

The average Bostonian Negro, say his civic leaders, is more independent than colored citizens in other places. He keeps abreast of civil rights attitudes of national candidates and is more inclined to vote his racial convictions. With no commitments to a strong, local organization, it is much easier, of course, to play the more promising side of the street on civil rights issues.

The uneven and unsettling character of the Negro vote is a major factor in the recurring reluctance of the Democratic organization to beat the bushes for a massive Negro turnout. This stand-offish attitude among Democrats has provided some Republicans, such as Christian Herter and Laurence Curtis, opportunities to make heavy inroads on the Negro vote. And in fact, if the switch back toward Republicanism continues, Boston's Negroes may meet with even more distrust from the city fathers.

Two recent elections provide an example of the difficulty of predicting the Negro vote. In 1952, the virtually all-Negro Ward 9 gave the Democratic candidate for U.S. Senator a plurality of 4,767 votes. Only two years later, the same ward gave the same party's candidate for the same office a margin of only 1,924 votes. The candidates were Kennedy in '52 and Furcolo in '54. In nearby Ward 14, primarily Jewish, the Democratic margins in the two races were 5,920 and 5,945. This is the type of partisan consistency which the strategists like to count on, and ordinarily can rely on in Boston. But in the Negro wards they feel only half safe.

Bi-partisanship is not the only factor limiting Negro political influence at present. The Negro potential ranges from 20,000 to 40,000 votes, depending on whose guess one accepts, but the reality never approaches the potential. Negro observers say the failure of Negroes to

vote and use their ballots as leverage is both a symptom and cause of their low political status.

In the state election of 1958, when 71.6 per cent of the city's voters went to the polls to help elect a U.S. senator, a governor, and other state officials, many Negroes watched from the sidelines. The proportion voting in Ward 9, for instance, was only 65.1 per cent. Add to this the great disparity between white registration and Negro enrollment, and the gap is greater than would appear.

Even worse, many of those who vote in the major contests do not trouble to mark their choice in the state legislative and other secondary races. By skipping the bottom of the ballot, they forego opportunities to vote for Negroes. In the last biennial election, Rep. Pope and his Republican opponent, Laurence H. Banks, received a combined total of 4,263 Ward 9 votes. But more than 5,300 persons cast ballots for governor in that ward. The story was similar in Ward 12. There also a Negro Democrat was running for the lower house. More than 9,000 votes in the senatorial and gubernatorial contests, but fewer than 7,000 voted for state representative.

Unfamiliarity with the voting machine accounts for some of this. After the machines were introduced in the wards comprising the 10th Congressional District, the number of Negroes voting for U.S. representative fell off markedly.

The relatively low educational level of the Negroes has been cited as a major factor in voting patterns over an eight-year period. A study by Bernard P. Cohen and Elizabeth G. Cohen showed a "significantly high percentage" of blank ballots in Wards 4 and 12.<sup>1</sup> "This can be explained," the Cohens reported, "on the basis of the large number of Negroes in these two wards, especially when one considers that the proportion of Negroes in Ward 12 has been increasing steadily."

They summarized the shortcomings of the "low-status, poorly educated" electorate, both white and Negro, with the following figures:

PERCENTAGE OF VOTERS WHO DID NOT VOTE FOR CONGRESSMAN

<u>Ward</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1954</u>
4	18.0	12.6	13.7	12.2
12	11.4	13.2	15.8	18.9

The validity of the picture they drew has been borne out time after time, most recently in the 1958 congressional district race. Then Democrat John L. Saltonstall lost to Curtis, 65,169 to 71,100. In the Boston wards of the district there were 7,753 blank ballots and 81,591 marked ones.

The Cohens concluded that the Democrats, by getting Negroes to the polls and instructing them in the use of voting machines, could pick up 1,500 votes in the district.

<sup>1</sup> Bernard P. and Elizabeth G. Cohen, "An Analysis of the Tenth Congressional District, 1948-54," Harvard University, 1956 (unpublished).



This, of course, is easier said than done.

There is another factor which no doubt weakens the potential strength of the Negro vote and this is its non-racial character which puzzles many Negro politicians.

In every election where racial loyalty has been put to a test it has been found wanting. The 1959 City Council election was no exception. Harry J. Elam, the only Negro candidate, finished far out of the money, 15th in a field of 18. He received overwhelming support in the heavily colored areas centering on Roxbury, but it was apparent that much of his backing came to him as a neighborhood favorite son, not as a member of the race. It included many white voters -- and it excluded many Negroes.

Elam later estimated that only about 7,000 votes of his 45,000 total were cast by Negroes. He believes that at least 3,000 Negro voters who went to the polls withheld their support out of ignorance, indifference, or insubordination.

In Ward 12, his home grounds, he thought virtually all the Negroes votes for him. He led the pack there by a substantial margin, receiving 4,959 votes compared to the 3,659 which Collins, the mayoral winner, attracted at the top of the city ticket.

In Ward 9, more heavily Negro than Ward 12, his performance was not nearly so impressive, although he led

the council ticket by 600 votes. However, John Powers, the defeated mayoral candidate, topped the slate as a whole. He got 2,354 votes, compared to Elam's 2,156.

Elam got more votes in Ward 20, predominantly white, than he did in Ward 9, virtually all-Negro.

Generally, his post mortem shows that in Roxbury, as in much of Boston, provincialism even in the absence of the old ward system is a much stronger appeal than purely ethnic or racial identity. When the ethnic boundaries roughly correspond to the "hometown" borders, as they invariably do for a Negro candidate running in a segregated ward, the combination often is mistaken for purely an ethnic loyalty.

Outside of Elam's home ward, his heaviest support came from Ward 14, largely Jewish with a sprinkling of Negro voters who have made the transition from Roxbury to a better life in North Dorchester. There Elam's campaign was supported by several Jewish leaders, including the three state representatives. He was also backed by the state senator from the district.

Elam conceded that he benefitted from some "bullet voting," although he did not openly solicit it. (In "bullet voting" the voter chooses only one candidate out of a possible nine, thereby reducing the potential totals of all rivals.) However, he pitched his campaign toward Negro voters, stressing the need for representation in the

City Council to assure Negroes a greater share of services. His slogan: "We share the burden, why not the benefits?" He pointed to the filthy streets, inadequate fire and police protection, and cited figures showing that tax assessments in Roxbury were as much as 60 per cent higher than those in West Roxbury.

Also he demanded action to get the Roxbury urban renewal project off the drawing boards and into bricks and mortar. Thus far, the urban renewal program, he told his Negro audiences, has been "all talk and no action."

He soft-pedaled his Republicanism although it was well-known in Ward 12 where he had run twice for the state legislature. But he concentrated strongly on two traditionally Republican Wards -- 4 and 5 -- in addition to the major Negro areas.

Many Negroes failed to vote for Elam out of "plain ignorance." Many, he said, did not even know a Negro was in the race, although he mailed 100,000 brochures during the campaign, used billboard ads in the subway stations, and appeared on television. Some Negroes told him they could not find his name on the ballot, and some reported they were confused by the voting machines.

He suspects he would have done better as a Democrat in Ward 9. "The Bal Taylor organization resented the fact I was a Republican," he said, "and did not relish the prospect of electing a Republican Negro to the council."

Generally, Elam's fate indicated that the bipartisan divisions within the Negro electorate have even some bearing in a "nonpartisan" contest. It also showed that ethnic loyalties are strongly diluted by the factor of localism.

Some Negroes may have discriminated against Elam on grounds of social class. The South End, where he did badly, is far down the socio-economic scale from Walnut Avenue in Upper Roxbury, where Elam lives.

