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Urban Government

A Reader
in Administration and Politics

Revised Edition

EDITED BY *Edward C. Banfield*

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Preface to the Revised Edition

IT IS astonishing how much has happened in and to the cities
in the eight years since the first edition of this book appeared. There
have been fundamental changes in public opinion (in 1961 the first civil
rights revolutionaries had just begun to take their seats at segregated
lunch counters), in the rules governing the electoral process (the first
one-man one-vote bombshell had not yet burst), and in the techniques
of management (planners were beginning to talk about benefit-cost
ratios but few of them had ever set eyes on a computer). Not until I
set about revising the book did I realize how much the situation had
changed and how much it needed to be brought up to date.

The changes have not been such as to require changing the general
character and plan of the book, however. I have retained the original
structure, the intention of which is to place the materials within an
analytical framework that will make their larger significance apparent
to the student. The approach is also the same in that it is concerned with
how urban government works rather than with rules-of-thumb for its
improvement. The distribution of emphasis is much as it was except
that I have enlarged Part VII, Problems of Management, to give a much
fuller account of the various kinds of planning that are making their
appearance in response to the growing scale and complexity of urban
problems. My hope is that students of city planning will find it useful to
have these materials brought together in one place.

I believe that about half the material in the book is new. I have not
hesitated to retain articles that I consider classics (Norton Long's two,
for example) or to print very long articles which could not be cut with-
out serious injury (for example, the note from the *Harvard Law Review*
on City Government in the State Courts). There are readings that are
very up-to-date (on Negro politics, riots, and reapportionment of local
government, for example) but I have not knowingly sacrificed anything
of analytical importance for the sake of being topical.

All of the readings in the last Part are new. They all contribute to
a single theme, of course—how policy is formed—but the reader
should note that each of them contributes to other parts of the book as

well. Harold Kaplan's article on Metro Toronto, for example, adds something to the section on Metropolitan Organization, Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven's article on welfare adds something to the section on Influence and Leadership, and H. R. Wilde's article on the Milwaukee riot adds something to at least three sections: The Theory of Good Government, The Trend of Urban Politics, and Influence and Leadership. My own article on the public library might be read in connection with the section on Problems of Management.

The bibliography has been brought up to date and an index has been added.

Preface to the First Edition

THIS IS a collection of the readings that I have found most valuable in teaching courses on urban government to both undergraduate and graduate students.

The readings come from so many places that even if each were readily available it would be a tedious task for a librarian to bring them all together on a reserve shelf. But many, like Henry Jones Ford's theory of corruption, would not be available at all in most libraries, and some, like Rexford G. Tugwell's evaluation of the career of Robert Moses, have never before appeared in print.

A book of this kind can be used in at least three ways: as a supplement to a textbook, in place of a textbook as an accompaniment to classroom lectures, or as a basis for a discussion series. It has been my experience that readings of this sort help give analytical depth to a course. The usual textbook provides a descriptive account of the more formal aspects of governmental structure and process, and then leaves it up to the instructor to show the student the larger meaning of what has been described. This book is designed to help him do this. Accordingly, I have selected the readings for the *ideas* that they contain.

Since some instructors will want to use the book without an accompanying text, the essential descriptive materials are supplied here in the form of a Glossary. Because the Glossary contains all of the background information necessary for understanding the readings, many students will find it useful to begin by reading the Glossary from start to finish.

The approach of this book differs from that of most texts in several respects. The most important difference, perhaps, is that this book tries to explain what really happens in urban government and to do so largely in terms of the concepts and theories of social scientists. Most textbooks on state and local government are preoccupied with what "experts" think *ought* to be the case; this one is occupied with what *really is* the case. While the views of reformers and experts are represented, they are not assumed to be authoritative, and they are placed in juxta-

position with those of social scientists. Thus, for example, the student is exposed not only to the usual criticisms of the big city machine but also to the views of the eminent sociologist, Robert K. Merton, on the machine's latent functions.

This emphasis on the social scientist's view of things as they are, as distinguished from what they ought to be, has inevitably led to a much heavier emphasis on politics than is common in most textbooks on urban government. Works on urban government all too often assume that the tasks of city government are almost entirely matters of administration—collecting garbage, repairing streets, putting out fires, and so on. Without belittling the importance of such activities, this book seeks to give politics—the struggle for power and the management of conflict —the attention that it deserves.

Politics would be important even if it had no consequences extending beyond the boundaries of the city. But the fact is that American national politics is to a very large extent local politics, and no one can possibly understand the national political system without first understanding politics in the cities, especially the larger ones. This is another reason for the emphasis here on politics.

This book focuses on the processes rather than on the techniques of government. Most students, for example, do not need to know anything about the technique of designing and filling out the forms of a city budget. Not one in a thousand will ever have use for such information, and the rare one who will can certainly best get it on the job. On the other hand, all students should know the kinds of things that are explained by William H. Brown, Jr. and Charles E. Gilbert in their article on capital programming in Philadelphia: what capital programming is, why it is done, how it is organized, what its connection with city planning is, what its political setting is, and what are the practical and theoretical limitations upon its effectiveness.

Some of the readings provide models for students who would like to go into the local community and do research of their own. The selections from Mark K. Adams, James Q. Wilson, Robert A. Dahl, and Kenneth E. Gray and David Greenstone should all be suggestive to the student who wants to try his hand at this' and to the class that is carrying on a joint research project. These examples show how much can be done without a computing machine, providing one has sound legs and a good mind.

Each Section of the book is preceded by an introductory note formulating the central questions around which it is organized, underlining the points that the editor believes are of the greatest analytical interest, and showing the relevance of each reading to the general themes of the book.

The bibliography lists items generally regarded as standard refer-

ences on each topic. These are annotated for the benefit of the non-specialist.

The author acknowledges with thanks the assistance of Martha Derthick, who prepared the Glossary and the Bibliography.

September, 1961

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I

Urban Government as a Subject for Study

GOVERNMENT serves two very different functions. One is that of providing goods and services that cannot be, or at any rate are not, provided under other, private, auspices. With respect to this *service* function, government is in many ways like a private enterprise. Private enterprise provides certain kinds of goods and services to people called "customers"; public enterprise provides other kinds of goods and services to people called "taxpayers." Both types of enterprise are judged by how well and how cheaply they supply the goods and services that are wanted.

The other function of government is to deal with conflict. Wherever there are people, there are bound to be differences of opinion and of interest. Politics is any kind of activity—reasonable discussion, heated argument, bribery, fighting, balloting, and so on—by which conflict in matters of public importance is carried on. Government deals with this conflict by regulating the manner in which it is carried on, by arranging compromises and balancing interests, and by imposing settlements which the parties to the disputes have to accept.

Whereas the service function is of necessity performed consciously and deliberately, the political function is often, but not always, performed as a more or less accidental by-product of a politician's effort to get office or of a bureaucracy's effort to maintain and expand itself.

Perhaps it is for this reason that many people regard "administration," or the carrying out of the service function, as the "real" justification for government, while they look on "politics," or the process by which conflict is handled, as a necessary evil, if not indeed as an irrational aberration.

Because the service function is so conspicuously important in the government of cities, many writers have treated it as if it were, or ought to be, the *only* function of city government. The usual textbook emphasis on the service role of city government relies implicitly, and often explicitly, upon a conceptual scheme appropriate to the normative study of administration. This perspective introduces a bias that hides other, perhaps more significant, dimensions of governmental activity.

In some places, city government is indeed much more a matter of administration than of politics. This is true in Great Britain, and also in many small, middle-class American cities. In these places, matters are usually decided on grounds that are (or at least seem to be) technical rather than political. In large, polyglot American cities, however, the case is different. In such cities, efficiency—the avoidance of waste—is of little or no interest to many voters, and conflict among groups and interests is pervasive and sharp. Despite the pleas of reformers, the people with something at stake have never agreed either to respect the neutrality of administration and to leave certain matters out of politics or to forego advantages that could be had by mixing local issues with state and national ones.

But the political character of government in all of our larger and many of our smaller cities need not necessarily be considered pathological. The successful management of conflict is a social function valuable enough in itself to justify, as a rule, whatever loss of efficiency in the performance of the service functions the injection of politics into administration may cause.

The effective management of conflict is valuable because it permits and encourages the expression of competing interests and opinions while at the same time preventing the eruption of violence and the eventual breakdown of social organization. But even more important, it is valuable as a way of discovering the concrete content of the common good. Political struggle is the means by which society develops the meaning of justice and of good. This is so even when the particular matter in question—say, the location of a housing project—is in itself trivial. Even though a concrete matter may be trivial to start with, it is often transformed and given great significance by ideological or symbolic elements that are introduced to serve someone's purpose. Thus the agitation over what is a trivial matter to begin with may prove useful in the elucidation of moral questions of the deepest interest to all mankind. For Aristotle, whose categories Norton E. Long believes provide the most appropriate framework for the study of local government, the city is

above all an ethical association. It comes into existence (to paraphrase Aristotle slightly) for the sake of its service functions, but it exists for the sake of the good life. How to establish empirically the influence of "regime" on the style and content of a city's government is one of the problems discussed by James Q. Wilson in an article which stresses the importance of comparative studies. The final reading in this section, by Edward C. Banfield, represents an effort to apply the advice given here on what to study and how to study it. The article (1) treats "actions which increase conflict" (as opposed to persons) as the relevant unit of analysis, (2) is comparative, and (3) compares two conceptions of "citizen, constitution, and ruling class."

The Management of Metropolitan Conflict

Edward C. Banfield

THE RAPID GROWTH of the metropolitan populations will not necessarily have much political effect. To be sure, many new facilities, especially schools, highways, and water supply and sewage disposal systems, will have to be built and much private activity will have to be regulated. But such things do not necessarily have anything to do with politics: the laying of a sewer pipe by a "public" body may involve the same kinds of behavior as the manufacture of the pipe by a "private" one. Difficulties that are "political" arise (and they may arise in "private" as well as in "public" undertakings) only in so far as there is conflict— conflict over what the common good requires or between what it requires and what private interests want. The general political situation is affected, therefore, not by changes in population density or in the number and complexity of the needs that government serves ("persons," the human organisms whose noses are counted by census-takers, are not necessarily "political actors") but rather by actions which increase conflict in matters of public importance or make the management of it more difficult. In what follows, such actions will be called "burdens" upon the political system.

In judging how a political system will work over time, increases and decreases in the burdens upon it are obviously extremely relevant. They are not all that must be considered, however. Changes in the "capability" of a system, that is, in its ability to manage conflict and to impose settlements, are equally relevant. The "effectiveness" of a political system is a ratio between burdens and capability. Even though the burdens upon it increase, the effectiveness of a system will also increase if there is a sufficient accompanying increase in its capability. Similarly, even though there is an inrease in capability, the effectiveness of a system will decrease if there is a more than commensurate increase in burdens.

In this article an impressionistic account will be given with respect to two contrasting political systems, the British and the American, of the burdens metropolitan affairs place upon them and of their changing capabilities. Naturally, the focus of attention will be upon *ratios* of burdens to capabilities and upon the significance of these ratios for metropolitan affairs.

The Tasks of British Local Government

Until recently British local government (meaning not only government that is locally controlled but all government that deals with local affairs) had, by American standards, very little to do. Until three or four years ago there was little traffic regulation in Britain because there were few cars (the first few parking meters, all set for two hours, were installed in London in the summer of 1958). Now all of a sudden there are 5,500,000 cars—more per mile of road than in any other country—and the number is increasing by a net of 1,500 per day; by 1975 there are expected to be 13,500,000. Obviously, the need for roads and parking places will be enormous. But the automobile will create other and graver problems for local government. When there are enough cars and highways, there will doubtless be a "flight to the suburbs." The central business districts will be damaged, and so will mass transit (94 percent of those who now enter London do so by public transportation) and the green belts.[1]

Law enforcement has been relatively easy in Britain up to now. The British have not been culturally disposed toward violence or toward the kinds of vice that lead to major crimes. (There are only 450 dope addicts in all of Britain, whereas in Chicago alone there are from 12,000 to 15,000.) British opinion, moreover, has not demanded that some forms of vice be made illegal, much less that vice in general be suppressed. In England adultery is not illegal, and neither is prostitution, although it is illegal to create a nuisance by soliciting. Physicians in England may prescribe dope to addicts. (In the United States, where this is illegal, black-market prices prevail and the addict must usually resort to crime

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1. Dame Evelyn Sharp, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Local Government, recently pointed out that the expected population increase in England and Wales in the next 15 years (nearly three million) is almost double the increase on which plans have been based. The number of separate households, moreover, is growing faster than the number of people. Much of the demand for new housing, she said, is demand for better and more spacious housing. All this has increased the pressure on land, especially on the green belt, and particularly around London. The Government policy, she said, was to encourage the building of houses for owner occupation, and how to follow this without wrecking the effort to preserve the green belt was one of the most difficult problems facing the planning authorities. She said there were also increasing demands on land by industry, for great new roads, car parking and garaging and for power. *The Times*, 23 October 1959.

to support his habit. In Chicago a week's supply of heroin costs at least $105; to realize this much, the addict must steal goods worth about $315. According to the estimate of a criminal court judge, about $50 million worth of goods is shoplifted every year in the central business district of Chicago by addicts.[2]) Never having tried to suppress drinking, gambling, or prostitution, the British have no organized crime.

The task of law enforcement is also becoming more difficult, however. Dope addiction, and consequently crimes of violence, will increase with the number of West Indians and others who are not culturally at home in England. In the past year the horde of London prostitutes has been driven underground, where they may prove a powerful force tending toward the corruption of the police.[3] As traffic fines increase in number and amount, the bribery of the police by motorists will also increase. "All Britain's big cities," an *Observer* writer recently said, "now have enclaves of crime where the major masculine trades appear to be pimping and dealing in dubious second-hand cars."[4]

Even if motorists, dope addicts, and prostitutes do not seriously corrupt it, the police force is bound to deteriorate. The British have had extraordinarily fine policemen, partly because their social system has hitherto offered the working class few better opportunities. As it becomes easier to rise out of the working class, the police force will have to get along with less desirable types. It is significant that the Metropolitan Police are now 3,000 men short.

State-supported schooling, one of the heaviest tasks of local government in the United States, has been a comparatively easy one in Britain. Four out of five British children leave school before the age of 16. The British, it is said, are not likely to develop a taste for mass education.[5] They are demanding more and better state-supported schools, however, and no doubt the government will have to do more in this field.

It would be wrong to infer that because of these changes the burden upon the British political system will henceforth be comparable to that upon our own or, indeed, that it will increase at all. Conceivably, the new tasks of local government will have no more political significance than would, say, a doubling of the volume of mail to be carried by the post office. One can imagine, for example, two opposite treatments of the London traffic problem, one of which would solve the problem with-

2. These facts were supplied by Dr. Arnold Abrams of Chicago in a private communication.

3. The Wolfenden Committee considered this possibility and concluded that the measures it proposed (chiefly to make it easier for police officers to establish "annoyance") justified the risk. Its measures, the Committee said, were not "likely to result in markedly increased corruption. There are other fields of crime where the temptation to the police to succumb to bribery is, and will continue to be, much stronger than it is here." *Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution,* Cmnd. 247, September 1957, p. 96.

4. "Table Talk," *The Observer,* 15 May 1960.

5. Sir Geoffrey Crowther, "English and American Education," *The Atlantic,* April 1960.

out creating any burden upon the political system and the other of which would leave the problem unsolved while creating a considerable burden.

Possibility 1. The Ministry of Transport takes jurisdiction over London traffic. Acting on the recommendations of a Royal Commission, the Minister declares that the central city will be closed to private automobiles. His decision is acclaimed as wise and fair—"the only thing to do"—by everyone who matters.

Possibility 2. The boroughs retain their control over traffic because the Minister is mindful of organized motorists. People feel that it is an outrageous infringement of the rights of Englishmen to charge for parking on the Queen's highway or to fine a motorist without having first served a summons upon him in the traditional manner. Traffic is unregulated, and everyone complains bitterly.

As this suggests, "governmental tasks" are "political burdens" only if public opinion makes them so. What would be an overwhelming burden in one society may not be any burden at all in another. What would not be a burden upon a particular political system at one time may become one at another. It is essential to inquire, therefore, what changes are occurring in the way such matters are usually viewed in Great Britain and in the United States. The factors that are particularly relevant in this connection include: the intensity with which ends are held and asserted; the willingness of actors to make concessions, to subordinate private to public interests, and to accept arbitration; and, finally, the readiness of the voters to back the government in imposing settlements.

The Relation of Citizen to Government

The British have a very different idea from ours of the proper relation between government and citizens. They believe that it is the business of the government to govern. The voter may control the government by giving or withholding consent, but he may not participate in its affairs. The leader of the majority in the London County Council, for example, has ample power to carry into effect what he and his policy committee decide upon; it is taken for granted that he will make use of his power (no one will call him a boss for doing so) and that he will not take advice or tolerate interference from outsiders.

Locally as well as nationally, British government has been in the hands of the middle and upper classes. Civil servants, drawn of course entirely from the middle class, have played leading and sometimes dominant roles. Most elected representatives have been middle or upper class. The lower class has not demanded, and apparently has not wanted, to be governed by its own kind or to have what in the United States is called "recognition." Although Labour has controlled the London County Council since 1934, there have never been in the

Council any such gaudy representatives of the gutter as, for example, Alderman "Paddy" Bauler of Chicago. The unions have kept people with lower-class attributes, and sometimes people of lower-class origins as well, off the ballot. They would not have done so, of course, if the lower class had had a powerful itch to have its own kind in office. (In that case the unions would themselves have been taken over by the lower class.) As Bagehot said in explaining "deferential democracy," "the numerical majority is ready, is eager to delegate its power of choosing its ruler to a certain select minority."[6]

The ordinary man's contact with government inspires him with awe and respect. (Is government respected because it pertains to the upper classes, or does causality run the other way, the upper classes being respected because of their association with government?) "The English workingman," an Englishman who read an earlier draft of this article said, "seems to think that the assumption of governmental responsibilities calls for the solemnest of blue suits. They tend to be so overawed by their position as to be silenced by it."

The ethos of governing bodies, then, has been middle or upper class, even when most of their members have been lower class. So has that of the ordinary citizen when, literally or figuratively, he has put on his blue suit to discharge his "governmental responsibilities" at the polls.

Consequently the standards of government have been exclusively those of the middle and upper classes. There has been great concern for fair play, great respect for civil rights, and great attention to public amenities—all matters dear to middle- and upper-class hearts. At the same time there has been entire disregard for the convenience and tastes of the working man. London pubs, for example, are required by law to close from two until six in the afternoon, not, presumably, because no one gets thirsty between those hours or because drinking then creates a special social problem, but merely because the convenience of pub keepers (who would have to remain open if competition were allowed to operate) is placed above that of their customers. Similarly, trains and buses do not leave the center of London after eleven at night, not presumably, because no one wants to go home later, but because the people who make the rules deem it best for those who cannot afford taxis to get to bed early.

It is not simply class prejudice that accounts for these things. By common consent of the whole society the tastes of the individual count for little against prescriptive rights. When these rights pertain to the body politic—to the Crown, in the mystique—then the tastes of the individual may be disregarded entirely. Public convenience becomes everything, private convenience nothing.

As heirs of this tradition, the British town planners are in a fortunate position. They do not have to justify their schemes by consumers' preferences. It is enough for them to show that "public values"

6. Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, ch. IX.

are served, for by common consent any gain in a public value, however small, outweighs any loss of consumers' satisfaction, however large. Millions of acres of land outside of London were taken to make a green belt without anyone's pointing out that workingmen are thus prevented from having small places in the country and that rents in the central city are forced up by the reduction in the supply of land. It is enough that a public amenity is being created (an amenity, incidentally, which can be enjoyed only by those having time and money to go out of London). The planning authorities of the London County Council, to cite another example of the general disregard for consumers' tastes, consider the following questions, among others, when they pass upon an application to erect a structure more than 100 feet in height:

> Would it spoil the skyline of architectural groups or landscapes? Would it have a positive visual or civic significance? Would it relate satisfactorily to open spaces and the Thames? Would its illuminations at night detract from London's night scene?

It is safe to say that the planners do not weigh the value of a gain in "visual significance" against the value of a loss in "consumer satisfaction." In all probability they do not try to discover what preferences the consumer actually has in the matter. Certainly they do not make elaborate market analyses such as are customarily used in the United States in planning not only shopping places but even public buildings.

Green belts and the control of the use of land are only part of a plan of development which includes the creation of a dozen satellite towns, "decanting" the population of the metropolis, and much else. Where these sweeping plans have not been realized, it has not been because of political opposition. There has been virtually no opposition to any of these undertakings. The real estate, mercantile, banking, taxpayer, and labor union interests, which in an American city would kill such schemes before they were started, have not even made gestures of protest. The reason is not that none of them is adversely affected. It is that opposition would be futile.[7]

The Direction of Change

Obviously, a political system that can do these things can do much else besides. If the relation between government and citizen in the next half century is as it has been in the past, the "govern-

7. An English friend comments: "I think you underestimate the sensitivity of central government to local or even private pressures. Parliamentary questions and debates, M.P.s' correspondence, lobbying, etc., provide plenty of opportunity for needling Ministers. The difference [between American and British practice] is, I think, that in Britain the government is not necessarily deflected by the pressures although it does its best to placate them. It does *not* ride rough-shod over protests; it lumbers on, writhing under the criticism and dispensing half-baked compromises."

mental tasks" that were spoken of above will not prove to be "political burdens" of much weight. One can hardly doubt, for example, which of the two ways of handling London traffic would, on this assumption, be more probable.

There is reason to think, however, that fundamental changes are occurring in the relations between government and citizen. Ordinary people in Britain are entering more into politics, and public opinion is becoming more ebullient, restive, and assertive. The lower class no longer feels exaggerated respect for its betters,[8] and if, as seems reasonable to assume, respect for public institutions and for political things has been in some way causally connected with respect for the governing classes, the ordinary man's attachment to his society may be changing in a very fundamental way. British democracy is still deferential, but it is less so than a generation ago, and before long it may be very little so.

It would not be surprising if the lower class were soon to begin wanting to have its own kind in office. Lower-class leaders would not necessarily be less mindful of the common good and of the principles of fair play than are the present middle and upper class ones, however. The ethos of the British lower class may not be as different from that of the other classes as we in America, judging others by ourselves, are likely to imagine.

There is in Britain a tendency to bring the citizen closer to the process of government. Witness, for example, a novel experiment (as the *Times* described it) tried recently by an urban district council. At the conclusion of its monthly meeting, the council invited the members of the public present (there were about twenty) to ask questions. According to the *Times:*[9]

> The Council, having decided to cast themselves into the arms of the electorate, had obviously given some thought to how they could extricate themselves if the hug became an uncomfortable squeeze. The chairman, after expressing the hope that the experiment would be successful, suggested a few rules. It was undesirable, he said, that such a meeting should become an ordinary debate with members of the public debating with members of the council and perhaps members of the council debating with each other. He decreed that the public should be restricted to questions on policy or factual information. He finished the preliminaries by saying that if things got out of hand he would rise and would then expect all further discussion to cease.
>
> This last precaution proved to be unnecessary. The public were

8. Such an incident as the following, which is supposed to have occurred about the time of the First World War, would be inconceivable today: Hulme [the poet] was making water in Soho Square in broad daylight when a policeman came up. "You can't do that here." Hulme: "Do you realize you're addressing a member of the middle class?" at which the policeman murmured, "Beg pardon, sir," and went on his beat. Christopher Hassall, *Edward Marsh, Patron of the Arts: A Biography* (London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1959), p. 187.

9. The *Times,* 24 November 1959.

pertinent, probing, and shrewd in their questions, but content to observe the proprieties. The more vexed of domestic questions of Nantwich (the demolition of old property, road repairs, housing, and the like) were thrown down quickly and in every case received reasoned replies. The atmosphere of the chamber continued to be one of high good humor.

Carried far enough, this kind of thing would lead to the radical weakening of government. (There is no use giving people information unless you are going to listen to their opinions. And if you do that, you are in trouble, for their opinions are not likely to be on public grounds, and they are virtually certain to conflict.) The British are not likely to develop a taste for what in American cant is called "grassroots democracy," however; the habit of leaving things to the government and of holding the government responsible is too deeply ingrained for that. What the public wants is not the privilege of participating in the process of government but, as the Franks Committee said, "openness, fairness, and impartiality" in official proceedings.[10]

The tastes of the ordinary man (consumers' preferences) will be taken more into account in the future than they have been in the past, not because the ordinary man will demand it (he may in time, but he is far from doing so now) but because the ruling elite—an elite that will be more sophisticated in such things than formerly—will think it necessary and desirable. The efforts of the Conservative government to let the market allocate housing are a case in point. These have been motivated, not by desire to deprive the workingman of advantages he has had for half a century (that would be out of the question), but by awareness that people's tastes may be best served in a market. The cherished green belts are now being scrutinized by people who are aware of consumer demand for living space, and some planners are even beginning to wonder if there is not something to be said for the American system of zoning. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the British will exchange their system of controls of the use of land, which as it stands allows the planner to impose a positive conception, for something resembling ours, which permits the user of land to do as he pleases so long as he does not violate a rule of law.

The conclusion seems warranted that twenty or thirty years from now, when today's children have become political actors, governmental tasks which would not place much of a burden on the political system may then place a considerable one on it. Governmental tasks like traffic regulation will be more burdensome politically both because there will be insistent pressure to take a wider range of views and interests into account, but also, and perhaps primarily, because the ruling group will have become convinced that the preferences of

10. *Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries,* Cmnd. 218, July 1958.

ordinary people ought to count for a great deal even when "public values" are involved. It is not impossible that the elite may come to attach more importance to the preferences of ordinary people than will the ordinary people themselves.

The Contrasting American Tradition

Local government in the United States presents a sharply contrasting picture. It has been required to do a great deal, and the nature of American institutions and culture has made almost all of its tasks into political burdens.

Although there have always been among us believers in strong central government, our governmental system, as compared to the British, has been extraordinarily weak and decentralized. This has been particularly true of state and local government. The general idea seems to have been that no one should govern, or failing that, that everyone should govern together. The principle of checks and balances and the division of power, mitigated in the Federal government by the great powers of the presidency, were carried to extreme lengths in the cities and states. As little as fifty years ago, most cities were governed by large councils, some of them bicameral, and by mayors who could do little but preside over the councils. There was no such thing as a state administration. Governors were ceremonial figures only, and state governments were mere congeries of independent boards and commissions. Before anything could be done, there had to occur a most elaborate process of give and take (often, alas, in the most literal sense) by which bits and pieces of power were gathered up temporarily, almost momentarily.

It was taken for granted that the ordinary citizen had a right— indeed, a sacred duty—to interfere in the day-to-day conduct of public affairs. Whereas in Britain the press and public have been excluded from the deliberations of official bodies, in the United States it has been common practice to require by law that all deliberations take place in meetings open to the public. Whereas in Britain the electorate is never given an opportunity to pass upon particular projects by vote, in the United States it usually is. In Los Angeles, according to James Q. Wilson, "The strategy of political conflict is more often than not based upon the assumption that the crucial decision will be made not by the City Council of Los Angeles, the Board of Supervisors of the county, or the legislature of the state, but by the voters in a referendum election."[11]

11. James Q. Wilson, *A Report on Politics in Los Angeles,* Joint Center for Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959, pp. 1–13.

Los Angeles is an extreme case, but the general practice of American cities, a practice required by law in many of them, is to get the voters' approval of major expenditures. The New York City government, one of the strongest, is now having to choose between building schools and making other necessary capital expenditures; it cannot do both because the voters of the state have refused to lift the constitutional limit on debt. Such a thing could not happen in London; there all such decisions are made by the authorities, *none of whom is elected at large.*

The government of American cities has for a century been almost entirely in the hands of the working class.[12] This class, moreover, has had as its conception of a desirable political system one in which people are "taken care of" with jobs, favors, and protection, and in which class and ethnic attributes get "recognition." The idea that there are values, such as efficiency, which pertain to the community as a whole and to which the private interests of individuals ought to be subordinated has never impressed the working-class voter.

The right of the citizen to have his wishes, whether for favors, "recognition," or something else, served by local government, has been an aspect of the generally privileged position of the consumer. If the British theory has been that any gain in public amenity, however small, is worth any cost in consumer satisfaction, however large, ours has been the opposite: with us, any gain to the consumer is worth any cost to the public. What the consumer is not willing to pay for is not of much value in our eyes. Probably most Americans believe that if the consumer prefers his automobile to public transportation his taste ought to be respected, even if it means the destruction of the cities.

We have, indeed, gone far beyond the ideal of admitting everyone to participation in government and of serving everyone's tastes. We have made public affairs a game which anyone may play by acting "as if" he has something at stake, and these make-believe interests become subjects of political struggle just as if they were real. "The great game of politics" has for many people a significance of the same sort as, say, the game of business or the game of social mobility. All, in fact, are parts of one big game. The local community, as Norton E. Long has maintained in a brilliant article, may be viewed as an ecology of games: the games serve certain social functions (they provide determinate goals and calculable strategies, for example, and this gives an element of coordination to what would otherwise be a

12. A couple of generations ago politics was literally the principal form of mass entertainment. See Mayor Curley's account of the Piano-Smashing Contest, Peg-leg Russell, the greased-pig snatch and other such goings-on at Caledonian Grove. When the working class could pay more than twenty-five cents for its all-day family outing, it went to Fenway Park and baseball pushed politics into second place. James M. Curley, *I'd Do It Again!* (New York, Prentice Hall, 1957), pp. 54–55.

chaotic pull and haul), but the real satisfaction is in "playing the game."[13]

Since the American political arena is more a playground than a forum, it is not surprising that, despite the expenditure of vast amounts of energy, problems often remain unsolved—after all, what is really wanted is not solutions but the fun of the game. Still less is it surprising that those in authority seldom try to make or impose comprehensive solutions. The mayor of an American city does not think it appropriate for him to do much more than ratify agreements reached by competing interest groups. For example, the mayor of Minneapolis does not, according to a recent report, "actively sponsor anything. He waits for private groups to agree on a project. If he likes it, he endorses it. Since he has no formal power with which to pressure the Council himself, he feels that the private groups must take the responsibility for getting their plan accepted."[14]

American cities, accordingly, seldom make and never carry out comprehensive plans. Plan making is with us an idle exercise, for we neither agree upon the content of a "public interest" that ought to override private ones nor permit the centralization of authority needed to carry a plan into effect if one were made. There is much talk of the need for metropolitan-area planning, but the talk can lead to nothing practical because there is no possibility of agreement on what the "general interest" of such an area requires concretely (whether, for example, it requires keeping the Negroes concentrated in the central city or spreading them out in the suburbs) and because, anyway, there does not exist in any area a government that could carry such plans into effect.[15]

Change in the United States

The relation of the citizen to the government is changing in the United States as it is in Britain. But the direction of our development is opposite to that of the British: whereas their government is becoming more responsive to popular opinion and therefore weaker, ours is becoming less responsive and therefore stronger. In state and

13. Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1958, 64: 252.

14. Alan Altshuler, *A Report on Politics in Minneapolis* (Cambridge, Joint Center for Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959), pp. 11–14. The writer has described the posture of Mayor Daley of Chicago, the undisputed boss of a powerful machine, in similar terms. This suggests that it is not lack of power so much as a sense of what is seemly that prevents American mayors from taking a strong line. See E. C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York, The Free Press, 1961), ch. 9.

15. See E. C. Banfield and M. Grodzins, *Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas*, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1958), esp. chs. 3 and 4.

local government this trend has been under way for more than a generation and it has carried far. Two-thirds of our smaller cities are now run by professional managers, who, in routine matters at least, act without much interference. In the large central cities, mayors have wider spheres of authority than they did a generation ago, much more and much better staff assistance (most of them have deputies for administrative management), and greater freedom from the electorate. These gains are in most cases partly offset, and in some perhaps more than partly, by the decay of party machines, which could turn graft, patronage, and other "gravy" into political power, albeit power that was seldom used to public advantage.

Reformers in America have struggled persistently to strengthen government by overcoming the fragmentation of formal authority which has afflicted it from the beginning. The council manager system, the executive budget, metropolitan area organization—these have been intended more to increase the ability of government to get things done (its capability, in the terminology used above) than to make it less costly or less corrupt.[16]

One of the devices by which power has been centralized and the capability of government increased is the special function district or authority. We now commonly use authorities to build and manage turnpikes, airports and ports, redevelopment projects and much else. They generally come into being because the jurisdictions of existing general-purpose governments do not coincide with the areas for which particular functions must be administered. But if this reason for them did not exist, they would have to be created anyway, for they provide a way of escaping to a considerable extent the controls and interferences under which government normally labors. The authority, as a rule, does not go before the electorate or even the legislature; it is exempt from the usual civil-service requirements, budget controls, and auditing, and it is privileged to conduct its affairs out of sight of the public.

The success of all these measures to strengthen government is to be explained by the changing class character of the urban electorate. The lower-class ideal of government, which recognized no community larger than the ward and measured advantages only in favors, "gravy," and nationality "recognition," has almost everywhere gone out of fashion. To be a Protestant and a Yankee is still a political handicap in every large Northern city, but to be thought honest, public-spirited, and in some degree statesmanlike is now essential. (John E. Powers, the candidate expected by everyone to win the 1959 Boston mayoralty election, lost apparently because he fitted too well an image of the Irish politician that the Irish electorate found embarrassing and wanted to repudiate.) Many voters still want "nationality recognition," it has

16. See Don K. Price, "The Promotion of the City Manager Plan," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1941, pp. 563–578.

been remarked, but they want a kind that is flattering.[17] It appears to follow from this that the nationality-minded voter prefers a candidate who has the attributes of his group but has them in association with those of the admired Anglo-Saxon model. The perfect candidate is of Irish, Polish, Italian, or Jewish extraction, but has the speech, dress, and manner and also the public virtues (honesty, impartiality, devotion to the public good) that belong in the public mind to the upper class Anglo-Saxon.

The ascendant middle-class ideal of government emphasizes "public values," especially impartiality, consistency, and efficiency. The spread of the council-manager system and of nonpartisanship, the short ballot, at-large voting, and the merit system testify to the change.

Middle-class insistence upon honesty and efficiency has raised the influence and prestige of professionals in the civil service and in civic associations. These are in a position nowadays to give or withhold a good government "seal of approval" which the politician must display on his product.

The impartial expert who "gets things done" in spite of "politicians" and "pressure groups" has become a familiar figure on the urban scene and even something of a folk hero, especially among the builders, contractors, realtors, and bankers who fatten from vast construction projects.[18] Robert Moses is the outstanding example, but there are many others in smaller bailiwicks. The special function district or

17. In a study of politics in Worcester, Massachusetts, Robert H. Binstock has written: "Israel Katz, like Casdin, is a Jewish Democrat now serving his fourth term on the Worcester City Council. Although he is much more identifiably Jewish than Casdin, he gets little ethnic support at the polls; there is a lack of rapport between him and the Jewish voter. The voter apparently wants to transcend many features of his ethnic identification and therefore rejects candidates who fit the stereotype of the Jew too well. Casdin is an assimilated Jew in Ivy-League clothes; Katz, by contrast, is old world rather than new, clannish rather than civic-minded, and penny-pinching rather than liberal. Non-Jews call Katz a "character," Casdin a "leader." It is not too much to say that the Jews, like other minorities, want a flattering, not an unflattering, mirror held up to them. (Robert H. Binstock, *A Report on the Politics of Worcester*, Joint Center for Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, forthcoming, 1960, Section II, B, 2.)

18. "In our political or business or labor organizations," Robert E. Sherwood observes in his account of Roosevelt and Hopkins, "we are comforted by the knowledge that at the top is a Big Boss whom we are free to revere or to hate and upon whom we can depend for quick decisions when the going gets tough. The same is true of our Boy Scout troops and our criminal gangs. It is most conspicuously true of our passion for competitive sport. We are trained from childhood to look to the coach for authority in emergencies. The master-minding coach who can send in substitutes with instructions whenever he feels like it—or even send in an entirely new team— is a purely-American phenomenon. In British football the team must play through the game with the same eleven men with which it started and with no orders from the sidelines; if a man is injured and forced to leave the field the team goes on playing with only ten men. In British sport, there are no Knute Rocknes or Connie Macks, whereas in American sport the mastermind is considered as an essential in the relentless pursuit of superiority." Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 39.

authority is, of course, their natural habitat; without the protection it affords from the electorate they could not survive.

The professionals, of course, favor higher levels of spending for public amenities. Their enlarged influence might in itself lead to improvements in the quality and quantity of goods and services provided publicly. But the same public opinion that has elevated the professional has also elevated the importance of these publicly supplied goods and services. It is the upper middle- and the lower-class voters who support public expenditure proposals (the upper middle-class voters because they are mindful of "the good of the community" and the lower-class ones because they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by public expenditures); lower middle-class voters, who are worried about mortgage payments, hostile toward the lower class (which threaten to engulf them physically and otherwise), and indifferent to community-regarding values, constitute most of the opposition to public improvements of all kinds.

Thus it happens that as Britain begins to entertain doubts about green belts, about controls of the use of land that make much depend upon the taste of planners, and about treating public amenity as everything and consumer satisfaction as nothing, we are moving in the opposite direction. There is a lively demand in the United States for green belts (the *New York Times* recently called "self-evident truth" the astonishing statement of an economist that "it is greatly to be doubted if any unit of government under any circumstances has ever bought or can ever buy too much recreation land");[19] the courts are finding that zoning to secure aesthetic values is a justifiable exercise of the police power; performance zoning, which leaves a great deal to the discretion of the planner, is becoming fashionable, and J. K. Galbraith has made it a part of conventional wisdom to believe that much more of the national income should be spent for public amenities.

Perhaps in the next twenty or thirty years municipal affairs will pass entirely into the hands of honest, impartial, and nonpolitical "experts"; at any rate, this seems to be the logical fulfillment of the middle-class ideal. If the ideal is achieved, the voters will accept, from a sense of duty to the common good, whatever the experts say is required. We may see in the present willingness of business and civic leaders to take at face value the proposals being made by professionals for master planning, metropolitan organization, and the like, and, in the exalted position of Robert Moses of New York, portents of what is to come.

The presence in the central cities of large numbers of Negroes,

19. *New York Times*, editorial, 11 April 1960. The economist was Dr. Marion Clawson of Resources for the Future, whose statement appeared in a report sponsored by the New York Metropolitan Regional Council and the New York Regional Plan Association.

Puerto Ricans, and white hillbillies creates a crosscurrent of some importance. For a generation, at least, these newcomers will prefer the old style politics of the ward boss and his "gravy train." How this anomaly will fit into the larger pattern of middle-class politics is hard to imagine. Possibly the lower class will simply be denied representation. And possibly the rate of increase of per capita income being what it is, the assimilation of these people into the middle class will take place faster than anyone now imagines.

Summary and Conclusions

It has been argued in this paper that the tasks a government must perform (the number and complexity of goods and services it must supply) have no necessary relation to political matters. Tasks may increase without accompanying increase in the burden placed upon a political system. The important questions for political analysis, therefore, concern not population density or other indicators of the demand for goods and services, but rather the amount and intensity of conflict and the capacity of the government for managing it. Looked at from this standpoint, it appears that the effectiveness of British government in matters of local concern will probably decrease somewhat over the long run. The demands that will be made upon it in the next generation will be vastly more burdensome than those of the recent past (although also vastly less burdensome than the same demands would be in America), and the capacity of the government will be somewhat less. The effectiveness of local government in the United States, on the other hand, will probably increase somewhat. Local government has had more tasks to perform here than in Britain, and these have imposed enormously greater burdens. The tasks of local government will doubtless increase here too in the next generation, but the burdens they impose will probably decline. American local government is becoming stronger and readier to assert the paramountcy of the public interest, real or alleged.

Although each system has moved a considerable distance in the direction of the other, they remain far apart and each retains its original character. The British, although more sensitive to public opinion, still believe that the government should govern. And we, although acknowledging that the development of metropolitan areas should be planned, still believe that everyone has a right to "get in on the act" and to make his influence felt. Obviously, the differences are crucial, and although the trend seems to be toward greater effectiveness here and toward reduced effectiveness in Britain, there can be no doubt that in absolute terms the effectiveness of the British system is

and will remain far greater than that of ours. Despite the increase in the tasks it must perform, the burden upon it will remain low by American standards, and its capability will remain high. Matters which would cause great political difficulty here will probably be easily settled there.

The basic dynamic principle in both systems has not been change in population density but rather change in class structure. It is the relaxation of the bonds of status that has caused the British workingman to enter more into politics, that has made his tastes and views count for more, and that has raised questions about the right of an elite to decide matters. In America the assimilation of the lower class to the middle class and the consequent spread of an ideal of government which stresses honesty, impartiality, efficiency, and regard for public as well as private interest have encouraged the general strengthening of government.

The mere absence of dispute, acrimony, unworkable compromise, and stalemate (this, after all, is essentially what the concept "effectiveness" refers to in this connection) ought not, of course, to be taken as constituting a "good" political order. Arrogant officials may ignore the needs and wishes of ordinary citizens, and the ordinary citizens may respectfully acquiesce in their doing so, either because they think (as the British lower class does) that the gentleman knows best or (as the American middle does) that the expert knows best. In such cases there may be great effectiveness—no dispute, no acrimony, no unworkable compromise, no stalemate—but far from signifying that the general welfare is being served, such a state of affairs signifies instead that the needs and wishes with which welfare under ordinary circumstances, especially in matters of local concern, is largely concerned are not being taken into account. To say, then, that our system is becoming somewhat more and the British system somewhat less effective does not by any means imply "improvement" for us and the opposite for them. It is quite conceivable that dispute, acrimony, unworkable compromise, and stalemate may be conspicuous features of any situation that approximates the idea of general welfare.

Such conclusions, resting as they do on rough and, at best, common-sense assessments, amply illustrate the difficulty of prediction, and—since the causal principles lie deep in social structure and in culture—the utter impossibility within a free society of a foresighted control of such matters.

II

Urban Government
in the Federal System

In a country as vast as the United States, a central government cannot very well carry on all public affairs. Some functions must be performed on a local basis and some on a more-than-local-but-less-than-national one. But although some such division of labor may be an evident necessity, the principles of it—and still less the concrete application of the principles—have never been easy to decide upon. Where the boundaries of the local and of the more-than-local-but-less-than-national jurisdictions should be drawn and what activities should be carried on within each of them are questions that have had to be agitated, discussed, and settled anew by each generation. The rate of social change, as well as the nature of the change, has made impossible any permanent or generally satisfactory answers.

Everyone agrees that local questions should be decided locally. And everyone agrees that when the two interests conflict, the interest of a local public should be subordinate to that of a larger one. But in their practical application these two principles have continually clashed, and efforts to formulate a workable compromise in abstract terms have again and again come to nothing. Part of the difficulty derives from the fact that it is impossible to define abstractly what is "local" and what is not. Moreover, the accidents of history—above all the great compromises by which the federal system was created in

1787—have had to be taken as fixed features of the situation. The problem has been further aggravated by the fact that party politicians have always been able to make political capital from mixing state and national politics with local ones.

The first two readings of this section show the complexity of local, state, and federal relations at the present time. Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, who describe the government of New York City, and Morton Grodzins, who presents a paradigm of federal and state impacts on the local scene, both use the term "shared functions" and emphasize the unreality of any notion of a strict "division of powers." The early historical developments leading to this complexity are described by Frank J. Goodnow in an excerpt from one of the first (1904) textbooks on city government. He shows how the centralization that characterized local government in Colonial times was replaced by extreme decentralization in the period of Jacksonian democracy; how the sphere of municipal activity grew and how local government changed from an organization for the satisfaction of local needs to one that was also, and primarily, an agent of state government; and how the legislatures interfered with the cities for political reasons, thus engendering a long and largely unavailing struggle by them for "home rule." (For a definition of this term, see the Glossary). The readings that follow bring his account up to date. Home Rule is evaluated in the light of present circumstances by a committee of practical men, the Chicago Home Rule Commission, who conclude that what is a proper distribution of powers between cities and states is at bottom a political question and must therefore remain unsettled. In their discussion of "the problem of the stable majority" (something that would not have seemed a problem at all to Aristotle!) the anonymous authors of the Note from the *Harvard Law Review* show that state courts have not hesitated to interfere in the operation of local government when they thought minority interests needed protection. Recently (1968) the Supreme Court of the United States has also taken a hand in the organization of local government. In Avery v. Midland County, Tex., it says that the principle of "one man, one vote" applies to local as well as to state elections. A city, town, or county, it says, "may no more deny the equal protection of the laws than it may abridge freedom of speech, establish an official religion, arrest without probable cause, or deny due process of the law." How the central cities and the suburbs have been affected by the court's earlier application of the "one man, one vote" rule to the apportionment of state legislatures is analyzed by William J. D. Boyd.

The rapid growth of the suburbs has brought to the fore the question of how to cope with problems that are in some sense metropolitan. In 1965 there were 224 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (see Glossary); in no case do the boundaries of an SMSA, or indeed of a metropolitan area otherwise defined, coincide with those of a general-purpose government. So long as this is the case area-wide needs must be met, if they are to be met at all, by cooperation among general-purpose governments having local jurisdictions and by special-purpose ones having area-wide jurisdictions.

The most common way of dealing with metropolitan problems has been by the creation of special districts. These, as John C. Bollens explains, usually have only one function—for example, water supply, sewage disposal, rapid transit, or air pollution control. If it has only one or two functions, a special district cannot possibly plan comprehensively for metropolitan area development.

Many proposals have been made for a multifunctional approach. But what functions are to be considered "metropolitan" rather than "local"? Oliver P. Williams, Harold Herman, Charles S. Liebman, and Thomas R. Dye analyze this question very acutely. Edward C. Banfield and Morton Grodzins think that the importance, as well as the number, of metropolitan problems has been somewhat exaggerated and that in any case sweeping reforms are politically out of the question. Their proposal for action—a realistic one, they say—is based on the assumption that the formal structure of government will in most places remain essentially unchanged for a long time to come. Luther Gulick, a former city administrator of New York and President of the Institute for Public Administration, believes that metropolitan reorganization is one of the urgent needs of the day. He finds more metropolitan (as opposed to local) problems than do Banfield and Grodzins and he is more sanguine than they about the political possibilities of change; accordingly he is led to propose creation of an altogether new level of local government.

In the final reading of this section Robert H. Connery and Richard H. Leach put forward their view of the proper role of the Federal government in metropolitan affairs and make some observations on the trend of federal-local relations. It is interesting that Goodnow, writing about sixty years before them, remarked that nothing need be said about the federal government, since it had no connection with city affairs.

ing and experience in the government problems of metropolitan areas. One of the reasons American agriculture has made the great strides it has in less than a century is that the federal government has recognized its importance by recruiting thousands of agricultural specialists. To date, not even the beginnings of anything comparable have been developed for metropolitan needs, although almost two-thirds of the population of the United States now live in metropolitan areas. The federal government does not lack skilled engineers to build urban highways or airports to serve urban areas, but it does lack personnel who are skilled in the general problems of urban government. Special urban units should be established and those already in existence should be strengthened in the federal agencies whose programs particularly concern metropolitan areas.

One of the structural changes which are needed is the establishment of a staff agency to furnish the President with continuous staff assistance on metropolitan problems. Stated briefly, a Council on Metropolitan Areas should be established by statute in the Executive Office of the President. The Council should consist of three to five full-time members, one of whom should be designated as chairman and be assigned broad administrative authority over the work of the Council. In addition to such day-to-day duties as the President might assign it, the Council should organize a program of continuing research on the impact of federal programs on metropolitan areas. Though the Council should have no authority to co-ordinate federal programs, it should have power to collect data, ask questions, and make recommendations to the President. It should keep abreast of developments in the field through the device of regional desks rather than by means of permanently established field offices. An advisory group representing private research bodies as well as state and local governmental units and interested professional groups should be appointed to consult with the Council in the performance of its duties.