Some Boston Negroes subscribe so wholeheartedly to the bipartisan, non-racial concept that they are loath even to talk in terms of black and white. One illustration was provided by a Negro attorney who has practiced law in Boston for 40 years and who founded a business and professional men's club. Asked about the Negro vote in the recent mayoral election, he took exception to the adjective, saying there was no such thing as a "Negro vote." Then he launched into an outspoken attack on John Powers and his whole retinue of influential backers. The lawyer maintained that Powers' attempted appeal to the Negro electorate on the basis of what he planned to do for it, above and beyond what everyone else would get, had backfired. This racial orientation, he declared, merely confirmed suspicions which Powers' opponent had already aroused with his charges of "power politics." By flaunting the endorsements of prominent leaders, both white

and Negro, Powers drove many of Roxbury's citizens to his underdog rival, this man said. Sympathy among the underprivileged Negroes naturally tends to gravitate toward the candidate in similar straits, and Collins' underdog status was underlined graphically by his wheelchair.

As proof of his own independence and also as a measure of the divisions within the Negro areas, the attorney made his anti-Powers remarks in the presence of the state representative who had guided the reins of the Powers-former mayor bandwagon in Roxbury. His bitter denunciations of Powers and his supporters were also a defiance of leadership inside the colored community.

#### 10. Conclusions

More than 50 years ago Robert A. Woods, director of the South End Settlement House, tried to convince Boston's Negroes that their quest for a better life would have to follow the courses charted by white immigrant groups. Only by closing ranks around leaders and adhering to a strict unity along economic, political, and religious lines could Negroes hope to exercise enough power to overcome the prejudice that hemmed them in. Woods warned the Negroes that "incapacity for loyal, continuous result-getting teamwork" and unrealistic allegiance to a myth of social equality would be disastrous. The Negro, he declared, must adopt the power-pressure methods of other

ethnic groups "or rule himself out of the game."

The historian, John Daniels, also warned that the Negroes' "lack of self-reliance" and a "deficiency in the capacity for social co-operation" would block the attainment of political self-expression.<sup>1</sup> "The propensities of the Negroes to 'backbite' one another, to be jealous and envious of each other's success, to quarrel and to split into continually changing factions, crop out conspicuously and damagingly to their political conduct," Daniels wrote.

In evaluating the cross-currents of 270 years of Negro history in Boston, Daniels sought to answer these questions:

1. Have the Negroes turned the ballot to good account in their own behalf?

2. Have they come to a fuller and more intelligent appreciation of its potential value as a practical means for achieving desired ends?

3. Have they profited by their numbers to combine and organize for political purposes?

4. Have they manifested any measure of political self-reliance and independence as a racial group?

5. Have they, as a total result, succeeded in obtaining a substantial political footing in the community, and in making themselves a recognized factor in the affairs of the body politic?

1 See John Daniels, In Freedom's Birthplace: A Study of the Boston Negroes, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914.



His pained and unequivocal conclusion: No -- on all five counts. Where there was an indication of some progress, it could be explained solely as a reflection of indulgence by the white community.

The answers that the present study gives to his questions would not surprise Daniels:

1. The Negroes have failed to turn the ballot to account in their own behalf, or in anybody's. The reasons for this are many, and the weakness of the Negroes in numbers and resources is only part of the story. In recent years Negroes have been handicapped also by the nonpartisan at-large election system, which was imposed at the very time their numbers became significant. Also the gerrymander has been crippling.

2. They still do not appreciate the value of the ballot as a practical means to achieve their ends. Their inertia on election day, their half-hearted support of Negro candidates, and their contentment with the status quo all testify to this.

3. They are inadequately organized for political purposes. The Ward 9 Democratic organization exists in only part of the Negro community, and its influence even here is shifting and sporadic. Dispersal and bipartisanship have prevented the growth of solidarity.

4. They have not shown much self-reliance and independence as a racial group. For the most part, they

have gone along with white political personalities, riding the tailgate of the passing bandwagon.

5. Although they are now a "recognized factor" in the body politic, this is mainly because they have symbolic value to liberal causes. Negroes have been ready to settle for the myth of political equality, and white politicians have been eager to foster the myth by appointing them to high office and by other acts of paternalism.

In addition, a few qualities of the Negro civic leadership should be noted:

1. The Negro's economic base is so small in Boston that docile leadership is almost inevitable.

2. There is no general agreement over goals, although immediate, bread-and-butter matters are generally regarded as more important than long-range racial ones.

3. There are no overriding motivations such as exist where racial tensions, harsh prejudices, and explosive incidents occur.

4. Comparatively high levels of education and social mobility encourage conservatism in the middle class.

5. Because there are no unifying personalities and issues in the Negro community, leadership is generally divided. The bipartisan tendency in political affairs is divisive.

6. The Negro press is extremely weak. Shaped to a certain degree by the Boston press as a whole, it avoids

militance .

7. There has been a tendency to let others carry the ball for the Negro. This may be a result of Curleyism in part, but it stems also from the compulsion of liberal civic groups, especially the Jewish ones, to champion the cause of Negroes.

8. Sweeping liberal legislation has enhanced the Negroes' status, but it has tended to prevent the development of self-reliant leadership. Legal guarantees have been handed to Negroes on a white platter.

"Anything they get is a gift," said one prominent Negro. Their complacency has been reinforced by the relatively soft residential barriers existing in major areas of Boston.

The leader -- white or Negro -- who tries to use the Boston Negro as a fulcrum of power will find himself perched on an unsteady see-saw.

D. Redistricting

by Mark K. Adams

In the landslide election of 1958 the Democrats gained complete control of Massachusetts for the first time in history. The Senate, a Republican bastion because of gerrymandered districts that combined halves and thirds of Democratic cities with enough surrounding GOP towns to offset the urban votes, went Democratic 24-16; the House and Governorship had been Democratic since 1954 and 1956.

The Democrats were gleeful. Now they could redraw the boundaries of Congressional and of state House and Senate districts without having to contend with a Republican-dominated Senate. If they were clever, they could assure themselves control of the state for many years to come. A Republican governor might be elected now and then, to be sure, but the Democrats could assure themselves of a two-thirds majority in the Senate, and this would be enough to override a governor's vetoes.

Late in the 1959 session of the General Court, a 12-man Special Commission on Redistricting was formed of 10 Democratic and two Republican legislators. It was to prepare reapportionment plans for the 1960 legislative session. Four of its Democratic members were from Boston.

Conflict between Boston and non-Boston Democrats developed almost immediately and this made it necessary to limit the scope of redistricting. Plans to reapportion state House districts were dropped when it became apparent that Boston would lose six or seven of its 41 seats. The four Boston Commission members, despite pressure from chairman Senator Maurice Donahue, joined the Republicans to deadlock the Commission 6-6. This killed

## House redistricting.

Party factionalism also helped kill Congressional reapportionment plans. The Commission recommended a redistricting that would reduce the number of Congressional districts from 14 to 12, with two candidates running at large. The justification for that was that two seats would probably be lost because of the 1960 Census. The districts of Republicans Edith Nourse Rogers, a widow who had represented a Middlesex county district northwest of Boston for 35 years, and Laurence Curtis, who represented the Newton-Brookline-Boston district that had been created for Christian Herter, were the two chosen for extinction.

Although it pleased many metropolitan Democrats, especially those who hoped to benefit from the elimination of the Curtis district, the redistricting plan met substantial party opposition. Governor Furcolo, never on good terms with Boston Democrats and reluctant to see their strength increase, expressed a fear that the two at-large representatives "would both come from the same ward in South Boston." John W. McCormack of Boston, Democratic floor leader in the U. S. House, opposed the plan because he believed voters would resent the liquidation of Mrs. Rogers. Finally Congressional redistricting was postponed until after the 1960 Census.