The federal government's program for metropolitan areas should be firmly anchored in the structure of Congress as well as in the White House. This can best be accomplished by requiring the President to submit an annual report to Congress on metropolitan problems, just as he does on the economic state of the nation, and by creating an appropriate Committee on Metropolitan Problems to which the President's report could be referred for study and action. These devices have been used successfully with regard to economic matters, and they could be used with equal success here. The creation of such a committee, however, should not deter the present House Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations (the Fountain Subcommittee) from continuing its studies of intergovernmental problems in general, with special attention to the important problem of federal-state relations.

III

The Machine and Its Reform

A "MACHINE" is a party organization held together and motivated by desire for personal gain rather than by political principle or ideology. To the poor in the slums, who are its chief support at the polls, it is a source of jobs, petty favors, and protection. To its precinct and ward workers, it is a source of soft jobs, careers in minor elective office, and favors—an "in"—at city hall. To the few who control it, it is a way of making money.

Perhaps the machine should be spoken of in the past tense. Chicago is the only large city still run by one, and (as a reading in Section V shows) the character of that machine is changing rapidly. Fragments of machines survive in various stages of deterioration in many cities. Some of these have a good deal of vitality and power, even though not enough to take control of the city, and it is not altogether out of the question that a change of conditions—the onset of a major depression, for example—might return them to power in a few central cities where the number of low-income Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and white hillbillies is very large. As a general phenomenon of urban politics, however, the machine is a thing of the past. The immediate causes of its decline were the introduction of merit systems (which eliminated most of the patronage at the disposal of the bosses), full employment and rising national income (which vastly depreciated the value of such patronage as remained),

the development of professionalized welfare services under the New Deal, and the structural reorganization of city governments. But a more general and long-term cause was the changing class character of the urban electorate. Middle-class people do not want and will not tolerate the boss and his "gravy train," and they have recently come to be in the majority in almost every city.

For a long time the machine was a conspicuous and powerful institution in American life. Between the Civil War and the Second World War all large cities and many small ones were at one time or another in the grip of machines. The bosses of the big city machines were leading figures in state and national politics. Whatever its present or future role, the machine is well worth study because of the part it has played in our history.

There is, however, a further and perhaps more important reason for studying it. Every political party (like every other formal organization) must maintain what Chester I. Barnard calls an "equilibrium of incentives." That is, it must offer a combination of inducements (in the case of the machine, "friendship," jobs, favors, protection, money) that will elicit from various classes of actors (voters, precinct captains, ward leaders, elective officials) the actions the organization requires; it must then use these actions to replenish its supply of inducements so that it may elicit more actions, and so on. Because of its heavy reliance upon personal, material inducements, the machine represents an extreme—and therefore analytically interesting—type of organization. Analysis of the extreme type is likely to be productive of insights into the "equilibrium of incentives" of other kinds of party organization, including those that are very unlike it. All of the readings of this section contribute in some way to an understanding of the machine as a system of incentives.

The first two readings offer general views of the machine. Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield describe the Chicago machine as it was during the transitional period between the retirement of Mayor Kelly and the rise of Mayor Daley. Lord Bryce's classic account is of machines as they were in many large cities at the turn of the century. The reader will find that the Chicago machine of the mid-1950's was strikingly like its predecessors.

George Washington Plunkitt, who started life as a butcher boy and became a millionaire during forty years of service as a Tammany office-holder, explains how the machine gets votes. The secret is that it asks for something of little or no value to the donor: note that Plunkitt's cousin Tommy "didn't take any particular interest in politics" and that his vote was therefore Plunkitt's for the asking. The Plunkitt reading incidentally conveys an impression of the amiable cynicism of the professional machine politician; perhaps William L. Riordan, the newspaperman who edited Plunkitt, gilded the lily a bit. In the next reading,

Oscar Handlin, an historian, describes the bond between the immigrant and the ward boss. He says that the control of the boss rested on several grounds: the jobs at his disposal, the feelings of group loyalty that were focused upon him, his social role as a spokesman for the immigrant, and his having favors to give and being fair in the giving of them.

The next three readings describe the internal economy of the machine at a higher level of hierarchy. Frank R. Kent, for many years a writer for the Baltimore *Sun*, discusses two aspects of the mechanics of control: the use of primary elections and the picking of the ticket. William Foote Whyte, a sociologist, tells how the politician uses his stock of resources to create the largest possible amount of support, how he uses the support to augment his influence, how he sells the influence for cash to buy more support, and so on in the endless cycle of organizational maintenance. Edward N. Costikyan, a former Tammany leader, brings the discussion up to date with an account of how Democrats are motivated in New York nowadays.

Corrupt and wasteful as it was, the machine served some socially valuable functions. Robert K. Merton, a sociologist, says that to understand its role we must look at the social circumstances that prevent other institutions from fulfilling essential social functions (the "structural context") and at the subgroups whose needs would remain unfulfilled if it were not for latent (i.e. unintended and unrecognized) functions performed by the machine. He lists several of these. The machine, he says, was an antidote to the constitutional dispersal of power. It humanized and personalized assistance to the needy. It gave business, including illicit business, the privileges it needed to survive. It provided a route of social mobility for some to whom other routes were closed. Unless due recognition is given to the importance of these and other functions, Merton warns, attempts at reform are likely to be "social ritual rather than social engineering." Mr. Dooley (Finley Peter Dunne, the humorist) follows a similar line in explaining why "rayformers" almost always fail and why he doesn't like them—"or anny other raypublican."

How to eliminate the machine and make democracy work has been the subject of a great deal of theory, a representative sample of which is presented in the second half of this section. Some of the theorists of reform anticipated Merton's functional approach. Thus Henry Jones Ford, writing more than half a century before Merton, makes much of the constitutional dispersal of power. The cities are corrupt, he says, because the executive and legislative functions are disconnected; corruption, under the circumstances, is an indispensable mechanism for overcoming an otherwise unworkable decentralization. Lincoln Steffens, the best known of the muckraking journalists, emphasizes another latent function of the machine, that of affording privileges to business, especially legitimate business. Politicians, he said, are corrupt because they are bribed by businessmen; businessmen offer bribes because they "have

to." The cure, manifestly, was to change the system (the structural context, as Merton would say). "Abolish privilege" was the advice that Steffens, a man who prided himself on his realism, gave. Jane Addams, the founder of Hull House, wrote informatively of the way the machine humanized assistance to the needy and gave opportunities for social mobility. In the pages reprinted here, she dwells on a related theme: the difference between the moral perspectives of the lower and the middle classes. The machine politician, she says, personifies the lower-class ideal of moral goodness, an ideal lacking sophistication because it is "individual" rather than "social" in reference. Perhaps exemplifying the moral standards of a class is still another social function of the machine. Mr. Costikyan, the politician, points out that in recent years the power to exercise discretion in the distribution of governmental privileges has to a large extent shifted from the politician to the bureaucrat. Power, he says, always attracts the corrupt (a proposition which differs in an interesting way from Lord Acton's famous dictum about power tending to corrupt).

THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS
OF THE MACHINE

A Machine at Work

Martin Meyerson and
Edward C. Banfield

THE CITY COUNCIL, the body which would have to pass upon any sites proposed by the Authority, consisted of 50 aldermen, with the mayor as presiding officer. The aldermen were elected for four-year terms from wards of roughly 25,000 to 65,000 registered voters, only about a third of whom usually voted in aldermanic elections. (The number who voted in mayoralty elections was about twice as great.) Nominally the office of alderman was non-partisan. Actually, however, no one could win an election without the support of a powerful organization and (with some rare exceptions) the only powerful political organizations in the wards were the Democratic and Republican parties. An alderman who did not have the support of his party "machine" ordinarily had no hope of reelection.

The Democratic "machine" had ruled Chicago since 1923. Catholics were in control of it; since 1930, with a few exceptions, they had held the major city offices: the mayor, city treasurer, county clerk, more than half of the county commissioners, and two-thirds of the aldermen were Catholics.[1] And among the Catholics it was those of Irish extraction who were dominant in politics: one-third of the Council, including most of its leaders, were Irish-Catholics. The other aldermen were mostly of Polish,

1. William R. Gable, "The Chicago City Council: A Study of Urban Politics and Legislation," unpublished dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1953, p. 13.

Italian, Bohemian, Lithuanian, Slovak, or Greek extraction (in descending order of importance, these were the principal nationality groups in the Democratic party) or of German extraction (these were Republicans).[2] A few aldermen were Jews (unlike the Poles, Italians, and other ethnic minorities, the Jews did not usually endeavor to be recognized as a group on the party slate or in the award of patronage).[3] Two were Negroes. The numerical importance of the Irish in the Council was to be accounted for not so much by their numbers in the electorate as by the fact that in wards where no one ethnic group had a clear majority they made the most acceptable compromise candidates. As one politician explained to an interviewer, "A Lithuanian won't vote for a Pole, and a Pole won't vote for a Lithuanian. A German won't vote for either of them—but all three will vote for a 'Turkey' (Irishman)."[4]

A few of the aldermen aspired to higher political office, especially (among those who were lawyers) to judgeships, but most of them were in the business of being aldermen as other men are in the business of selling shoes. Being an alderman was supposed to be a full-time occupation, but the salary was only $5,000, so most aldermen supplemented their salaries by selling something—most often insurance or legal service (more than half of them were lawyers). Being an alderman was, of course, very good for business.

Ordinarily, even if he were so inclined, an alderman could not concern himself deeply with the larger issues of city government or take a city-wide view of important problems. If he wanted to stay in office, he had to devote all of his available time and attention to the affairs of the groups that made up his ward. He was in the Council to look after the special interests of his ward and to do favors for his constituents: to get streets repaired, to have a playground installed, to change the zoning law, to represent irate parents before the school authorities, and so on. In addition to activities of this kind, he had to take an interest in the social life of his ward—to appear at weddings, funerals, and neighborhood occasions, and to say a few well chosen words and make a

2. John P. White, "Lithuanians and the Democratic Party, A Case Study of Nationality Politics in Chicago and Cook County," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science Department, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1953, p. 25.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 64. A candidate's ethnicity was often a decisive asset or liability; in mixed wards he was most fortunate if his name was such that he could be presented as belonging to more than one ethnic or nationality group. Thus, Alderman Benjamin M. Becker's ward committeeman introduced him to voters of German extraction as of German extraction, stressed to voters of Swedish origin that Becker's wife had lived in Sweden and must have Swedish blood herself, pointed out to Catholics that Becker was a graduate of the DePaul University College of Law and a teacher there (thus implying that he was a Catholic), and presented him to Jews as a Jew. If the Catholics were fooled, no great injustice was done, for Becker's predecessor as alderman for many years was Dr. Joseph Ross, a Catholic whom the Jews assumed was a Jew. [Interview document.]

small donation when called upon. If he had any time left, he might think about the problems of the city as a whole. But whatever he thought, he was expected to work for his ward first.

From a formal standpoint, the 50 aldermen governed Chicago.[5] The Council made appropriations for all municipal purposes, it awarded franchises to and regulated the rates of public utility companies, it passed on appointments presented by the mayor, and (within the authority given it by the state) it could create new city departments at will. The mayor could send or read messages to the Council, he could vote when there was a tie (or when more than one-half of the aldermen had already voted for a measure), and he had a veto (including an item veto over appropriations acts) which could be overridden by a two-thirds vote. In principle, each alderman was the independent agent of his ward. From a formal standpoint, then, the Council was a good deal like a league of independent nations presided over by a secretary-general.

In fact, however, there existed two sets of informal controls by which the aldermen's independence was very much limited and qualified. One set of controls was the leadership of the Council itself. Half a dozen of the most powerful Democratic aldermen—the "Big Boys," they were sometimes called—working usually with the mayor, effectively controlled the whole Council when matters of interest to them or to the mayor were at stake. They did this in part by controlling committee assignments. Unless an alderman could get on an important committee, his power in the Council was small. And unless he cooperated with the chairmen of the important committees and especially with the chairman of the Finance Committee (whose salary was $8,500, who was provided a limousine with a police chauffeur, and who had an office second only to the mayor's in splendor), he could not hope to get anything done for his ward. Any measure that required an appropriation had to go to the Finance Committee, and so, as one alderman explained, the chairman of that committee "sits at the gate of accomplishment for any alderman. . . ."[6] Indeed, if an alderman fell foul of the Finance Committee chairman or of any of the "Big Boys" he might be punished by having some city service to his ward reduced or suspended. On the other hand, even if he were a Republican, he could expect generous treatment from the leadership if he "played ball."

The other set of informal controls operated through the party or machine. An alderman had to stay in favor with his ward committeeman —i.e., the party leader in his ward—or else be the committeeman himself. The ward committeeman made all of the important decisions for

5. The city could exercise only those powers doled out to it by the state legislature, however, and so it might be more accurate to say that the city was governed by the state. See Barnet Hodes, "The Illinois Constitution and Home Rule for Chicago," 15 *Chicago Law Review* 78 (1947).

6. Interview document.

the party within the ward. The Committeeman was elected in the primary every four years (usually he could keep an opponent off the ballot by raising technical objections to his petitions) and so his power rested in part upon a legal foundation. From a legal standpoint, he was entitled to receive and disburse party funds, to manage campaigns, and to represent the leaders of the party within the ward. In fact he was commonly the "boss" of the ward; the party organization in the ward "belonged" to him. He decided who would run on the party's ticket within the ward, he appointed and dismissed precinct captains at will, and he dispensed patronage. As a member of the City and County Central Committees of his party, he particiapted in selecting its candidates for all city, county, and state offices and for Congress. (Half of Illinois' 26 Congressional districts were in greater Chicago.) In each of the party governing bodies his vote was in proportion to the total primary vote for his party in the last election; this of course gave him an incentive to "turn in" the biggest vote possible.

No salary went with the office of committeeman, but most of the committeemen held one or more public jobs and some of them ran businesses which were profitable because of their political connections.

William J. Connors, Democratic boss of the 42nd ward (the district described by Zorbaugh in *The Gold Coast and the Slum*),[7] may be taken as reasonably representative of at least some other ward committeemen. In 1950 Connors, who was in the insurance business, was on the public payroll in two capacities: as a state senator and as a bailiff of Municipal Court. His way of running his ward was described as follows:

> That Connors provides well for his workers is undeniable. Not only does he have a great many jobs to distribute, but he is a source of funds if any of his men need to borrow. He supports them when they are in difficulty with the law, as sometimes happens, and takes an interest in their family affairs. His relationship with them is that of a benevolent despot. He holds the power to withdraw their source of livelihood and to banish them from active work in the party and from their power positions in the community. He is the sole dispenser of the campaign funds from the party superstructure and the candidates. He may establish the assessments of the jobholders at any rate he desires without consulting them. He makes the party commitments to the county and city organs without a canvass of the captains' opinions and then demands complete obedience to these decisions. He may move a captain from one precinct to another at his discretion and is, of course, the sole source of patronage distribution.
>
> The committeeman generals his workers much like a military leader might. He plots the strategy of the campaign, estimates the difficulties that may be encountered, and decides the amount and allocation of money to be spent. He shifts captains from one point to another when

7. Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929, p. 287.

called for. He attempts to build good precincts over a long period of time. Such building requires several years and may involve extensive trials and changes. Jobs are distributed not only on the basis of the effectiveness of the captain but in regard to the total effects such distribution may have. It happens occasionally that a strong Democratic captain has a smaller number of jobs allotted to him than one who is attempting to build up a Democratic precinct in the face of strong Republican competition. Thus in one precinct which casts a heavy Democratic vote, there are only two jobs besides the captain's, while another precinct that turns in only a slight Democratic majority is staffed by nine jobholders in addition to the captain.

The committee respects the unity of the precinct organization and the authority of the captain and his workers. As long as the captain's activities are successful and his conduct does not threaten the party's vote-getting power, Connors does not interfere with the internal structure. The captain selects his own assistants and nominates his choices to receive public jobs. He assumes the responsibility for building an effective precinct organization. He decides how party funds allocated to him will be distributed and to a certain extent how they will be obtained. He and his men must share the responsibility of contributing whatever additional money is necessary beyond that sent from the party's headquarters. Connors respects the autonomy of the captain in this area of personal influence. Captains may or may not distribute campaign literature, pay cash for votes, engage in fraudulent activities, or arrange precinct meetings of the voters. The only important check on the captain's conduct is the final tabulation of votes at each election.[8]

Any ward committeeman who cared to could have himself nominated alderman. If he chose not to run for office himself (like Connors, he might prefer to be on the public payroll in another capacity), he made sure that the candidate was someone who would work closely with him in ward affairs and offer no challenge to his control of the organization. "Naturally," an alderman once explained, "he (the ward committeeman) doesn't want to get a man who will build himself into a power so he can take the organization away from the committeeman. If the alderman doesn't do what the ward committeeman wants him to do, then the committeeman will dump him at the next election."[9] Some committeemen treated their aldermen as errand boys, others paid little attention to them, and still others treated them as friends, partners, and collaborators.[10]

If an alderman became powerful enough, he might unseat his committeeman and become the ward boss himself. But even in this case he

8. Leonardo Neher, "The Political Parties in Chicago's 42nd Ward," unpublished dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1952, pp. 65–66.

9. W. R. Gable, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

10. James A. Rust, "The Ward Comitteeman in Chicago," unpublished dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1953, p. 56.

could not be independent of the machine. The leaders of the Central Committee could bring him into line by withholding patronage or discharging public employees from his ward, by denying him financial support from the party's general coffers at election time, or by allowing an investigation of graft and corruption to take place in his ward. If it saw fit, the Central Committee could destroy a ward organization—and thus a ward committeeman—by these means, but it could do so, of course, only at the cost of impairing, at least temporarily, the effectiveness of the machine. Since its purpose was to win elections, a major concern of the machine was "harmony." Only if a committeeman failed to support the party's slate was he likely to be disciplined severely. If they wanted a favor from him, party leaders would offer him a favor —usually patronage—in return.

To increase their power *vis-à-vis* the Central Committee leadership, ward committeemen formed factional alliances or "blocs." Usually these alignments were on a geographical basis—thus, for example, there were South Side and West Side blocs of ward committeemen.

In order to maintain itself and to accomplish its purposes, any organization must offer incentives of the kinds and amounts that are necessary to elicit the contributions of activity it requires. It must then use these contributions of activity so as to secure a renewed supply of resources from which further incentives may be provided—it must, in other words, maintain what Chester Barnard has called an "economy of incentives" or else cease to exist.[11]

In Chicago a political machine distributed "gravy" to its officials, its financial backers, and to the voters. In this way it induced them to contribute the activity it required—to ring doorbells on election day, to give cash, and to go to the polls and vote for its candidates—and in this way it gained possession, through its control of the city or county government, of a renewed supply of "gravy."

As the word "gravy" suggests, the incentives upon which the machines relied were mainly material. Some prestige attached to being a ward politician; there was "fun" in playing the political "game"; there was satisfaction in being "on the inside"; and sometimes there was even an ideological commitment to an issue, the party, or a candidate. But these non-material incentives were not ordinarily strong enough to elicit the amount and kind of activity that a machine required from its workers. "What I look for in a prospective captain," a ward committeeman told an interviewer, "is a young person—man or woman—who is interested in getting some material return out of his political activity. I much prefer this type to the type that is enthused about the 'party cause'

11. Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1938, Ch. XL. Barnard discusses the special case of the political organization on pp. 156–157.

or all 'hot' on a particular issue. Enthusiasm for causes is short-lived, but the necessity of making a living is permanent."[12]

The "material return" that the party offered a worker was generally a job on the public payroll. Committeeman Connors, for example, had at his disposal in 1952 an estimated 350 to 500 jobs and the total public payroll to Democratic workers in his ward was conservatively estimated at $1,320,000.[13]

Although jobs were the most visible of the material returns the party gave its workers, other opportunities to make money may have been more valuable. An alderman or committeeman who was a lawyer, an insurance man, or a tavern owner could expect to profit greatly from his association with the party. Whether he was profiting lawfully or unlawfully it was often impossible to tell. Alderman Sain and his ward committeeman, County Commissioner John J. Touhy, for example, were partners in an insurance business. "We handle a lot of business, no question about it," Touhy once blandly told a reporter. "I assume its just good business in the ward to carry insurance with us."[14]

Even with the voters the machine did not make its appeal on the basis of issues or ideology. It offered them certain non-material incentives—chiefly the friendship and protection of its precinct captains—but in the main with them, as with the party workers, it relied upon "gravy." Just as it gave its workers jobs and opportunities to make money in exchange for their services, so it gave its loyal voters "favors"—special services and preferential treatment at the hands of its members and dependents who held city or county jobs—in exchange for their votes.

The party's agent in exchanging friendship and favors for votes was the precinct captain.[15] In 1950 a representative captain described his work as follows:

> I am a lawyer and prosecuting attorney for the City. I have spent 19 years in precinct work and have lived and worked in my present precinct for three and a half years.

12. H. Dicken Cherry, "Effective Precinct Organization," unpublished dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1952.

13. Leonardo Neher, *op. cit.,* p. 76.

14. *Chicago Daily News,* August 27, 1949. Some years earlier the *Chicago Daily News* compiled a list of the ordinances introduced by Sain over a five-month period and then inquired of the people who were specially benefited by these ordinances whether they had recently bought insurance of the firm of Touhy and Sain. It turned out that many of them had. (September 24, 1940.)

15. In a vivid account by David Gutmann, the Chicago precinct captain is described as a "salesman." Mr. Dolin [the precinct captain] is a go-between between his party, which has services and favors to sell the public in exchange for the public's votes, and the public, or at least the segments of it which are willing to exchange their votes for services—often enough to swing a close election. In this relationship the vote stands for currency, the party is the manufacturer or the supplier, the public is the consumer, and Mr. Dolin the door-to-door salesman. . . . To the party the vote has 'commodity' or exchange value, in that it represents a fraction of the total sum of votes needed by the party to gain exclusive control over the 'tons' of patronage whereby it holds power, and to gain access to the financial resources of the community." [David Gutmann, "Big-Town Politics: Grass-Roots Level," *Commentary,* 17:1, February 1954, p. 155.]

I try to establish a relationship of personal obligation with my people, mostly small shopkeepers and eighty per cent Jewish. I spend two or three evenings a week all year round visiting people, playing cards, talking, and helping them with their problems. My wife doesn't like this, but it is in my blood now. I know ninety per cent of my people by their names.

Actually I consider myself a social worker for my precinct. I help my people get relief and driveway permits. I help them on unfair parking fines and property assessments. The last is most effective in my neighborhood.

The only return I ask is that they register and vote. If they have their own opinions on certain top offices, I just ask them to vote my way on lower offices where they usually have no preferences anyway.

I never take leaflets or mention issues or conduct rallies in my precinct. After all, this is a question of personal friendship between me and my neighbors. I had 260 promises for Korshak in this primary.

On election day I had forty or fifty people help me because this was a "hot" campaign. All they had to do was to get out their own family and friends. I used to lease an apartment near the poll where I gave out drinks and cigars, but I don't do this any more.

I stayed inside the poll most of election day, especially during the vote counting. If something went wrong, you could have heard me yell all over the precinct. Actually there isn't as much fraud now as there used to be.

Abner (the PAC candidate) was not really a threat in my precinct. He had seven workers but they contacted only their friends. No one feels obligated to them and they worked only during the campaign. Abner's campaigners were naive. They expected to influence people by issues, and they relied on leaflets and newspaper publicity which is not effective. Besides, Abner (Negro) is not hard to beat in a white precinct. I just carried a picture of both candidates around with me.