Only the state Senate was left for redistricting. Senate redistricting plans too ran into strong Democratic opposition. Senate President Powers said the Democrats might do well not to tamper with districts they already held. Senator Michael LoPresti and others from impregnable Democratic districts in Boston feared that changes would make possible

defeat in future primaries. Senator William C. Madden of Lexington charged that Commission members from Boston were trying to make certain non-Boston Democratic legislators dependent on votes from MTA communities in order to increase the power of the MTA bloc in the General Court. The pet plan of veteran Commission member Representative John J. Toomey of Cambridge to have his city represented by one senator (it was divided among four) was violently opposed by three Democratic Senators who depended on Cambridge wards in their primary fights.

The Commission's plan for Senate redistricting was killed when it became apparent that at least four Democratic Senators (LoPresti of East Boston, McCann of Cambridge, Corbett of Somerville, and Madden of Lexington) would join a united Republican minority to defeat it in the Senate.

Pressure for Senate redistricting remained strong, however, led by the six Democratic Senators (one among whom was Richard R. Caples, from Boston) who had won election in 1958 by less than 4,000 votes. Those who favored redistricting won an important ally when John Powers, who may have feared a primary challenge after his defeat in the Boston Mayoralty election, endorsed redistricting in order to add a "safe" ward to his district. A surprise victory by a Republican in a special election in a hitherto impregnable Democratic Senate district in New Bedford increased the pressure for redistricting among panicky Democrats who began to fear they might lose control of the Senate in the 1960 elections. At the request of alarmed Democrats, the Commission's redistricting plans were referred to the Rules Committee for revisions that would obtain the united support of the Senate Democratic majority.



The Rules Committee first took care of its Democratic members by redrawing district lines to give them safe constituencies. Then it re-divided Cambridge among four Senators to win their support. The Boston Democrats were not allowed to make non-Boston Senators dependent upon MTA district votes for election, but were satisfied by ward shuffling. Democratic Senator Caples was given Cambridge Ward 2 to make his Back Bay-Brighton district safe. Roxbury's Ward 9 was added to Powers' district to make him safe from primary challenges. James W. Hennigan, an opponent of Powers in the Mayoralty primary, benefited when in place of Ward 9 he was given suburban Ward 20, which had gone heavily for Collins in the Mayoralty election. LoPresti's East Boston-Charlestown-North End district was made more heavily Italian and "safer" by the deletion of Cambridge Ward 2. The Rules Committee also attracted Boston support for its bill by failing to reduce the city's representation in accordance with its population losses.

When at last there was unanimous Democratic support, the redistricting bill was introduced into the Senate (May 13, 1960) and at once passed 22-17 on a straight party vote.

When it reached the House the bill almost died. Democratic Representatives, led by Toomey of Cambridge, who was angry that his city had been parcelled out to satisfy incumbent Senators joined with the united Republican minority to make the votes (May 23 and 24) close: 112-110, 114-108, and 103-100. As many as 23 Democrats voted with the Republicans; their reasons included friendship for Toomey, fear of voter reprisals, recognition that some district changes would hurt future political

plans, and idealistic objection to gerrymandering. Of the 23 Representatives who bolted, six were from Boston, 12 from other metropolitan area communities, and only five from the rest of the state.

The Republicans played their last card on June 3 when a group of them led by state chairman Daniel McLean asked the state's Supreme Judicial Court for a writ of mandamus to set aside the redistricting bill. McLean's plea was based primarily on a constitutional provision that redistricting should be undertaken by the session of the General Court immediately following the decennial state census, which had last been held in 1955. Republican General Courts had violated this provision with redistricting laws in 1939 and 1947, however, and there is little chance that the Court will accommodate McLean.

Senate Districts in Boston after 1960 Redistricting are:

Second Suffolk: Wards 1, 2, 3 of Boston; ward 1 of Cambridge. Represented by Michael LoPresti of East Boston.

Third Suffolk: Wards 4, 5, 21 of Boston; ward 2 of Cambridge. Represented by Richard Caples of Brighton.

Fourth Suffolk: Wards 6, 7, 8, 9, 13 of Boston. Represented by John E. Powers of South Boston.

Fifth Suffolk: Wards 10, 11, 19, 20 of Boston. Represented by James W. Hennigan of Jamaica Plain.

Sixth Suffolk: Wards 12, 14, 18 of Boston. Represented by A. Frank Foster of Dorchester.

Seventh Suffolk: Wards 15, 16, 17 of Boston. Represented by John J. Beades of Dorchester.

Norfolk and Suffolk: Ward 22 of Boston; Brookline; wards 1, 6, 7 of Newton. Represented by Joseph Silvano of Brookline.

E. Schools1. General

The Boston school system suffers from neglect. More than half the Catholic children go to parochial schools, and many of the few middle class Protestants and Jews who live in Boston send their children to private schools. Since neither the Catholic nor the non-Catholic elite is vitally concerned about them, the schools are left in the hands of the teachers' lobby and the very minor politicians on the School Committee. For example <sup>it is said that</sup> policemen are usually stationed at crossings near parochial schools and seldom at crossings near public ones. The reason, persons close to the school system say, is not that the police play favorites but rather that the School Committee does not exert itself to get cooperation.

The cost of the schools is not particularly low (\$41.89 per capita in 1958 as against \$49.18 for the average of 130 cities over 25,000 population), but their quality is generally admitted to be low. There are many poor teachers, and the system has great difficulty keeping the best ones. In theory teachers qualify by examination and get permanent appointments after three years of service or after passing another examination. In practice they are often hired on a temporary basis (no experience required) or as substitutes, and then, before they have had the service that would qualify them for permanent appointments, replaced by other temporary employees. Promotion is supposed to be on the basis of merit, but the system is said to work unfairly and, some say, there are occasionally

pay-offs for jobs. The schools do little active recruiting for a teacher. It is common knowledge at the Teachers' College that a graduate who does not get an offer elsewhere can count on one in Boston; the city is said to get the bottom of the graduating class regularly.

Even the Boston Latin School, founded one year before Harvard College, is having to hire teachers with no experience and to use masters from the language department to teach mathematics. On this the Boston Globe editorialized (4/24/60):

A member of the Boston City Council had the urbanity to tell the Head Master, "Look. Get this straight. Boston Latin is just another high school." (Look. Get this straight. The Boston Symphony Orchestra is just another brass band.)

## 2. The Teachers' Salary Issue

For many years teachers' salary schedules have been an important political issue. The issue seems to be settled now, but its history is worth reviewing for the light it sheds on the way things are done in Boston.

On the recommendation in 1944 of Dr. George D. Strayer of Columbia Teachers' College, Boston accepted the principle of a single salary schedule for its 800 high school and 2600 elementary and junior high school teachers. This meant that teachers having the same qualifications (the same seniority and the same years of formal training) were paid the same regardless of the grades they taught: e.g., a woman elementary teacher might be paid the same as a man who taught physics to high school seniors. The first step to implement this principle was taken in 1952 by giving elementary teachers larger raises than were given to high school teachers. In

1956 the School Committee violated the single salary principle by giving high school teachers raises of \$200, and the next September, a few days before the preliminary election, it virtually abandoned it by voting 3-2 to give increases of \$756 to high school teachers, \$360 to junior high school teachers, and \$264 to elementary school teachers.

The majority of the Committee (Joseph Lee, T. J. McInerney, and William F. Carr) justified this on the grounds that there was shortage of high school teachers, but not of other teachers. The competition of industry, the majority said, made raises necessary in order to attract and keep high school teachers; other teachers were not in the same market.