I can control my primary vote for sure because I can make the party regulars come out. I don't encourage a high vote here, just a sure vote. In the general election there is much more independent voting, and I can't be sure of control.[16]

In the conservation areas, especially, the precinct captain was often active in the neighborhood improvement association and a leader in efforts to keep "undesirable people" out of the neighborhood. An interviewer who spoke to 30 precinct captains in 1951 found that 16 of them had been approached by voters who wanted help in preventing Negroes and Jews from moving into the neighborhood. Some of these captains invented slogans and ran campaigns on an issue such as: "The ———— neighborhood is a good clean neighborhood. Let's keep it that way!" A captain was likely to learn about it almost immediately if a landlord rented to an "undesirable"; very often the captain would go

16. Quoted in Fay Calkins, *The CIO and the Democratic Party*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952, pp. 67–68.

to the landlord to urge in the name of civic pride that he discriminate and to point out that property values would decline if he did not.

In heavily Democratic precincts the owners of rooming houses sometimes consulted with their precinct captains about new roomers and assisted the party workers with their canvass at election time. In some cases these owners refused to permit Republican workers to enter their buildings. The loyalty of the rooming house owner to the Democratic party was not a matter of ideology: the owner who did not co-operate with the precinct captain could expect a visit from the city building inspector the next day.[17]

In addition to the services of party workers and voters, the machine needed cash. (It usually cost about $40,000 to elect an alderman.) This it raised by assessing the salaries of people who owed their jobs to the party, from the proceeds of ward-sponsored affairs such as picnics, boxing matches, and golf days, and in contributions from individuals and organizations who wanted to be on good terms with the party or, perhaps, even to help its candidates win.[18] These were all considered legitimate sources of revenue. In some wards, however, money was raised by promising favors or threatening injury to business interests, especially to those interests—e.g., taverns, hotels, and nightclubs—which were subject to inspection and licensing laws. Business people who wanted favors—a change in the zoning law, a permit to operate a tavern, a tax adjustment, and so on—were expected to pay for them in cash. In some wards there was even said to be a fixed schedule of prices for such favors. Whether the money so received went to support the party or to support personally the ward committeeman, the alderman, and their cronies was seldom clear; indeed, in many wards no real distinction could be made between the coffers of the party and the pockets of the boss: the ward organization "belonged" to the boss.[19]

The most profitable favors were of course those done for illegal enterprises. In giving protection to gambling joints, unlawful taverns, and houses of prostitution some politicians joined with racketeers to form a criminal syndicate.[20] A by-product of their activity was the syste-

17. H. D. Cherry, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–68.

18. Neher, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

19. If he thought the transaction was likely to be profitable, the ward boss might sell the services of his organization to the opposition. He might be criticized for doing this, but he was not likely to be unseated; after all, the organization "belonged" to him.

20. ". . . the criminal syndicate," according to Aaron Kohn, chief investigator for the Emergency Crime Committee of the City Council, "can be described as consisting of political officials, having the power and responsibility to enforce the laws, who maliciously withhold that power in exchange for money and support from hoodlums, vice operators, professional gamblers, and other community enemies, to aid them in their political ambitions." Independent Voters of Illinois, *The Kohn Report; Crime and Politics in Chicago*, Chicago, 1953, p. iii. However, after two months' inquiry a grand jury in the Spring of 1954 gave up its efforts to uncover specific links between crime and

matic corruption of the police force; in one way or another officers were either bribed or discouraged from doing their duty. "After you find out how many places are protected by the ward politicians," a patrolman of long service told an investigator, "you just stay out of the way so you won't be around when something happens."[21]

The machines were most effective in delivering votes in the precincts where they were most corrupt. In general, these were in the "skid-row" districts and the slums, where votes were cheapest and illegal activities most numerous. The "river wards" in the decaying center and on the West Side of the city were the most solidly organized and the most corrupt. Here "social absenteeism"—the departure of socially articulate leaders of the community—had reached such a point that the machine politicians had the field to themselves.[22] It was almost unthinkable that an alderman in one of these wards might lose at the polls because he took an unpopular stand on an issue. If he lost, it was because his committeeman "dumped" him, because the committeeman sold out to the opposition, or because the opposition managed to build a more powerful machine, but it was not because the voters disliked his stand on any issues. These "river wards" were in sharp contrast to the so-called "newspaper wards" particularly on the North Side where voters usually split the ticket in the way a newspaper advised. The aldermen in the "river wards" could afford to be contemptuous of the newspapers; in their wards editorials were words wasted.

Although corruption in varying degrees was widespread in both parties, it was by no means universal in either. Some Democratic and some Republican wards were probably almost entirely "clean" and even in wards which were not "clean" there were aldermen and other officials who were not parties to the "deals" that were made in the back rooms. The honest aldermen, however, got little credit or encouragement from the voters. Many people seemed to think that all politicians were corrupt and that if an alderman did not use his office for personal profit it was because he was a fool. When a North Side alderman bought his boy a football suit and helmet the other children in the neighborhood said, "Look at the alderman's son," suggesting ill-gotten funds. The alderman himself drove a two-year-old Dodge instead of the Cadillac that he could well afford, but even this did not convince his constituents that he was

politics in Chicago. "If an alliance exists," the jurors said, "it might be disclosed with funds to conduct undercover work. . . ." *Chicago Sun-Times*, May 1, 1954.

21. Independent Voters of Illinois, *The Kohn Report; Crime and Politics in Chicago*, Chicago, 1953, p. 10.

22. See the discussion of social absenteeism in Morris Janowitz, *The Community Press in an Urban Setting*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952, p. 214. Janowitz notes that social absenteeism contributes to the decay of the ideological element in politics, thus creating "a new kind of hoodlumism in politics" and making possible sudden shifts from one party to another which have no significance in terms of the traditional political allegiances.

honest.[23] This widespread cynicism tended, perhaps, to give the aldermen a low conception of their calling and to encourage irresponsibility on their part.

Some of the honest men, the Mayor among them, did less than they might have done to put a stop to corruption. The fact was that they needed for themselves or for their party the support of the powerful bosses in the corrupt wards. So, for that matter, did many other interests, both liberal and conservative, in city, state, and nation.

23. Interview document. As this study went to press a committee of the Chicago Bar Association filed charges against this very alderman after the *Sun-Times* had accused him of fee-splitting in zoning cases.

IV

"Good Government"

"GOOD government" is put in quotation marks because for more than a hundred years it has been part of the jargon of the municipal reform movement. (In Lincoln Steffens' day reformers were called "goo-goos" by unregenerate boodlers because they used the words so much.) In the jargon, good government meant government that was honest, impartial, and efficient—the kind of government that would exist (so the reformers thought) once the machines were destroyed, "petty politicians" driven out, and public-spirited citizens like themselves elected to office. Good government in this sense was neither very democratic nor very much concerned with the needs and wishes of the low-income and low-status elements of the community. But whereas to the reformers the machine represented evil, good government represented virtue.

The ideal of "good government" was a class ideal, of course. As Jane Addams explained in a reading in the previous section, there is wide difference in the moral perspective of middle- and of lower-class voters. The lower class thinks of "goodness" in terms of some advantage for the individual or the family, whereas the middle class thinks of it in terms of the community or some larger abstract public. From the standpoint of the middle-class ethic, characteristically that of native Yankee-Protestants and Jews, the task of government is to serve the "community as a whole." Implicit in this idea is the notion that the community is an entity that has ends or purposes different from those of the individuals who comprise it. In this view, the ends of individuals

—indeed, of all private, local, or partial interests—should be subordinated to the "community as a whole." Therefore politics, instead of being a competitive struggle among partial interests, ought to be a cooperative search for the implications of communal interests. In this search the expert—one who is both disinterested and possessed of special technical qualifications—should play a leading, and perhaps a decisive, part.

It will be seen that this conception of politics implies an altogether different set of institutional arrangements than does the individualistic, lower-class conception. It implies nonpartisanship (for the interest of a party is less than, and therefore opposed to, that of the "community as a whole"), election at-large rather than on a ward basis, and a strong, independent executive who will ignore special interests and assert his "impartial" conception of the interest of the "community as a whole." The nonpartisan election system and the council-manager form of government are both expressions of these general principles. Proportional representation, which the promoters of the council-manager plan tried for a time to link with it, did not fit this underlying logic, and, as Don K. Price explains, never had the popularity of the other reforms.

The middle-class, Yankee-Protestant belief that government is mainly a matter of honest, impartial, and efficient pursuit of the interest of the "community as a whole" (and not at all one getting petty favors, protection, or advantage for one's family, ethnic group, or ward) leads, of course, to a conception of government as "administration," or the businesslike conduct of service functions, rather than as "politics," or the management of conflict. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a conservative like Andrew D. White (the first president of Cornell University) and a progressive like Brand Whitlock (a novelist who in 1905 became the first nonpartisan mayor of Toledo) both supporting nonpartisanship on the grounds that city affairs should be kept clear of state and national politics. Both of these men, it must be added, saw other advantages in nonpartisanship. White believed it would put affairs out of the reach of the city proletariat. Whitlock thought that, by eliminating the machine, it would make democracy work.

In practice, the nonpartisan system has by no means always kept the parties out of local elections. Robert L. Morlan, a political scientist, describes the actual working of a nonpartisan system in Minneapolis, one of the many cities where the parties, although without any formal standing, do a good deal of prompting and managing from the wings.

The relation of the city manager movement to the general doctrines of "good government" is explained by Don K. Price, now the Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. He shows that the main motivation of the reformers was not to overturn the machine (cities that would accept the council-manager plan were likely to be middle-class ones that had no machines) but rather to make government more effective and more democratic. It was a mistake, Price says, to think that the city manager could "administer" policy, leaving the making of it to others. The most influential spokesman for the point of view Price here attacks was the late Professor Leonard D. White, who argued, in a book that did much to establish doctrine about the city manager profession, that a city manager who attempted to furnish the brains, enthusiasm, and leadership to decide policy for his city would risk having his program rejected and his position weakened. Charles R. Adrian brings some facts to bear upon this old dispute. Observations in three cities that have had managers for more than twenty-five years, he says, show that the managers have been leaders in policy matters—indeed, that they could not help being so even when they tried—but that they have preferred to attribute *innovations* in policy to others. That even an able manager may not be able to survive when a mayor (also able) takes the bit in his teeth is shown by Bruce Kovner in his account of the resignation of Elgin Crull of Dallas.

What Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone have to say about the theory of the city manager plan in their "Three Fundamental Principles" applies equally to nonpartisanship and may be taken as a general account of the theory of the "good government" movement. Implicit is the idea that the community has an interest "as a whole," that the main problem of governmental organization is to give effective and consistent expression to this interest, and that this is to be done by preventing "special interests" from asserting themselves while at the same time giving "impartial experts"—especially the city manager—a free hand. Charles A. Beard, the historian, disputes the premises of this theory. Group conflict is inevitable in a major city, he says, and issues are more frequently pretexts than causes of partisanship. His article is somewhat marred by a confusing use of the word "partisan." Apparently Beard thinks of nonpartisanship, not as a system in which state and national parties play no part (the accepted meaning of the term), but as one in which there are no factional groupings at all. This misunderstanding makes it difficult to follow his criticism of nonpartisanship, but it makes his criticism of the fundamentals of the "good government" position all the more pertinent.

Using relatively "hard" data on a sample of 200 cities with populations of 50,000 or more in 1960, Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler show that nonpartisan elections, at-large constituencies, and manager governments have in fact substantially fulfilled the reformers' hopes by insulating policy decisions from political conflict. As they point out, it is impossible to use contemporary census data to explain the *adoption* long ago or reform institutions. Their evidence is of the *impact* these institutions have had.

In the final reading of this section, James E. Reichley, a novelist

and political scientist, criticizes "good government" as he observed it in Philadelphia. In his view, the efforts of upper-class Protestant reformers have emptied political life of much of its interest and meaning. This accounts, he says, for the impermanence of reform and for its lack of real accomplishment. He believes that excessive individualism has led the Protestant elite away from politics, one of man's natural interests. The conclusion as to the reason for the Protestant elite's withdrawal is of course incompatible with the line of analysis in this introductory note. In the editor's opinion, the Protestant elite withdrew from city politics because the only kind of politics it thought moral—a politics of community rather than of individual or group interest—was impossible in the institutional and cultural setting of the large American city.

Municipal Affairs Are Not Political

Andrew D. White

WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST EXAGGERATION we may assert that, with very few exceptions, the city governments of the United States are the worst in Christendom—the most expensive, the most inefficient, and the most corrupt. No one who has any considerable knowledge of our own country and of other countries can deny this. . . .

What is the cause of the difference between municipalities in the old world and in the new? I do not allow that their populations are better than ours. What accounts, then, for the better municipal development in their case and for the miserable results in our own? My answer is this: we are attempting to govern our cities upon a theory which has never been found to work practically in any part of the world. Various forms of it were tried in the great cities of antiquity and of the middle ages, especially in the mediæval republics of Italy, and without exception they ended in tyranny, confiscation, and bloodshed. The same theory has produced the worst results in various countries of modern Europe, down to a recent period.

What is this evil theory? It is simply that the city is a political body; that its interior affairs have to do with national parties and issues. My fundamental contention is that a city is a corporation; that as a city it has nothing to do with general political interests; that party political names and duties are utterly out of place there. The questions in a city are not political questions. They have reference to the laying

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opportunity for active political participation to the larger number of ordinary citizens. But why should these citizens feel frustrated over being denied the opportunity for political participation when, as we have argued, the economic motive for political activity is not a very intense one?

This returns us to the question of what the "boys" really mean when they say they "love politics." We have admitted that the quest for status is involved in this motivation, as no doubt it is with the urge that the ordinary citizen may feel toward the political realm. But we have also suggested that status hunger alone cannot explain the satisfaction the "boys" seem to gain from their work, just as it does not explain the clear emotional return experienced by a Joe Clark or a Richardson Dilworth or a Thacher Longstreth. Let us look more closely at the concept, "love politics." What, after all, is politics? Politics, we are told, is who gets what, when, and how. Viewed in one light, no doubt. But if that is politics, then what is economics? Is not economics also who gets what, when, and how? Are politics and economics then identical? Hardly, since there are clearly economic activities—like selling automobiles and buying cucumbers—that are not political activities. Is politics, then, a division within the general class of economics? One thinks not. The feeling of frustration associated with reform, for instance, seems to have little economic basis, and neither does the feeling of camaraderie that is so valued by the "boys." Is not politics more truly defined, all things considered, as the expression of the will of the individual within the society of his fellows, or, more completely, the participation of human beings in the activities of conserving, distributing, and improving the values that are created by a civilized community? In short, is not politics the "art of government"? And if this is true, is not the question of why human beings should "love politics" similar to the question of why men should love women? Is not the answer to both, that is, that it is the nature of the beast? Is it not true, then, that political activity is a normal manifestation of human nature, and the real question is: Why should there be men who do *not* love politics?

With this question in mind, let us return for another look at the Protestant group whose mores have set the dominant pattern in the United States, and whose general lack of political interest has been used as an argument in favor of the theory that politics, insofar as it is not economic, is a "status-conferring" function. Let us suggest now that the general lack of political activity among members of the Protestant, middle class is due not so much to the fact that they may be in a secure status position as to the effect of any unduly individualistic philosophy which over-emphasizes the private will at the expense of the social context in which it seeks to operate.

V

The Trend of Urban Politics

THE most significant single fact for the future of urban politics in America is its changing class character. Until recently, our cities have been predominantly working class. Today, they are in most cases predominantly middle class, and soon they will be overwhelmingly so. What has happened, according to Samuel Lubell, is that the sons and daughters, and the grandsons and granddaughters, of the immigrants (the "old underdog elements") have climbed into the middle class. These new elements of the middle class are different from the old middle class in several important respects. Having made their gains during a time of depression and war, they do not share the hostility of the older middle-class generation to Big Government. And whereas the old middle class was preoccupied with the task of creating a nationwide economy, Lubell thinks that the new middle class is ready for an "adventure in social unification." This "new frontier," he says, is the creation of the kind of nationwide social structure required by an industrial civilization. It is, therefore, an "urban frontier."

Lubell overlooks one striking feature of the situation: in spite of the differences in their history and outlook, the new middle classes have accepted the political ethos of the old. They have moved from what Jane Addams called a "personal" to a "social" morality. Most of those who were Catholic in theology before are so still, but they have become Yankee-Protestant in their political ethos. They are avid for ethnic recognition (Lubell points out that in this they differ from the old

middle class), but they want a kind of recognition that is flattering by the new standards they have come to accept. To have a surname that marks one as a member of what Mayor Curley of Boston called "the newer races" is a political advantage in any large city, but only when it is accompanied by attributes—not only speech, dress, and manner, but also public virtues: honesty, impartiality, and regard for efficiency—that the public mind associates with the old Yankee-Protestant elite. The "new immigrants" indignantly reject those political ways—above all, the boss and the machine—that remind them of their pre-middle-class past. Thus, as Frank J. Sorauf explains, patronage, an indispensable element in the equilibrium of incentives of the machine, has practically disappeared in most cities. According to Sorauf a party that tries to clean house after an election is likely to encounter public indignation because the middle class respects the "public-spirited citizen" and not the "self-interested party worker," and because it will not excuse the presence of mediocrities in public service in the name of party loyalty. Edward C. Banfield shows how the one remaining powerful big city machine, that of Chicago, is beleaguered by middle-class elements in the outlying neighborhoods and suburbs. To get the necessary support from these elements, the machine must accept one reform after another, and so must eventually reform itself out of existence.

The new style of politics takes its character not only from the political ethos of the mass of voters, but more especially from the mentality of the elite. This elite, which is necessarily small, consists of those who run for office, select candidates, and manage and finance campaigns. About this mentality and its significance for urban politics, Robert C. Wood and Joseph Lyford, tell us a good deal. Although the elites they describe are very differently situated—they are suburbanites in the case of Wood, and Manhattan cliffdwellers in the case of Lyford —it is nevertheless apparent that they share a single mentality. In other words, what is significant is not where they live (whether in the suburbs or the central city), but their class, age, and educational characteristics. Although these new-style political activists are likely to be hi-fi addicts and to wear toreador pants, these readings suggest that their outlook is not essentially different from that of earlier generations of reformers. They feel a lively concern (to use a characteristically Protestant word) for the welfare of the community and a corresponding obligation to participate in its affairs. They believe that disinterested and expert search for the interest of the community "as a whole" is far better than political struggle as a way of solving public problems. They believe, with Steffens and the Progressives, that the popular will, when it expresses itself without distortion by defective institutions or other "external" corrupting elements like the machine or, nowadays, TV or advertising, is always good, right, and wise, and

that therefore the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy. They think that a political party is tolerable only to the extent that it persuades on grounds of public interest, and they regard party discipline based on anything else—above all, on personal material incentives —as a form of corruption. And they conclude that for all practical purposes party is an evil, although perhaps a necessary one, and that the ideal should be nonpartisanship.

Carried to its logical conclusion, this ideal implies government without politics. An executive (whether called mayor, manager, or chairman) would run the government as if it were a business. Presumably he would decide matters strictly on the basis of technical criteria. He would be high-handed, of course, but he would "get things done" and the voters would have the satisfaction of knowing that things were being done honestly, impartially, and efficiently. For all practical purposes his tenure would be permanent—he would be re-elected or reappointed almost automatically—and he would play no part in the partisan politics of the state and nation. In the intervals between the going of one such executive and the coming of another, there would, of course, be flurries of what Robert L. Morlan calls "unorganized" politics. Interest groups and voluntary associations would move to the center of the stage, but the character of their performance would be influenced by that of their audience, which would, for the most part, be dedicated to the cause of "good government." And when another strong executive was found, "unorganized" politics would again dissolve into no politics.

How the Negro population, which is still predominantly working class, will fit into this middle-class style of politics is hard to predict. By 1970 fifteen cities of 100,000 or more population are expected to be at least 40 percent Negro, and four of these—Washington, D.C., Richmond, Va., Compton, Calif., and Gary, Ind.—are expected to have Negro majorities. The presence of large numbers of Negroes in a city does not necessarily mean that they will exercise great influence in its affairs, however. One reason for this, which John Hadley Strange documents heavily with respect to Philadelphia, is that they may choose not to participate in politics very fully. Another, which Lee Sloan, a sociologist, shows in the case of "Lakewood," is that whites may find ways of reducing their influence when they do participate.

causes, spur the parties to further centralization, to the heightening of their ideological content, to a greater reliance on group participation in politics, to greater nationalization of the candidate image and party campaigning, and to the establishment of some modicum of party discipline.

There is something almost quaint in these days of big parties, big government, and advertising agency politics about a political institution that conjures up images of Boss Tweed, torchlight parades, and ward heelers. As the great day of patronage recedes into history, one is tempted to say that the advancing merit systems will not kill patronage before it withers and dies of its own infirmity and old age.

The Dilemmas of a Metropolitan Machine

Edward C. Banfield

TO UNDERSTAND how the political heads evaluate their opportunities, i.e., how they decide the terms on which they will use influence or allow it to be used upon them, it is necessary to look at some salient facts of political geography.

"Downstate" (all of Illinois outside of Cook County) is white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, rural, and normally Republican. It elects the governor (a Democrat has held the office in only 16 of the last 58 years), and it controls the General Assembly. Under a recent reapportionment, the Senate is safely downstate and Republican; a narrow majority of the House may be from Cook County, but some of the Cook County representatives are sure to be Republicans, and some downstate Democrats are almost sure to vote with the Republicans. Downstate hates and fears Chicago, which it regards as an alien land.

Chicago is heavily Democratic. The Democratic heartland is the slums and semi-slums of the inner city; here, in wards which are predominantly Negro, Italian, Polish, Lithuanian, or Irish, and (except for the Negroes) almost entirely Catholic, the machine gets the hard core of its support. The lower the average income and the less average education, the more reliably Democratic is the ward.

The vote is less Democratic as one moves outward from the center of the city. Some of the outlying wards are usually Republican. So are most of the "country towns" (that part of Cook County which lies outside Chicago); for the most part, the suburbanites of the "country towns" are white, Protestant, and middle-class. Their affinity is with downstate rather than the inner city.

The inner city wards are so populous and so heavily Democratic that they can usually offset the Republican vote of the outlying wards. In the future, the ascendancy of the inner city wards is likely to be even more complete. White, middle-class families are moving to the suburbs, and their places are being taken by Negroes and poor whites

from the South. Since the newcomers are almost all Democrats, and since many of those who leave are either Republicans or upward mobile types likely to become Republican, the proportion of Democrats in the inner city is increasing.

One might expect, then, that a mayor of Chicago would make the maintenance of the Democratic machine his most important business. So long as he controls the machine and it controls primary elections in the inner wards, he is invincible. And, of course, the way to maintain the machine is to pass out "gravy" with a generous hand—to give jobs, favors, and opportunities for graft and bribery to those who can deliver votes in the primaries.

This is, in fact, the strategy followed by the bosses of the most powerful machine wards.

It is not, however, the strategy of the mayor. He is normally the chairman of the county Democratic committee and therefore the leading figure in the party in Illinois and one of its leading figures nationally. Consequently, it is not enough for him merely to maintain himself in office in Chicago. He must take a wider view. He must carry the county and, if possible, the state, and he must contribute all that he can to the success and prestige of the party nationally. When the interests of the party on the larger scene conflict with its interests in the inner city of Chicago, the interests of the party in the inner city must usually be sacrificed.