The minority (John P. McMorrow, the chairman, and George F. Hurley) supported the single salary schedule on the grounds that it was equitable and that it protected the teaching profession from the unstabilizing effects of competition. They pointed out also that the single salary system was universally supported by the experts on school administration. (Superintendent of Schools Haley went so far as to say that an increase of \$300 across the board was the most equitable arrangement he had seen in his 42 years of service).

Chairman McMorrow argued that the single schedule would be less political in its operation. Under that system, he said, teachers knew they did not have to curry favor with the School Committee; if the system were changed, the spoils system would return. Before the Strayer report was implemented, he recalled, 80 groups of teachers were on 165 different salary

scales and the "barons" on the School Committee had victimized both teachers and public. The Boston Teachers' Alliance endorsed McMorrow and Hurley and waged a door-to-door campaign for their election and for the defeat of Lee, McInerney, and Carr. The High School Teacher of Boston took the opposite stand, of course; it appointed a committee to inform the public about the basic issues. An Emergency League for Better Schools was formed by nine teachers' groups that favored the single salary schedule. The League was supported by the Central Labor Union and by the Boston Home and School Association, a parent-teachers association. All newspapers supported the single salary schedule. The Herald supported the League throughout the campaign. In an editorial the day of the preliminary election it said the "top" 25 cities of the United States had the system, and, besides Boston could not afford the "luxury" of a differentiated system until its basic scale was raised.

The air was blue with charges and counter-charges just before the preliminary election. However, only 17 per cent of the voters turned out. All five incumbents were qualified, but McMorrow and Hurley, the minority who had supported the single salary schedule, got the heaviest vote. William F. Carr, who had led the ticket two years before, ran third. In the final election, only the Alliance candidates won.

In 1959 Lee was returned to the Committee. He was chastened, however, and was quoted as saying, "If schools can be run by a single salary, I'm for it." McMorrow, who had made a name for himself supporting the single salary principle ran unsuccessfully for mayor in the 1959 preliminary.

F. Urban Renewal and Housing

by Mark K. Adams

1. General

Boston has lagged behind other large cities in urban renewal. Although it is the nation's 10th largest city, it ranks 21st in capital grants for renewal from the federal government.

Boston's elected officials have not effectively promoted urban renewal largely because they have not understood it. Most City Councilors and state legislators, while quick to complain about particular broken street lights and to generalize about the need for more and better housing, do not have the broad outlook on city problems needed to support a renewal program. The Federal, state and local laws concerning renewal and redevelopment are a morass of unfathomable technicalities to most politicians. Only the Mayor and one Councilor (Foley) have seriously tried to understand renewal, and only the most recent Mayor has tried to weld the administration of renewal in Boston into a workable, competent organization.

The business leadership that has been important in urban redevelopment in Philadelphia, Baltimore and Pittsburgh is lacking in Boston. The businessman's ineffectiveness is in part a consequence of the long-standing and often bitter rivalry between the Yankee and the Irish. The businessmen are mostly Yankee; the politicians, Irish. The cooperation necessary for renewal to take place comes hard. Some Boston businessmen, moreover, apparently want their city to be closer



to a New England town than to a world metropolis like New York: they feel that massive redevelopment and renewal projects are out of character and too expensive besides. Other businessmen have contended that eastern New England is economically static and that Boston does not provide good investment opportunities. These say that leadership and funds for renewal must come largely from outside the city, for only by attracting new tenants and industries can redevelopment be supported. Boston's civic and business organizations have usually given lip service to redevelopment, but they have not been willing to fight for it. When controversies have developed they have remained silent.

Fragmentation of the redevelopment effort among many agencies has also made Boston's progress slow. Until it was abolished in September 1960 (see below), a nine-member volunteer Planning Board co-ordinated renewal and redevelopment projects into an overall plan. The Hynes-appointed Planning Board, while not brilliant, was generally regarded as competent. A statute required that the Planning Board's membership include an engineer, an architect, and a landscape architect or city planner. The Board was assisted by a staff of about 45 headed by Donald M. Graham, a highly qualified city planner with a national reputation in the field. It had an annual budget of about \$250,000.

The Boston Redevelopment Authority, whose powers have recently been enlarged, was created in 1957 from a division in the Boston Housing Authority to execute plans developed by the Planning Board. It has five unpaid members, four of them

appointed by the Mayor and the other by the State Housing Board. Its chairman is a prominent realtor, Joseph W. Lund. Three of its members, including Msgr. Francis J. Lally, editor of the Catholic diocesan newspaper, The Pilot, are journalists. Two, Lund and labor leader Stephen E. McCloskey, were ardent supporters of Mayor Hynes' redevelopment plans and may have got their places on the Authority in consequence of this support. The Authority, until its recent reorganization, had a 17-member staff, headed by Kane Simonian, and an annual budget of \$260,000. Mr. Simonian and his staff were not able to keep the administration of the program in their hands; Authority members were deeply involved in day-to-day administration. Some members were especially interested in contract awards. Just as there was no center of decision within the whole Boston redevelopment program, so there was none within the Redevelopment Authority. Its work is said to have been chaotic and subject to manipulation by individual Board members.

Cooperation between the Planning Board and Redevelopment Authority was only fair. The Authority often differed with the Planning Board, and on these occasions it usually emerged triumphant. Allies made through contract awarding were a great help to the Authority in these battles.

The City Council, which must approve all renewal projects, has added to the chaos. Councilor William Foley is chairman of all three committees handling renewal matters, so is in a position to exercise a great deal of control. He is another focus of power in the complicated situation.

The Boston Housing Authority, the Zoning Board of

Appeals, the Building Department, and even the Fire Department all play important roles in renewal by virtue of their responsibilities in enforcing laws, codes and regulations.

## 2. Methods Employed

Boston has the choice of three major methods of renewal, and action has sometimes been slowed down while debates raged over which method should be used for a particular project. The most controversial method for urban renewal is Title I of the Federal Housing Law of 1949. This permits cities to assemble land for redevelopment by eminent domain, to clear it and to sell it to private contractors at prices written down to "use value." The Federal government bears two-thirds of the cost of such projects. Title I has been controversial in Boston largely because it involves the wholesale eviction of residents and the destruction of their homes and neighborhoods. The 48-acre West End project drove 2600 families -- about 12,000 people -- from a dilapidated Italian neighborhood bounded by Beacon Hill, North Station, Massachusetts General Hospital, and the Charles River. Luxury apartments are being built there. About 700 families were displaced by the New York Streets project, which involved clearing 22 acres in the near South End along the Southeast Expressway to make way for industrial development. An equal number will be evicted from the proposed 25-acre Castle Square site just west of the New York Street area.

The cost of Title I renewal has also aroused opposition. The City paid \$7.39 per square foot (9 million) to buy and clear the West End area and sold the land to a developer

for \$1.37 per square foot. The New York Streets site cost the city \$5.40 per square foot (\$3.5 million) and was sold for 70¢ per square foot. The write-down will probably be as large for Boston's third Title I project, Castle Square. Some leaders, notably Gabriel F. Piemonte, former City Councilor and candidate for Mayor, have objected to subsidizing expensive (\$125-\$400 monthly) apartments in the West End and wealthy industrial users (Westinghouse, Herald-Traveler Corp.) in the New York Streets site.

Generally speaking Title I has not had much support outside of the Planning Board and the Redevelopment Authority. Opponents of the West End project, led by State Senator Mario Umana, Representatives Christopher Iannella and Charles Capraro and School Committeeman Joseph Lee, managed to delay it for eight years (it was first proposed in 1950). But the two agencies (whose administrative problems also contributed to the delay) finally had their way. The residents of the New York Streets area, many of them destitute old people and Orientals, had less political weight; they were not able to delay that project as long.