As the table shows, to win a county-wide election a heavy vote in the inner city wards is not enough. There must also be a fairly strong Democratic vote in the outlying wards and in the suburban "country towns." The voters in these places are not in the habit of doing what the precinct captains tell them to do; their incomes are generally high enough, and their positions in society secure enough, to make them indifferent to the petty favors and advantages the machine has to offer. Many of them even seem to have absorbed the idea that "independence," i.e., splitting the ticket, is a mark of middle-class sophistication. To get

Relative Importance in the Cook County Electorate of Inner City Wards of Chicago, Outlying Wards of Chicago, and "Country Towns"

	POPULATION (IN THOUSANDS)		PER CENT CHANGE	PER CENT CONTRIBUTED TO COUNTY DEMOCRATIC VOTE	
	1950	1960[a]		1948	1956
18 Inner City Wards	1,257	1,291	3	37	31
Outlying Wards (Rest of Chicago)	2,364	2,616	11	50	51
"Country Towns" (Suburbs)	888	1,532	73	13	18
Total Cook County	4,509	5,439	20	100	100

[a] Estimate.

the vote it needs from these outlying areas, the Democratic party must appear not as a "machine" but as a "force for clean and progressive government." To do this it must offer "blue-ribbon" candidates, and it must give the city and county the kind of administration that will win the approval of the press and of "good government" forces generally. ("Good government" is some kind of a mixture—the proportions vary greatly from context to context—of the following principal ingredients: (a) "reform" of the old-fashioned kind, i.e., the suppression of vice, crime, and political corruption; (b) "efficiency" in the sense of doing what public administration "experts" recommend with respect to organization structure and "housekeeping" functions like budgeting and personnel management; (c) following "progressive" policies in the fields of housing, planning, race relations, and welfare; and (d) executing big projects—airports and exhibition halls, for example—to boost the size, business, and repute of the city.)

The preference of the outlying wards and "country towns" for good government has for a good many years been a force which the inner city machine has had to take into account. Its importance, moreover, is growing every year. In part, this is because the whole population —and especially that of the outlying wards and "country towns"—is becoming more discriminating in its voting behavior. In part, also, it is because the numerical strength of the outlying areas is growing while that of the inner city remains approximately the same.

In this situation, a rational county Democratic leader will be less attentive to the inner city wards, whose vote he can count on, than to the outlying areas, whose independence is a danger. His strategy in dealing with these outlying areas is clear: he must help his party live down its reputation as a "corrupt machine" and establish a new one as the honest and energetic servant of the people. The welfare of the suburbs must be his special concern; he must show the suburbanites that they have nothing to fear and much to hope for from the Democratic organization in the central city.

By the same token, a rational Republican leader will endeavor to keep alive the old image of the "boss-ridden" and "crooked" machine. He will do his best to frighten suburbanites and downstaters with stories of the growth and spread of the machine and of its designs on them.

These strategies are the ones the Democratic and Republican political heads do, in fact, follow. Mayor Daley, whose slogan is "good government is good politics and good politics is good government," has made it clear that he will not tolerate corruption in office and has kept a very tight rein on gambling, prostitution, and other organized crime. At the same time, he has inaugurated many reforms: he established an executive budget, introduced the performance-type budget, passed a performance zoning ordinance and housing code, extended the merit system, established a centralized purchasing system under a respected administrator, took control over contracts from the City Council, and

transferred authority to issue zoning variation permits from the City Council to a Zoning Board of Appeals. His policy toward the suburbs has been sympathetic and generous: through James Downs, the highly respected businessman who is his consultant on housing and planning, he has offered them the assistance of the city-planning department and of such other technicians as might help with their transportation, water, drainage, and other problems. In his campaign for re-election in 1958, the Mayor presented himself as an efficient and non-partisan administrator. His principal piece of campaign literature did not so much as mention the Democratic party or the Democratic slate.

The Republicans have also followed a rational strategy. They have tried to paint the Mayor as a "boss" and the Democratic organization as a corrupt and rapacious "machine." In the 1958 election, for example, Daley was dubbed Dictator Dick, and the Republican organizations distributed buttons marked "S.O.S."—"Save Our Suburbs from the Morrison Hotel Gang" (the Morrison Hotel is Democratic headquarters in Chicago). Some buttons showed the Democratic machine as an octopus reaching out to grasp the unprotected suburbs.

These and other antagonisms put adoption of any plan of metropolitan area organization out of the question. Because of their strength in the outlying wards and in the suburbs the Republicans would have a good chance of controlling a metropolitan area government. But in order to avail themselves of the chance, they would have to relinquish their present control of most of the suburbs. For if the whole metropolitan area were, so to speak, put in the same pot, the Democrats might now and then win the whole pot, and even when they could not win it they could offer a troublesome and expensive contest. Therefore, although the bolder Republicans and the Republicans whose interests are mainly metropolitan favor proposals for putting one or more functions on an area-wide basis, the more timid ones and those whose interests are in particular "safe" suburbs are opposed to it. With the Democrats the situation is similar. Mayor Daley would probably be glad to take his chances with the electorate of the metropolitan area. But the leading ward committeemen of Chicago much prefer certain success in the central city to occasional success in the metropolitan area.

The central city–suburban cleavage is the fundamental fact of party politics in the metropolitan area. But the cleavage is not simply a party one. . . . Party differences reflect differences of interest and outlook that are deep-seated and pervasive.

It will be seen that the influence of the mayor depends largely upon his being "boss" of the party in the county and that this in turn depends upon his ability to maintain the inner city machine while attracting support from the "good government" forces in the outlying wards and suburbs. In short, the mayor must bring the machine and the independents into a working alliance.

To become the county boss, one need only have the backing of the principal ward bosses of the inner city. There are 80 members of the county committee, 50 from the central city and 30 from the "country towns," and their votes are weighted according to the number of Democratic votes cast in each district in the previous general election. The inner city wards are therefore in a decided majority. These are grouped into ethnic blocs each of which has its own boss: there is a bloc of Negro wards under the control of Congressman William L. Dawson, a bloc of Italian wards under an Italian leader, a bloc of Polish wards under a Polish leader, and certain mixed wards under Irish leaders. Four or five of the most powerful bloc leaders, together with the president of the County Board, can, by agreeing among themselves, choose the county chairman.

Left to themselves, the bloc bosses would doubtless prefer someone who would not trouble them with reform. They realize, however, that the voters in the outlying areas will not leave them to themselves and that, unless the machine's reputation is improved, it will be swept out of existence altogether. They accept, therefore—although, no doubt, as a necessary evil and probably without fully realizing the extent of the evil—the need of a leader who will make such reforms as will maintain the organization.

In choosing a leader, the bloc bosses look for someone whose identifications are with the inner city wards (he has to be a Catholic, of course, and one whom ward politicians will feel is "their kind"), whose "nationality" will not disturb the balance between the Italians and the Poles (this virtually means that he must be Irish), who knows the workings of the organization from long experience in it and who is felt to have "earned" his promotion, who has backers with money to put up for campaign expenses (for it will be assumed that the county chairman will have himself nominated for office), who is perfectly "clean" and has a creditable record of public service, and who has demonstrated sufficient vigor, force, and shrewdness to maintain the organization and lead it to victory at the polls.

Once he has taken charge of the machine, a new leader need pay very little attention to the ward bosses who selected him. If he can win elections, he is indispensable to them. Moreover, possession of office—of the county chairmanship and the mayoralty—gives him legal powers (patronage, slate-making, and control of city services, including police) which make the ward bosses dependent upon him. Without them to hold the ladder, he could not climb into his position. But once he is in it, they cannot compel him to throw something down to them.

He is likely, therefore, to prove a disappointment to them and a pleasant surprise to the friends of good government. The bloc bosses need him more than he needs them. They want "gravy" to pass out to their henchmen. But he is a county, state, and national leader, and as such his task is to limit or suppress the abuses upon which they fatten.

To win the respect and confidence of the independent voters in the outlying wards and the suburbs, he must do the things that will hurt the bosses most.

The requirements of his role as a leader who must win the support of the independent voters are enough to account for his zeal to show himself honest and public-spirited. But it is likely that another circumstance will be working in the same direction. Ethnic pride may swell strongly in him and make him want to show the skeptics and the snobs that a man from the wrong side of the tracks can be as much a statesman as anyone from an "old family" or an Ivy League college.

The political head is not likely to take a lively interest in the content of policy or to be specially gifted in the development of ideas or in their exposition. If ideas and the content of policy interested him much, or if he were ideologically-minded, he would not have made his career in the machine, for the machine is entirely without interest in such matters. Similarly, he is not likely to be a vivid public personality, to be eloquent, or to have a flair for the direct manipulation of masses. The qualities that make a popular or charismatic leader would tend to prevent a man from rising within the organization. The kind of leader produced by it is likely to be, above all, an executive.

Any mayor of Chicago must "do big things" in order to be counted a success. It is not enough merely to administer honestly and efficiently the routine services of local government—street cleaning, garbage collection, and the like. An administration that did only these would be counted a failure, however well it did them. As a businessman member of the Chicago Plan Commission explained to an interviewer:

> The Mayor—no public official—is worth his salt if he isn't ambitious. That's true of you and everyone else. Now, what's a political person's stock in trade? It's government, of course. For a public official to just sit back and see that the police enforce the laws is not dynamic enough. I don't know that he would reason it out this way, but you have to get something with a little sex in it to get votes. In the old days, there were ward-heelers with a fistful of dollar bills. But that, even in Chicago, is passé.
>
> What makes a guy have a civic pride? A worker in a factory, a cab driver? He gets a sense of pride in taking part in an active community. The Mayor's smart enough to realize it. Today the tendency all over the country is for the public officials to take the lead more than they did a few years ago. . . .

Wanting to do "big things" and not caring very much which ones, the political head will be open to suggestions. (When Mayor Daley took office, he immediately wrote to three or four of the city's most prominent businessmen asking them to list the things they thought needed doing.) He will be receptive, particularly, to proposals from people who are in a position to guarantee that successful action will win a "seal of approval" from some of the "good government" groups. He may be

impressed by the intrinsic merit of a proposal—the performance budget, for example—but he will be even more impressed at the prospect of being well regarded by the highly respectable people whose proposal it is. Taking suggestions from the right kind of people will help him get the support he needs in order to win the votes of independents in the outlying wards and suburbs.

For this reason, he will not create a strong staff of policy advisers or a strong planning agency. The preparation of policies and plans will be done mainly within those private organizations having some special stake in the matters involved and by the civic associations. Quite possibly, the political head might, if he wished, assemble a technical staff of first-rate ability and, working closely with it, produce a plan far superior to anything that might be done by the private organizations and the civic associations. But a plan made in this way would have one fatal defect: its makers could not supply the "seal of approval" which is, from the political head's standpoint, its chief reason for being. On the other hand, a plan made by the big business organizations, the civic associations and the newspapers, is sure to be acclaimed. From the political head's standpoint it is sure-fire, for the people who make it and the people who will pass judgment upon it are the same.

Under these circumstances, the city planning department will have two main functions: (*a*) to advise the mayor on the technical aspects of the various alternatives put before him by private groups, and (*b*) to assemble data justifying and supporting the privately-made proposals that the mayor decides to "merchandise," and to prepare maps, charts, perspective drawings, and brochures with which to "sell" the plans to the public. . . .

There are often fundamental differences of opinion among those whose approval the political head wants. Chicago is too big a place, and the interests in it too diverse, for agreement to occur very often. When there is disagreement within the "good government" forces, the rational strategy for the political head usually is to do nothing. Watchful waiting will offend no one, and to be negative when one does not have to be is . . . bad politics. The political head is therefore inclined to let a civic controversy develop in its own way without interference from him, in the expectation that "public opinion" (the opinion of "civic leaders" and newspapers) will "crystallize." Controversies . . . serve the function of forming and preparing opinion; they are the process by which an initial diversity of views and interests is reduced to the point where a political head feels that the "community" is "behind" the project.

The political head, therefore, neither fights for a program of his own making nor endeavors to find a "solution" to the conflicts that are brought before him. Instead, he waits for the community to agree upon a project. When agreement is reached, or when the process of controversy has gone as far as it can, he ratifies the agreement and carries it into effect.

VI

Influence
and Leadership

IT is characteristic of the American political system that persons who have no office nevertheless participate actively in the conduct of affairs and sometimes exercise more influence than elected and appointed officials. In part, this is no doubt a consequence of the extreme decentralization of the system. Officials must collaborate with private interests in order to bring together the scattered pieces of power that are needed to get anything done. In part, too, it is a consequence of our conception of democracy, according to which everyone must be allowed, and indeed encouraged, to take an active part in the business of governing. The fact remains that by looking only at the activities of people who hold office, one can get an impression of the American political system so incomplete and distorted as to be downright wrong.

The first six readings in this Section are descriptive accounts of interests that figure largely in urban government. Floyd Hunter, a sociologist, asserts that in Regional City (Atlanta), decisions in community affairs are made by a few "power leaders" who are at the apex of a stable, hierarchical "power structure." These leaders, most of whom are heads of large corporations, pass directions on to second, third, and fourth rate personnel (the "under-structure" of power); public officials, it is interesting to note, are among the second and third rate personnel. The first two ratings are said to "set the line of policy"; the other two

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"hold the line." If an understructure man is presumptuous enough to question a decision made by the top leaders, he may lose his job or be otherwise punished. Robert A. Dahl finds nothing like this in New Haven. There the Economic Notables, as he calls them, are only one among many groups "out of which individuals emerge" to exert influence; like other groups in the community (Negroes and schoolteachers, for example), the Economic Notables sometimes have their way and sometimes do not.

It may be asked why Hunter's findings differ so greatly from those of Dahl. One explanation may be that Hunter's research method, which involved asking people active in civic affairs to rate others according to their relative power, tended to produce the kind of answers that were expected, whereas Dahl's method, which was based mainly on observation of events rather than of opinions or attitudes, did not. Nelson W. Polsby compares Hunter's "stratification" method with Dahl's "pluralist" one to the advantage of the latter; researchers, he concludes, should study "the outcomes of actual decisions." But Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz point out that the pluralist approach also makes assumptions which may predetermine findings. They criticize the idea of studying "actual" and "key" decisions on the ground that "nonissues" (that is, issues that do not come up for decision because powerful interests prevent them from doing so) may be more important. There is, they insist, more to community power than meets the eye.

The remaining readings have to do with influence in a variety of concrete settings. Basing his observations largely on interviews that he conducted in Boston and Cleveland, Norton E. Long says that, although the idea of a "power elite" may be comforting, there is little in reality that corresponds with it. Instead, there is undirected cooperation of particular social structures, each seeking particular goals (for example, the newspaper, which seeks prestige, readership, and advertising) and, in so doing, meshing with the goals of others. He concludes that although this meshing makes possible cooperative action on projects, it is very far from constituting a structured government. Paul H. Weaver's article is very apposite to this argument. He shows how in changing its "style" a newspaper may also change—in ways that it may not intend— the amount and kind of its influence. Since the newspaper in question is *The New York Times,* the metropolitan coverage of which helps to create the stereotypes about urban America, his discussion of this is of special significance. Another "particular social structure" is the labor union; as Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson emphasize, the goals of unions in local politics range from almost everything to almost nothing. For other studies of influence and leadership at work the reader is referred to Section VIII of this book.

The Power Structure of Regional City

Floyd Hunter

ONE OF THE FIRST INTERVIEWS had in Regional City was with James Treat of the Southern Yarn Company. He gave a great deal of information concerning power relations in the community. Among other things, he supplied a clue to certain existing clique relationships and considerable information about them which was later verified. Several times in his conversation he had used the term "crowds" in describing how certain men acted in relation to each other on community projects, and he was asked to explain the term. His reply ran in this vein:

"I simply mean that there are 'crowds' in Regional City—several of them—that pretty well make the big decisions. There is the crowd I belong to (the Homer Chemical crowd); then there is the First State Bank crowd—the Regional Gas Heat crowd—the Mercantile crowd— the Growers Bank crowd—and the like."

Mr. Treat was asked to give the names of some of the men who were active in each crowd, and he said:

"Sure! The biggest man in our crowd is Charles Homer. I belong to his crowd along with John Webster, Bert Tidwell, Ray Moster, Harold Jones, James Finer, Larry Stroup, and Harold Farmer. There are others, but they would be on the edges of this crowd. These would be the ones to be brought in on anything.

"In the State Bank crowd there would be Herman Schmidt, Harvey Aiken, Mark Parks, and Joseph Hardy. Schmidt used to be the biggest man in that crowd, but young Hardy is coming up fast over there.

"In the Regional Gas Heat crowd there is Fargo Dunham, Elsworth Mines, Gilbert Smith, and Percy Latham maybe. George Delbert might be said to belong to that crowd, but he is a pretty independent fellow. He moves around [from crowd to crowd] quite a bit.

"The Mercantile crowd is made up of Harry Parker, Jack Williams, Luke Street, Adam Graves, Cary Stokes, and Epworth Simpson.

"The Growers Bank crowd would be Ralph Spade, Arthur Tarbell,

and assistance required for a really serious report. Second, even if the reporter were given the necessary time and assistance, he would not in most cases have the special knowledge and talents needed to produce something really serious. Indeed, even the most highly educated academic experts rarely have the information, understanding, judgment, and expository skill that the ideal of "hard" reporting presupposes. And in any event the reporter—even the "good" reporter—demonstrates little inclination for serious reading or thinking. Third, even if he had the time and ability, the reporter would not for long be permitted to offer really "hard" reportage: no newspaper, not even the *Times*, could suffer the consequences of trying its readers' patience with stories that go very far beneath the surface.

If "hard" reporting has not done more than increase somewhat the "readability" of the *Times*, it may have done even this at a price higher than anyone would have wanted to pay. Most longtime observers of New York politics agree that there has been some loss of accuracy and neutrality in *Times* metropolitan affairs coverage. Some might well say that even if the loss is small it is too high a price to pay for a gain in readability. But this loss may not be the full price. A further, indirect consequence may be a decline in the influence of the *Times*. An editor spoke frankly of this to an interviewer:

> What has kept the *Times* what it is, what has made it able to survive the mergers, is that it was always authoritative and correct, even at the expense, sometimes, of readability. You were forming the opinions of the people in the power structure. By losing authoritativeness, you lose influence in the power structure but gain popular influence. So the changes going on in the *Times* today mean that we're losing the one thing that separates the *Times* from all other newspapers. I'll be interested to find out what you learn from the politicians. If they don't like the *Times* as it is today, we've done a very, very bad thing. Our attempt is most certainly not to oversimplify and distort but only to add readability. It is not impossible to be readable and accurate at the same time, but it is very hard.

In fact, many politicians in New York do think that the *Times* is not as accurate as it used to be. No one can say, of course, whether there has been again in "popular influence" sufficient to compensate for whatever loss there may have been in "influence in the power structure." On the whole, however, it seems unlikely that the *Times*'s bargain will prove to be a particularly good one, either for it or for New York. Ultimately the influence of a newspaper arises from the respect people feel for it, and readability, one would think, cannot inspire as much respect as reliability.

Organized Labor in City Politics

Edward C. Banfield and
James Q. Wilson

PERHAPS the most striking thing about the part played by organized labor in city politics is its variety. Some unions want nothing more from city government than assurance that the police will not interfere with pickets during strikes. Others aspire to take possession of the city government and to run it as an adjunct of the union. Between these extreme positions there are many intermediate ones. Which position a union takes depends upon many factors, including its organizational structure, the ideological bent of its leaders, the nature of the industry and of the local economy, and structure of party competition within the city.

The Interest of the Union in Local Affairs

The range of interests that unions have in local affairs is suggested by the findings of Joel Seidman and his associates in their study of six locals in and near Chicago.[1] All six of the locals wanted friendly treatment from police, courts, and city officials, especially in the event of a strike. Beyond that, their goals differed considerably. For example, one local of the United Mine Workers paid practically no attention to local politics; it was in a community consisting entirely of miners who could be depended upon to elect fellow miners to office. Although the leaders of this local were very much interested in politics in the state capital and in Washington—where crucial safety and work regulations were framed—they ignored city and county politics.

At the opposite extreme, locals of the United Steelworkers of America and the United Auto Workers (UAW) felt keenly the need for organized political action at the local level. The Steelworkers were engaged in collective bargaining with a powerful firm under conditions

1. Joel Seidman *et al., The Worker Views His Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 227-236.

of mutual hostility and suspicion, and were therefore particularly anxious to retain political support from the local Democratic machine in order to ensure its sympathy or at least neutrality. Many local Steelworkers leaders disliked the machine politicians but felt they could not defeat them or dare to risk alienating them. The UAW, on the other hand, did not need political reinforcement of its collective bargaining position because contracts were not negotiated locally, but nationally. At the same time, however, the UAW leaders desired broader political involvement for what were essentially reasons of ideology rather than union security. Since the motivation was ideological, the choice of party tended to be made on ideological grounds, without reference to what party or what party faction controlled local government.

A local of the plumbers' union, one of the nineteen craft unions associated with the building and construction trades department of the AFL-CIO, was vitally concerned with city political matters. Entry into, and rewards of, the plumbing profession were crucially dependent upon the licensing regulations which control the apprenticeship program and upon building and housing codes. Plumbers, like other building trade unions, must work with whatever party or faction happens to be in power locally in order to get favorable codes and the appointment of sympathetic building and plumbing inspectors. Not infrequently the union approves city inspectors or even nominates them from its own ranks. Furthermore, the city and county government is a prime source of construction contracts. The building trades unions have in common with contractors an interest in seeing that these contracts are large and frequent and that the work is done by private industry rather than by municipal or county employees.

These studies and others lend general support to the familiar observation that with respect to political involvement there is a sharp difference between industrial and craft unions. Industrial unions, with a large membership of unskilled or semiskilled workers in nation-wide industries, are concerned about industry-wide or national wage contracts and with the state and federal welfare measures which redistribute income in favor of lower-income groups. Craft unions, with a membership of well-paid skilled workers in competitive local markets, are concerned about access to the local bureaucracy, sympathetic treatment from local police, and local wages and hours.[2] The industrial union finds itself drawn into national political alliances, in particular with that party which seems most favorable to certain welfare measures; craft unions can and must resist such alignments, for they must not allow ideology to prevent them from working with whatever party or faction is in power locally.

Differences in markets create other differences among union lead-

2. See Richard Baisden, "Labor Unions in Los Angeles Politics," unpublished dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1958.

ers. The heads of the state and national federations of unions involved in local markets (e.g., building trades unions) have few direct links with rank-and-file members. The local leaders negotiate contracts and service the members; the state and national leaders can maintain their position only by persuading union members that they have common interests which only state or national leaders can service. Legislative campaigns waged in Washington, D.C., are thus often dictated not so much by the felt needs of the rank-and-file worker as by the maintenance needs of high-echelon officials who lack any other relationship with the members.

Unions dealing with national markets, by contrast, are apt to vest a much higher degree of influence in state and national leaders. Industry-wide and nation-wide contract negotiations give national union officials considerable authority over the locals. This bargaining pattern, together with the importance of federal legislation for nation-wide and industry-wide markets, imbues the entire organization with a more "political" or even "ideological" tone. As a result, even the local officials of, for example, the United Auto Workers may have more comprehensive political goals than the national leaders of a building trades union.

Given these differences, however, it is nontheless true that local union leaders are generally less ideological than national ones. Where the leader's contact with the members is direct, ideology is typically of minor importance. If the industry is still unorganized, the leaders will be absorbed in establishing themselves as the bargaining agents of the workers and in arranging for the security of the union. Once the industry and the city are organized, however, other activities must be found for local unions. In the case of many craft unions, these other activities consist largely in enforcing agreements and supervising work conditions and job assignments—particularly when, as with the building trades, work is done on widely scattered sites by small groups of workers hired on a contract basis by small, highly competitive contractors. In the case of industrial unions,[3] the leaders must devise other services.

These other services, while something more than a concern for wages and hours, are usually a good deal less than an active involvement in local politics. Where industry-wide contracts have eliminated local wage negotiations, the development of local welfare services becomes even more important.[4] These day-to-day services—often of crucial importance in ensuring the re-election of local officers—include handling individual grievances, providing free legal advice, filling out

3. Seidman, et al., Worker Views His Union, pp. 42–47.
4. See the account of the UAW in Windsor, Ontario, in C. W. M. Hart, "Industrial Relations Research and Social Theory," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, February 1949, esp. pp. 60–63. Community involvement also emerged as a substitute for collective bargaining among the unions in Lorain, Ohio; see James B. McKee, "Status and Power in the Industrial Community: A Comment on Drucker's Thesis," American Journal of Sociology, January 1953, p. 367.

workmen's compensation applications, dealing with eviction notices or medical needs, helping to get loans, interceding with the police, and arranging social events and beer supplies. Many of these activities, not unexpectedly, are of precisely the same kind as a political ward leader spends his time on.