A second method of renewal is rehabilitation. This is relatively cheap and it involves only spot clearance and consequently few evictions. The Planning Board has tentatively scheduled rehabilitation projects for Roxbury and the South End. Rehabilitation, rather than clearance, has been deemed best for predominantly Negro areas such as Roxbury because of the difficulty of re-housing large numbers of Negro families. Because rehabilitation promises new schools, fire and police

stations, playgrounds, libraries and streets and because it helps landlords and homeowners to improve their properties at relatively low cost, the powerful Roxbury Community Council has strongly supported it. The first Roxbury plan called for the rehabilitation at a cost of \$24 million of a gigantic (1000-acre) area with a population of 70,000, but a shortage of available Federal funds reduced the scheme to a \$4 million, 186-acre pilot project -- the Washington Park Renewal Area.

The City's second rehabilitation project, the 25-acre West Canton Street site is even farther than the Washington Park project from execution. Although there has been no important opposition to it and it is welcomed by residents of the area it will affect, the lack of leadership from politicians and businessmen and confusion in the planning and executing agencies has delayed matters. Most of the work on the rehabilitation projects has been done by the Planning Board. The project has no official status.

A third method of renewal has employed a 1945 state law subsidizing limited-dividend private housing projects. The law (until it was broadened by the Prudential act amendments in September 1960) enabled private corporations to use eminent domain to assemble land in blighted areas and to clear it at city expense for apartment construction. The development corporations were given substantial tax concessions by the city on condition that they limit their annual dividends to six per cent of capital costs. Plans for renewal of the eight-acre Whitney Street site in Roxbury were prepared under this law. Eight-hundred middle-income apartments with rents

from \$95-\$100 monthly will be built. A similar project, involving the clearance of 60 acres, is planned for Mattapan. The Mattapan project also calls for 800 middle-income apartments. It has been in the planning stage for almost a decade.

The limited-dividend corporation method of renewal has had important political friends and few determined enemies. Because of the influence public agencies will have in awarding construction contracts, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (especially one member, James G. Colbert) and Councilor Foley urged revising the law in order to attract more firms into the field. Colbert and Foley wanted to raise the dividend to eight or nine per cent, to make commercial as well as residential development eligible, and to broaden the definition of "blight" to include almost every part of Boston. All of this was done (except that the dividend was left at six per cent) by the Prudential act, adopted in September 1960 in order to make possible the construction of the Prudential Center (see p. VI-18).

### 3. Efforts to Establish Coordination

It has been obvious to everyone concerned that Boston's renewal efforts could be improved by coordination and central control. Both candidates for Mayor in 1959 said they favored having one top-level executive to run the entire program. Soon after his election, Mayor Collins announced that he was hiring 38-year old Edward J. Logue, who was in charge of New Haven's outstanding renewal program, as Boston's Development Administrator. Mr. Logue, who was paid \$13,500 in New Haven, was to get \$30,000 in Boston. Early in 1960, he got a leave

of absence from his New Haven job and was retained by Boston on a per diem basis pending formal organization of his office.

Mr. Logue, who is said to be so respected by Federal officials that he can get all the funds he can use in Boston, almost at once became the Mayor's chief adviser on renewal and on planning in general.

Mr. Logue decided at once that the Redevelopment Authority was the biggest stumbling block to a coordinated renewal program, that its staff was considered incompetent by renewal experts everywhere, and that neither Federal officials nor private developers could work well with it. He also felt that Authority members, especially Mr. Colbert, interfered too much in administration. Supported by Mayor Collins, Mr. Logue on April 19, 1960, submitted a plan of organization to the Redevelopment Authority which called for it to yield some of its executive responsibilities to a Development Administrator.

The plan implied that Staff Director Simonian would be downgraded. In addition, Mr. Logue argued that three conditions would have to be met before Boston could meet its full redevelopment potential: 1) Federal officials had to be confident that Boston could handle the program; 2) redevelopment leadership must be such as to inspire confidence among professionals on the staff; and, 3) administrators of the program would have to have a demonstrated record of performance in a big, fast-moving program such as New Haven's.

Although Mr. Logue went into the meeting with the support of at least three Authority members (Msgr. Lally, Mr. Lund, Mr. McCloskey), his plan was defeated unanimously after



discussion. Reportedly, Mr. Colbert persuaded the other Authority members that Mr. Simonian's downgrading would violate tenure laws, that it was dangerous to place too much power in the hands of one man (Mr. Logue), and that accepting the authority of a Development Administrator would end the Authority's statutory independence. Instead of adopting Mr. Logue's proposals, the Authority directed Mr. Simonian to make recommendations for more effective organization.

After his plans had been rejected by the Authority, Mr. Logue said that unless he could get the power he needed to direct Boston's redevelopment program he would return to New Haven. Mayor Collins supported him and made it clear that he would use his influence to subordinate the Authority to the Development Administrator.

The Mayor increased pressure on the Authority to accept Logue by achieving a reform of Boston's redevelopment administration in the Prudential act. The act not only paved the way for construction of a civic center by the Prudential insurance company (its primary purpose): it also abolished the Boston City Planning Board, turning its functions over to the Redevelopment Authority. On September 22, three weeks after passage of the Prudential act, Mayor Collins proposed a \$90 million development program for Boston, calling primarily for neighborhood rehabilitation rather than clearance. It was announced that the federal government would contribute two-thirds of the cost -- \$60 million, four times as much as Boston had received in federal renewal aid in the previous 10 years. The program was heavily publicized and received wide

civic acclaim.

But the Redevelopment Authority -- led, apparently, by Colbert -- was still putting up resistance. Though they did not object to the mayor's program, they did object to his proposals for administering it. The mayor wanted to establish four new divisions in the Redevelopment Authority -- a planning division under Graham, an operations division under Simonian, and two other divisions (project development and land). Logue, as Development Administrator, would coordinate all four.

The Authority countered on October 6 with a proposal that Logue head one of the four divisions rather than the whole program. Earlier its counsel had drawn up an opinion reiterating the claim that it would be illegal, under state tenure laws, for Simonian to be made Logue's subordinate. (The law says that "No person permanently employed" by the Authority, after serving six months, shall be "transferred from the latest office of employment held by him without his consent.")

Collins, in mid-October, was attempting to assemble enough weight behind his program to force the Redevelopment Authority to accept Logue. Newspaper stories left the impression that the program was Logue's and could not be realized without him.

#### 4. Public Housing

Although redevelopment has been slow in Boston, the city has more public housing per capita than any other city in the nation. Fifty-five thousand people live in \$140 million worth of it. Public housing has not had an important

role in Boston redevelopment, however. The projects were built for housing during the Depression and the post-World War II years. Cost and accessibility were more important factors in site selection than were redevelopment or site suitability.

There are several reasons why Boston has so much public housing. Activity at the Army and Navy bases in South Boston during and after World War II was one important reason for the construction of the huge Columbia Point project in Dorchester. In the 'thirties there was a great deal of unemployment in Boston and this attracted Federal housing funds. Probably a most important reason, however, is the Boston Irish tradition of reliance on government to take care of the underprivileged. No stigma is attached to public housing in Boston. Bostonians have flocked to public housing whenever it was available. The Housing Authority gets 4,000 requests for the 225 units that become available in a normal year's turnover. Lately, however, there has begun to develop some contempt for public housing such as has handicapped projects in other cities.

G. Highway Politics

by Mark K. Adams

William F. Callahan, Chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, dominates Boston highway politics. Commission of the Department of Public Works from 1933-1939 and from 1949-1952 and Turnpike chairman since 1952, he has developed a loyal following among Massachusetts politicians, especially Democratic ones, that gives him nearly complete control over the state's roadbuilding program. Highway contractors and suppliers, business and civic associations, local governments, urban planners, industrial developers, taxpayer's associations, and property owners all have something to say regarding Boston expressway construction, but Mr. Callahan is the chief mover and shaker.