Nonetheless, some unions do engage in a significant amount of direct political action. In most large cities, the AFL-CIO council has a Committee on Political Education (COPE) which participates in party conventions and in primary and general elections. Individual unions may also contribute money and manpower outside the framework of COPE. Normally these tasks are undertaken by a relatively small number of activists who are involved because of personal ties to some candidate. Even in the heavily "political" Detroit UAW, no more than 6 to 10 percent of a random sample of union members when interviewed recalled having participated in any way in the 1952 Presidential campaign.[5]

In many locals it would appear that the pressure for active local political involvement arises, not from the expectations of the membership as a whole, but from the requirements of the union activists from whose ranks officers are drawn and by whose standards those officers are judged. On the extent to which rank-and-file members approve of union political activity, the evidence is conflicting. One study of the UAW in Detroit showed that a clear majority of the members supported such activity.[6] A study of the International Association of Machinists in an Illinois area found that slightly more than half the members believed that the "union should take an active part in politics" although they were not so sure that politics should be discussed at union meetings and were quite opposed to the union's telling members whom to vote for.[7] The Teamsters in St. Louis were in favor of union political action so long as it did not involve telling members how to vote.[8] In the study of six locals by Seidman and others, however, a clear majority of the members of five of the six unions rejected union political-activity organizations, and most of them opposed such organizations when they were explained to them.[9]

Even among the union activists who share a belief in political action of some sort, the precise strategy to employ is often in dispute be-

5. Arthur Kornhauser et al., When Labor Votes (New York: University Books, 1956), pp. 124–126.

6. Ibid., pp. 100, 104, 105. The same results appeared in a 1956 survey: Harold L. Sheppard and Nicholas A. Masters, "The Political Attitudes and Preferences of Union Members: The Case of the Detroit Auto Workers," American Political Science Review, June 1959, pp. 440–443.

7. Hjalmar Rosen and R. A. Rosen, The Union Member Speaks (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955), pp. 36–42.

8. Arnold Rose, Union Solidarity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952), pp. 83–84.

9. Seidman et al., Worker Views His Union, pp. 230–233.

cause of the conflicting roles of the union lobbyist and the union campaign director.

The lobbyist sees political action in terms of getting concessions from elected officials, particularly legislators. He works alone in attempting to influence a fairly small group of men whose primary concern is with getting re-elected. Often he needs the votes of men from both political parties; thus, he dare not risk aligning himself entirely with one party or faction. Ideally, he would like to be free to commit his union to whoever has helped him the most; this sometimes means supporting—or at least not opposing—a conservative politician not normally friendly to labor. He avoids making allies if by so doing he must take on his ally's causes—"don't get stuck with the other fellow's fights." He chooses his issues carefully and concentrates on specific goals.

The union's campaign director, on the other hand, sees the requirements of political action in entirely different terms. He desires to elect a slate of local candidates. To do so he must create an organization of volunteers. Because of their political convictions, these volunteers often insist on working entirely within one party—usually the Democratic. The campaign director must, therefore, reject "deals" with Republicans and he must avoid endorsing conservative candidates who are not likely to arouse volunteer enthusiasm. He is inevitably restless with prior union commitments for they deprive the volunteers of a sense of participating in making decisions about endorsements. He must seek out allies from other liberal groups; this means he must make their causes his.

This tension means that the unions with the most to gain from local lobbying (like the building trades unions) will tend to reject political campaigns, while those with the least to gain by local lobbying (such as the UAW) will emphasize such campaigning. Between these extremes there are unions which are not infrequently split between the two strategies. Even within the normally "political" industrial unions formerly of the CIO, campaigning has often been undertaken half-heartedly.[10]

The Union as an Agency of Civic Leadership

Leaders of organized labor do not appear as frequently as businessmen among the ranks of reputed civic leaders or on the rosters of important civic or governmental organizations.[11] It is customary to find in most large cities one or two "labor representatives" appointed to

10. For an account of the difficulties experienced in political campaigning in Chicago by certain CIO unions, see James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), pp. 125–127, and Fay Calkins, The CIO and the Democratic Party (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 70, 77, 81–84.

11. See the tables in William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller, Industry, Labor, and Community (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 43.

the board of education, the board of the Community Chest, and various public commissions. However, when the members of, say, the board of education are elected rather than appointed, and when—as in most nonpartisan cities—there is no powerful political organization which can draw up and elect a "balanced ticket" to such boards, labor is likely to be unrepresented. This seems to be the case in Detroit and Los Angeles, for example.

Furthermore, there appears to be a crucial difference between business and union membership on such bodies. Organized labor—even if it includes in its ranks the majority of all the adult citizens in the community—is generally regarded as a "special interest" which must be "represented"; businessmen, on the other hand, are often regarded, not as "representing business" as a "special interest," but as serving the community as a whole. Businessmen, in Peter Clark's term, often are viewed as "symbols of civic legitimacy." Labor leaders rarely have this symbolic quality, but must contend with whatever stigma attaches to being from a lower-class background and associated with a special-interest group.[12]

This bias in favor of business and professional occupations among governmental agencies and civic associations does not necessarily mean that such organizations always serve "business ends" to the detriment of labor. Given the many opportunities for private intervention in public decisions, labor, like all other politically involved organizations, may find that it can attain its ends (or prevent others from attaining theirs) with minimal or even no representation on such bodies. Underrepresentation in the politics of large American cities probably does not prevent groups such as labor from blocking civic actions. But this underrepresentation, and the lack of civic status it implies, probably does make it more difficult for labor goals to be placed near the top of the civic agenda. To put it another way, organized labor probably has less influence than businessmen *collectively* over *what kind* of issues are taken seriously in the city.

Labor is handicapped not only by having imputed to it less civic virtue but also by a shortage of money and organizational skills. Unions at the local level often can donate relatively little money to civic projects. Craft unions particularly are likely to have a very small staff, and sometimes a staff which—because its recruitment and tenure are closely tied to the fortunes of particular officers in the annual union elections—is not as competent as it might be if the job were sufficiently secure to attract able men.[13] Large industrial unions, on the other hand, may have a sizable permanent staff at the district or regional level.

12. One measure of this difference in civic roles is found in the underrepresentation of labor leaders among those given certain kinds of public honors, including citation in *Who's Who*. See Orme W. Phelps, "Community Recognition of Union Leaders," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, April 1954, pp. 417–433.

13. Hart, "Industrial Relations Research and Social Theory," p. 70.

Nonetheless, certain public bodies and civic associations have—particularly in recent years—gone out of their way to enlist union leaders, if only to co-opt potential opponents and increase the agency's resources. William Form and Delbert Miller note the rise of labor representation on the board of the Community Chest in Lansing, Michigan. There were only representatives of "company unions" in 1933 but six union men (on a 36-man board) by 1953. Labor obtained this recognition after having won its organizing fights in the auto plants and after the Chest realized the fund drives among workers would benefit if conducted by the unions (labor now contributes 40 per cent of all Chest funds). In an attempt to increase further its representation in community welfare agencies, labor once threatened to boycott an important fund drive.[14]

A similar increase in labor representation on the Chest was reported in a study of Lorain, Ohio. The invitation to join was extended in order to increase the contributions from workers. Paradoxically, however, the unions made no substantive demands once they were accorded representation. In this city, and probably in many others, labor's demand to be included in civic and welfare associations reflects not so much a desire to attain certain political goals as simply a desire to participate in a status-conferring civic venture. This desire, in turn, probably is based on labor's attempt to acquire the kind of civic legitimacy heretofore reserved for businessmen. "The CIO in Lorain," James McKee wrote, "wants to be regarded as concerned with the welfare of the whole community, not merely with the interests of labor, and views its participation in the Community Chest as demonstrating this concern."[15]

Labor's preoccupation with strictly labor goals and its concern for general civic legitimacy have combined to produce in many cities an antipathy between union leaders and municipal reformers. Although there are cases such as Detroit where the UAW and liberal and reform Democrats have joined forces, the more common pattern is that of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and other cities where reform efforts have had to deal with the indifference or active hostility of most unions.[16] To the extent labor is concerned with strictly union objectives—wages and hours, workmen's compensation, unemployment benefits, union security guarantees—it finds the programs of civic reformers largely irrelevant. To the extent labor is concerned with acquiring influence in the local political parties and legislature, it regards the reformers as a rival. And to the extent labor is anxious about its civic reputation, it often sees the liberal reformers as the source of extreme and politically damaging ideology.

14. See Form and Miller, *Industry, Labor, and Community*, pp. 673–674. In San Diego—which is not a pro-labor city—a prominent union official was chairman of the 1961 Community Chest drive.

15. McKee, "Status and Power in the Industrial Community," pp. 368–369.

16. The discussion of unions and reform follows Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 273–277.

Thus, the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor passed a resolution in 1961 opposing the right of the liberal California Democratic Council to make pre-primary endorsements in state and local contests. The New York Central Labor Council in 1961 was largely indifferent to the anti-Tammany campaign then being waged by the reformers in the New York Committee for Democratic Voters, although it joined with the reformers in backing Robert Wagner, the anti-Tammany candidate. In Chicago, with some minor exceptions, union leaders have publicly supported the candidates of the Democratic machine, not those of the reform-minded Independent Voters of Illinois. The Liberal Party in New York, largely backed by unions in the garment industry, has remained independent of the various reform movements in the city.

In those few cases in which there has been a labor-reform alliance (as in Chicago's Fifth Senatorial District in 1950[17]), the union involved has typically been the United Auto Workers. But even the UAW cannot always act independently, for it must consider the costs of political isolation from other unions in the city and from state federations as well as from the local Democratic party. The desirability of playing politics in city affairs must be measured against the necessity of playing politics within labor affairs. It probably takes an energetic and persuasive labor leader to make the advantages of independent civic action more attractive than its costs.

Unions in Urban Political Parties

The common view that "labor is tied to the Democratic party" requires much modification before it is accurate, particularly with regard to local politics. Unions have many different relations with local parties. In a very few cases unions (mostly the UAW) have attempted to take over the leadership of the Democratic party; with the help of allies, they succeeded in this in Detroit, in Gary, Indiana, and in Rockford, Illinois.[18] Or they may act in coalition with party leaders, as in the Democratic Farmer-Labor party in Minneapolis and St. Paul. They may stay aloof from local politics, as in Houston. They may confine themselves to seeking favors from local party organizations, as in Chicago. They may form independent parties to win votes and thereby bargaining power, as in New York City. They may, as do most CIO unions, carry over into city politics their national attachment to the Democrats; or they may, as do many AFL unions, support local politicians with little reference to national party labels. Where the city is nonpartisan, unions may—as they have in the past in St. Paul—endorse and elect a slate of candidates. Or they may—as in Los Angeles—instinctively oppose, with meager resources, whatever candidate the *Los Angeles Times* sup-

17. See Calkins, *CIO and Democratic Party*, pp. 59–85.
18. *Ibid.*, chaps. v and vi.

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ports. (Labor-*Times* agreement in backing Mayor Norris Poulson in 1961 was an exception. And he lost anyway.)

Some representative cases of labor involvement in party politics follow.

1.
The Unions Capture a Party: The Case of Detroit

Beginning in 1948, the Wayne County CIO Political Action Committee (PAC), then made up almost entirely of UAW members, began, in alliance with certain liberal Democrats, an effort to take control of the state leadership of the Michigan Democratic party. State law required that precinct captains be elected directly by the voters. The PAC-liberal coalition elected 720 captains in Wayne County in 1948, about one third of the total. This was enough to give them control of the Democratic conventions in five of the six Wayne County Congressional districts; control of these, in turn, was enough to give the liberal coalition control of the state Democratic convention. After a bitter struggle with the party's Old Guard, this victory was repeated in 1950, and since then the liberals—dominated by the UAW—have controlled the state party.[19]

In the city of Detroit, however, elections are nonpartisan. Here labor's Committee on Political Education (the successor to the PAC since the AFL-CIO merger) functions directly as a political party.[20] The AFL-CIO Council, acting on COPE recommendations, endorses candidates and operates the strongest precinct organization in the city. Although the UAW has only slightly more than half of all union members in the city, it provides almost all of the key COPE officials. In some cases, COPE is open to nonlabor Democrats, and some liberals from business and professional backgrounds participate. Most nonlabor liberals, however, work directly through the Democratic party rather than through COPE. About 40 percent of all precinct captains are COPE members; alliances with non-COPE but liberal captains give COPE clear control of the county and thus of the state party. In city elections, these same captains work on behalf of nonpartisan labor endorsees.

The Detroit COPE has had imparted to it by the UAW a militant attitude toward political action. Kenneth Gray and David Greenstone offer several reasons to explain this militancy:

> First, the union was organized and led for some time by radicals . . .
> who fought violently among themselves but who agreed on the crucial
> importance of programmatic political action. Second, a bitter and violent

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 112–146.
20. This account follows Kenneth E. Gray and David Greenstone, "Organized Labor in City Politics," in Banfield (ed.), *Urban Government* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 368–373.

struggle for recognition left the UAW with a deep hostility toward management. This hostility was manifested in political action. . . . Third, the union sought to ease a serious problem of ethnic and racial hostilities among its own members by emphasizing class solidarity of workers among its own members. This emphasis on the members' interest as a class against management. This emphasis on the members' interest as a class strongly implied broad political goals rather than an exclusive concern with collective bargaining. . . . Fourth, the automobile workers have a tradition of rank-and-file participation, which contributes to the intensity of their activity in COPE.[21]

Militancy may have contributed to the state-wide successes of the Democrats, but it has not produced comparable successes in Detroit. Between 1946 and 1955, CIO-PAC endorsees won 67.5 percent of all primary and 91.2 percent of all general elections for partisan offices at the state, Congressional, and county level, but less than 38 percent of all contests for nonpartisan municipal offices.[22] As observed in an earlier chapter, union members have not hesitated to desert labor nominees in nonpartisan local elections—if, indeed, these members have even known who the labor candidates were. The CIO failed three times (1943, 1945, and 1949) to elect a mayor of Detroit after bitter contests in which labor's political arm emphasized "liberal issues"—Negro rights, public housing, urban redevelopment, and the right of public employees to strike. In 1953, labor regarded opposition to the incumbent as hopeless and made no endorsement. By 1957 a new strategy was emerging: play down ideological issues, back a sure winner, and hope for favors if he is elected. That year COPE joined with business and newspaper groups in supporting the man who won. Pleased with their success, labor leaders tried again in 1961, only to have the noncontroversial incumbent, despite almost unanimous business, labor, newspaper, and civic support, lose to an unknown who had strong support from Negroes.

Despite the 1961 setback, it is unlikely that COPE will revert to the militancy of the 1940's. First, Detroit city government has begun to be responsive to the demands of lower-class and Negro voters even without labor control of the city government. Second, labor has learned "to conform to the peculiar rules of the nonpartisan game" which require that it refrain from overly aggressive political behavior, that it stress the most widely shared community sentiments, and that it avoid the appearance of seeking to "take over" city government.[23]

Not all cases of labor dominance in local affairs are confined to industrial unions, however. For many years, the AFL unions associated with the "Labor Temple" in St. Paul (now the St. Paul AFL-CIO Trades

and Labor Assembly) were continually successful in electing their candidates to office in that nonpartisan city. These labor leaders were conservative in temper, but eventually their influence was undermined by the rise of an aggressive coalition of CIO leaders and intellectuals which made up the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party (DFL) that emerged in 1948. After much controversy, an uneasy alliance between the DFL and the Labor Temple developed.[24]

In Minneapolis too the AFL craft unions were powerful. Between 1941 and 1957, they made the Central Labor Union (CLU) the most important political force in that nonpartisan city.[25] With the advent of the DFL, the CLU remained the dominant partner; no liberal candidate felt he could win without labor support. The terms of the DFL-CLU alliance allowed the DFL to nominate candidates for state and national office (where the liberal ideologies of the DFL intellectuals were engaged anyway) while the CLU elected candidates for city posts. After the defeat of labor candidates in 1957 (owing to scandals, indiscretions, and poor tactics), CLU strength began to decline.

2.
Unions Defer to the Party: The Case of New York and Chicago

In large, industrially diversified cities such as New York and Chicago, where political parties have (or have had) power independent of the support of other organized groups, labor has had to be content either with bargaining with elective officials (usually after, rather than before, the election) from a position of relative weakness, or with forming third parties to strengthen that bargaining position. In contrast with Detroit, unions have not attempted to take over party posts, and in contrast with Minneapolis they have not been able to make themselves senior partners in a labor-liberal coalition. Only very rarely have a few unions challenged the regular party leadership (the Democrats, of course) in primary contests.

In Chicago, labor needs the politicians more than the politicians need labor. Both sides know this, and a kind of half-hearted good fellowship results. The craft unions typically remain close to the party and attempt to share in the patronage, particularly in the licensing and building-inspection departments. The industrial unions—notably the steel, auto, and meatpacking workers—usually support regular party candidates. But occasionally they assert their independence in what they know in advance is a lost cause; for example, certain unions backed an insurgent candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor in

21. *Ibid.*, p. 370.
22. Nicholas A. Masters, "The Politics of Union Endorsement of Candidates in the Detroit Area," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, August 1957, p. 149.
23. Gray and Greenstone, "Organized Labor in City Politics," p. 373.

24. Alan Altshuler, *A Report on Politics in St. Paul* (Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1959, mimeo) pp. II-3 to II-10.
25. Alan Altshuler, *A Report on Politics in Minneapolis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1959, mimeo), pp. II-8 to II-9 and V-5 to V-7.

1960. He lost, but the result of the challenge was to increase somewhat the vigor with which the regular candidate attempted to meet union demands in order to arouse their enthusiasm for the general election contest with the Republican. Indeed, labor leaders can probably wield greatest influence by endeavoring to control rather precisely the ardor with which they help Democrats mobilize voters in the closely contested county and state elections. The few union leaders who have been successful at this and at the same time have stayed clear of charges of "left wing" leanings have become important forces in local politics. In case of a showdown with the party, however, there is not much doubt as to who would win.

New York's Democratic party has in recent years been much weaker than its counterpart in Chicago, and therefore labor has probably been more influential. First with the American Labor party and then (after 1944) with the Liberal party, certain New York unions—mostly those Jewish-led unions in the garment industry—have endeavored to act as a third force in city and state politics. The ALP was in 1937 and 1941 a crucial source of votes for Fiorello H. La Guardia. After it was destroyed by the struggle between Communist and anti-Communist factions, the Liberal party continued the strategy of always endorsing Democrats nationally but of playing one side against the other locally. It has always polled a substantial vote, and in 1951 it managed to elect, on its own, a city council president.

Most New York unions, however, have never had any association with either the ALP or the Liberal party. The AFL unions, organized into the Central Trades and Labor Council, followed an almost unvarying policy of supporting regular Democrats in city elections and expecting in return to be given certain assurances about police attitudes toward strikers and certain concessions on local codes, licenses, inspections, and prevailing wage rates on city construction work. The very size of the New York labor movement—the Council had over three quarters of a million members—made it exceptionally difficult for it to speak with one voice on even crucial matters, much less on the secondary issues of political participation. The building trades unions and the Teamsters had their own councils which were part of the larger Council, and union autonomy was jealously guarded.[26]

In 1959, the CIO and AFL unions in New York merged into a Central Labor Council, with a total membership of a million and a half workers. Such an organization, even if it did nothing in politics, would be a force to be reckoned with because of the vast audience it could provide politicians fortunate enough to enjoy access to it. Union meetings are one way politicians have of dealing with the perennial and insoluble problem of how to reach the people.

But the new organization set out to be something more than just an

26. This account follows Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960), pp. 508–510.

audience. Its first president, Harry Van Arsdale, was a vigorous exponent of union education and political action. In 1961, he persuaded the Central Labor Council to support Mayor Robert Wagner for reelection even though the mayor had broken with the regular party leaders, and to organize a new political force, the "Brotherhood party," which would do for unions generally what the Liberal party had done for the needle trades. At the time this new party was created, it was widely believed that Wagner would not win the Democratic primary and thus he would need such third parties as the Brotherhood to enable him to run as an independent in the general election. Instead, Wagner won easily in the primary and the immediate need for the Brotherhood party vanished. Though the party had a strong start, organizing political units in most assembly districts in the city, its future became uncertain.

3.
The Dormant Unions: The Case of the Southwest

In the large cities of the Southwest, where strong political parties do not exist and where population and industry are rapidly expanding, labor has been a recent and still minor civic actor. An aggressive union may be able to convert a one-industry town into a one-party town, as in Detroit. And unions may extract concessions from professional politicians in the old, stable cities of the Northeast and Midwest, such as New York and Chicago. But in such booming cities as Houston, Dallas, San Diego, and Los Angeles, where rapid growth is occurring, business (and, more generally, middle-class) influence is often such that organized labor (which, in most of these communities, is only a recent arrival) is lacking in either legitimacy or power.

Businessmen often dominate the politics of these cities (sometimes

TABLE 15   *Cities over 500,000 population ranked by the percentage of employed persons in white-collar occupations, 1960*

Rank	City	Percent white-collar	Rank	City	Percent white-collar
1	Seattle	47.8	12	Boston	35.5
2	Dallas	45.9	13	Pittsburgh	35.2
3	Los Angeles	45.0	14	Philadelphia	35.1
4	San Diego	44.8	15	Baltimore	34.2
5	San Francisco	43.0	16	Chicago	33.4
6	New York City	42.8	17	Detroit	32.1
7	Washington	42.7	18	Milwaukee	31.5
8	Houston	41.6	19	Buffalo	30.4
9	New Orleans	39.0	20	St. Louis	30.2
10	San Antonio	38.1	21	Cleveland	24.8
11	Cincinnati	36.8			

Note: "White-collar" refers to professional, technical, official, managerial, sales, and clerical occupations.
Source: 1960 Census of Population.

by default) so long as they can agree among themselves. Furthermore, business and conservative values are widely shared. Business leadership is not an imposition; it is generally accepted. In Houston and Los Angeles, strong anti-union feelings are still widespread among citizens. The absence of a mass production heavy industry (such as an auto plant) means the absence of a large pool of easily organized unskilled workers. The largest CIO unions are often found in the aircraft plants where there is a high proportion of skilled workers. In San Diego, for example, the largest local industrial union is the International Association of Machinists. As Table 15 shows, these are the cities with the largest percentages of white-collar workers in the labor force, and such workers are extremely difficult—often impossible—to organize.

Despite such constraints, labor in these cities may be a major participant in at least state and national politics. In Houston and San Diego, for example, some labor unions are principal partners in a liberal-labor coalition which contests Democratic primaries. The very absence of a strong party organization, the result in part of nonpartisan, business-dominated city politics, often gives rise to intraparty factional warfare at the county and state level in which labor, albeit weak, is strong enough to play an important role.

VII

Problems of Management

THE mayor of today's large city occupies a position his predecessors would in some ways have envied. At last most legislatures have ceased to be meddlesome, and the cities in general have a degree of home rule that is adequate for most of their purposes. The authority of the mayor has been vastly strengthened. There are still many independent and quasi-independent offices and bodies, but these are fewer than before. In the city government proper the mayor is now very strong indeed: he appoints department heads, who are accountable directly to him, he makes up the budget, which the council does little more than approve; and he has the advantage of a large, competent, professional staff. The voters—most of them—want and expect government that is honest, impartial, and efficient, and the mayor knows that he will generally be applauded if he resists unreasonable demands from special interests and condemned if he does not.