The usual way of describing Mr. Callahan's relations with politicians is to extend a half-open fist and sputter, "He has them in the palm of his hand." By judicious distribution of jobs and of construction and maintenance contracts, Mr. Callahan has won the hearts of an impressive number of state legislators and local leaders. He has stoutly defended his patronage-rich agencies from greedy politicians by maintaining one-man control over his agency and by keeping a monopoly of "the facts." The question of who will build what highway where and when is answered by Mr. Callahan more than by all other interests combined.

His most bitter critics admit that Mr. Callahan is a tremendously effective road builder. The gigantic circumferential Route 128 was conceived and initiated by Callahan

in 1938, near the end of his first term as Commissioner of the Department of Public Works. The commissioners who followed him let the project lay fallow, but when Callahan returned to office in 1949 he got work underway at once and by 1952 the road was finished. In his second term Mr. Callahan built the 3.5 mile, \$110 million Central Artery through the North End and downtown Boston. For this, he seized block after block of residential and commercial property. The Democratic Boston Post beamed that "the old master is back on the job," and the Republican Herald-Traveler charged that Callahan, because he was "Mr. \$300 million to the average legislator," was a dictator.

Boston's present expressway disputes arise from Callahan's desire to extend his Turnpike system through the city and under the Harbor to get heavy traffic from the north. The Massachusetts Port Authority was his first victim. Organized in 1956 to finance and administer the development of Logan Airport, Sumner Tunnel, Mystic River Bridge, and port facilities, the Port Authority was dominated by Republican, civic-minded Yankee businessmen who wanted to keep it out of "politics." Their attitude left the Authority helpless when Mr. Callahan used his influence in the 1958 Democratic legislature to transfer control over Sumner Tunnel and the rights to build a second under-Harbor tube from the Port Authority to the Turnpike Authority. He took advantage of the Port Authority's political impotence again late in 1959 when he persuaded the Department of Public Works to plan an East Boston-Saugus highway (the William F. Callahan, Jr.,

Expressway) connecting the tunnels with the projected Northeast Expressway (Interstate Highway 95). The William F. Callahan, Jr., Expressway will divert Boston-bound traffic from the Port Authority's Mystic River Bridge to Mr. Callahan's tunnels, thus swelling his toll revenues, encouraging motorists to use other elements of his highway system, and providing more funds for more Turnpike expansion.

The state Department of Public Works, the cities of Boston and Newton, the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, and many civic improvement and planning groups have fought another part of Mr. Callahan's expansion program. In order to link the Harbor tunnels with the rest of the Turnpike system, a 12-mile extension must be built from the present terminus at Route 128 east through Newton and Boston to the Central Artery near South Station. In 1955 the General Court gave the Turnpike Authority permission to make this extension over the Boston & Albany railroad right-of-way, but inability of the Authority to float a \$145 million bond issue delayed the project. The legislation creating the Authority specified that before new bonds could be issued the Turnpike system had to earn 140 per cent of its maximum principal and interest payments; in 1959, the Authority's best year, it earned only 80 per cent. Mr. Callahan could undoubtedly get the legislature to change this requirement, but even if it were changed, few investors would buy the bonds. Since 1955, Mr. Callahan has insisted that he is waiting for the bond market to improve in order that he may get a better interest rate.

The inability of the Turnpike Authority to finance its

extension gave Mr. Callahan's opponents time to fight. The City of Newton provided the most vocal opposition. Newton's government is solidly Republican whereas Mr. Callahan is a firm ally of the Democrats. More important, however, Newton wanted a free rather than a toll road to Boston, and feared the loss of property that would be caused by cutting six or eight lanes through the heart of the city. Its basic strategy, as formulated by Mayor Howard Whitmore and continued by Mayor Donald Gibbs, has been to urge construction of a freeway through the mostly vacant land along the Charles River. This it wants done under the Federal Highway Act of 1956 (under which the Federal government pays 90 per cent of the cost of highways approved by the U. S. Bureau of Roads as conforming to the Interstate Highway system). Building a Charles River freeway to connect the Turnpike with downtown Boston would cost Massachusetts only about \$4.7 million, according to Newton officials, and would not involve the destruction of much property. Early in the Furcolo administration (1957), Department of Public Works Commissioner Sheridan released a U. S. Bureau of Roads-approved plan for a Newton-Boston freeway. Governor Furcolo, who is said to rely heavily on Mr. Callahan in highway matters, soon replaced Mr. Sheridan with the present Commissioner, Anthony DiNatale. Plans for a western freeway have not since received serious consideration. Apparently Newton has lost its battle.

Opposition to the Turnpike extension also developed among proponents of the Inner Belt, a \$150 million expressway to swing in an eight-mile arc from the Central Artery in the



South End through Roxbury, the Fenway, Cambridge, and Somerville, to Charlestown, where it would connect with the Mystic Bridge highway complex. The Inner Belt, first proposed in the 1948 Master Highway Plan, would link together radial roads coming into Boston, thus reducing congestion in the city. After the Federal Highway Act provided for \$9 in national funds to match every \$1 in state funds for much new highway construction, the Inner Belt became a practical possibility. Boston's government was enthusiastic about it. The Traffic Commission said it would reduce congestion and traffic accidents. The Planning Board said it would facilitate urban redevelopment and slum clearance. The Mayor was pleased because low-tax property in the South End and Roxbury would be replaced with valuable sites for industrial development. Civic and business groups, notably the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce then headed by former Republican Department of Public Works Commissioner John Volpe, saw these and other advantages in the Inner Belt. Important contracting, supplying, and automotive interests announced their support. Even DiNatale's Department of Public Works, sensitive as it was to the ambition of the Turnpike Authority, listed the Inner Belt as one of its important plans.

The Inner Belt was soon recognized as an alternative to Mr. Callahan's Turnpike extension. The arguments in its favor were strong. Its southern half would perform the same function as the extension without dumping traffic into downtown Boston and the Central Artery. Boston traffic engineers calculated that the Inner Belt would provide about 65 major

traffic separations, while the Turnpike would provide only 24. The freeway, slicing through the South End and Roxbury, would help to clear slums; the Turnpike extension, following the B & A right-of-way, would not. Although both highways would cost between \$140-\$150 million, the Federal government would pay for 90 per cent of the Inner Belt whereas the Turnpike would have to be paid for by tolls charged mainly to Massachusetts residents.

Early in 1960, the U. S. Bureau of Public Roads announced that it would take a hard look to see if the two proposed expressways were in competition. It seemed likely that the answer would be "yes": that if the Turnpike Extension were built, the Bureau of Public Roads would not approve Federal assistance for the Inner Belt. Mr. Callahan was, of course, determined to get his Turnpike extension; if the Inner Belt were built it would be impossible to finance the extension. He therefore launched a two-pronged offensive. He tried to show the supporters of the Inner Belt that his influence with the Governor and the legislature was so great that no highway could be built without his approval. The Department of Works, although it included the Inner Belt in a billion dollar highway program announced on January 20, 1960, did not support it energetically.

The second prong of Mr. Callahan's offensive was designed to expedite construction of the Turnpike extension. Because the Authority had in 1955 been given the right to build through the B & A railroad yards which later became the site of the mammoth Prudential Center development, Mr.

Callahan was intimately concerned with that project. He was able to negotiate an agreement with Prudential that so involved the Turnpike extension with the Center that one project could not be built without the other. Since the Prudential development soon became the symbol of Boston's salvation, even Mr. Callahan's enemies were willing to let him extend the Turnpike as the price of getting the Prudential Center built. In an editorial on April 30, 1960, the Herald, which had been a leader in the anti-Callahan fight for many years but which now ardently advocated the Prudential Center, argued that although the Authority was "overly independent" Bostonians "should accept things as they are." By tying the Turnpike extension to the Prudential development, Mr. Callahan was able to force Boston opponents to accept his plans as a necessary evil.