These very improvements in the mayor's situation have created their own characteristic difficulties, however. For one thing, committed to good government and with no patronage or other "gravy" to dispense, the present-day mayor cannot exercise power as informally as the old-fashioned boss could. What he cannot do by an exercise of formal authority or by salesmanship, he cannot do at all. Thus, despite gains in his formal authority, his net influence position may in some matters be

weaker than before. Moreover, since the mayor is supposed to be impartial and even nonpartisan (this is often expected of him even when he is elected on a partisan basis), he cannot let narrowly political criteria guide him in making policy decisions. The interest of the community "as a whole," which his good government supporters tell him should replace "politics," turns out, however, to have no concrete meaning in important and controversial matters. Thus, although not permitted to employ criteria that are frankly political, he generally cannot find others that are appropriate.

One gets a sense both of the improvements in the mayor's situation and of the difficulties that these entail from the report Nat Hentoff, a journalist and novelist, gives of his interview with New York's Mayor John V. Lindsay. "Sometimes," the Mayor tells him, "I feel I'm pushing my shoulder against a mountain. My feet are churning away and the mountain won't budge." Except for the size of the mountain, all mayors are in about the same situation. There are two main problems of "top management": (1) how to organize the executive branch so that the mayor can maintain control over it and make it an effective instrument for carrying out a comprehensive program of action on matters of fundamental importance, and (2) how to use the technical knowledge of planners and other professionals to frame a comprehensive program that represents the interest of the community "as a whole."

The first of these is examined in a wide perspective by Charles R. Adrian. He discusses three types of large-city administrative structure—council-manager government, the management cabinet, and the chief administrative officer—and concludes that the third, which is a sort of cross between the council-manager and strong-mayor forms of government, is most likely to spread; however, he warns, its success will depend to a large extent upon the personality of the mayor and upon his willingness to delegate authority. This conclusion recalls Bruce Kovner's account of "The Resignation of Elgin Crull" which appears in the section on the city manager. Another reading that deals specifically with the problem of organizing the executive branch consists of advice that the late V. O. Key gave to a commission which was trying to decide how to fit a planning body into the structure of a government. The government was that of a state, but Key's remarks are no less to the point when, as has been done here, *mayor* is substituted for *governor* and *city* for *state*. The crux of the problem in both cases is how to bring the planner close to the seat of power without bringing him *too* close to it.

The other main problem of "top management" is treated here in what amounts to a symposium. Alan Altshuler opens the discussion with a critique of the planner's traditional ideal, that of comprehensive (or master) planning. The ideal, he says, is of little or no help because it presupposes the existence of something which in fact does not exist—namely, a complete and consistent set of community goals. Paul

Davidoff, a professor of city planning, agreeing that the people of a city have diverse goals, objects to leaving it to the city planning department to prepare *the* comprehensive plan. It would be more democratic, he says, to consider "*alternatives strongly supported by their proponents*" (the emphasis is his); accordingly he calls for a "plural" as opposed to a "unitary" planning process. In an ideal situation, he says, local political parties would offer platforms containing master plans, as would neighborhoods, including poor ones. Lisa Peattie, an anthropologist, has worked as an "advocate planner" for a low-income section of Boston, and in her article she ponders this experience. Some of her conclusions about advocacy planning for a neighborhood resemble Altshuler's about comprehensive planning for a city. In the neighborhood, she says, the issues are "miniaturized" but their basic structure remains. "Even at the neighborhood level there is no simple aggregation of people's wants and needs into a plan." The problem Altshuler points to is raised also by the late William H. Brown, an economist, and Charles E. Gilbert, a political scientist, in their article about planning for capital expenditures in Philadelphia. The main difficulties the planners encounter, they say, are not political but intellectual: no procedure exists for establishing a set of goals (criteria) such as is required by the ideal of the comprehensive (master) plan. This being the case, about the best that the planning agency can do is to provide information, encourage popular consultation, and make such consultation more meaningful by supplying perspectives on benefits and costs.

The last three readings of the section offer ideas about the direction planning will or should take in the future. Martin Meyerson, a professor of city planning when his article was written, says that what is needed is a type of planning that will give the politicians an enlarged view of the context in which they are acting and yet not be beyond the intellectual and other resources of the planners. He amplifies this "middle-range" conception of planning in terms of five more or less separate functions, one of which is not altogether unlike the traditional view of comprehensive planning. Anthony Downs, an economist and businessman, predicts a revolution in city planning. He agrees with Meyerson and others that the idea of a single "best" plan is passé and that the planner of the future will emphasize quantitative studies of *several* alternative programs. In the final reading, Edward C. Banfield asserts that the trend is toward making a wider range of decisions on technical (or allegedly technical) grounds; professionalism in decision-making will entail, he thinks, application of three concepts: economizing, decentralization, and welfare. It will be seen that he agrees with Downs's prediction that "city planners will become general advisers to key politicians concerning nearly all city government activities and resource uses."

weak personality or one hostile to the trend described herein. Nevertheless, at least some aspects of the revolution in city planning which we have described will undoubtedly have taken place in every metropolitan area in the United States by 1975. Many cities will have experienced nearly all these aspects by that date.

Moreover, the revolution may occur even faster in other parts of the world. This is particularly likely in underdeveloped nations because their national governments are relatively much more powerful than in the United States. They not only have a stronger voice in the policies of local governments, but also control more of the economy through state-owned economic activities operated under national economic plans. Thus, they exert great influence on both the *supply* of local government services and the *demand* for such services. Furthermore, in both roles, it is in their interest to coordinate local planning with national planning so as to conserve their limited capital and managerial resources. Finally, because there is almost no city planning of any kind in many underdeveloped countries, no entrenched group of traditional planners exists to impede adoption of the systems analysis approach.

True, one tremendous obstacle in such countries is the acute shortage of trained personnel. But many of these nations are sending at least some young planners to urban planning schools like those at M.I.T. and Berkeley. These schools are incorporating the revolutionary changes I have described into their curricula much faster than local governments are incorporating them into their behavior. Hence the practice of sending foreign planners to American schools may produce a more accelerated revolution in the limited amount of urban planning done in these countries than in this country.

VII. Conclusion

The individual causes of the revolution I have forecast have been at work for some time; so many city planners are aware that significant changes are about to occur in their profession. This awareness is reflected in the comparative ferment and uncertainty recently exhibited in professional planning literature and at this year's meeting of the American Institute of Planners in St. Louis. Naturally, the prospect of such dramatic change is causing a great deal of conflict, uncertainty, insecurity, and even anxiety in the profession—as in many other types of governmental service. Yet for those planners who are willing to look ahead and to adapt themselves to the rapidly altering nature of their profession—in a word, to plan for their own futures—the challenge of "riding out" the revolution and taking advantage of its many opportunities should make the next decade an exciting and rewarding one.

Three Concepts for Planners

Edward C. Banfield

IN THE LAST COUPLE of decades there has been a conspicuous increase in the range and importance of the matters that local (and for that matter other) government officials are expected to decide on grounds that are "nonpolitical" and "in the public interest." This is not the place for me to speculate on the nature of the forces that are tending in this direction or to discuss whether, assuming such a thing to be possible at all, it is on the whole good to have important decisions made "nonpolitically." I start from the assumption that, whether it is good or not, administrative, technical, and professional personnel (as well as a good many elected officials whose outlook is like that of these others or who find it expedient to pretend that it is) will be making ever more decisions on grounds that are technical or allegedly technical. The pressure of this growing professionalism will be toward the adoption of concepts, methods, and modes of thought different from the ones now current in government. In this paper I shall describe briefly three closely related sets of ideas which seem likely to pervade the professionalism of the future and thus to affect deeply the way government is organized and governmental affairs conducted. I am far from asserting that these ideas will ever prevail or even gain wide acceptance outside of professional circles. Professionalism is not, after all, the only force at work in determining the character of government. Nor are all professionals likely to be united on these ideas or any others. I do believe, however, that such influence as professionals have in the future is likely to be largely along the lines I shall describe.

The three sets of concepts, or ideas, relate to (1) the "economizing" approach, which in its more formalized and technical versions is often called "systems analysis"; (2) the theory and practice of decentralization, and (3) conceptions of "welfare" and of the institutional arrangements that will promote it under various circumstances. All three of these matters are relevant to all parts of government. However, I think they are peculiarly relevant to a city planning body.

The Economizing Approach—Systems Analysis

The economizing approach is a decision-making procedure which starts from the premise that nothing is free—that any gain in terms of some ends always involves a loss in terms of others. Starting from this premise, the decision-maker is on the alert to search out and measure as accurately as he can both the losses and the gains that will follow from actions that he may take. He tries to identify the course of action that will yield the largest net gain.

This may appear to be the obvious way to approach a problem. It is not, however, the way in which problems are usually approached in government. The usual procedure, sometimes called the "requirements" approach, is to lay out a course of action that is expected to lead to the attainment of the end or ends sought and then to present in the form of a budget request an itemized list of the means ("requirements") that are needed. There would be nothing the matter with this approach if resources were unlimited. Since they are not unlimited, it is wasteful. It is not enough to achieve the end or ends that are sought. The real problem is to achieve them with a minimum use of resources or, depending on the situation, to use a fixed stock of resources so as to maximize the attainment of the ends.

This is what the economizing approach does. Instead of proposing one course of action which will "achieve the end" it studies a variety of courses of action to find the one that will achieve it "most efficiently." If, for example, the end is to increase the city's water supply by a certain number of gallons, the requirements approach would imply a proposal (say) to build an additional reservoir. The economizing approach, by contrast, would "cost out" all of the plausible ways of getting the additional water—e.g., repairing leakages in street mains, installing meters to prevent waste, and purifying water from a nearby river—in order to find the one that was cheapest.

Usually different ways of doing something do not yield exactly the same "mix" in terms of the various ends that are sought. This complicates the problem of choice. It is necessary to measure the amounts of the different benefits, as well as costs, that are associated with each course of action. In doing this, the economizer assumes that substitutions (or "trade-offs") may be made among benefits as well as between benefits and costs. (For example, consumers would be willing to trade some amount of dependability in their water supply for some amount of purity; similarly, they would be willing to trade some amount of both dependability and purity for some saving in money cost). The economizer's task, therefore, is to find that combination of benefits and costs which is optimal; it is, in other words, to make such trade-offs as will maximize net benefits. In making his calculations of benefit and costs he must be careful to take into account the effects on third parties as

well as those on the persons primarily involved. If the action will have an incidental ("side") effect on third parties, this must be counted as a benefit or cost even though the persons so affected may be themselves unaware of it or even if the precise individuals affected are unspecifiable (e.g., if they are "the public at large"). Things that appear "free" may not turn out to be so at all when the whole system of relations involved in the action is taken into account. (For example, if we regard only the welfare of the inmates of the city jails, it may be advantageous for the city to employ abler physicians to treat them. But if we remember that paying abler physicians to treat people in jail amounts to paying them not to serve people not in jail—the number of able physicians being limited and their time being fully employed—it is obvious, regarding the system of activity in its entirety, that net benefit may be decreased rather than increased by moving the able physicians from one set of patients to another.) It is characteristic of the economizing approach that it measures benefits and costs in terms of entire systems of relations, hence the term "systems analysis."[1]

As a further illustration of the difference between the requirements and the economizing approaches, consider how a school superintendent might act if his budget were raised to permit him to improve the education of his pupils. If he adopted the requirements approach, he would (let us say) hire more teachers because he knows that a higher ratio of teachers to children improves teaching. On the other hand, if he adopted the economizing or systems analysis approach, he would break the end "to improve education" into component ends (e.g., to improve the reading ability of handicapped children, to improve the math of college-bound ones, etc.) and then decide the terms on which he would trade off a marginal unit of benefit in terms of one end for a marginal unit of benefit in terms of another. At the same time he would be examining all the plausible ways of achieving the various ends that he seeks. He would carry on research to find out the marginal rate of return (in terms of his various ends) of investment in (say): (1) additional teachers, (2) raising teachers' salaries, (3) employing television and "teaching machines," and (4) buying additional laboratory equipment. He would take into account as benefits and costs any side effects that could be anticipated (e.g., the influence this or that action might have on the morale of the parents of handicapped children). In the end he might well conclude that no course of action was best by all relevant criteria (in this case he would have to toss a coin or make a "political" decision). In reaching this conclusion, however, he would probably have discarded some highly plausible courses of action on the grounds that they were worse than others by *all* relevant criteria. This

1. See Roland McKean, *Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis*, Wiley, 1958; also, J. A. Kershaw and R. N. McKean, "Systems Analysis and Education," RAND Corporation monograph RM-2473-FF (1959).

in itself would have prevented him from making the most serious errors.

As the influence of professionalism increases in local government I should expect to see the economizing mode of thought more generally employed. I should expect, also, to see specialized systems analysis units created within police departments, water departments, boards of education, port authorities, and all the rest. City planning departments may be expected to facilitate this development, perhaps by establishing training schools to which operating departments and agencies can send their personnel for instruction in the techniques of systems analysis or by maintaining pools of analysts from which the departments and agencies may draw consultants. The city planning department's main function, however, will be the analysis of systems that cut across departmental and agency lines or transcend them all. The question of how to make a city more beautiful, for example, is not one that architects and physical planners, using the requirements approach, can best answer; it is one which calls for comparison of a very wide assortment of means, each with its own distribution of benefits and costs.

Decentralization

Another impetus of professionalism will be toward decentralization of administration. The search for efficiency is bound to lead in this direction. I am not asserting that local, state, and federal jurisdictions will shrink; they will doubtless be enlarged. But within the jurisdictions the distribution of decision-making will move to lower levels. The tendency of professionalism will be to economize on executive judgment and on the assembly of information of the kind relevant to judgment, both of which are expensive, and to make the most of the principle of specialization and division of labor.

The general theoretical principle that will be employed is that of "suboptimization."[2] According to this, problems that are independent of each other (or as nearly so as possible) are identified and an organization set up to solve each one. The managers of these separate organizations have a stock of resources assigned to them by a central budget-maker and are told to do the best they can within this constraint. If they have been provided with a complete set of criteria of choice to start with and if their operations do not interact (i.e., impose costs or benefits on each other as side effects), the managers by maximizing the attainment of their separate outputs also maximize the total output. Where interactions appear or criteria of choice are lacking, a coordinator adjusts matters from "above" so as to assure the maximization of total output. He may do this by reallocating budget amounts (if organization

2. See A. C. Enthoven and H. S. Rowan, "Defense Planning and Organization," in ed.? *Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1961, esp. 394–405.

A is conferring benefits on organization B, the budget allocation to B may have to be reduced in order to maximize total output) or by changing the design of the operations. Each manager, of course, "factors out" independent subproblems and creates suborganizations under sub-managers who are instructed to suboptimize. The manager's task is to make a correct initial budget allocation and then to function as a coordinator to the extent required.

This schema has been applied to the city planning function by Professor Allison Dunham.[3] He believes that operating departments should be left free to decide matters like the size and location of parks and the width of streets. Assuming that the initial budget allocation is correct and that adequate criteria of choice have been given to the departments, there is reason to believe that their decisions will be better than any that could be made for them from above. The task of the central planning body, according to Dunham, is to keep track of the side effects that the departmental operations give rise to—that is, to identify and measure the costs and benefits that are incidentally being imposed on other departments and on third parties of all sorts. The central planning body, in other words, is a coordinator, whose task is to so arrange the situation that the managers (operating departments, business firms, etc.) in maximizing their separate outputs will also maximize total output ("the public interest"). To say the same thing in other terms, it is engaged in systems analysis where the "system" is a constellation of subsystems.

Dunham's account of how the city planning body ought to function may be taken as a paradigm of the proper functioning of managerial bodies at every level, local, state, and federal. For example, the hundreds of local governmental units within a large metropolitan area may be thought of as suboptimizing. The task of a coordinator is to distribute resources among them properly (e.g., by grants in aid) and to make adjustments in the design of their operations (e.g., by giving or withholding permission to discharge wastes into a river used by more than one city) so that when the benefits and costs accruing throughout the governmental system are fully taken into account the net output will be at a maximum. The redesign of operations might often involve changing municipal or other boundaries so as to reduce or eliminate the imposing of costs by some units on others; the coordinator would consider, for example, what costs are imposed upon the people of the central city by the zoning practices of the suburbs. Where serious interdependencies were found to exist the coordinator would consolidate the interdependent units, for where constant appeal must be made to a higher authority the higher authority may as well dispense with managers and run the interdependent operations directly.

3. Allison Dunham, "City Planning: An Analysis of the Content of the Master Plan," *Journal of Law and Economics* Vol. I (Oct. 1958).

Whereas in the past the tendency has been to deal with problems by setting up organizations to build physical structures and to exert direct, consciously felt control over the behavior of large numbers of people, in the future it will be to deal with them by arranging the situation so that individuals, in seeking to maximize the attainment of their own ends, do not impose so many costs upon each other. One of the simplest ways of relieving downtown traffic congestion would be to stagger working hours, for the problem is almost entirely one of peak loads. When it arranges work hours so as to reduce peak loads a planning agency designs the operations of a large set of "organizations" (in this instance, persons who travel) so that the "manager" of each (the traveler) can be left to maximize the attainment of his organization's ends (to go his own way) without any instructions from a coordinator and without imposing unacceptable costs (congestion) on others.

Welfare

Officials who must make decisions on grounds that are not political must find some way of deciding whose ends and which ends should be served. Is there a "public interest" in the situation? If so, what is its content? Or is the problem, perhaps, to serve the preferences of the individual citizen-consumer as he himself defines them? If it is this, how is the official to get accurate knowledge of these preferences? And when the preferences of different persons are incompatible, as they normally are, how is he to decide whose preferences are to prevail or on what terms a compromise is to be made?

Probably the normal thing in such situations is for officials to "decide" without "choosing." They are likely to continue more or less habitually in whatever direction they were pointed by the political forces that were operating at some earlier time. In other words, if an agency does not receive continuing political direction its course of action tends to be an extrapolation from the past, although perhaps one that is "bent" by the (nonpolitical) necessities of organizational maintenance. For example, a municipal zoo established a century or so ago when the city was run by a Protestant elite that was entranced with natural history (almost the only science then existing) and with the bizarre animals of the newly opening continents and that wanted to stimulate the poor immigrant masses to self-improvement continues today along very much the same lines although natural history is no longer regarded as a suitable introduction to science and the poor would rather go to baseball games or watch TV.

Very often officials evade the problem of deciding whose ends and what ends should be served by falling back on "standards" that are promulgated by some authoritative professional body. Libraries, parks,

hospitals, and police and fire departments, for example, may discover from the publications of a national association what is deemed an adequate level of service for a city the size of theirs. Needless to say, no such association can possibly decide by looking at one item alone (e.g., libraries, apart from hospitals, police departments, and all the rest) what allocation will maximize the attainment of "public purposes" or, if these be the relevant quantity, consumer tastes. All such standards are based on premises (hidden, of course) that are in some sense political. The enthusiasm of the specialist for his speciality is one ingredient of such standards; his awareness of the limits of what the public will stand for is another.

The impetus of professionalism, I believe, is away from institutional habit and from standards and toward taking the satisfaction of the citizen-consumer as the ultimate goal of policy, i.e., as "welfare." This implies a new respect for the competitive market and for private as against public enterprise. If the only object is to give people what they prefer, by all odds the best way to go about it is to let the zoo compete on an equal basis with the circus, Disneyland, TV, opera, the supermarket, and all else. If this is the way things are to be done, there is no advantage—in fact a good deal of disadvantage—in keeping the zoo a public institution.

The individualistic conception of welfare does not, however, imply the complete dismantling of government. The demand for certain goods and services must be set by the government. One category includes goods and services (e.g., air pollution control) which by their nature cannot be sold to individuals. Another category includes goods and services which, because of the benefits and costs their consumption confers on third parties, must in order to maximize total welfare be consumed in greater quantity (e.g., education) or in lesser quantity (e.g., narcotics) than individuals, taking account only of themselves, would consume them. In other words, with regard to the first category decentralization is impossible and with regard to the second its operation must be regulated by a coordinator.

That the government must fix the demand in such cases does not mean that it must also organize the production and distribution of the goods or services in question, however. In principle, at least, it is possible for most of that to be done under private auspices (i.e., to be decentralized). The Defense Department sets the demand for missiles but it does not manufacture them itself. Similarly, a public school system sets the demand for textbooks, but it does not write them or manufacture them.

The tendency of professionalism will be to divest the government of activities which can be carried on as well or better under private auspices (i.e., with respect to which the government need neither set the demand nor organize production and distribution). This is a much

wider range of activities than one might think. (If the public school board need not write or manufacture textbooks, why must it do the teaching?)

Where for one reason or another the government does organize the production and distribution of a good or service, the impetus of professionalism will be toward employing the price mechanism and market-like devices to the greatest extent feasible. User-charges will be favored by professionals not so much on grounds of equity (although as a general rule there is something to be said for making those who receive the benefits bear the costs) as because such changes afford a means of giving people what they really want. The amount that people are willing to pay to enter a zoo, for example, would indicate to the manager whether its facilities should be expanded or contracted. In effect, user-charges are a device for rationing scarce resources in accordance with people's preferences. If the subway is overloaded at peak hours the price of a ride at the peak hour should be raised; those who could as well travel at another time would then have an incentive to do so. Similarly, if there is a shortage of water, the price of it should be raised to eliminate such use of it as is of little or no value to anyone.

To the extent that this view of welfare prevails, we may expect government agencies in general and city planning bodies in particular to become more and more occupied with the following functions: (1) setting the demand for those goods and services which cannot be, or should not be, left to individual choice; where it is asserted that a higher (or lower) level of consumption of a particular commodity (e.g., zoos or public libraries) would confer benefits (or costs) on third parties, the special task of the agency will be to identify and measure the alleged benefits (or costs) and by the methods of systems analysis to establish how they may be secured at least cost; (2) creating and maintaining "rules of the game" and institutional arrangements (e.g., a competitive market or a para-market of some kind) which would tend to give citizen-consumers as wide a range of choices as possible; this would imply government efforts to stimulate the private market to offer needed goods and services; it would also imply "rigging the market" to secure side effect benefits for third parties and to prevent the imposition of side effect costs on third parties; and (3) maintaining a correct (which is not necessarily an equal) income distribution so that in the operation of the price mechanism the preferences of the relatively well-off will not be overweighted in comparison with those of the poor.

VIII

The Formation of Policy

THIS last section deals with the process of policy formation and with the concrete content of policy in several fields of particular interest. The readings have been chosen for what they tell about the matrix out of which policy emerges (especially the "givens" that constrain policy-makers, the interests and groups that shape policy, the nature of the interaction among these interests and groups, and the terms on which differences of interest are adjusted or balanced) and about the major alternatives that are open to decision-makers—not only politicians and administrators, but also ordinary citizens.