The case for the Turnpike extension was further strengthened early in 1960 when the Department of Public Utilities agreed 4-3 to let the B & A drop its commuter service to the west on April 1. This decision came as a surprise to almost everyone. Although the B & A had lost passengers every year since World War II, it has a weaker case for ending service than most other railroads in the state. In 1959 the Boston & Maine had been denied permission to curtail commuter service, although its losses were greater and its petition was less sweeping. The Turnpike Authority stood to gain tremendously from the decision. The end of B & A commuter service made it easier for the Authority to use the right-of-way for an extension; a single track could handle

the freight load. More important, the end of commuter service would leave thousands of Newton, Wellesley, Natick, and Framingham commuters without a convenient way to reach their jobs. The commuters, Mr. Callahan apparently reasoned, would press for the Turnpike extension and would patronize it when it was built.

The towns along the B & A line proved not to be submissive, however. As soon as the Department of Public Utilities' decision was announced, the towns -- all of which were solidly Republican -- showed themselves more determined than ever in their opposition to the Turnpike extension. On January 24, 1960, Representative William D. Morton, a Republican of Wellesley, charged that the Department of Public Utilities had not made its decision on the merits of the case. Three of its members who voted to abandon service were Furcolo appointees, he said, and a fourth was a person awaiting reappointment who should not have voted at all. "It would take only a whisper from the Governor's office to pass the word along," Mr. Morton said. "It would take a very faint whisper from William F. Callahan." The Herald joined the attack, pointing out that the timing of announcements by the Department of Public Utilities and the Department of Public Works indicated that the former had been used by the latter. Mr. Callahan and the Governor, it seemed, had pulled strings from behind the scenes. The Governor, the Herald said, was ready to declare a "transportation emergency" so that he could give his friend Mr. Callahan state credit or access to gasoline tax funds to finance construction of the Turnpike

extension at once.

A state court frustrated any plans Mr. Callahan had for taking advantage of the B & A decision. After hearing arguments from attorneys for Newton, Wellesley, and Worcester, the court overruled the Department of Public Utilities decision and postponed until April 1, 1961, the end of the B & A commuter service.

The situation had reached an impasse. Mr. Callahan, with the full cooperation of the General Court and silent assent from the executive department, had blocked both the western freeway wanted by Newton and the Inner Belt wanted by Boston. But for lack of financing he could not extend the Turnpike.

The stalemate ended late in May. Although because of Mr. Callahan's practice of keeping "the facts" to himself figures are not available, it is likely that for the first time the Turnpike Authority will make enough money to permit regular financing of an extension. Mr. Callahan is said to be exuding confidence. Work on the extension is likely to begin within a year.

The U. S. Bureau of Roads has decided that future traffic will justify construction of both the Turnpike extension and the Inner Belt. With \$135 million in Federal money and with the Turnpike Authority satisfied by being enabled to build its extension, the Inner Belt will probably be started soon.

The decisions about highways undoubtedly have more importance for the future of Boston than do any other decision

that are likely to be made. Boston's elected officials and interest groups have had very little to say in the making of them, however. Compared to that of Mr. Callahan and to that of the Department of Public Works, their influence has been miniscule. The Boston Planning Board, the Traffic Commission, the Police Department, and the Real Property Department (which builds parking facilities) are all very much interested in highway matters but they can make themselves heard only through the Mayor's office, and the Mayor, since he is elected on a non-partisan basis, has no political weight with the Governor and the legislature. The Massachusetts Port Authority and the Metropolitan District Commission are politically impotent in highway matters. Real power rests with Mr. Callahan, whose decisions have been based on his desire to link the Turnpike with downtown Boston and the north, with the Department of Public Works, which tries to placate Mr. Callahan while giving Boston the roads it needs, and with the U. S. Bureau of Roads, whose outlook is formed almost entirely by engineering standards.

Boston retains some influence in highway matters by virtue of its ability to determine the route of Federal Highway Act roads. Although at the mercy of the General Court and the Turnpike Authority on the location of toll roads, Boston can exert pressure in favor of one or another freeway location. The location of the Inner Belt has not aroused much interest among homeowners and landlords in Boston. It swings through areas of the South End and Roxbury where property is worth more to its owners cleared than covered with



old buildings. People who live in these areas do not have enough political power to influence the route. On the other hand, institutional landowners along the northern section of the Inner Belt's swing through Boston have been influential in determining the road's location. The so-called Tremont street route was rejected for several reasons. Probably the most important reason was that it would divide the big Mission Roman Catholic Church from its new Convent. The Tremont street route was also opposed by Harvard Medical School, Children's Hospital, and Beth Israel Hospital. The Fenway route, chosen by the Department of Public Works, is opposed by Wentworth Institute, the Museum of Fine Arts, and the Green Shoe Company, whose factory would be divided from its parking lot. Green has threatened to move from Boston if the Fenway route is chosen. This may cause the City to oppose that route; more likely, however, Mayor Collins will risk the loss of a big taxpayer and employer in order to get the Inner Belt built promptly.



H. Law Enforcement

Failure of the city police to curb illegal betting has recently opened the issue of law enforcement in Boston. Several raids on gambling joints by Internal Revenue Service agents, beginning with a raid in East Boston on the eve of the 1959 mayoralty election, have brought the problem to public attention. The federal raids have more than once been conducted within sight of a city police station.

Criticism of the city's law enforcement has come primarily from the New England Citizens Crime Commission, an 82-year-old organization with headquarters in Boston. The Commission operates with a modest budget--somewhat under \$30,000 a year--but it has a zealous executive secretary in Dwight S. Strong. Appearing on a local radio program on April 18, 1960, Strong announced that he had sent a letter to Governor Furcolo asking the resignation of Boston Police Commissioner Leo J. Sullivan because, he said, it was obvious that Boston police "are not doing their jobs." He declared that gambling, organized crime, and after-hours drinking were rife in the city. A week before Strong's radio appearance, state police had raided an after-hours drinking establishment in Boston, ending a long hands-off policy towards the city.

Replying indirectly to Strong at a press conference a few days after the broadcast, Governor Furcolo said that his office had conferred with the State Attorney General and the Suffolk County District Attorney and had received no information about a breakdown in Boston law enforcement. (Even as he spoke, federal agents were carrying out one of their more

spectacular raids.) Furcolo stressed the importance of home rule for the city, declaring that for him to interfere in its police administration would set a "dangerous precedent."

Furcolo's response pointed up the dilemma of Boston's would-be reformers. Since 1906 Boston's police department has been administered by a commissioner appointed by the governor for a seven-year term. (The governor's own term is only two years.) Massachusetts governors have not, however, coveted the responsibility for Boston's law enforcement. Governor Furcolo, like Governor Herter before him, has introduced bills to return the power of appointment to the mayor. But Boston's mayors have not coveted the responsibility either. Mayor Hynes explicitly opposed the governors' bills, and Collins has remained silent on the question of the appointment power even though he has sought greater authority over police expenditures. Citizens who want to complain about law enforcement therefore cannot find a promising target. The mayor clearly is not responsible for the Police Department. The governor is partly responsible but unresponsive to criticism. The police commissioner himself is invulnerable to direct attack. The NECCC, hoping to remedy this situation, will push a bill in the next legislative session to return the appointment power to the mayor. It hopes that Mayor Collins will support it.