The first reading of this section, Harold Kaplan's account of Metro Toronto, deals with a policy formation process that goes on at two levels. At the substantive level decisions are made about transportation, water supply, sewage disposal, revenue collection, and so on; at another level, which with some risk of confusion will be called the constitutional, decisions are made about the process of (substantive) decision-making; and between the two levels, substantive and constitutional, there is interaction, one kind of decision influencing the other. Since Kaplan is writing about policy formation in the *Canadian* political system, his article is particularly useful here because it points by implication to what is different and special in the American system as revealed in the other readings. It is a constitutional question in the

American context that Robert H. Salisbury discusses in the next reading. The public schools, he points out, have always had a high degree of formal autonomy and most people have felt that they should be kept "out of politics." This has left the schools without much support in state and national capitals and naked against community pressures. On the whole it might be better, he thinks, if the schools were under a greater degree of control by the mayor. But he adds that the justification for any solution to the problem cannot be found in its effect upon education considered apart from the other issues and problems of the metropolis. In other words, the proper policy formation process for education is the one that will contribute most to the solution of the whole complex of urban problems. The public library, according to Edward C. Banfield, is the product of a policy formation process which proceeds on assumptions that badly need to be reexamined. The goals of the library may have been appropriate in the last century and the early part of the present one, he argues, but conditions have changed in ways that make them inappropriate now. His discussion of the library illustrates the application of principles of policy-making developed by economists in the field of public finance. In the next reading, James Q. Wilson looks at the administrator's contribution to the policy formation process. The police administrator (chief, superintendent, commissioner, captain) like the administrator of most public agencies, has no satisfactory way of assessing the effectiveness of his organization's performance; lack of information both about what the organization is achieving and about what it would achieve if it did things differently is a principal constraint on the administrator as policy-maker. Another is the difficulty, amounting often to an impossibility, of laying down general rules adequate to guide a patrolman in dealing with particular cases. The nature of the patrolman's task, Wilson says, necessitates his being a policy-maker too. In the next reading, Richard A. Cloward, a sociologist, and Frances Fox Piven, a political scientist, write about another bureaucrat who exercises a great deal of discretion: the welfare professional. Policy in welfare, they say, is largely made by and for the welfare professionals and their organizations; since it is to their interest to keep the low-income client dependent upon them, government programs for the poor are likely to diminish rather than increase the political vitality of the poor. In the final reading, H. R. Wilde shows to what extent the policy of a city may be formed on the basis of stereotypes reaching it through the mass media. Milwaukee's perception of its 1967 "riot" was, he thinks, formed largely in New York and Washington and conveyed to Milwaukee by the television networks, *The New York Times*, and in general the national arbiters of "good government" and "sound" opinion. The tendency of the new style of city politics, he believes, is to bring the city more publicity, more money, and more bitterness.

Metro Toronto: Forming a Policy-Formation Process

Harold Kaplan

ONE OF THE PROPOSALS often mentioned in discussions of municipal reorganization is the metropolitan federation plan. This scheme attempts to meet the regional problems of a metropolitan area not by consolidating municipal units but by interjecting a regional government between the municipalities and higher levels of government. Variations of this regional federalism have been adopted in the Miami, Nashville, and Winnipeg metropolitan areas. The first of these federations was the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, which has now been in operation for over fifteen years. The Toronto experience, then, should be of interest to those readers concerned with problems of metropolitan reform, particularly those who wish to reach some evaluative conclusion on the idea of metropolitan federation. This essay attempts to summarize some major findings of a study the author recently conducted on the first fourteen years of the Metro Toronto political system.[1] Particular attention will be paid to the reform and policy implications of these findings.

The postwar development of the Toronto metropolitan area followed the usual North American pattern: an aging central city losing population to rapidly growing suburbs; the proliferation of suburban governmental units; and the appearance of serious, region-wide problems, which the municipalities, by themselves, could not solve. A group of the suburban municipalities decided to apply to the province of Ontario for the creation of a joint-service area. The city of Toronto countered with a request to annex most of the inlying suburbs, leaving the newer, relatively uncompleted suburbs outside this expanded city. In 1953, the province rejected both requests in favor of a metropolitan federal system. This plan appealed to provincial politicians because it

1. See Harold Kaplan, *Urban Political Systems. A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). The policy implications of the Toronto experience are suggested in this book but are spelled out more explicitly in the present essay.

of how the many goals we wish to achieve in the city can best be approached. If it turned out that education was not at the head of the list, educators would be compelled to acknowledge that fact in a situation where they had to bargain for their share of the local resources against the direct competition of other programs as well as against the fiscal prudence of the electorate.

Direct competition for local money; subordination of educators to other public officials with other interests and programs; the self-conscious use of the schools as instruments to fight poverty, improve housing conditions, or fight city-suburb separation: these have been virtually unthinkable heresies to devoted schoolmen. Yet, are they much more than an explicit statement of steps and tendencies already being taken or implicit in present practices? I think not; we are already moving this way, to some extent we always have been doing so, and the real question to be faced is: How might we do these things better? A greater measure of local political leadership in education and coordination of the schools with other portions of the community might well contribute to this end.

Some Alternatives for the Public Library

Edward C. Banfield

THE PUBLIC LIBRARY has more users and more money today than ever before, but it lacks a purpose.[1] It is trying to do some things that it probably cannot do, and it is doing others that it probably should not do. At the same time, it is neglecting what may be its real opportunities. What the library needs is, first, a purpose that is both in accord with the realities of present-day city life and implied by some general principles, and, second, a program that is imaginatively designed to carry its purpose into effect.

This paper will begin with a brief look at the principles justifying *public* action. (Why should a public body distribute reading matter and not, say, shoes?) In the light of these principles, it will then consider what the public library has been, what it is now, and what it ought to be.

Some General Principles

Economists offer several justifications for governmental intervention to set the demand for a commodity or good (in this case library service).[2] One justification exists when the good is of such a nature that it cannot be supplied to some consumers without at the same time being supplied to all—examples are national defense and air pollution

1. For evidence see the report of the eighty-fourth annual conference of the American Library Association, *New York Times*, July 4, 1966, p. 40. The theme of the conference was "Libraries for a Great Society" and the president of the association announced that an inventory of public and school library needs made by the U.S. Office of Education and the association revealed that $3.1 billion would have to be spent to bring the nation's libraries to the level of "adequacy" and operating budgets would have to be raised $1.2 billion a year to keep them there. "These are enormous figures, of course," he said, "but our wealthy nation can easily contribute all that is called for and then some." With regard to the library's purpose, he seems to have said nothing.

2. *See* Richard Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), Chapter 1.

control; in such cases, it is impossible for the distributor of the good to charge a price for it, since he cannot withhold it from anyone who refuses to pay the price. Therefore (apart from philanthropists) only the government, which through its tax power can coerce everyone into paying, is in a position to offer the service. Clearly this justification has no application to libraries.

Another justification—and one which presumably *does* apply to the library—exists when the public will benefit in some way if the consumer consumes more (or less) of the good than he would if the government did not concern itself in the matter. If my consumption of a good —my immunizing myself against disease or my sending my children to school, for example—confers benefits of some kind upon the community at large, the government ought, in the community's interest if not in mine, to see to it that I consume a proper amount of it. In order to encourage consumption of such "merit goods" (to use an economist's term), the government may employ subsidies.

That consumption of certain goods confers benefits upon the community does not automatically justify government subsidies, however. No doubt it is a good thing from a public standpoint that I eat well, have a safe roof over my head, and go to the doctor when I am sick. But if I am compos mentis and not indigent the chances are that I will look after these matters without any encouragement from the government. The public does not have to pay me to eat; I will do so both because I must in order to stay alive and because I enjoy eating.

Public intervention to set the demand does not necessarily involve public production or distribution of the good. The school board sets the demand for school books, but it does not hire authors to write them and it does not operate its own printing press. The Air Force sets the demand for planes but it does not manufacture them.

By the same token, that a good is produced or distributed under public auspices does not imply the necessity of a public subsidy for the people who consume it. The function of the government may in some instances be merely to make up for a deficiency in the private market by offering consumers a good which from the standpoint of the community they ought to have and which for some reason no private enterprise offers. If no one saw fit to go into the shoe business, the government would have to. But if it went into the shoe business it would not have to give shoes away, or sell them for less than the cost of manufacture.

The Nineteenth-Century Purpose

Let us now look at the public library of the past in the light of these principles. In the very beginning, libraries were private associations for the joint use of a facility that was too expensive for any but

the well-off to own individually. Some state legislatures conferred on the associations certain corporate powers, including the power to tax their members provided that a two-thirds majority concurred. They did this on the grounds that benefits to the community at large would ensue—i.e., that library service satisfied a "merit want." "These libraries," Franklin remarks in his autobiography, "have improved the general conversation of Americans, made the common tradesmen and farmers as intelligent as most gentlemen from other countries, and perhaps have contributed in some degree to the stand so generally made throughout the colonies in defense of their privileges." Early in the nineteenth century charitable societies were formed in the larger cities "to furnish wholesome religious, moral, and improving reading of all kinds to the poor, cheaper than they now get fanatical or depraved reading." There were complaints that the books circulated were not improving enough (a director of the Astor Library in New York wrote that "the young fry . . . employ all the hours they are out of school in reading the trashy, as Scott, Cooper, Dickens, Punch, and the 'Illustrated News'") to which the reply was made that "if people will not come to your library you may as well establish none." No one, however, would have justified a charitable library on the grounds that it provided entertainment.[3]

Later on the corporations thus created were made public and were supported in part by taxation of the whole public. This was about the middle of the last century, when bright and ambitious farm boys who had mastered the 3 R's but not much else were flocking to the cities to seek their fortunes. "Mechanics libraries" were established to afford these Alger characters opportunities to pick up by home study the small amount of technical knowledge that then existed. Such libraries were not supported in full by the public—philanthropists provided most of the support—but they were tax exempt and they enjoyed other advantages. There were good reasons for giving them these advantages: anything that encouraged self-improvement on the part of the "respectable poor" tended to increase the productivity and wealth of the community. Besides, to the Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite that ran the cities, self-improvement appeared good in and of itself.

It was not until near the turn of the century, however, that most sizable cities had public libraries in the present-day sense. There was no doubt about the public purpose of these libraries. They were to facilitate the assimilation of European immigrants to the urban, middle-class, American style of life.

The immigrants—many of them—were highly receptive to what the library offered. They came—many of them—from cultures that respected books and learning; with few exceptions they were eager to learn the language and customs of their new country and to get ahead

3. David B. Tyack, *George Tichnor and the Boston Brahmins* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 208–211.

in a material way. There was, accordingly, a high degree of harmony between the public purposes being sought through the library and the motives and aspirations of its potential clientele.

Times Have Changed

Today the situation is entirely different. The Horatio Alger characters and the immigrants have long since passed from the scene. There are, to be sure, more poor people in the large cities than ever (they are not as poor in absolute terms, however, and they constitute a smaller proportion of the metropolitan area's population), and the movement of the poor from backward rural areas of the South and Puerto Rico is likely to continue for some time to come. The present-day poor, however, represent a new and different problem. Their poverty consists not so much of a lack of income (although they lack that) as of a lack of the cultural standards and of the motivations, including the desire for self-improvement and for "getting ahead," that would make them more productive and hence better-paid. "The culturally deprived of today's cities are not on the bottom of a ladder; they do not even know that one exists," the editor of a bulletin for librarians has written in an article extremely apposite to the present discussion.[4] Many of the poor are "functionally illiterate," some though they have gone to, or even graduated from, high school. Giving them access to books will not accomplish anything.

Assimilating the lower class into the working and the middle classes may be a public purpose of the highest urgency. (Some people, of course, assert that lower class values—certain of them, at any rate—are as worthy of respect as any others.) But however compelling the case for assimilation is thought to be, the question has to be faced whether the library is a fit instrument for the purpose.

Certainly no one believes that the library is now of any service to the lower class. By and large, libraries are of the middle class and for the middle class. With rare exceptions, librarians have the wrong skin color, the wrong style of dress and make-up, the wrong manner of speech, and the wrong values (among other things, they think that people should be quiet in the library!) to be acceptable to the lower class. The feeling is mutual, moreover, for most librarians are probably no freer of class and race prejudice than are other middle-class whites. The consequence is that the lower class is repelled by the library, or would be if it ever got near it.

A few library boards have tried to change this, but without much

4. Kathleen Molz, "The Public Library: The People's University?" *The American Scholar*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 1964–1965), p. 100. The writer wishes to express his appreciation of Miss Molz' criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.

success. Some will say that their methods have not been sufficiently ingenious: they should establish store-front libraries and staff them with lower-class librarians, preferably radical ones; they should employ supersalesmen to go from door to door selling cheap reprints, and so on.

If one believes that lower-class adults can be enticed to read, there is much to be said for making this a primary purpose of the library and for trying any approach that offers the least promise. It may be, however, that the educational level of the lower class is so low and its demoralization so great that no efforts on the part of the library will have much effect. Something much more fundamental than library service may be needed—for example, compulsory nursery school attendance from the age of two or three.

Not being able or willing (or both) to serve the lower class, the public library has tended to make itself an adjunct of the school, especially of the middle-class school. Children have always been an important class of library users, but in recent years they have become the principal clientele of the public library in many places. Children sent by teachers to use books in connection with course assignments crowd some libraries after school hours to such an extent that adult users have to leave. (In certain Los Angeles schools, teachers require each pupil to borrow at least one book a week from the public library!) Here and there libraries have been forced by the sheer weight of the children's numbers to place limits on service to them.

One reason for this invasion is that, thanks to the "baby boom" of a few years ago (which, of course, is still continuing), there are more children than ever. Another is that the schools do not have adequate libraries of their own. (Two-thirds of all elementary schools have *no* central library, and those with central libraries have only five books per pupil in them on the average.) Still another reason is that it has become fashionable among teachers to require "research" papers (in some places third-graders swarm into the public library to do "research") and to assign, not a single textbook, but a list of readings, some in very short supply, selected by the teacher from a variety of sources.

Public libraries were not designed for large numbers of children and are usually not staffed to handle them. The wear and tear on books, librarians, and innocent bystanders is therefore very great. In Brooklyn, it was recently reported, book losses—not all of them caused by children—run to 10 per cent of the library budget. In some places rowdyism is a serious problem.

In fairness to both the children and the adults, the schools ought to have adequate libraries of their own; presumably they will have them if the aid-to-education legislation now pending in Congress is passed. Children should not be excluded from public libraries, however —it is a good thing for them to go now and then to a place the atmosphere of which is decidedly adult—but they should not be sent there

to do assignments; they should go to the public library on their own initiative to find books that please them and in the expectation of entering a world that is not juvenile.

The Light Reader

Apart from school children, the most numerous class of library users consists of light readers, especially middle-class housewives. The books these readers borrow are not *all* light, of course, and even the ones that are light are not the very lightest; public librarians do not buy out-and-out trash. Nevertheless, a considerable part of the circulation is of romantic novels, westerns, detective stories, and books on how to repair leaky faucets, take off excess fat, and make money playing the stock market. About two-thirds of the books public libraries lend to adults are fiction, and most of these are probably light fiction. (Unfortunately, libraries do not use more relevant categories than "fiction" and "nonfiction" in their record keeping.)

It is hard to see how encouraging light reading can be regarded as a public purpose. That the housewife finds it convenient to get her detective story from a public rather than a rental library is certainly not a justification for the public library. Her neighbor, who may not care to borrow books and whose income may be less than hers, will be coerced into paying taxes to support a facility that is for her convenience. Why should he be? Whether she gets to sleep by reading a novel, by watching the late show, or by taking a sleeping pill—indeed, whether she gets to sleep at all—is a matter of indifference to him and to the community at large.

If it could be shown that light reading leads to serious reading, a justification for public action would exist. In the case of uneducated people who are introduced to books by the library, such a showing might possibly be made. But it is highly unlikely that it can be made in the case of the middle-class readers who constitute most of the adult library users. For the most part, light reading leads to nothing except more light reading.

Unless reason can be found for believing that light reading confers some benefit upon the community, the public library should leave the light reader to the rental library, the drugstore, and the supermarket. If for some reason these readers *must* be served by the public library, they should be charged the full cost of the service, including, of course, a fair share of the rental value of the library building and site. Charging the full cost of service would soon put the public library out of the light-reading business, but this would prove to be a benefit even from the standpoint of the light reader. He would find that when the public library stopped competing with rental libraries by giving its service free,

they and other profit-making enterprises (the paperback counters of the drugstore and supermarket, for example) would fill the gap and give him better service than he got before. If there is a demand for thirty copies of *Peyton Place*, the rental library makes haste to put that many on its shelves. The public library, not being under the stimulus of the profit motive and (let us hope) feeling itself under some obligation to serve more important purposes, buys only one or two copies of such a book if it buys any at all. This, of course, accounts for the more than 3,500 rental libraries (not to mention the drugstore and supermarket counters) that are competing successfully with the tax-supported libraries.

The Serious Reader

The proper business of the public library is with the *serious* reader and—assuming that the library cannot be an effective instrument for educating the lower class—with him alone. "Serious" reading is any that improves one's stock of knowledge, enlarges one's horizons, or improves one's values. Reasonable men will disagree as to where the boundary should be drawn between light and serious reading; that does not render the distinction invalid or useless, however, although it will lead to some practical difficulties.

The common-sense assumption is that all serious reading confers some benefit upon the community. This would be hard to demonstrate in a rigorous way (imagine trying to specify the amounts and kinds of benefits conferred upon various sectors of the community by, say, so many man-years of novel reading, so many of historical reading, and so on); but the difficulty, or impossibility, of demonstrating it does not mean that the assumption is wrong.

That an activity confers benefits upon the community does not, however (as was remarked above), constitute a sufficient justification for publicly supporting it. Perhaps those who read serious books would read as many of them if public libraries did not exist. (Indeed, conceivably they might read more of them, for if an existing institution did not stand in the way, a new and more effective one, public or private, might come into existence. Any foreigner who has observed the operation of the government salt and tobacco monopoly in Italy will agree that other and better ways of distributing these commodities are possible. To the Italian who has never been abroad, however, the idea of putting the government out of the salt and tobacco business might seem preposterous. "How then," he might ask, "could one possibly obtain these indispensable articles?") Most serious readers have adequate or more than adequate family incomes; it seems likely that if they had

to pay the full cost of their reading they would not read less. If this is so, there is no reason for the public to subsidize their reading.

The relatively few serious readers who are poor—so poor that to pay for library service would entail a sacrifice of something else that is necessary to an adequate standard of living—present a problem. They would of course be given service at reduced rates or free. This is widely done by colleges, and there is no reason why there should not be "library scholarships" for all who need them. If such an arrangement involved use of an objectionable means test (would it be objectionable to give service free to all families with incomes of less than $5,000 if the user's statement that he belonged to that category were accepted without question?) or if the costs of record keeping were unduly high, the sensible thing would be to make the service—the standard service, not necessarily special services—free to all.

If it is decided that serious reading must be subsidized in order to secure for the community all of the benefits that it wants, it need not follow that the best thing for the library board to do is to own and circulate a collection of books. There may be much better ways of accomplishing the purpose. Perhaps, for example, those who have responsibility for allocating the library fund—let us now call it the "fund to encourage serious reading"—would get a greater return on the investment by inducing the local supermarket to display a big stock of quality paperbacks and to have one-cent sales of them now and then. Or, again, perhaps the fund would best be used to subsidize the rent of a dealer in used books who, because of the ravages of urban renewal or for other reasons, could not otherwise stay in business.

Some Illustrative Ideas

Assuming, however, that such radical innovations are out of the question and that the practical problem is to make some minor changes in the existing institution, what might be done?

Here are a few suggestions.

1. Provide soundproofed cubicles that readers may rent by the week or month and in which they may keep under lock and key books (subject to call, of course), a typewriter (rented, if that is what they want), and manuscripts. Nowadays few people have space at home for a study. Many libraries have reading rooms, but there are no places where one can read, let alone write, in privacy and comfort. (An habitual smoker, for example, cannot read if he is not permitted to smoke.) The New York Public Library at 42nd Street is probably the only public library with cubicles (they are supported by an endowment); there is a long waiting list for them.

2. Offer the services of a "personal shopper" to take orders by

phone and to arrange home deliveries and pickups. Many readers are too busy to go to the library, especially when there is no more than an off-chance that the book they want is in. The personal shopper could also arrange fast interlibrary loans and for the photo-copying of hard-to-get, out-of-print books. (Publishers naturally object to the copying of copyrighted material. But perhaps they could be persuaded to give libraries a general permission to make one copy per library of works that are not available for sale.) A fair number of the larger libraries have had "readers' advisers" ever since WPA days; the advisers' time is usually entirely taken up by children, however; in any case, only handicapped persons are assisted *in absentia*.

3. Buy a large enough stock of *serious* books so that no reader will have to wait more than, say, two weeks for a copy. Bentham's remark about justice can be paraphrased here: "Reading delayed is reading denied."

4. Display prominently, and review in library newsletters, those current books that are not widely reviewed by "middle-brow" journals. Many people suppose that all worthwhile books are listed, if not actually reviewed by the better newspapers and magazines. This is not the case. Scholarly books are ignored as often as not; some of them are unknown to most serious readers. The natural tendency of the library is to make a fuss about the very books that the ordinary reader would be most likely to hear of anyway. It should try instead to make up for the deficiencies of the commercial institutions by calling attention to the less-well-advertised books.

5. Maintain up-to-date, annotated bibliographies of the sort that would help introduce a layman to a specialized field. A physician, let us suppose, wants to know what social science has to say that is relevant to problems of medical organization. What books and journals should he look at first? If the library had a file of reading lists, course outlines, and syllabi used in colleges and universities, together with bibliographical notes and articles from academic journals, he could be assisted to make his way into the subject. A good many of the better libraries have materials of this sort—more materials, probably, than most of their serious readers realize. Even so, there is probably a good deal of room for improvement both in the quality of the materials that are collected and in the methods by which they are made known to library users.

6. Offer tutorial service for readers who want instruction or special assistance. Perhaps the physician would like to discuss his questions with a social scientist. The library might have a social scientist on its staff or it might bring one as a consultant from a nearby college or university. The tutor would be available for an hour's discussion or, at the other extreme, to give a short course.

7. Have a mail-order counter supplied with a directory of all books in print, a list of available government publications, and the catalogues

of some dealers in used and hard-to-find books. A librarian should be on hand to help buyers find what they want. In the many towns and small cities that are without proper bookstores, this kind of service might go a long way toward making up for the lack.

The Library's Failure Is Typical

The library is by no means the only public institution that with passage of time has ceased to serve its original purpose and has not acquired a new one that can be justified on any general principles. Very likely it could be shown: (1) that the professionals most involved, and a fortiori everyone else, have given little serious thought to the nature of the purposes which presumably justify not only public libraries but also public parks, museums, schools, and renewal projects (to mention only a few activities of the sort that are in question): (2) that such purposes as might plausibly be advanced to justify such activities are ill-served, or not served at all, by the activities as presently conducted; (3) that these purposes could usually be better served by the market (rigged perhaps by public authorities) than by public ownership and operation; (4) that in most cases using the market would result in greater consumption of the good and in less waste in the supplying of it (public institutions tend to offer too much of those goods that are in light demand and not enough of those that are in heavy demand); and (5) that certain goods not offered by private institutions are not offered by public ones either, and this even though increased consumption of these goods would confer relatively large benefits upon the community at large.

To find the reasons for this state of affairs, one must look deep into the nature of our institutions and of our political culture. Organizations tend to perpetuate themselves and therefore to embrace whatever opportunities come along, however unrelated these may be to any previously-stated purposes. Public organizations, moreover, often exist as much to symbolize something as to accomplish something. These are only two of many considerations that doubtless should be taken into account.

The Police Administrator as a Policymaker

James Q. Wilson

THE POLICE ADMINISTRATOR—variously called chief, superintendent, commissioner, or captain—has in common with all other executives, especially those of governmental organizations, responsibility for the policies of his agency. In principle, he is supposed to "set policy" and, having set it, to obtain resources (money, manpower, public support) from the community in order to carry it out. Ideally, performing this function requires that the administrator have sufficient knowledge about and control over the rank-and-file members of his organization—especially the patrolmen—so that he can show what the police are doing and how well they are doing it, alter more or less precisely their behavior to accord with such policies as the community may agree to, and evaluate a particular officer's actions in the light of a specific citizen complaint. With respect to some members of his organization, and with respect to some aspects of the work of all members, the administrator does have knowledge and control. He knows, or can find out, whether his officers are tolerating the operation of a brothel and how many traffic tickets they are issuing. But with respect to how well they are preventing crime, catching criminals, and maintaining order, he has very little information.

The police share with most other public agencies—the schools, foreign ministries, anti-poverty organizations—an inability to assess accurately the effectiveness of their operations. Indeed, some writers, such as Anthony Downs, have made the absence of any output which can be priced on a market (or otherwise given an objective, continuous evaluation) a defining characteristic of bureaucracy.[1] However they choose to interpret such measures, automobile dealers know how many cars their salesmen have sold, television producers know what audience ratings their programs have earned, and baseball managers know their

1. Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), Chap. III.