Whether the change would improve the city's law enforcement is debatable. The theory of those who complain about the present system seems to be that the police commissioner would be more sensitive to the stipulations of the law if he were responsible directly or indirectly to the city's electorate. It is not clear, however, that the city's electorate is very

much aroused over the law enforcement problem. In the past it has displayed an indulgent attitude towards the bookies, who have rarely gone to jail even when the Boston police have bothered to arrest them. Gambling defendants have regularly been sentenced to jail terms by Municipal Court judges only to go free after appealing to the Superior Court, where they are guaranteed a trial by jury. The juries tend to view their offenses sympathetically.

The NECCC does not have a large, active membership, although in recent months, since the law enforcement issue has developed, it has received some response from citizens who are interested in assisting it. This interest has not been sufficient to swell its treasury. The Commission relies for financial support on three major donors, who live in or near Boston, and on a modest number of modest donors, most of them from the metropolitan area. Its board of directors, which meets once a month, was headed until recently by Dr. Dana McLean Greeley, former pastor of the Arlington Street Unitarian Church and current president of the American Unitarian Association.

Mr. Strong, a native of western Massachusetts, has been executive secretary of the Commission for twelve years. Before then he held jobs with various community welfare agencies in Boston. He is in the vanguard of the critics of law enforcement, giving speeches, distributing literature, and pressuring police officials in private meetings. The only group that is active on the law enforcement issue in addition to the Commission is the Committee Against Organized Gambling and

Crime of the Massachusetts Council of Churches, which has assisted the Commission in spreading its literature throughout the state. Except for the Monitor, which ran a series of five articles on the city's police in May, the Boston newspapers have displayed no disposition to crusade on the crime issue, although the Herald on November 5, 1959, carried a photo-exposé of the bookies that was arranged by Mr. Strong. The Herald has editorialized in favor of restoring full authority for administration of the police department to the city.

Apart from the problem of enforcement and the bookies, the police department is vulnerable to charges of poor administration. According to the Monitor, the Boston Municipal Research Bureau has found that Boston taxpayers pay more per capita for police protection than do taxpayers in any other large American city. In 1958, according to the Bureau's figures, Bostonians paid \$22.90 per capita for their police force, New Yorkers paid \$20.04, and the average for 18 big cities was \$15.44. (Cf. the figures on p. VI-6.) Boston had 4.37 police personnel per 1,000 population, while New York had only 3.39 and the average for 18 large cities was 2.9. In 1960, the city's police budget was \$18,484,706, of which about \$17,500,000 went for salaries.

There has been steady controversy in the past two years between the city and Commissioner Sullivan over his spending powers. Court rulings on the issue have been sought unsuccessfully. One of the complaints against the police department is that it has split contracts into small amounts in order to evade the requirement for competitive bidding. In January 1960



the city auditor served notice on Sullivan that he would not approve payment of \$53,175 to a South Boston contractor for rewiring done at police headquarters.

The Police Department has also been criticized for maintaining too many division stations (17) and supervising them inadequately. Mayor Collins has been exploring with police officials the possibility of consolidating the stations, in conformance with a pattern set years ago by other cities. The problem of supervision was attacked by Commissioner Sullivan himself in May, when he organized the city's police divisions into three districts and assigned outstanding officers to supervise each district. A bookie raid led by one of the new supervisors followed shortly after the reorganization.

PART VII - ADDITIONAL REFERENCES, SOURCES, AND DOCUMENTS

The most convenient places to begin research on Boston politics are:

1. The library in the State House on Beacon Hill, which has the fullest available collection not only of Boston city documents but also of the documents of other cities and towns in Massachusetts. (These documents consist, in the case of Boston, primarily of annual reports of the city departments and the mayor's inaugural address.) A clipping file is kept on state legislation, which may be helpful on topics that concern the city.

2. The Kirstein business branch of the Boston Public Library, which is on City Hall Ave., adjacent to the City Hall. Proceedings of the City Council, ordinances, and current reports of the Metropolitan District Commission, Finance Commission, Metropolitan Transit Authority, and Police Department are available here.

3. The citizens' relations office on the third floor of the City Hall, which has a clipping file that was begun with the Collins administration.

4. The main building of the Boston Public Library at Copley Square, which has a current file of Boston newspapers and a collection of city documents.

The official chronicle of Boston city government, the City Record, is available to subscribers for \$5 a year. A sample is attached as Document #7.

United Community Services, 14 Somerset St., Boston,

sells a volume called Social Facts by Census Tracts, which includes census data by tracts along with maps of the city's planning districts. The volume for the metropolitan area costs \$5 and that for the city \$2. For \$.50 UCS sells Neighborhoods of Boston Ranked for Selected Factors, in which 64 neighborhoods -- subunits designated by UCS within the various communities of Boston -- are ranked on the basis mainly of census data (median income, housing characteristics, etc.) and also on the basis of some welfare data (juvenile delinquency rates, infant mortality, TB cases). These volumes are currently the most convenient source of census tract data for Boston. The official Commerce Department publication of census tract statistics from 1950 has been out of print since 1956, and the volume from the 1960 census is not expected to be available until late 1961.

The Seminar Research Bureau of Boston College has compiled a bibliography, Political and Economic Problems of the Boston Metropolitan Area (March 1958), which is the best source of additional references. It accompanies this report as Document #8. Other publications of the Bureau are also helpful as sources, especially its annual series, Proceedings of the Citizen Seminars on the Fiscal, Economic, and Political Problems of Boston and the Metropolitan Community. The latest publication in this series accompanies the report as Document #9. Members of the Bureau's staff are themselves good sources.

A few titles that may be of interest are:

Boston. City Planning Board. Capital Improvement



Program, 1957-1962. Boston, 1957. A program recommended by the Planning Board.

Griffenhagen and Associates. Reports on the City of Boston. A series of reports (1948-49) by consultants in public administration and finance. Thirty-one reports, with findings and recommendations, concerning all departments of the city.

Friedrich, Carl J. et al. The Boston Contest. Boston, Boston University Press, 1944. 1st, 2d, and 3d prize essays. Recommendations for federated city, metropolitan district, and regional authorities.

Soloway, Arnold M. Report on the City's Financial Problem. New Boston Committee, Boston, 1953. mimeo.

Goodwin, George. Intermunicipal Relations in Massachusetts. Amherst, Bureau of Government Research, University of Massachusetts, 1956. A study of special purpose district governments made for the Commission on State and Local Relationships under the direction of the Bureau of Government Research of the University of Massachusetts. Noting that Massachusetts is turning more and more to such governments, the author discusses the resulting problems of fragmentation of authority and the attempts to overcome them by (1) informal intermunicipal cooperation, (2) intermunicipal contractual arrangements, (3) special districts, (4) extension of state and county activities, (5) consolidation and annexation, and (6) federated district government.

## PART VIII - DOCUMENTS

List of Documents Attached

## Document #

1. Greater Boston Economic Study Committee, The Population of the Cities and Towns of Greater Boston Projected to 1970, Economic Base Report No. 4 (December 1959).
2. Boston City Planning Board, Research Division, "Information on Boston" (April 1957).
3. Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston (New York, 1960).
4. Bryant C. Danner, "Campaign Decision-Makers" (April 1960).
5. City of Boston, Annual Report of the Election Department for the Year 1959.
6. Metropolitan District Commission, "Development and Organization" (Rev. ed. Sept. 1952).
7. City Record, Official Chronicle of Boston Municipal Affairs.
8. Richard M. Doherty (comp.), Political and Economic Problems of the Boston Metropolitan Area, Boston College Seminar Research Bureau (March 1958).
9. Proceedings of the 1959 Series of Citizen Seminars on the Fiscal, Economic and Political Problems of Boston and the Metropolitan Community.
10. Robert Hanron, "West End Project Could be Spark to Revitalize Boston," Boston Sunday Globe, Dec. 20, 1959.

